FIRST DIVISION
ABOITIZ INTERNATIONAL G.R. No. 142272
FORWARDERS, INC.,
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C. J., Chairperson,
- versus -
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
THE HONORABLE COURT NAZARIO, JJ.*
OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE
CHARTER INSURANCE Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petition for
review on certiorari filed by Aboitiz International Forwarders, Inc. (petitioner AIFI) of
the Decision dated November 16, 1999 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 57892 dismissing its appeal from the Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 4 (court a quo) in Civil Case No. 92-62951 denying the petition for relief from
judgment of petitioner AIFI.
The Antecedents
On P269,349.54,
with interests thereon. Respondent PCIC
alleged in its complaint that:
3. On or
about 25 February 1991, I.S. Parts International, Inc. of New Jersey, USA,
engaged the services of the defendant ABOITIZ [herein petitioner AIFI] as
forwarder/consolidator to deliver from Philadelphia, USA, one (1) box
containing Glass Making Machine Parts for Hold/Open/Close Operating Linkage[s]
with invoice value of P8,283.60 C & F Manila to Union Glass &
Container Corp. in Manila;
4. Defendant
ABOITIZ loaded the above cargo of one (1) box containing Glass Making Machine
Parts for Hold/Open/Close Operating Linkage on or about 25 February 1991 at the
port of Philadelphia, USA, on board the vessel “COOL Fortune” for
transportation to Manila and delivery thereat to Union Glass & Container
Corp. as ultimate consignee covered by bill of lading No. MNLO29110609, x x x;
5. The
consignee insured with plaintiff the above cargo under the terms and conditions
of its MRN-31131 for the sum of P269,349.54;
x x x
x
8.
On
9.
Defendants misdelivered
or misappropriated the subject cargo thereby failing to deliver the same to the
consignee in violation of their obligations to forward and deliver the same to
the consignee;
10.
Claims were filed with the defendants for
the value of the undelivered cargo but defendants declined payment without any
valid or justifiable ground; plaintiff, having received similar claim under the
insurance coverage, settled and paid the consigned-assured the sum of P269,349.54
after proper assessment and thereby become subrogated to the consignee’s rights
of recovery against the defendants.[1]
Respondent PCIC prayed that judgment
be rendered in its favor, thus:
Wherefore,
it is most respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to render judgment ordering
the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the sum of P269,349.54
with interest thereon at the legal rate computed from the filing hereof plus
cost of suit.[2]
Based on the return of the process
server of the court a quo, copies of
the complaint and summons were served by him on
On
Respondent PCIC adduced its
testimonial and documentary evidence on
On P10,000.00 as attorney’s fees. The fallo of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing, the court hereby
renders judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering
the latter to jointly and severally pay the plaintiff the amount of P269,349.54,
with the legal rate of interest thereon from the date of filing of the
complaint until fully paid and to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees in the
amount of P10,000.00 with costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
A
copy of the said decision was served on petitioner AIFI on
On
Petitioner AIFI claimed that it had a
meritorious defense because it exercised and observed extraordinary diligence
in its vigilance over the goods consigned to Union Glass & Container Corp.,
which insured the same with respondent PCIC. It was allegedly due to the fault
and negligence of petitioner AIFI’s co-defendants
that the said goods were lost. As such, petitioner AIFI’s
co-defendants must be the ones held liable to respondent PCIC, which paid the
consignee-assured (Union Glass & Container Corp.) the sum of P269,349.54
and thereby became subrogated to the latter’s right of recovery against
petitioner AIFI’s co-defendants.[9]
Petitioner AIFI prayed that, after
due proceedings, it be granted reliefs, as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully
prayed that upon the filing of this Petition, a restraining order and/or writ
of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the plaintiff and/or the Sheriff
of this Honorable Court from proceeding with the execution of the Judgment
dated 11 July 1995; and that this Petition for Relief from Judgment be granted,
dismissing this case, setting aside of the Judgment dated 11 July 1995 for
being null and void, quashing the Writ of Execution dated 30 August 1996 and
the Notice of Garnishment dated 23 September 1996.
