SECOND DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE |
G.R. Nos. 162130-39 |
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Petitioner, |
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- versus - |
Present: PUNO,*
J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,** AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. |
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HON. JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, Chairman,
Fourth Division, Sandiganbayan, and MRS. IMELDA R.
MARCOS, Respondents. |
Promulgated:
May 5, 2006 |
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DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
This
is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction seeking to nullify and set aside the
resolutions issued by public respondent Gregory S. Ong,
Associate Justice and Chairperson of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan, in Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291, 19225
and 22867 to 22870, specifically:
(1) The Resolution[1]
dated
(2) The Resolution[2]
dated
Petitioner
likewise prays that public respondent be permanently enjoined from presiding
over the trial and sitting in judgment in these ten consolidated cases against
private respondent Ms. Imelda R. Marcos for violation of Section 3(h) of
Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act.
At the outset, it must be noted that
the above cases relate intimately to Civil Case No. 0141 (forfeiture case)
arising from the petition for forfeiture filed by the Presidential Commission
on Good Government on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (Republic) to
recover from former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and herein private respondent
(collectively, respondents) funds alleged to be ill-gotten and deposited under
different Swiss bank accounts in the name of several foreign foundations.
The
forfeiture case was heard by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
which, at that time, was composed of Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena as Chairperson with Justice Catalino R. Castañeda and public
respondent as regular members. In the Decision[3]
dated
The
records show that prior to consolidation, the criminal cases were being heard
by the Third and Fourth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan
albeit they were at different stages of proceedings. In contrast to the four
cases[7]
pending with the Fourth Division, trial on the merits had already begun in the
six cases[8] docketed
with the Third Division. In fact, the prosecution had been in the course of
presenting its first witness in the person of Atty. Francisco I. Chavez. It
must be noted that on one occasion, public respondent had the opportunity to
hear part of the testimony of Atty. Chavez[9]
when he was designated to sit as a special member of the Third Division.[10]
As
previously mentioned, and conformably to the Resolution[11]
dated
Petitioner,
acting through Special Prosecutor Wendell E. Barreras-Sulit,
filed a Manifestation and Motion[12]
dated
Nonetheless,
prior to the issuance of the Resolution[14]
dated October 15, 2003 denying petitioner’s manifestation/motion, Prosecutor Sulit personally met with public respondent in the latter’s
office sometime in February 2003, purportedly to explain that the
manifestation/motion which sought that
the cases be assigned to Justice De Castro was not meant to undermine the
capability of the other Justices of the Sandiganbayan
to try the cases but was mainly because of Justice De Castro’s familiarity with
them and also to ensure the smooth flow of proceedings.[15]
According to Prosecutor Sulit, it was at this
juncture that she and Atty. Elissa V. Rosales, the
Fourth Division Clerk of Court whom she requested to accompany her during her
visit, heard public respondent say:
Actually, ayaw ko sa
kasong yan, idi-dismiss ko ‘yan, puro hearsay lang naman ang sinasabi
ni Chavez nong umupo ako minsan
sa trial nyo.[16]
Petitioner
avers that public respondent even confirmed at a later date to Special Prosecutor
Dennis Villa-Ignacio that he issued that statement.[17]
Perceiving
the remark to be prejudicial and revealing a predisposition to dismiss the
criminal cases, petitioner moved for the inhibition of public respondent. Petitioner also contends that public
respondent’s apparent dislike of Atty. Chavez who is a key witness for the
prosecution, taken with
his judicial record[18]
of favoring the Marcoses in the earlier forfeiture
case, bolstered petitioner’s fear that the criminal cases would not be tried
before an impartial tribunal.
The
hostility towards Atty. Chavez was purportedly evidenced by another statement
made by public respondent in open court whereby he expressed displeasure over
the letter[19] he
received from the former requesting for the consolidation of the ten cases at a
time when these cases were still being separately heard by the Third and Fourth
Divisions. Public respondent was likewise alleged to have been overheard as
saying he did not like Atty. Chavez because “mayabang
yan.”[20]
In view of this, petitioner prayed that public respondent voluntarily inhibit
himself from hearing the cases pursuant to Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court.
