THIRD DIVISION
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PEOPLE OF THE Appellee, |
G.R. No.
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- versus - RONAN P. DULANAS,* |
Present: Quisumbing,
J., Chairperson, Carpio, Carpio
Morales, Tinga, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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Appellant. |
May 3, 2006 |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
In
its decision dated
The
antecedent facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:
Appellant was charged of murder
before Branch
That on or about October
WOUND, GUNSHOT.
CAUSE OF DEATH: NEUR[O]GENIC SHOCK
which injuries caused his
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
During his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, he filed a petition for bail
which was granted by the then Presiding Judge William Layague, on the ground
that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
Aggrieved, the prosecution filed a
motion for reconsideration and sought to inhibit Judge Layague. Judge Layague inhibited himself and the case was
re-raffled to Branch
During the trial, the prosecution
adopted the evidence presented at the hearing on the petition for bail. Its version of the incident is as follows:
At around
Michael Awad replied that they were
already closed, but decided to open the door which was only two meters away
from where he was. With both hands, he
removed the wooden bar securing the door.
He bent to place the bar on the ground with his right hand while holding
the door handle with his left hand. The
small door swung and fully opened.
At that moment, Maria was only two
meters away from Michael. When her
husband opened the door, the light in and out of the store, and in the electric
post just beside the store, illuminated appellant Ronan Dulanas from his
shoulder up. Instantaneously after
Michael opened the door, Maria heard a gunshot and saw Michael slump to the cement
floor.[6] She rushed
to Michael, tried to carry him, but was unable to move him. She looked back towards the door, but appellant
was no longer there. She went outside looking for him. A few feet outside their door[7] she saw appellant, about five meters away
from her, putting something in his bag before opening the door of a waiting
car. He glanced at Maria as he was
boarding the car. Scared that appellant might
come back for her, she dashed back inside her house, closed the door, and went
to Michael to hold his head.[8] When she
heard the car speeding away, she cried for help. Three neighbors came and brought Michael to
the Davao Doctor’s Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival.[9] Maria,
meanwhile, stayed home with her two children.
Senior Police Officer I Florencio Mira
of the Talomo Police Station, the lead investigator, narrated that he asked Maria twice if she knew who shot her husband.
He said she simply kept crying hysterically.
Four or five bystanders whom he
interviewed told him that three armed, unidentified persons came to Michael’s store
and one shot Michael as he was opening the door.[10] He then
returned to the police headquarters and wrote the incident in the police
blotter. Afterwards, he went to the hospital,
and was later informed by Maria, who had calmed down, that it was appellant who
shot her husband.[11]
SPO
Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma
of the City Health Office of Davao City, autopsied Michael Awad’s body on
Maria Awad and the victim’s mother, Souad
Awad, also testified. PP
For his defense, appellant interposed
denial and alibi. Appellant claimed that
he was at home 200 to
Appellant explained that he used to frequent
Awad’s store but stopped in
The defense also presented Leo Villareal and Bobby Agodolo to refute the
testimony of prosecution witness SPO
Leo Villareal, a radio reporter and a news writer for the Mindanao Daily
Mirror, testified that he reported on Awad’s murder. He testified that he copied the
Bobby Agodolo, a radio announcer for DXMF Radio Bombo and a news writer
for Ang Peryodiko Dabaw, testified that he also read the
Lastly, the defense presented Roland Cabrera, appellant’s high school
classmate and close friend. Cabrera claimed
that around
On rebuttal, the prosecution presented Senior Police Inspector Alberto
Ginese who testified that the second police blotter entry identifying appellant
as the killer was made strictly off-the-press pursuant to standard operating
procedures.
When Judge Marasigan retired, the case was reassigned to Judge Jesus
Quitain, Branch 15.
Judge Quitain gave full credence to
the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Maria Linda Cuares Awad and found no
merit in appellant’s uncorroborated alibi.
In his Decision dated January P
On appeal, the Court of Appeals found appellant guilty of murder
qualified by treachery and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The Court of Appeals
likewise ordered him to pay actual damages of PP85,980, and moral damages of PP
Without entering judgment, the case was certified to this Court for
review.
Before us, appellant initially contended that:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF MURDER DESPITE THE INHERENT WEAKNESS OF
THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE.
THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCREASING THE MONETARY AWARD IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT.[25]
Subsequently, in his second supplemental
brief, he averred that the appellate court additionally committed a palpable
mistake in
x x x CONCLUDING THAT FROM THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL
EVIDENCE IT CONSIDERED FOR EVALUATION, ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS THE TRIGGERMAN;
and
x x x NOT
CONSIDERING FOR EVALUATION THE SINGLE PIECE OF PHYSICAL EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY
PROVING THAT ANOTHER PERSON, NOT ACCUSED-APPELLANT, WAS THE TRIGGERMAN.[26]
The sole issue now for our resolution
is whether there is sufficient proof that appellant is guilty of murder beyond
reasonable doubt.
Appellant disputes the identification
by Maria of appellant as the person who shot her husband. He contends that Maria’s identification of
him as the gunman was mere speculation. Appellant
points out that Maria herself testified that she only saw appellant from the
shoulder up and did not see him point a gun much less fire at her husband. Likewise, prosecution witness SPO
Appellant adds that the Court of
Appeals erred in concluding that Dr. Ledesma’s testimony supported Maria’s
declaration that no other person could have shot Michael within
Well
settled is the rule that the findings of lower courts which are factual and
which revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses deserve respect when, as
in this case, no glaring errors bordering on gross misapprehension of the
facts, or where no speculative, arbitrary and unsupported conclusions, can be
gleaned from such findings.[31]
Contrary
to appellant’s contention in his second supplemental brief, Maria did not testify
that appellant was three meters away from Michael at the time of the
shooting. True, Maria testified on cross-examination
that she was two meters away from Michael while appellant was five meters away
from her. It is worthy to note that Maria,
however, explained on re-direct examination that she was referring to two
different points in time. Maria made it
clear that at the time of the shooting, appellant was more or less only about a
meter away from Michael and that she was only two meters away from
Michael. At the time she went outside
the house to look at where appellant went, appellant was five meters away from her. The pertinent portion of her testimony reads:
A It is like
this Sir, when my husband was shot, I was two (2) meters away from him, but
after the shot, when I run outside, I was five (
Atty.
Martin Suelto:
Q At that
time that your husband was as you said still [crouching] or bending when you
heard the shot and you saw Dulanas shot your husband, tell the Court if you
know how far was your husband from the accused Dulanas?
Court
Interpreter:
The
witness is now standing and is trying to describe the position and distance
between Michael and Dulanas.
A From this point up to this point.
Court:
About a
meter, more or less.[32]
Appellant’s theory concerning the
incident is difficult to accept. Assuming
that one of the three assailants shot Michael, then the three assailants would have
to be crowding by the door when Michael opened it. The physical evidence showed that the gun was
fired from a distance of only
Roland Cabrera’s testimony
relied upon by appellant to corroborate his story does not suffice to discredit
Maria’s testimony. As correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General, what Cabrera testified to was that after he heard
a gunshot, he turned around and saw three persons running towards a red getaway
car. Cabrera’s statement does not support
the theory that any one of the three could have shot Michael within a distance
of
Moreover, Cabrera
testified that he was purportedly looking for a mason named Boy to make hollow
blocks for his house. Yet, his house had
already been completed five weeks earlier and he had no need for more hollow
blocks for his house. Also, while Cabrera
claimed to be familiar with Manga Street in Juna Subdivision[34] where Boy lived, Cabrera
in the dark of night, curiously took the roundabout way of more than a
kilometer, passing several out-of-the-way streets including Francisco Street where
Michael’s store was located, to get to Manga Street which was only a few meters
from where he started his search. For
Cabrera’s testimony to be credible, it must also pass the test of common sense.
Maria’s failure to mention
the other two malefactors would not detract from the veracity of her
testimony. It simply means that she did
not see them from where she was.
We find People v. Gamer[35] cited by
appellant inapplicable here. Unlike the
prosecution eyewitness in Gamer, Maria never wavered in her
identification of appellant. From the
beginning and even under rigorous cross-examination, Maria steadfastly declared
that it was only appellant whom she saw when her husband opened the door and
who could have been responsible for the killing.[36] She testified:
Q You said
that when your husband opened the door and also placed the wooden bar down and
at the same time opening the wooden door of your residence and store, there was
a shot, will you please tell us if you saw the person who shot?
A Yes,
sir.
Q Who was
the person who shot Michael Awad?
