FIRST DIVISION
SELEGNA MANAGEMENT G.R. No.
165662
AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; and Spouses Present:
EDGARDO and ZENAIDA
ANGELES, Panganiban, CJ,
Petitioners, Chairman, Ynares-Santiago,
-
versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS Promulgated:
BANK,*
Respondent.
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PANGANIBAN, CJ:
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A |
writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an extrajudicial
foreclosure, only upon a clear showing of a violation of the mortgagor’s
unmistakable right. Unsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process and
prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagee’s unmistakable
right to an extrajudicial foreclosure.
Before us is a Petition for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
The assailed Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
On September 19,
1995, Petitioners Selegna Management and Development Corporation and Spouses
Edgardo and Zenaida Angeles were granted a credit facility in the amount of P70
million by Respondent United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). As security for this credit
facility, petitioners executed real estate mortgages over several parcels of
land located in the cities of Muntinlupa, Las Piñas, Antipolo and Quezon; and
over several condominium units in
The parties
stipulated in their Credit Agreement dated September 19, 1995,[5] that failure to pay “any
availment of the accommodation or interest, or any sum due” shall constitute an
event of default,[6]
which shall consequently allow respondent bank to “declare [as immediately due
and payable] all outstanding availments
of the accommodation together with accrued interest and any other sum payable.” [7]
In need of
further business capital, petitioners obtained from UCPB an increase
in their credit facility.[8] For this purpose, they executed a Promissory Note
for P103,909,710.82, which was to mature on
On
“Gentlemen:
“With
reference to your loan with principal outstanding balance of [P103,909,710.82],
it appears from the records of United Coconut Planters Bank that you failed to
pay interest amortizations amounting to [P14,959,525.10] on the Promissory Note
on its due date,
“x x x x
x x x x x
“Accordingly,
formal demand is hereby made upon you to pay your outstanding obligations in
the total amount of P14,959,525.10, which includes unpaid interest and
penalties as of 21 December 1998 due on the promissory note, eight (8) days
from date hereof.”[10]
Respondent decided to invoke the acceleration provision in
their Credit Agreement. Accordingly,
through counsel, it relayed its move to petitioners on
“Gentlemen:
“x x x x
x x x x x
“It appears from the record of
[UCPB] that you failed to pay the monthly interest due on said obligation since
“Consequently, we hereby inform you
that our client has declared your principal obligation in the amount of [P103,909,710.82],
interest and sums payable under the Credit Agreement/Letter
Agreement/Promissory Note to be immediately due and payable.
“Accordingly,
formal demand is hereby made upon you to please pay within five (5) days from
date hereof or up to January 29, 1999 the principal amount of [P103,909,710.82],
with the interest, penalty and other charges due thereon, which as of January
25, 1999 amounts to [P17,351,478.55].”[11]
Respondent sent
another letter of demand on
In response,
petitioners paid respondent the amount of P10,199,473.96 as partial
payment of the accrued interests.[13] Apparently unsatisfied, UCPB applied for
extrajudicial foreclosure of petitioners’ mortgaged properties.
When petitioners received the Notice of Extra Judicial
Foreclosure Sale on
On
“This is to reply to your letter
dated
“As earlier advised, your account
has been referred to external counsel for appropriate legal action. Demand has also been made for the full
settlement of your account.
“We regret that the Bank is unable
to grant your request unless a definite offer is made for settlement.”[15]
In order to forestall the extrajudicial foreclosure scheduled
for
Judge Josefina G. Salonga,[17] then
executive judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
After due hearing, Judge Pimentel issued an Order dated May
31, 1999, granting a 20-day TRO on the scheduled foreclosure of the Antipolo
properties, on the ground that the Notice of Foreclosure had indicated an
inexistent auction venue.[20] To resolve that issue, respondent filed a
Manifestation[21] that it would withdraw
all its notices relative to the foreclosure of the mortgaged properties, and
that it would re-post or re-publish a new set of notices. Accordingly, in an Order dated
Subsequently, respondent filed new applications for
foreclosure in the cities where the mortgaged properties were located. Undaunted, petitioners filed another Motion
for the Issuance of a TRO/Injunction and a Supplementary Motion for the Issuance
of TRO/Injunction with Motion to Clarify Order of September 6, 1999.[24]
On
“Admitted by defendant witness is
the fact that in all the notices of foreclosure
sale of the properties of the plaintiffs x x x it is stated in each
notice that the property will be sold at public auction to satisfy the mortgage
indebtedness of plaintiffs which as of P131,854,773.98.