As
stated above, petitioner’s motion for inhibition was denied in a Resolution[21]
dated October 15, 2003 on the ground that public respondent (1) has not
prejudged the merits of the consolidated criminal cases to favor private
respondent; (2) is not biased against or hostile towards petitioner’s principal
witness, Atty. Chavez; and (3) does not possess a judicial track record of
favoring or promoting the interests of private respondent.
After
the motion for reconsideration of this resolution was denied by public
respondent in a Resolution[22]
dated
Public respondent acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he DENIED PROSECUTOR SULIT’S
MOTION TO INHIBIT HIMSELF FROM TRYING THE CASES DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF CLEAR
SHOWING OF HIS BIAS AND PARTIALITY IN FAVOR OF ACCUSED MRS. MARCOS, HIS
HOSTILITY TOWARDS THE PROSECUTION WITNESS AND HIS DETERMINATION TO DISMISS SAID
CASES OF MRS. MARCOS AS SERIOUSLY UTTERED BY HIM ALLEGEDLY BECAUSE THE
TESTIMONIES OF CHAVEZ ARE PURE HEARSAY.[23]
By
way of response, public respondent, in his Comment[24]
dated
According
to public respondent, Prosecutor Sulit was allowed
entry into his chambers on the day in question only upon her representation
that her visit would be a purely social one. He was thus dismayed to learn that
the actual purpose of Prosecutor Sulit’s visit was
“upon a pending judicial matter, in that she wanted to personally convince
respondent Justice, as Chairman of the Fourth Division, to transfer, assign or
otherwise agree to transfer or assign, the consolidated Imelda R. Marcos cases
directly to the First Division.”[25]
While public respondent purportedly told Prosecutor Sulit
he would not accede to her request to transfer the cases, he also firmly denied
having issued the objectionable statement. In disputing the version given by
petitioner, public respondent cited the contents of the affidavit executed by
Atty. Rosales who disavowed that she was present when the alleged statement was
made by public respondent.
For
her part, private respondent likewise argued for the dismissal of the present
case in her Comment[26]
dated August 20, 2004 on the ground that petitioner “miserably failed to adduce
facts or evidence indicating arbitrariness, bias or prejudice” on the part of
public respondent.
Section
1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rule on inhibition and
disqualification of judges, to wit:
SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or
judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or
otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of
consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed
according to the rules of civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any
inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon
the record.
A judge may, in the
exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case,
for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above. (Emphasis
supplied.)
This rule enumerates the specific grounds
upon which a judge may be disqualified from participating in a trial. It must be borne in mind that the inhibition
of judges is rooted in the Constitution, specifically Article III, the Bill of
Rights, which guarantees that no person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law. Due
process necessarily requires that a hearing is conducted before an impartial
and disinterested tribunal[27] because unquestionably, every litigant
is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. All
the other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be
meaningless if the ultimate decision would come from a partial and biased
judge.[28]
Relevant to the present case is the
second paragraph governing voluntary inhibition. Based on this provision,
judges have been given the exclusive prerogative to recuse
themselves from hearing cases for reasons other than those pertaining to their
pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or
decisions. The issue of voluntary inhibition in this instance becomes primarily
a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.[29]
It is a subjective test the result of which the reviewing tribunal will
generally not disturb in the absence of any manifest finding of arbitrariness
and whimsicality.
This discretion granted to trial judges
takes cognizance of the fact that these judges are in a better position to
determine the issue of voluntary inhibition as they are the ones who directly
deal with the parties-litigants in their courtrooms.[30]
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the authority for voluntary inhibition
does not give judges unlimited discretion to decide whether or not they will
desist from hearing a case.[31] The decision on whether or not judges should
inhibit themselves must be based on their rational and logical assessment of
the circumstances prevailing in the cases brought before them.[32]
Similarly, the right of a party to seek
the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly
free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be
balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression.[33] The movant
must therefore prove the ground of bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial.
The Court now addresses the particulars
of the present case.
The primary evidence relied upon by
petitioner to substantiate its claim that public respondent has prejudged the
criminal cases is the remark attributed to him by Prosecutor Sulit which purportedly showed his predisposition to
dismiss the criminal cases based largely on his characterization of Atty.
Chavez’s testimony as being hearsay. Whether the remark was actually made,
however, is disputed and petitioner may indeed not have adduced evidence to the
degree of certainty required.