AIFI prays for such other relief as may be deemed just
and equitable under the premises.[10]
Appended
to its petition was the affidavit of merit of its Treasurer, Ramonito E. De La Cruz.[11] Petitioner AIFI claimed that it had not been
officially served with a copy of the decision of the court a quo nor of copies of the writs of execution and garnishment.
Petitioner
AIFI likewise moved that it be allowed to present Lita
Apostol as its witness to prove that, contrary to the
statement in the return of the process server, she was merely petitioner AIFI’s customer service representative and not authorized
to receive the complaint and summons in its behalf. The court a
quo granted the said motion.
However, petitioner AIFI failed to present Apostol
as witness.[12]
On
First.
As between the self-serving contention
of petitioner AIFI and the return of the process server, the latter’s
determination of Lita Apostol
as documentary clerk is accorded greater weight in view of the presumption that
he had regularly performed his functions.[13] The court a
quo took note of the fact that it granted petitioner AIFI’s
motion to present Lita Apostol
in the hearing of November 8, 1996, however, it failed to do so.
Second. As documentary clerk, Lita
Apostol is considered an agent of petitioner AIFI insofar
as service of court processes is concerned since she is a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori supposable that she ought to know what to do with the
legal papers served on her, consistent with the doctrine laid down in Villa Rey Transit,
Inc. v. Far East Motor Corporation[14]
and Golden Country Farms, Inc. v. Sanvar Development Corporation.[15]
Third. The court a
quo relied on the original complaint in the conduct of its proceedings and
rendition of decision. It awarded
attorney’s fees although there was no prayer for the same in the original
complaint because it may nevertheless award attorney’s fees “when (it) deems it
just and equitable.”[16]
Fourth. There was a valid service of the court a quo’s decision on petitioner AIFI. The certificate of service shows that the same
was served on Lilia Nebris, a security guard of the
building. The security guard represented
to the process server of the court a quo,
Thieron Johnston, Jr., that she was duly authorized
to receive papers pertaining to the corporation, as reflected in the
certificate of service filed by the said process server.
Fifth. Petitioner AIFI failed to show that it had a
meritorious defense. Its liability as a
common carrier has been well-established in the decision subject of the
petition for relief.[17]
Petitioner
AIFI filed a motion for reconsideration of the court a quo’s order denying its petition for relief from judgment.[18] However, the same was denied in the Order of
I. THE COURT A QUO NEVER ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
INASMUCH AS THERE WAS NO VALID SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON
THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DATED
II. NEITHER
DID THE COURT A QUO ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION [OVER THE] COMPLAINT DATED
III. EVEN
ASSUMING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT
SUMMONS WAS VALIDLY SERVED UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT ON THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
AND, AS SUCH, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT. THERE WAS
NO SERVICE OF SUMMONS UPON DEFENDANT-APPELLANT OF EITHER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT,
THE JUDGMENT AND/OR THE FINAL ORDER OF THE HONORABLE COURT DATED 11 OCTOBER
1993 DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE, IN COMPLETE VIOLATION OF
RULE 13, SECTION 9 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, NOW RULE 9, SECTION 3(A) OF
THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
IV. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT FAILED TO SHOW A MERITORIOUS DEFENSE.[20]
Petitioner AIFI reiterated the arguments
in its petition for relief from judgment and motion for reconsideration filed
with the court a quo in support of
its appeal before the appellate court.
On
provided in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court; (b) the complaint and summons were
validly served on petitioner AIFI through Lita Apostol, its documentary clerk; and (c) it had the remedy
of a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the court a quo or an appeal therefrom
but petitioner AIFI failed to avail any of the said remedies; hence, it was
proscribed from filing a petition for relief from the judgment of the court a quo.
