SECOND DIVISION
FACULTY AND ALLIED WORKERS
UNION – INDEPENDENT, Present:
Petitioner,
PUNO,
J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-
versus -
AZCUNA,
and
*GARCIA,
JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
APRON
MANGABAT as Voluntary Arbitrator, Promulgated:
and
Respondents.
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D E C I S I O N
PUNO, J.:
Republic Act No. (R.A.) 6728,
otherwise known as the “Government Assistance To
Students and Teachers in Private Education Act,” allows private schools to
increase their tuition fees on the condition that 70% of the tuition fee
increases shall go to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other
benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel. The petition at bar poses the issue of whether
respondent Centro Escolar University may source from the 70% incremental
proceeds (IP) the integrated IP incorporated into the salaries of its teaching
and non-teaching staff pursuant to the collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) entered into by their union.
It
appears that petitioner union, representing the teaching and the non-teaching
staff of respondent university, has existing CBAs with
the university. Their respective CBAs granted both the teaching and the non-teaching staff
increases in their compensation. The
following increases were provided in the CBA of the teaching personnel for the
period 2000 to 2005:
ARTICLE
V
SALARIES
Section
1. Salary Scales. In order to achieve a sound and effective
administration, the UNIVERSITY and the
Section
2. Hiring Rates. The following shall be the salary scale for
the college teachers (inclusive of the amount of P3.00 per hour for
faculty members with rank and P1.50 for those without rank) as a result
of negotiation aimed at preventing distortion of the salary rate.
In
addition to the above rates, an integration of IP is added according to the
following schedule:
x x
x
Section
3. Improvement in salary due to
Educational Qualifications. Any faculty
member in the College Level shall be given P3.00 per hour increase in
pay upon presentation to the Human Resource Department of his Special Order for
a Master’s Degree and P5.00 per hour increase in pay upon presentation
to the Human Resource Development of his Special Order for a Doctoral Degree;
provided the same has not been considered in the determination of his rank.
Section
4. Other benefits.
a) Emergency Financial Assistance. The faculty member shall receive an
additional P350.00 to the previous P800.00 for a total of P1,150.00
for the Emergency Financial Assistant (EFA).
b) Mid-year Bonus. Mid-year bonus shall be improved from 115% to
120% of basic pay, effective
c) There shall be an improvement of summer
pay for permanent faculty members with master’s degree using the following
table:
x x x
Section
5. At no time shall a faculty member
suffer a reduction of the salary rate he enjoyed before the effectivity of this
agreement even if his rate exceeds that which corresponds to his rank as
established in the CBA Pay Scale set forth.
Section
6. Salary increases arising from the CBA’s (sic) and from faculty ranking shall not be
deductible from the 70% share in the Incremental Proceeds (IP) of the faculty
and non-teaching staff.[1] (emphases
supplied)
Respondent university admits that
salary increases provided under Sections 1, 2, 3 and 4 are taken from the
university fund, while the salary increases brought about by the IP integration
are deducted from the IP.[2]
The CBA for the non-teaching
personnel, on the other hand, provided:
ARTICLE
V
SALARIES
Section
1. Effective P600.00 per month.
This is an across the board increase, over and above legislated wage
increase.
All
employees shall also receive an additional P350.00 or a total of P1,150.00
for their EFA.
Section
2. Job Classification and Salary
Scale. The University agrees to adopt a
table or classification of jobs in the University with component grade levels
and corresponding salary ranges which shall form part of this contract by
reference.
Starting
Section
3. Effective
x x x
Section
4. There shall be a partial integration
of incremental proceeds in the basic pay amounting to not more than P1,000/per
month, according to the following schedule:
x x x
Section
5. Salary increases arising from
CBA’s (sic) from job classification shall not be deductible from the 70%
share of the IP of the faculty and non-teaching staff.[3] (emphases
supplied)
As with the salary increases for the
school’s faculty, the increases provided under Sections 1, 2 and 3 are also
taken from the university fund, while the increases under Section 4 are deducted
from the IP.[4]
Petitioner asserts that the integrated
IP granted in the CBAs should not be deducted from the
personnel’s 70% share in the IP. It cites
the common provision in the CBAs of the faculty and the
non-teaching staff prohibiting the deduction of salary increases arising from
the CBA from their 70% share in the IP.