“x x x x
x x x x x
“As the court sees it, this is the
problem that should be addressed by the defendant in this case and in the
meantime, the notice of foreclosure sale should be held in abeyance until such
time as these matters are clarified and cleared by the defendants x x x Should
the defendant be able to remedy the situation this court will have no more
alternative but to allow the defendant to proceed to its intended action.
“x x x x
x x x x x
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and
finding compelling reason at this point in time to grant the application for preliminary
injunction, the same is hereby granted upon posting of a preliminary injunction
bond in the amount of P3,500,000.00 duly approved by the court, let a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued.”[27]
The corresponding Writ of Preliminary Injunction[28]
was issued on
Respondent moved for reconsideration. On the other hand, petitioners filed a Motion
to Clarify Order of
On December 29, 2000, Judge Pimentel issued an Order[29]
granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and clarifying his November
26, 1999 Order in this manner:
“There may have been an error in the
Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued dated November 29, 1999 as the same
[appeared to be actually] an extension of the TRO issued by this Court dated 27
October 1999 for another 20 days period. Plaintiff’s seeks to enjoin defendants
for an indefinite period pending trial of the case.
“Be that as it may, the Court
actually did not have any intention of restraining the defendants from
foreclosing plaintiff[s’] property for an indefinite period and during the entire
proceeding of the case x x x.
“x x x x
x x x x x
“What the [c]ourt wanted the
defendants to do was to merely modify the notice of [the] auction sale in order
that the amount of P131,854,773.98 x x x
would not appear to be the value of each property being sold on
auction. x x x.[30]
“WHEREFORE, premises considered and after finding merit on the
arguments raised by herein defendants to be impressed with merit, and having
stated in the Order dated
“1.] To give due course to
defendant[‘]s motion for reconsideration, as the same is hereby GRANTED, however, with reservation that
this Order shall take effect upon after its[] finality[.]”[31]
Consequently, respondent proceeded
with the foreclosure sale of some of the mortgaged properties. On the other hand, petitioners filed an “[O]mnibus
[M]otion [for Reconsideration] and to [S]pecify the [A]pplication of the P92
[M]illion [R]ealized from the [F]oreclosure [S]ale x x x.”[32] Before this Omnibus Motion could be resolved,
Judge Pimentel inhibited himself from hearing the case.[33]
The case was then re-raffled to
Branch 58 of the RTC of Makati City, presided by Judge Escolastico U. Cruz.[34] The proceedings before him were, however, all
nullified by the Supreme Court in its En Banc Resolution dated
The case was re-raffled to the
pairing judge of Branch 58, Winlove M. Dumayas. On
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Motion to Reconsider the Order dated December 29, 2000 is hereby granted and
the Order of November 26, 1999 granting the preliminary injunction is reinstated
subject however to the condition that all properties of plaintiffs which were
extrajudicially foreclosed though public bidding are subject to an
accounting. [A]nd for this purpose
defendant bank is hereby given fifteen (15) days from notice hereof to render
an accounting on the proceeds realized from the foreclosure of plaintiffs’
mortgaged properties located in Antipolo,
The aggrieved respondent filed before
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, seeking the nullification of
the RTC Order dated
The Special Fifteenth Division,
speaking through Justice Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, affirmed the ruling of Judge
Dumayas. It held that petitioners had a
clear right to an injunction, based on the fact that respondent had kept them
in the dark as to how and why their principal obligation had ballooned to
almost P132 million. The CA held that respondent’s refusal to give them
a detailed accounting had prevented the determination of the maturity of the
obligation and precluded the possibility of a foreclosure of the mortgaged
properties. Moreover, their payment of P10
million had the effect of updating, and thereby averting the maturity of, the
outstanding obligation.[39]
Respondent filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was granted by a Special Division of Five of the Former
Special Fifteenth Division.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Citing China Banking
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[40] the appellate court held in its Amended
Decision[41]
that the foreclosure proceedings should not be enjoined in the light of the clear
failure of petitioners to meet their obligations upon maturity.[42]
Also citing Zulueta v. Reyes,[43] the CA, through Justice Jose Catral
Mendoza, went on to say that a pending question on accounting did not warrant
an injunction on the foreclosure.