A Ronan
Dulanas.
x x x x
Q When you
said that the person who shot your husband, Michael Awad is one Ronan Dulanas,
if that Ronan Dulanas is in Court, will you please point to him?
A That
one. (Witness pointing to a person inside the Courtroom, at the back, wearing a
white shirt with collar and also wearing eyeglasses and when asked his name, he
identified himself as Ronan Dulanas).
x x x x
Q Will you
please tell us why you were able to identify that the person who shot your
husband when your husband opened the wooden door was Ronan Dulanas?
A Because
I saw him.[37]
She further testified
on cross-examination:
Q And you are
telling the Honorable Court that you saw the accused clearly in your front when
the door was opened by your husband?
A Yes
Sir.[38]
Direct evidence of the
commission of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may
draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction is proper if the
established factual circumstances constitute an unbroken chain and are
consistent with each other and with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty,
to the exclusion of any other hypothesis that he is not.[39]
The testimony of Maria
that she saw appellant directly in front of Michael when Michael opened the door,
and that Michael was shot while still bending is corroborated by the medical testimony
of Dr. Ledesma. Based on the location of
the wound and the trajectory of the bullet, Dr. Ledesma testified that the
assailant responsible for the killing was directly in front of the victim and
that the victim was on a lower level than the assailant. Their testimonies, when
considered with the fact that appellant was the only person outside the door,[40]
was only a meter directly in front of Michael at the time of the shooting, and
was seen escaping from the scene of the crime immediately after the shooting, indubitably
establish that it was appellant who killed Michael.
Between the categorical
statements of Maria and appellant’s bare denials, the former must prevail. Notably also, appellant did not present his
wife, his parents, nor his house companions who were supposedly with him at
home, to corroborate his alibi. Denial
when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is negative,
self-serving and merits no weight in law.
It cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the credible testimony
of Maria, who unequivocally testified on affirmative matters.
Appellant makes much of the prosecution’s failure to show that the alleged
caller was persistent in buying beer to make Michael open the door despite
being told the store had already close; the absence of an explanation why
Michael chose to open the door instead of the store’s small transaction window;
and the contradiction in Maria’s testimony that her husband was shot inside the
house vis SPO
We find appellant’s arguments lame, to
say the least. We can never be privy to
the deceased’s reasons for choosing to open the door. Neither can Maria divine her husband’s reasons. The dead husband’s decision to act one way or
another does not affect Maria’s credibility.
Lastly, SPO
Appellant further questions
the Court of Appeals observation that Maria’s hysteria explained her failure to
immediately disclose appellant’s identity to the police. He claims that Maria was not in such a state
since she was conscious enough to answer SPO
The stance taken by appellant
is unconvincing. In our view, Maria’s
actions were natural and within the bounds of expected human behavior. Her actions reveal a spontaneous and natural
reaction of a person who has yet to fully comprehend a shocking and traumatic
event. Besides, the workings of the human mind are unpredictable. People react differently to emotional stress.
There is simply no standard form of behavioral response can be expected from
anyone when confronted with a strange, startling or frightful occurrence.[45]
Next, appellant points out that the appellate court erred in not giving
credence to the unbiased testimonies of Leo Villareal and Bobby Agodolo, who
both testified that based on the blotter report of the police, someone knocked
to buy cigarettes and that when Maria opened the window, Michael, who was
resting inside the house, was shot dead.
No error, in our view, was committed by the appellate court in this
regard. As previously held,[46] entries in the police blotter, though
regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are not
conclusive proof of the truth of such entries and should not be given undue
significance or probative value, for they are usually incomplete and
inaccurate. Entries in official records
made in the performance of his duty by a public officer or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law are only prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated. To
be admissible in evidence, it is essential that the person who made the entries
had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated, which must have been
acquired by him personally or through official information.[47] In
this case, SPO
Moreover, the inaccuracy in the testimony of the two witnesses, Villareal
and Agodolo, is apparent. If indeed it
was Maria who opened the small window of the store, then it would have been
impossible for the gunman to shoot Michael who was resting inside the house,
for Maria would be in the line of fire and she would have been the one hit.