Petitioner also sought the payment of additional IP for the faculty
members with overload and permanent substitution units.
On
The parties submitted their position
papers before the voluntary arbitrator.
Petitioner contended that the deduction of the IP integration from the
70% share of tuition fee increase is illegal and contrary to the CBA, as the IP
integration in the salary is considered a CBA-won increase, hence, may not be
deducted from the 70%. It also claims
that the IP is computed on a pro-rata basis, depending on the number of hours
worked. Hence, those who are assigned
overload units must also receive the corresponding IP for the extra assignment.[5]
Respondent university, meanwhile,
averred that there are two kinds of salary increases in the CBA—the
CBA-negotiated increase taken from the university fund, and the increase as a
result of IP integration which, by its nature, is taken from the 70% share of
the school personnel in the IP. It further
argued that it would not be feasible to grant additional IP to teachers with
overload or permanent substitution assignments, as the IP is distributed among
all employees of the school, whether teaching or non-teaching. The only conceivable formula to accommodate
the claim of teachers with overload or permanent substitution assignment is to
reduce the share of the employees who have no such load. This, respondent university claimed, would create
more problems than solutions for the university.[6]
In his decision dated
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby issued in favor of the
1. Integration of incremental proceeds in
the basic pay as provided for in the Collective Bargaining Agreement shall be
deducted from the employees’ share on the incremental proceeds;
2. Other than that currently provided in
the Collective Bargaining Agreement, no other incremental proceeds shall be
integrated in the basic pay;
3. No additional incremental proceeds
shall be granted to faculty members with overload assignments and with
permanent substitution classes; and,
4. The case is hereby dismissed.[8]
Petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. The appellate court dismissed
the petition on the ground that petitioner used a wrong mode of appeal. It held that petitioner should have filed an
appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[9]
The Court of Appeals also denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.[10]
Hence, this petition based on the
following grounds:
1. Respondent court
committed reversible error in dismissing the instant petition on technical
ground that appeal under Rule 43 is the proper remedy, and not certiorari under
Rule 65, when no less than Section 2 of Rule 43 explicitly provides that Rule
43 does not apply in labor cases.
2. Respondent court committed reversible
error in relying on Bautista vs. Court of Appeals when Bautista refers to
criminal case (while this is a labor case) and the citation is a mere obiter
dictum, hence, inapplicable.
3. Respondent court committed reversible
error in denying pertitioner’s motion for reconsideration based on the case of
Luzon Development Bank vs. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees, to
further support the original ruling that Rule 43 is the correct remedy. However, in that case, the Supreme Court
equates the award or decisions of voluntary arbitrator with that of RTC and
ruled that in a petition for certiorari from that award or decision, Court of
Appeals have concurrent jurisdiction with Supreme Court. Thus it ordered the remanding of the petition
for certiorari to the Court of Appeals, thereby recognizing certiorari as a
proper remedy.
4. Respondent court committed reversible
error in not holding that, as ruled by the Honorable Supreme Court in a long
line of cases, decision of voluntary arbitrator is final and unappealable,
except when there is want or excess of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion,
denial of substantial justice or erroneous interpretation of the law. In such cases, certiorari is the proper
remedy.
5. Respondent court committed reversible
errors in not holding that the voluntary arbitrator has acted with grave abuse
of discretion, without or in excess of jurisdiction, in ignoring the CBA as the
law between the parties and in not deciding the grievances through the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA pursuant to his limited authority
under Article 260 of the New Labor Code.
6. Respondent court committed reversible
error in conveniently disposing the merit of the case on a one-sentence, one
paragraph coup de grace that petitioner has failed to offer meritorious
reasons or arguments for allowance of petition.
The truth is that petitioner has adduced ample meritorious reasons and
arguments. Since the assailed deductions
and estimated amounts are all uncontroverted only questions of law are
involved, i.e., whether the deductions are valid in view of the CBA
prohibition, and whether the university is liable to refund the deducted amount
totaling P500 million.[11]
The
issues in this case are two-pronged:
first, the procedural issue – whether the decision of the voluntary
arbitrator is appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; and second, the substantive issues – (1) whether the university may deduct from the
70% share of the personnel in the IP the integrated IP granted in the CBAs of the teaching and the non-teaching staff; and (2) whether
the teaching staff is entitled to additional IP for overload and permanent
substitution units.