Parenthetically, the CA added that petitioners were not without
recourse or protection. Further, it
noted their pending action for annulment of interest, damages and
accounting. It likewise said that they
could protect themselves by causing the annotation of lis pendens on the titles
of the mortgaged or foreclosed properties.
In his Separate Concurring Opinion,[44]
Justice Magdangal M. de Leon added that a prior accounting was not essential to
extrajudicial foreclosure. He cited Abaca Corporation v. Garcia,[45]
which had ruled that Act No. 3135 did not require mortgaged properties to be
sold by lot or by only as much as would cover just the obligation. Thus, he concluded that a request for
accounting -- for the purpose of determining whether the proceeds of the auction
would suffice to cover the indebtedness -- would not justify an injunction on
the foreclosure.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
Hence, this Petition.[47]
Issues
Petitioners raise the
following issues for our consideration:
“I
“Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals denied the
petitioners of due process.
“II
“Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals supported its
Amended Decision by invoking jurisprudence not applicable and completely
identical with the instant case.
“III
“Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals failed to
establish its finding that RTC Judge Winlove Dumayas has acted with grave abuse
of discretion.”[48]
The resolution of this case hinges on two issues: 1)
whether petitioners are in default; and 2) whether there is basis for
preliminarily enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure. The other issues raised will be dealt with in
the resolution of these two main questions.
The Court’s
Ruling
The Petition has no
merit.
First Issue:
Default
The resolution of the present controversy necessarily begins with a
determination of respondent’s right to foreclose the mortgaged properties
extrajudicially.
It is a settled rule of law that foreclosure is proper when the
debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation. In fact, the parties stipulated in their
credit agreements, mortgage contracts and promissory notes that respondent was
authorized to foreclose on the mortgages, in case of a default by
petitioners. That this authority was
granted is not disputed.
Mora solvendi, or debtor’s default, is defined as a delay[49]
in the fulfillment of an obligation, by reason of a cause imputable to the
debtor.[50]
There are three requisites necessary for a finding of default. First, the
obligation is demandable and liquidated; second, the debtor delays performance; third, the creditor judicially or extrajudicially requires the
debtor’s performance.[51]
Mortgagors’ Default of
Monthly Interest Amortizations
In the present case, the Promissory Note executed on
“Section 8.01. Events
of Default. Each of the following
events and occurrences shall constitute an Event of Default of this AGREEMENT:
“1. The CLIENT shall fail to pay, when due, any
availment of the Accommodation or interest, or any other sum due thereunder in
accordance with the terms thereof;
“x x x x
x x x x x”
“Section 8.02. Consequences
of Default. (a) If an Event of
Default shall occur and be continuing, the Bank may:
“1. By written notice to the CLIENT, declare all
outstanding availments of the Accommodation together with accrued interest and
any other sum payable hereunder to be immediately
due and payable without presentment, demand or notice of any kind, other
than the notice specifically required by this Section, all of which are
expressly waived by the CLIENT[.]”[53]
Considering that the contract is the law between the parties,[54]
respondent is justified in invoking the acceleration clause declaring the
entire obligation immediately due and payable.[55] That clause obliged petitioners to pay the
entire loan on
Petitioners’ failure
to pay on that date set into effect Article IX of the Real Estate Mortgage,[57] worded
thus:
“If, at any time, an event of default as defined in the
credit agreements, promissory notes and other related loan documents referred
to in paragraph 5 of ARTICLE I hereof (sic), or the MORTGAGOR and/or DEBTOR
shall fail or refuse to pay the
SECURED OBLIGATIONS, or any of the amortization of such indebtedness when due,
or to comply any (sic) of the conditions and stipulations herein agreed, x x x
