THIRD DIVISION
Carlito L. Montes, G.R. No. 143797
Petitioner,
Present:
-
versus - QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES, and
Court of Appeals, TINGA,
Sixth Division, OFFICE VELASCO, JJ.
of the Ombudsman,
Department of Science Promulgated:
and Technology,
Respondents. May
4, 2006
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R E S O L U T I O N
Tinga, J.
In this Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order[1]
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner Carlito L. Montes (Montes) seeks to prohibit the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Science and Technology (DOST) from implementing
the suspension order[2] dated
TO: CARLITO L. MONTES
Chief, Legal Division, DOST
In compliance with the 2nd
Indorsement dated 29 March 2000 from the Office of the Ombudsman directing this
Office the implementation of the OMB Order dated 02 March 2000, in relation to
OMB Decision dated 17 January 2000, wherein you were found guilty of violation
of RA 4200 (THE ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW) amounting to GROSS MISCONDUCT in
OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 entitled “Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla -versus- Carlito L.
Montes,” your (sic) are hereby SUSPENDED FROM THE
SERVICE FOR ONE YEAR WITHOUT PAY EFFECTIVE JULY 16, 2000.
You are hereby directed to make the necessary
turn-over/clearance of property and monetary accountabilities and submit all
pending legal work to the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Administrative
and Legal Affairs.
AS ORDERED.
Taguig, Metro
(sgd)
DR.
FILEMON A. URIARTE, JR.
Secretary[5]
OMB-ADM-0-98-0556 is the administrative
complaint filed by complainants therein Imelda D. Rodriguez and Elizabeth Fontanilla against Carlito L.
Montes, Chief of the Legal Division of DOST, for grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of service. Rodriguez and Fontanilla
alleged that on 15 July 1999, while Montes was in the process of adducing
evidence against Rodriguez and the DOST Secretary in the complaint for
misconduct he had filed against them before the Presidential Commission Against
Graft and Corruption (PCAGC), Montes produced a tape recording of a private
conversation he had had with the DOST Secretary. Montes admitted that he had
taped the conversation at the DOST Secretary’s Office without the DOST
Secretary’s knowledge and consent a few days after
During cross-examination, Montes likewise
admitted that he had also recorded a private conversation he had with Fontanilla at the DOST Office in Taguig
sometime in November 1997. This was without the knowledge and consent of Fontanilla.[7]
Moreover, in two (2) missives[8] Montes
sent Pedro A. del Rosario, Jr., the former mentioned the existence of the tape
recordings he had made of his conversations with other people. Sometime in June
1998, Montes even re-played for Eduardo Langara the
taped conversations he had with Secretary William G. Padolina
and Fontanilla. In addition, PCAGC Prosecutor Mariano
C. Quintos, Jr., stated in his affidavit dated
The Ombudsman found Montes guilty of
grave misconduct and suspended him for one (1) year without pay. The Ombudsman
held that Montes’ taping of his conversations with Fontanilla
was prohibited by R.A. 4200, the Anti-Wiretapping Law. Montes did not deny that
he made the recording without the Fontanilla’s
consent.[10]
In an Order[11] dated
The Court of Appeals dismissed outright
Montes’ petition in a Resolution[12] dated
On motion for reconsideration, however,
the appellate court issued a Resolution[13] dated
Meanwhile, on
Montes now argues in his petition before
the Court that the implementation of the suspension order is premature
considering the pendency of his petition before the appellate court. Citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[15] he
further states that there is no law or provision in R.A. 6770,[16] the
Ombudsman Law, or in Administrative Order No. 7[17]
mandating the immediate execution of the Ombudsman’s decision in an
administrative case where the penalty imposed is suspension for one (1) year.
Moreover, he asserts that the administrative complaint, which is for a
violation of R.A. 4200, is cognizable by the regular courts considering the
imposable penalty. Finally, he complains that he was convicted of the alleged
wire-tapping by mere substantial evidence which is short of the quantum of
evidence required for conviction of a criminal offense.[18]
In their Comment[19] dated
In his
Memorandum[21] dated
The Ombudsman
and the DOST, on the other hand, restate in their Memorandum[23]
dated
The pivotal
issue here is whether Montes is entitled to the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining the DOST Secretary from enforcing the suspension order.
At the outset, we find
that Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping.
There is forum shopping when a party
seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had already been
solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other tribunals. Forum
shopping is also the act of one party against another when an adverse judgment
has been rendered in one forum, of seeking another and possibly favorable opinion
in another forum other than by appeal or the special civil action of
certiorari; or the institution of two or more acts or proceedings grounded on
the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition.[24]
Forumshopping
is an act of malpractice, as the litigants trifle with the courts and abuse
their processes. It is improper conduct and degrades the administration
of justice. If the act of the party or its counsel clearly constitutes
willful and deliberate forum-shopping, the same shall constitute direct
contempt, and a cause for administrative sanctions, as well as a ground for the
summary dismissal of the case with prejudice.[25]
In the case at bar, when Montes filed
the petition for prohibition against the suspension order on
Montes’ petition for certiorari
prayed, among others, that the appellate court issue an order “restraining the
Honorable Secretary, Department of Science and Technology from implementing the
Order dated
Clearly, the relief sought from the
appellate court is the same as the relief prayed for in the present
petition—that is, that an order be issued restraining the DOST Secretary from
implementing the Ombudsman’s Order. In filing the instant petition without
awaiting the resolution of his pending motion before the appellate court,
Montes asked for simultaneous remedies in two different fora.
This act is censurable and serves as a ground for the dismissal of the instant
case with prejudice.
Moreover, we
find that Montes failed to adequately show that there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the
issuance of a writ of prohibition.
For a party to
be entitled to a writ of prohibition, he must establish the following
requisites: (a) it must be directed against a tribunal, corporation, board or
person exercising functions, judicial or ministerial; (b) the tribunal,
corporation, board or person has acted without or in excess of its
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion; and (c) there is no appeal or
any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[30]
A remedy is
considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment or rule, order or resolution
of the lower court or agency.[31]
When the DOST
issued the assailed suspension order on
Evidently too, Montes disregarded the
doctrine of judicial hierarchy which we enjoin litigants and lawyers to
strictly observe as a judicial policy. For this reason, the instant petition
should be dismissed. As we ruled in Vergara,
Sr. v. Suelto,[32]to
wit:
The Supreme Court is a
court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the
functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and immemorial tradition.
It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in
the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-called
extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or
where serious and important reasons exist therefor. Hence, that jurisdiction
should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the
Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies or
agencies whose acts for some reason or another, are not controllable by the
Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in
either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must
be presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a
policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.[33]
The Court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction however should not be taken to mean that the parties have an
absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which they will file
their application or petition. There is an ordained sequence of recourse to
courts vested with concurrent jurisdiction, beginning from the lowest, on to
the next highest, and ultimately to the highest. This hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and is likewise determinative of the
proper forum for petitions for extraordinary writs. A direct invocation of the
Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefore, clearly and
specifically set out in the petition. This is established policy. It is a
policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time
and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent the further clogging of the Court’s docket.[34]
In this regard, the Court notes that
Montes implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping by stating that he
had to file the instant petition before this Court in view of the denial of his
motion for reconsideration before the appellate court. Montes failed to
consider that the same implementation of the suspension order which impelled
him to abandon his motion for reconsideration also rendered the instant
petition academic.
As the present petition is one for
prohibition which is a preventive remedy, worthy of note is the fact, as
manifested by the petitioner himself, that the suspension order has already
been implemented on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition for Prohibition is DISMISSED.
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[12]
[16]An
Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of
the Ombudsman, and for Other Purposes.
[22]