We
shall first address the procedural issue.
We
find that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that petitioner used a
wrong remedy when it filed a special civil action on certiorari under Rule 65
instead of an appeal under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court held in Luzon Development Bank
v. Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees[12] that decisions of the voluntary arbitrator
under the Labor Code are appealable to the Court of Appeals. In that case, the Court observed that the
Labor Code was silent as regards the appeals from the decisions of the
voluntary arbitrator, unlike those of the Labor Arbiter which may be appealed
to the National Labor Relations Commission.
The Court noted, however, that the voluntary arbitrator is a government
instrumentality within the contemplation of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
(BP) 129[13]
which provides for the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals.[14] The decisions of the voluntary arbitrator are
akin to those of the Regional Trial Court, and, therefore, should first be
appealed to the Court of Appeals before being elevated to this Court. This is in furtherance and consistent with
the original purpose of Circular No. 1-91 to provide a uniform procedure for
the appellate review of adjudications of all quasi-judicial agencies not
expressly excepted from the coverage of Section 9 of BP 129. Circular No. 1-91 was later revised and
became Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95. The Rules of Court Revision Committee
incorporated said circular in Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. The inclusion of the
decisions of the voluntary arbitrator in the Rule was based on the Court’s
pronouncements in Luzon Development Bank v. Association of Luzon Development
Bank Employees.[15] Petitioner’s argument, therefore, that the
ruling in said case is inapplicable in this case is without merit.
Moreover,
a petition for certiorari is an extraordinary remedy that is adopted to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or quasi-judicial agency,
or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of such court or agency
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of law or fact which is
a mistake of judgment, the proper remedy should be appeal.[16] In addition, an independent action for
certiorari may be availed of only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[17] There was no question of jurisdiction
involved in the decision of the voluntary arbitrator. What was being
questioned was merely his findings of whether the university’s practice of
sourcing the integrated IP in the CBA from the 70% share of the personnel in
the IP violates the provisions of the CBA.
Such is a proper subject of an appeal.
Nonetheless,
even if we overlook petitioner’s procedural lapse, the case should still be
dismissed on substantive grounds.
Section
5 (2) of R.A. 6728 provides:
SEC. 5. Tuition Fee
Supplement for Student in
x x
x
(2) Assistance under paragraph (1),
subparagraphs (a) and (b) shall be granted and tuition fee under subparagraph
(c) may be increased, on the condition that seventy percent (70%) of the amount
subsidized allotted for tuition fee or of the tuition fee increases shall go to
the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits of teaching and
non-teaching personnel except administrators who are principal stockholders of
the school, and may be used to cover increases as provided for in the
collective bargaining agreements existing or in force at the time when this Act
is approved and made effective:
Provided, That government subsidies are not used directly for salaries
of teachers of nonsecular subjects. x x
x
In Cebu Institute of Medicine v.
Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees’ Union-National Federation of Labor,[18]
the Court held that the private institution concerned has the discretion on the
disposition of the seventy percent (70%) incremental tuition fee increase. It enjoys the privilege of determining how
much increase in salaries to grant and the kind and amount of allowances and
other benefits to give. The only
precondition is that seventy percent (70%) of the incremental tuition fee
increase goes to the payment of salaries, wages, allowances and other benefits
of teaching and non-teaching personnel.
In other words, the allocation of the 70% of the IP is considered a
management prerogative. In that case,
the Court allowed the charging against the 70% the employer’s share in the SSS,
Medicare and Pag-ibig premiums, they falling within the category of “other
benefits” as provided in Section 5 (2) of RA 6728.
There is an additional element,
however, in the case at bar. Here, the CBAs between the university and the teaching and the
non-teaching staff prohibit the deduction of the CBA-won benefits from the 70%
of the IP. The CBA is a negotiated
contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning
wages, hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a
bargaining unit, including mandatory provisions for grievances and arbitration
machineries.[19] It is the law between the parties, and they
are obliged to comply with its provisions. We need to resolve, therefore, whether the
charging of the integrated IP against the 70% is violative of the CBA.
