OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. No. 169241
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PENDATUN G. LAJA and
the COURT OF
APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails the May 12,
2005 Resolution[1] of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 00101-MIN which granted respondent Pendatun G. Laja’s prayer for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction conditioned upon the posting of
the requisite bond, as well as the June 24, 2005 Resolution[2]
which issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Office of the
Solicitor General, Mindanao, from enforcing the April 15, 2004 Joint Decision[3]
and the September 27, 2004 Joint Order[4] of
the Office of the Ombudsman, Mindanao, in Case Nos. OMB-M-A-02-306-K and
OMB-M-A-02-312-L. The Joint Decision and
Joint Order of the Office of the Ombudsman,
The
facts of the case are undisputed.
On
November 18, 2002 an administrative complaint for Misconduct and Neglect of
Duty[5]
was filed by the employees of the Provincial Government of Tawi-Tawi
against respondent Laja, in his capacity as
Provincial Treasurer, in connection with the non-remittance of their
contributions to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) for the years
1998 to 2001 which resulted in the denial of their loan applications.
Thereafter, on November 29, 2002, a similar administrative complaint[6]
for Dishonesty, Oppression and Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees, was filed by former employees of the Provincial Government of Tawi-Tawi against said respondent in connection with the
non-remittance of their GSIS contributions which resulted in the deduction of
the corresponding amounts from their retirement benefits. These two cases were
subsequently consolidated and submitted for resolution.
The
Office of the Ombudsman for
WHEREFORE, WITH THE
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds respondent PENDATUN G. LAJA, Provincial Treasurer
of Tawi-Tawi and currently Officer-In-Charge of Office of the Assistant Regional Director of
the Bureau of Local Government Finance-Legaspi City, GUILTY of the administrative charges of
DISHONESTY, NEGLECT OF DUTY and GRAVE
MISCONDUCT pursuant to the Revised Administrative Code and Section 52,
paragraph (A), sub-paragraph (1, 2 and 3) of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. The subject offenses
being all classified as grave, respondent Laja is
consequently meted the penalty of DISMISSAL
FROM SERVICE, with the accessory penalties of perpetual disqualification to
hold public office and cancellation of civil service eligibility, effective
upon the finality of this Decision.
SO
DECREED.[7]
Respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration[8]
which was denied in a Joint Order dated
On
On
Upon
receipt of the petition, the OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion dated May 16,
2005[11]
praying that it be excused from further participation in the case on the ground
that under Section 5, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, it is the private
respondents who are tasked to defend the validity of the proceedings below as
well as the challenged Joint Decision dated April 15, 2004 and Joint Order
dated September 27, 2004.
On
April 4, 2005, counsel for private respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 00101-MIN
filed a Comment[12] praying
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of forum shopping, pointing out
that Laja appealed the Joint Decision to this Court
by way of a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which was denied in a
Resolution dated January 12, 2005 and a motion for reconsideration thereof is
still pending.
Due
to the impending expiration of the 60-day temporary restraining order issued by
the appellate court, Laja filed a Motion To Resolve the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and/or Extend the Lifetime of the Temporary Restraining
Order.[13]
On
Prefatorily,
respondent Laja raises procedural objections on the
propriety of this proceeding pointing out that no motion for reconsideration
was filed by petitioner before elevating its cause to this Court and that the
petition is tardily filed.
Concededly,
the settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is
to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived error
attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances
of the case.[14] The rule is, however, circumscribed by
well-defined exceptions such as where the order is a patent nullity, as where
the court a quo had no jurisdiction; where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court,
or are the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; where there
is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; where petitioner was deprived of
due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; where, in a criminal case,
relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the
trial court is improbable; where the proceedings in the lower court are a
nullity for lack of due process; where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to
object; and where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public
interest is involved.[15]
Furthermore,
as is oft said the provisions of the Rules of Court should be applied with
reason and liberality to promote its objective of securing a just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. Rules of procedure are
used to help secure and not override substantial justice. Thus, the dismissal
of an appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will
result in unfairness.[16]
In
accordance with this policy, appeals tardily filed were allowed by the Court in
a plethora of cases.[17] Prescinding,
therefore, from the foregoing, the technical objections raised by the
respondent will be disregarded by the Court to get at the substantive issues
raised by both parties, consistent with this Court’s inherent power to suspend
the application of procedural rules when warranted, in relation to the dictum
that all controversies should be resolved on their merits.