then all the obligations of the MORTGAGOR secured by this MORTGAGE and all the
amortizations thereof shall immediately
become due, payable and defaulted and the MORTGAGEE may immediately foreclose
this MORTGAGE judicially in accordance with the Rules of Court, or
extrajudicially in accordance with Act No. 3135, as amended, and Presidential
Decree No. 385. For the purpose of
extrajudicial foreclosure, the MORTGAGOR hereby appoints the MORTGAGEE
his/her/its attorney-in-fact to sell the property mortgaged under Act No. 3135,
as amended, to sign all documents and perform
any act requisite and necessary to accomplish said purpose and to appoint its
substitutes as such attorney-in-fact with the same powers as above specified. x
x x[.]”[58]
The foregoing discussion
satisfactorily shows that UCPB had every right to apply for extrajudicial
foreclosure on the basis of petitioners’ undisputed and continuing default.
Petitioners’ Debt Considered Liquidated Despite the
Alleged
Lack of Accounting
Petitioners do not even attempt to
deny the aforementioned matters. They
assert, though, that they have a right to a detailed accounting before they can be declared in default. As regards the three requisites of default, they
say that the first requisite -- liquidated debt -- is absent. Continuing with foreclosure on the basis of
an unliquidated obligation allegedly violates their right to due process. They also maintain that their partial payment
of P10 million averted the maturity of their obligation.[59]
On the other hand, respondent asserts that
questions regarding the running balance of the obligation of petitioners are
not valid reasons for restraining the foreclosure. Nevertheless, it maintains that it has
furnished them a detailed monthly statement of account.
A debt is liquidated
when the amount is known or is determinable by inspection of the terms and
conditions of the relevant promissory notes and related documentation.[60] Failure to furnish a debtor a detailed statement of
account does not ipso facto result
in an unliquidated obligation.
Petitioners executed a Promissory Note, in which they stated that
their principal obligation was in the amount of P103,909,710.82, subject
to an interest rate of 21.75 percent per annum.[61] Pursuant to the parties’ Credit Agreement,
petitioners likewise know that any delay in the payment of the principal
obligation will subject them to a penalty charge of one percent per month,
computed from the due date until the obligation is paid in full.[62]
It is in fact clear from the agreement of the parties that when the
payment is accelerated due to an event of default, the penalty charge shall be
based on the total principal amount outstanding, to be computed from the date
of acceleration until the obligation is paid in full.[63] Their Credit Agreement even provides for the
application of payments.[64] It appears from the agreements that the
amount of total obligation is known or, at the very least, determinable.
Moreover, when they made their partial payment, petitioners did not
question the principal, interest or penalties demanded from them. They only sought additional time to update
their interest payments or to negotiate a possible restructuring of their
account.[65] Hence, there is no basis for their allegation
that a statement of account was necessary for them to know their
obligation. We cannot impair
respondent’s right to foreclose the properties on the basis of their
unsubstantiated allegation of a violation of due process.
In Spouses Estares v. CA,[66]
we did not find any justification to grant a preliminary injunction, even when
the mortgagors were disputing the amount being sought from them. We held in
that case that “[u]pon the nonpayment of the loan, which was secured by the
mortgage, the mortgaged property is properly subject to a foreclosure sale.”[67]
Compared with Estares, the
denial of injunctive relief in this case is even more imperative, because the
present petitioners do not even assail the amounts due from them. Neither do they contend that a detailed
accounting would show that they are not
in default. A pending question regarding
the due amount was not a sufficient reason to enjoin the foreclosure in Estares. Hence, with more reason should
injunction be denied in the instant case, in which there is no dispute as to the
outstanding obligation of petitioners.