Petitioner
AIFI sought to reconsider the above decision but the CA denied its motion for
reconsideration. Hence, petitioner AIFI
filed the present petition for review on certiorari
alleging that:
I. THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF PETITIONER SUCH THAT SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT DATED
II. THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN NOT FINDING THAT EVEN ASSUMING IN GRATIA ARGUMENTI THAT SUMMONS WAS
VALIDLY SERVED UPON PETITIONER ON THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND, AS SUCH,
PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY DECLARED IN DEFAULT, THERE WAS NO SERVICE OF SUMMONS
UPON PETITIONER ON EITHER THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, THE JUDGMENT AND/OR THE FINAL
ORDER OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 11 OCTOBER 1993 DISMISSING THE CASE FOR FAILURE
TO PROSECUTE, IN COMPLETE VIOLATION OF RULE 13, SECTION 9 OF THE REVISED RULES
OF COURT, NOW RULE 9, SECTION 3(A) OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
III. THE PUBLIC
RESPONDENT COMMITTED MANIFEST ERROR IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER’S FILING OF
PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT WITH THE TRIAL COURT WAS AVAILED OF AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO APPEAL.[21]
Petitioner AIFI insists that Lita Apostol was merely one of
its customer service representatives, not its president, manager, cashier,
director, or agent, hence, not authorized to receive the complaint and summons
addressed to it. It avers that the
declaration of the process server
of the court a quo that Apostol was its documentary clerk has no factual
basis. It concedes that in Golden Country Farms, Inc. v. Sanvar Development Corporation,[22] the
Court ruled that the service of the complaint and summons on the
clerk-typist of the petitioners therein was a substantial compliance with the
Rules of Court. However, petitioner AIFI
posits that unlike in those cases, the
complaint and summons were never turned over by Lita Apostol to any of its officers authorized to receive the
complaint and summons. Hence, the
rulings of this Court in said cases were not allegedly applicable. Petitioner AIFI maintains that its petition
for relief from judgment was the proper remedy in the court a quo.
In its comment on the petition,
respondent PCIC avers that the judgment of the court a quo had long became final and executory and had been satisfied as
early as 1996; consequently, this case
must be considered closed and terminated.
It further contends that the assailed orders of the court a quo and the decision of the appellate
court are in accord with the Rules of Court and the law. According to respondent PCIC, as documentary
clerk of petitioner AIFI, Lita Apostol
was its agent authorized to receive the complaint and summons in its
behalf. Further, petitioner AIFI received
a copy of the decision of the court a quo
on
In reply, petitioner AIFI does not
deny the contention of respondent PCIC that the decision of the court a quo had already been fully satisfied
as early as 1996. However, petitioner
AIFI insists that, since it was not validly served with the summons and
complaint, the court a quo had no
jurisdiction
over it, hence, all proceedings before the court a quo and its decision, writ of execution, and writ of garnishment
are null and void. Petitioner AIFI claims that its only remedy was to file a
petition for relief from judgment and not a motion for new trial or an appeal
from the decision of the court a quo to
the CA.
Based on the arguments and
counter-arguments of the parties, the issues for the Court’s resolution are:
(a) whether the petition is moot and academic with the satisfaction of the
decision of the court a quo as early
as 1996; and (b) whether petitioner AIFI had a cause of action for relief from
the decision of the court a quo under
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
The
petition is denied for lack of merit.
On
the first issue, the petition at bar has not been mooted by the satisfaction of
the decision of the court a quo. There is no evidence on record that the award
in favor of respondent PCIC under the decision of the court a quo was satisfied by the deputy
sheriff’s garnishment of petitioner AIFI’s deposits
with its bank. Even then, petitioner
AIFI is not proscribed from assailing the decision of the court a quo and the writs of execution and
garnishment of its funds with its bank in the Court of Appeals and in this
Court.
On
the second issue, the Court finds and so declares that, based on the
allegations of petitioner AIFI in its petition before the court a quo, it had no cause of action for
relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1 thereof provides that a
petition for relief from judgment may be filed only on the grounds of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence:
SECTION
1. Petition for relief from judgment,
order, or other proceedings. – When a judgment or final order is entered,
or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a
petition in such
court and in the same case praying that the judgment,
order or proceeding be set aside.
Even
a cursory reading of the petition for relief filed by petitioner AIFI with the
court a quo will readily show that it
failed to allege therein that the decision of the court a quo was entered or the
proceedings was taken against it through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence. The only ground for its
petition was the lack of jurisdiction of the court a quo over it on its claim that the process server of the court a quo failed to serve the summons and
complaint on it through any of its officers or agent enumerated in Section 13,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court which reads:
SEC.