The
primordial question posed is whether the Court of Appeals may enjoin petitioner
from enforcing its judgment in an administrative case ordering respondent’s
dismissal from the service pending the final resolution of respondent’s appeal
from said verdict before the appellate tribunal.
The
crux of the controversy is the effectivity or
binding effect of the challenged Joint Decision. Petitioner insists that the issuance of the
injunctive writ is improper because respondent does not have a vested right to
hold public office and that decisions imposing administrative sanctions in
administrative disciplinary cases are ‘executory’ pending
appeal. Respondent, on the other hand,
contends that petitioner’s authority and jurisdiction to order his dismissal is
merely ‘recommendatory’ under the Constitution.
On
the question of whether the assailed judgment dismissing respondent Laja from the service is ‘executory’
pending appeal, we held in Lopez v. Court of Appeals[18] that:
[O]nly orders,
directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases
imposing the penalty of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more
than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary shall be final and
unappealable hence, immediately executory. In all other disciplinary cases where the
penalty imposed is other than public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to one month salary, the law
gives the respondent the right to appeal.
In these cases, the order, directive or decision becomes final and executory only after the lapse of the period to appeal if
no appeal is perfected, or after the denial of the appeal from the said order,
directive or decision. It is only then
that execution shall perforce issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties
the right to appeal from its decisions should generally carry with it the stay
of these decisions pending appeal.
Otherwise, the essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.[19]
[Emphasis added]
Thus, the order imposing the penalty
of dismissal from the service of the respondent is not immediately executory. An appeal
timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.[20]
Regarding
respondent Laja’s argument that the Ombudsman’s
administrative decisions are merely ‘recommendatory’, we held in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[21] that the Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely
advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory, thus:
We
note that the proviso above qualifies the “order” “to remove, suspend, denote,
fine, censure, or prosecute” an officer or employee – akin to the questioned
issuances in the case at bar. That the
refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the
Ombudsman to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for
disciplinary action, is a strong indication that the Ombudsman’s
“recommendation” is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
within the bounds of law. This
should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the authority of
the head of office or any officer concerned.
It has long been settled that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate
and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not an
exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense charged. By stating therefore
that the Ombudsman “recommends” the action to be taken against an erring
officer or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and RA 6770 intended
that the implementation of the order be coursed through the proper officer, x x x.[22]
[Emphasis added]
All
told, we sustain the grant of injunctive relief by the appellate court. The order dismissing an employee from the
service, as in this case, is not immediately executory
considering the pendency of the appeal. The Joint
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the challenged Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA.
ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-35. Penned by Associate Justice Romulo V. Borja and concurred in
by Associate Justices Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and Normandie
B. Pizarro.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]Docketed as OMB-M-A-02-306-K.
[6] Docketed as OMB-M-A-02-312-L.
[7] Rollo, p. 79.
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11] Id at 170-172.
[12] Id.at
173-175.
[13]
[14]Estate
of Salvador Serra Serra v.
Heirs of Primitivo Hernaez,
G.R. No. 142913, August 9,
2005, 466 SCRA 120, 127.
[15]Tan
v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 570, 577-578 (1997).
[16]Benguet Corporation v. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No. 155343, September 2, 2005, 469 SCRA 381, 385-386.
[17]See Postigo. v. Philippine
Tuberculosis Society, Inc. G.R. No. 155146, January 24, 2006; Philippine Ports Authority v. Sargasso Construction
and Development Corp., G.R. No. 146478, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 512, 527; Sacdalan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128967,
May 20, 2004, 428 SCRA 586, 597; Development
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 411 Phil. 121, 135
(2001).
[18] 438 Phil. 351 (2002).
[19]
[20] Lapid v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil. 236, 247
(2000).
[21] 465 Phil. 437 (2005).
[22]