At any rate, whether respondent furnished them a detailed statement
of account is a question of fact that this Court need not and will not resolve in
this instance. As held in Zulueta v. Reyes,[68]
in which there was no genuine controversy as to the amounts due and demandable,
the foreclosure should not be restrained by the unnecessary question of
accounting.
Maturity of the Loan Not Averted
by Partial Compliance with Respondent’s Demand
Petitioners allege that their partial payment of P10 million on
To be sure, their partial payment did not extinguish the obligation. The Civil Code states that a debt is not paid
“unless the thing x x x in which the obligation consists has been completely delivered x x x.”[71] Besides, a late partial payment could not
have possibly forestalled a long-expired
maturity date.
The only possible legal relevance of the partial payment was to
evidence the mortgagee’s amenability to granting the mortgagor a grace period. Because the partial payment would constitute a
waiver of the mortgagee’s vested right to foreclose, the grant of a grace period
cannot be casually assumed;[72] the bank’s agreement must be clearly shown. Without a doubt, no express agreement was
entered into by the parties. Petitioners
only assumed that their partial
payment had satisfied respondent’s demand and obtained for them more time to
update their account.[73]
Petitioners are mistaken. When
creditors receive partial payment, they are not ipso facto deemed to have abandoned their prior demand for full
payment. Article 1235 of the Civil Code
provides:
“When the obligee accepts the
performance, knowing its incompleteness or irregularity, and without expressing any protest or objection,
the obligation is deemed fully complied with.”
Thus, to imply that creditors
accept partial payment as complete performance of their obligation, their acceptance
must be made under circumstances that indicate their intention to consider the performance complete and to renounce their claim arising from the
defect.[74]
There are no circumstances that would indicate a renunciation of the
right of respondent to foreclose the mortgaged properties extrajudicially, on
the basis of petitioners’ continuing default.
On the contrary, it asserted
its right by filing an application for extrajudicial foreclosure after
receiving the partial payment. Clearly, it
did not intend to give petitioners more time to meet their obligation.
Parenthetically, respondent cannot be reproved for accepting their
partial payment. While Article 1248 of
the Civil Code states that creditors cannot be compelled to accept partial
payments, it does not prohibit them from accepting such payments.
Second Issue:
Enjoining
the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
A writ of preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy that may be resorted to by litigants, only to protect or preserve their rights or interests during the pendency of the principal action. To authorize a temporary injunction, the plaintiff must show, at least prima facie, a right to the final relief.[75] Moreover, it must show that the invasion of the right sought to be protected is material and substantial, and that there is an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.[76]
In the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance of the injunctive writ constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. It is not proper when the complainant’s right is doubtful or disputed.[77]
As a general rule, courts should
avoid issuing this writ, which in effect disposes of the main case without
trial.[78] In
“x x x. We remind trial courts that while generally
the grant of a writ of preliminary injunction rests on the sound discretion of
the court taking cognizance of the case, extreme
caution must be observed in the exercise of such discretion. The discretion
of the court a quo to grant an
injunctive writ must be exercised based on the grounds and in the manner
provided by law. Thus, the Court declared in Garcia v. Burgos:
‘It has been
consistently held that there is no power the exercise of which is more
delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sound discretion, or
more dangerous in a doubtful case, than the issuance of an injunction. It is
the strong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great
injury, where courts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in
damages.
‘Every court should
remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the
defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court is
fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.’”[80] (Citations omitted)
Petitioners do not have any clear right to be protected. As shown in our earlier findings, they failed to substantiate their allegations that their right to due process had been violated and the maturity of their obligation forestalled. Since they indisputably failed to meet their obligations in spite of repeated demands, we hold that there is no legal justification to enjoin respondent from enforcing its undeniable right to foreclose the mortgaged properties.