We find that it is not.
The voluntary arbitrator described
the nature of the IP, thus:
The
allocation of 70% of the IP for payment of salaries, wages, allowances and
other benefits of teaching and non-teaching personnel is clearly mandated by
law. Yet, nowhere is it provided in
Republic Act No. 6728 that the IP should be integrated with the salary and
wages. The nature of IP is that it bears
a reasonable relation as to whether or not universities/schools will increase
their tuition fees. Like that of a
bonus, IP is additional compensation subject to a resolutory condition imposed
for its payment. But unlike a bonus or
commission, the IP is not given for extra efforts exerted. Thus, a teacher originally handling a load of
21 units will not be provided IP the next school year even with the same
teaching load, should there be a tuition fee increase. Historically, IP was allocated “to alleviate
the sad plight of private schools, their personnel and all those directly and
indirectly dependent on school incomes.”
It is additional benefit accorded to the employees. Hence, the determination of the amount of IP
to be integrated into employees’ basic salary entails the exercise of the right
of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment. Precisely, the employer has the right to
change the basis of the payment of wages of the employees, subject to
provisions of law.
x x
x
Distinct
and separate from employees’ basic salary, IP are sourced from increase in
tuition fees while the basic salaries and wages and incidental salary increases
i.e., due to educational qualifications, emergency financial assistance,
mid-year bonus, longevity pay, job classification, among others are sourced
from the university fund.
This
distinction bears importance in the IP integration as provided under the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the parties. x x x[20]
The integrated IP provided in the CBAs of the teaching and the non-teaching staff is actually
the share of the employees in the 70% of the IP that is incorporated into their
salaries as a result of the negotiation between the university and its personnel.
The purpose of the integration is to regularize the receipt by the personnel of
the benefits arising from the increase in the school’s tuition fees. But it
does not change the nature of the benefit as IP. There is no basis, therefore,
for petitioner’s objection to the sourcing of the integrated IP from the 70% of
the tuition fee increases.
Finally,
we agree with the discussion of the voluntary arbitrator as regards the award
of additional IP to members of the faculty with overload or permanent substitution
assignment:
Coming
now to the claim for additional IP for faculty members with overload
assignments and with permanent substitution classes, the same must be
denied. To be entitled to IP, it matters
not that a teacher is handling a regular full teaching load or is handling
extra teaching load. Professors handling
extra teaching loads are correspondingly compensated depending on the extra
units they are assigned. To grant them
additional IP would amount to double compensation. As argued by University, “[t]he only
conceivable formula to satisfy petitioner’s claim for additional incremental
proceeds is to deduct from the IP benefits of teaching personnel who do not
have overload assignments or who do not have permanent substitution classes, and
from non-teaching staff, which formula will create more problems than
solution[s].”[21]
In
view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in
dismissing the petition filed before it by herein petitioner.
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
(on leave)
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
I attest that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 133-134.
[2] Rollo,
p. 134.
[3] Rollo,
p. 135.
[4] Rollo,
p. 136.
[5] Rollo,
pp. 115-126.
[6] Rollo,
pp. 128-136.
[7] Rollo,
pp. 185-195.
[8] Rollo, p. 194a.
[9] Rollo,
pp. 60-67.
[10] Rollo,
pp. 111-114.
[11] Rollo,
pp. 19-21.
[12] G.R.
No. 120319,
[13] Judiciary Reorganization Act.
[14] SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. – The Court of
Appeals shall exercise:
x x x
(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional
Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or
commissions, except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the provisions of this Act,
and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the
fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
x x x
[15] 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure Annotated by Justice Jose Y. Feria (Ret.).
[16] Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium Vol. I
(1997), p. 705, citing Matute v. Macadaeg, L-9325,
[17] Section
1, Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[18] G.R.
No. 141285,
[19] University
of the Immaculate Conception, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R.
No. 146291, January 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 471.
[20] Rollo,
pp. 192-193.
[21] Rollo,
p. 194.