13. Service upon private domestic corporation
or partnership. – If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the
Moreover,
a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is only available
against a final and executory judgment.[23] Since petitioner AIFI claims that the court a quo had no jurisdiction over it, then
all the proceedings therein, including its decision are null and void. Hence, recourse by petitioner AIFI to a
petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court was
inappropriate.
Even
on the assumption that the court a quo
had no jurisdiction over petitioner AIFI on account of the non-service on it of
the summons and complaint, the remedy of petitioner AIFI from notice of the
decision by default on July 24, 1996 was to file a motion for the
reconsideration of said decision or for new trial within fifteen days from said
date. This is without prejudice to its
right to file a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court for the nullification of the order of default of the court a quo
and the proceedings thereafter held including its decision, the writ
of execution and the writ of garnishment issued by the court a quo on the ground that it acted
without jurisdiction.[24] However, petitioner AIFI opted to file a petition
for relief from judgment of the court a
quo.
The
issue of whether or not Lita Apostol
was petitioner AIFI’s documentary clerk or a customer service representative is
one of fact. Petitioner AIFI is
proscribed from raising the issue in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court which specifically provides that only questions of law may be raised in
this Court for the simple reason that it is not a trier
of facts.
Moreover, the certificate of service
of the process server of the court a quo is
prima facie evidence of the facts as
set out therein.[25] The records show that despite being allowed
to present Lita Apostol as
witness to prove that she was its customer service representative and not its
documentary clerk, petitioner AIFI failed to do so. This omission rendered the certification of
the process server of the court a quo
conclusive on petitioner AIFI.
The
court a quo and the appellate court
held that Lita Apostol, as
the documentary clerk of petitioner AIFI, was deemed to be an agent thereof
because her employment with petitioner AIFI and the nature of her duties as
such are so integrated with its business as to make it a priori supposable that she brought the complaint to petitioner
and knew what she ought to do with any legal papers served on her. The Court is bound by the findings of facts
of these courts absent evidence on record to the contrary.
In Pabon v. NLRC,[26]
the Court elucidated on the definition of agent under Section 13, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court, thus:
Black’s
Law Dictionary defines an “agent” as “a business representative, whose function
is to bring about, modify, affect, accept performance of, or terminate
contractual obligations between principal and third person.” To this extent, an “agent” may also be shown
to represent his principal in some one or more of his relations to others, even
though he may not have the power to enter into contracts. The rules on service of process make service
on “agent” sufficient. It does not, in
any way, distinguish whether the “agent” be general or special, but is complied
with even by a service upon an agent having limited authority to represent his
principal. As such, it does not
necessarily connote an officer of the corporation. x x
x[27]
One
may be an agent of a private domestic corporation although he is not an officer
thereof. However, an employee of a
corporation may not be deemed an agent of the corporation under the above rule
unless his or her duties are so integrated to the business of the corporation
that his or her absence or presence will not toll the entire operation of the
business.
It can be supposed a priori absent any evidence to the
contrary that Lita Apostol
as documentary clerk was tasked to receive the complaint and the summons for
petitioner AIFI and to pass on these legal documents to any of its responsible
officers. She worked in the same
building as the officers of petitioner AIFI and, thus, had easy access to them.
The
case for petitioner AIFI was debilitated by the absence of any meritorious
defense as against the claim of respondent PCIC. The contention of petitioner AIFI that it
acted and observed extraordinary diligence in its vigilance over the shipment
insured by respondent PCIC, without any factual basis for such allegation, is
merely a conclusion. Neither did
petitioner AIFI offer any factual basis for its claim that the loss of the
cargo was caused by the negligence of its co-defendants.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice Associate Justice
(On official
leave)
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On official leave
[1] Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[2]
[3] Rollo, p. 42.
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, p. 58.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 67-68.
[11]
[12]
[13] Section 5(m), Rule 131, Rules of Court.
[14] No.
L-31339,
[15] G.R.
No. 58027,
[16] Article
2208(11), Civil Code of the
[17] Rollo, p. 74-78.
[18] Rollo, pp. 77-85.
[19]
[20]
[21] Rollo, p. 7.
[22] Supra note 15.
[23]
[24]
[25] Rubia v. GSIS, G.R. No. 151439, 2004
[26] G.R.
No. 120457,
[27]