In any case, petitioners will not be deprived outrightly of their property. Pursuant to Section 47 of the General Banking Law of 2000,[81] mortgagors who have judicially or extrajudicially sold their real property for the full or partial payment of their obligation have the right to redeem the property within one year after the sale. They can redeem their real estate by paying the amount due, with interest rate specified, under the mortgage deed; as well as all the costs and expenses incurred by the bank.[82]
Moreover, in extrajudicial
foreclosures, petitioners have the right to receive any surplus in the selling
price. This right was recognized in Sulit v. CA,[83] in which the Court held that “if
the mortgagee is retaining more of the proceeds of the sale than he is entitled
to, this fact alone will not affect the validity of the sale but simply gives
the mortgagor a cause of action to recover such surplus.”[84]
Petitioners
failed to demonstrate the prejudice they would probably suffer by reason of the
foreclosure. Also, it is clear that they
would be adequately protected by law.
Hence, we find no legal basis to reverse the assailed Amended Decision
of the CA dated
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed
Amended Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman, First
Division
W E C O N C U
R:
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
* The Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, but is presently excluded pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[1] Rollo, pp. 8-33.
[2]
[3]
[4] Assailed Amended CA Decision, p. 7; rollo, p. 41.
[5] Rollo, pp. 263-268.
[6]
[7]
[8]
Amendment of Mortgage dated
[9]
Promissory Note executed on
[10]
Letter dated
[11]
Letter dated
[12]
Letter dated
[13]
See letter dated
[14]
[15]
Letter dated
[16] Rollo, pp. 82-90.
[17] Now CA associate justice.
[18]
CA Decision dated
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo, pp. 246-248.
[22]
[23]
[24]
CA Decision dated
[25] Rollo, pp. 96-100.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
Order dated
[31]
[32]
CA Decision dated
[33]
[34]
[35]
Dr. Alday v. Judge Cruz, Jr., 426 Phil. 385,
[36]
[37]
CA Decision dated
[38]
[39]
[40]
333 Phil. 158,
[41] Justice de Guia-Salvador dissented and stood by her original ruling.
[42]
Assailed Amended CA Decision, p.
5; rollo, p. 39.
[43]
126 Phil. 625,
[44]
Rollo, pp. 43-47.
[45]
272 SCRA 475,
[46]
Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[47]
This case was deemed submitted
for decision on
[48] Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 204. Original in uppercase.
[49] Civil Code, Art. 1169. Those obliged to deliver or to do something incur delay from the time the obligee judicially or extrajudicially demands from them the fulfillment of their obligation.
[50]
A.
Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
[51]
[52] Rollo, p. 292.
[53]
Credit Agreement dated
[54]
Civil
Code, Art. 1159.
[55] Rollo, pp. 293-294.
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 16-19; rollo, pp. 204-207.
[60]
Pacific Mills, Inc., v. CA, 206 SCRA 317, February 17, 1992 (citing
Bareng v. CA, 107 Phil. 641, April
25, 1960; Insurance Company of North
America v. Republic, 127 Phil. 635, August 30, 1967).
[61] Rollo, p. 290.
[62]
Credit Agreement dated
[63]
[64]
[65]
[66]
459 SCRA 604,
[67]
[68] Supra note 43.
[69] Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 204-205.
[70]
[71] Civil Code, Art. 1233.
[72]
Pacific Mills, Inc., v. CA, supra note 60; Andres v. Crown Life Insurance Company, 102 Phil. 919,
[73]
Petitioner Selegna’s
[74]
A.
Tolentino, supra note 50 at 278.
[75]
Ortigas & Company, Limited Partnership v. Ruiz, 148 SCRA 326,
[76]
Sps. Arcega v. CA, 341 Phil. 166,
[77]
[78]
F.
Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, vol. I, 639 (7th revised
ed., 1999).
[79]
445 Phil. 369,
[80]
[81]
Republic Act No. 8791, approved
on
[82]
J.
Feria and M.C. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated, Vol. II, 577 (2001).
[83]
335 Phil. 914,
[84]