Nevertheless, there remain the
declarations made by Prosecutor Sulit and Special
Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio. These
declarations unavoidably cast doubt on public respondent’s impartiality in
deciding these very critical cases before his Court. So while it may not be sufficient as a ground
to compel him to inhibit himself, it should have been considered by him, as any
truly circumspect and prudent person would, as sufficient ground for him to
voluntarily inhibit himself from considering the cases. For judges must be like Caesar’s wife – above
suspicion.
Furthermore, while it is settled
principle that opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings, based on
the evidence presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal
bias or prejudice on the part of the judge,[34] the situation involved in this case
relates to an extrajudicial remark or comment and not one in the course of the
proceedings.
Petitioner’s second contention is that
public respondent has a judicial record favoring private respondent. Normally, bias or partiality cannot be inferred
from the fact that a judge ruled in favor of a party in a previous case. When taken together, however, with an
extrajudicial remark showing bias against a key witness, public respondent
should have voluntarily declined to participate in the cases. For it is essential that the people continue
to trust in the fairness and impartiality of our magistrates, particularly in
sensitive cases with far-reaching consequences.
Public respondent is
reminded of the principle that judges should avoid not just impropriety in their conduct but even the
mere appearance of impropriety[35]
for appearance is an essential manifestation of reality.[36]
In insulating the Bench from unwarranted criticism, thus preserving a democratic
way of life, it is essential that judges be above suspicion.[37]
It bears stressing that the duty of judges is not only to administer justice but also
to conduct themselves in a manner that would avoid any suspicion of
irregularity.[38] This
arises from the avowed duty of members of the bench to promote confidence in
the judicial system. Occupying
as they do an exalted position in the administration of justice, judges must
pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon them. Hence, any act which
would give the appearance of impropriety becomes, of itself, reprehensible.[39]
WHEREFORE,
the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED and public
respondent is DIRECTED to recuse himself from
participating in the Criminal Cases Nos. 17287 to 17291, 19225 and 22867 to
22870 of the Sandiganbayan.
No
costs.
SO
ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On Leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the cases
were assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the cases were assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] Rollo, pp. 67-89.
[2]
[3]
[4] At that time, the Special First Division was composed of the members of the First Division as well as Justice Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Justice Francisco Villaruz, Jr.
[5] Rollo, pp. 213-230.
[6]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154,
[7] Criminal Case Nos. 22867 to 22870.
[8] Criminal Case Nos. 17287 to 17291 and 19225.
[9] Rollo, pp. 267-268.
[10]
Public respondent filled in
for Justice Ricardo M. Ilarde who was unable to
attend the trial or participate in the deliberations of the Third Division on
[11] Rollo, pp. 135-137.
[12]
[13] Justice De Castro was a former member of the Third Division which originally tried six of the ten criminal cases against private respondent.
[14] Rollo, pp.146-147.
[15]
[16] Ibid.
[17]
[18]
In support of this allegation,
petitioner cites the fact that (1) public respondent changed his position in
the forfeiture case and wrote a separate concurring opinion favoring the
respondents; and (2) public respondent concurred in granting private
respondent’s Motion to Travel dated
[19] Rollo, pp. 207-209.
[20]
[21] Rollo, pp. 67-89.
[22]
[23] Rollo, pp. 28-29.
[24]
[25]
[26] Rollo, pp. 265-275.
[27] Gutierrez
v. Santos, G.R. No. L-15824,
[28] Rallos v. Gako, A.M. Nos. RTJ-99-1484 and RTJ-99-1484 (A), March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 324.
[30] Gutang v. CA, 354 Phil. 77 (1998).
[31]
People v. Kho, G.R. No. 139381,
[32] Gacayan v. Pamintuan, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1483,
[33]
Webb v. People, G.R.
No. 127262,
[34] Webb v. People, supra note 33.
[35] San Juan vs. Bagalacsa,
G.R. No. A.M. No. RTJ-97-1395,
[36]
Espiritu v. Jovellanos, A.M.
MTJ-97-1139,
[37]
Concerned Employees of the
RTC of
[38]
Contreras v. Solis,
A.M. No. RTJ-94-1266,
[39] Concerned Employees of the RTC of Dagupan City v. Falloran-Aliposa, supra note 37.