Appellant claims that since the judge who penned the decision was not the
judge who presided over the trial, Judge Layague’s assessment of the evidence during
the hearing on the application for bail should have been the one considered.[48] But Judge
Layague’s assessment of the evidence for purposes of granting bail is merely
preliminary and is not conclusive. That
assessment did not bind another judge, nor prevent the latter from reaching a
different conclusion regarding appellant’s guilt. The standards in evaluating evidence for purposes
of bail and determining guilt beyond reasonable doubt are different.
During summary bail hearings, it may be stressed, the court does not sit
to try the merits or enter into any extended inquiry on the weight of the
evidence for or against the accused. Nor
will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may
be offered and admitted.[49]
In our view, Judge Layague misappreciated the testimony of Dr. Ledesma
that the victim was shot within
Moreover, the fact alone that the ponente in the trial court did not hear
the testimonies of the witnesses, would not automatically warrant a reversal of
the decision nor would it per se render his decision void. The judge who was not present during the
trial can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the trial
as basis of his decision. Such reliance
does not violate substantive and procedural due process of law.[50]
Appellant’s assertion that Maria was motivated
by vengeance against him because all the criminal cases Michael had filed
against him were dismissed does not hold water.
As we have held repeatedly, it would be unnatural for a relative who is
interested in vindicating the crime to implicate persons other than the real
culprits lest the guilty go unpunished.[51] The earnest
desire to seek justice for a dead kin is not served should the witness abandon
his conscience and prudence, and blame one who is innocent of the crime. Absent any showing that the principal witness
was motivated by improper motives, the presumption is that she was not so
moved.
Appellant is guilty of murder, qualified by treachery, for the wrongful
death of Michael. Treachery was evident
in the manner by which the crime was committed.
The attack upon Michael was a sudden, treacherous and violent aggression
without warning. He was tricked into opening
the door of the store, and then he was immediately fired upon. A gun was used and fired point blank at his
chest to ensure death.
Article
The appellate court’s award of PP44,202, representing the receipted amount
spent for Michael’s funeral and burial.
Both are sustained.
For the treachery, P25,000 is further awarded to the heirs of the
victim as exemplary damages. In People
v. Catubig,[54] we ruled that insofar as the civil aspect is
concerned, exemplary damages in the amount of PP
The award of PP
Lastly, we modify the award for loss of earning capacity. PPPPP806,465.
WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals’ decision
dated
1.
P50,000 as civil indemnity;
2.
P
3. P
4. P
5. P
6.
P
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
|
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
* “Dolanas” in some parts of the records.
[1] CA Rollo, pp. 294-311. Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes
Gozo-Dadole, with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., and Rosmari D.
Carandang concurring.
[2] As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC effective
October
SEC.
[3] Sometimes referred to as “George Michael” or “Michael George”
in the Records.
[4] Records, p.
[5] Sometimes referred to as “Marilyn” in the Records.
[6] TSN,
[7] TSN,
[8] TSN,
[9] TSN,
[10]
[11] TSN,
[12]
[13] Exhibit “A,” “B,” “B-
[14] TSN,
[15]
[16] TSN, November 26,
[17] TSN,
[18] TSN,
[19] TSN,
[20] TSN,
[21]
[22] TSN,
[23] Records, pp.
[24] Rollo, p.
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31] People v. Mirafuentes, G.R. Nos. 135850-52,
[32] TSN,
[33] TSN,
[34] TSN,
[35] G.R. No.
[36] TSN,
[37] TSN,
[38] TSN,
[39] Ungsod v. People, G.R. No.
[40] TSN,
[41] Rollo, p. 158.
[42] TSN
[43] G.R. No.
[44] Rollo, p. 166.
[45] People v. Castillo, G.R. No. 118912,
[46] People
v.
[47]
[48] Rollo, pp.
[49] People v. Hapa, G.R. No. 125698,
[50]
[51] People v. Agudez, G.R. Nos. 138386-87,
[52] Art.
In all cases in which the law
prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties the following rules
shall be observed in the application thereof:
x x x x
2.
When there are neither mitigating or aggravating circumstances in the
commission of the deed, the lesser penalty shall be applied.
[53] Ungsod v. People, supra note 39.
[54] G.R. No.
[55] See People v. Aringue, G.R. No.
[56] Sullon v. People, G.R. No.
[57] In accordance with the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality adopted by this Court, the loss of earning capacity is
calculated as follows:
Net earning capacity (x) = life expectancy x gross-living
expenses annual (50% of gross annual income)
Nueva España v. People, G.R. No. 163351,