Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
RODOLFO HERMOSO,
ANTONIO JACOBE, BRIGIDO PORTUGUESE, REGALADO AUSTRIA, LOLITA ANGELES, PRESINA
BERSABE, ANGELITO ROSQUETA, CONSTANCIO PROTUGUESE, ROGELIO SANTOS, ALIAS
FIEL, CATALINA VALENZUELA, JAIME PANGILINAN, ESTELA DE VERA MACALALAD,
LETICIA LOPEZ, NOEMI BAUTISTA, GREGORIO ANTAZO, ELPIDIO CRIZALDO, OSCAR
VICTORIO and ANTONIO ZURITA, Petitioners, - versus - C.L. REALTY
CORPORATION, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 140319 Present: PUNO, J.,
Chairperson,* SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,** AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in
this petition for review under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 43795, to wit:
1.
Decision[1] dated
2. Resolution[2] dated June 17, 1999 denying petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, thereby also denying their belatedly-filed motion for reconsideration; and
3.
Resolution[3] dated
Respondent C.L. Realty Corporation (C.L.
Realty, for short) is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of
46.1476 hectares located at Brgy. Alas-asin, Mariveles,
On P273,559.00. C.L. Realty challenged the
valuation thus made, claiming it to be unconscionably low since, under its Sworn Statement on Agricultural Land
Holdings dated February 8, 1988 and filed with the Municipal Assessor’s
Office, P4,614,760.00 was the amount
entered as the fair value of the land.
On
Barely a month after, C.L. Realty,
without requesting for the lifting of the land coverage, formally requested and applied with DAR-Region
III for conversion of the land from agricultural to industrial/commercial use
which request was also indorsed in due time to the PARO of Bataan for
appropriate action.
Evidently unbeknownst to C.L. Realty
when it made its deferment request and filed its application for conversion,
CLOAs were already issued to herein petitioners Rodolfo Hermoso, et al. In fact, pursuant to the CLOAs thus issued, some
of them were able to secure on
Later apprised of the CLOA issuance, C.L.
Realty filed with the DARAB- Region III office a petition, later docketed as DARAB Case No. 092-B-93, praying for the
cancellation of herein petitioners’ CLOAs on the ground of irregular, premature
and anomalous issuance. Specifically, C.L. Realty alleged, inter alia, that the CLOA recipients do not meet the basic farmer-beneficiary
qualification requirement and are not under the order of priority defined in
Section 22 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657[4].
In their answer, petitioners denied allegations
of irregularity and prematurity in the issuance of the CLOAs in question,
adding that all legal requirements for the purpose have been complied with and
that they are all qualified farmer-beneficiaries. They also contend that the
petition to cancel was erroneously directed at them when it should have been
addressed to the DAR officials who processed/approved their applications filed in
good faith.
Finding that undue haste attended the
processing and issuance of the CLOAs in question, and that the petitioners were
not qualified farmer-beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657, the DARAB
Provincial Adjudicator rendered, on
Therefrom, petitioners appealed to the DARAB
Proper at Diliman,
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal meritorious, the decision of the Honorable Adjudicator a quo is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is rendered rejecting any attempt to nullify the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) to herein respondents-appellants. The Board upholds the efficacy of the same.
The DARAB Proper
predicated its disposition on the premise that C.L. Realty, failing as it did
to substantiate its allegations respecting the lack of qualification as farmer-beneficiaries
of petitioners, had not overturned the presumption that official duty had been
duly performed.
Following the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, C.L. Realty went to the Court of Appeals (CA) by way of petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43795.
At stated at the outset, CA, in the
herein assailed decision[5]
dated
WHEREFORE,
the premises considered, the appealed decision of the DARAB is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE and the Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator dated
Subsequently,
petitioners, through counsel, filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration. On
Citing Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc., et. al. vs. Hon. Maximo Japson, et. al.,[6] the CA,
in its equally assailed resolution[7] of
Aggrieved, petitioners are now before us
via this petition for review under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In the meanwhile, the Court, upon
application of the petitioners, issued, on
The issues raised, as summarized in
petitioners’ memorandum[10], turn
on the following questions:
1. Whether or not the DARAB provincial adjudicator has jurisdiction to nullify the CLOAs issued to petitioners, given that the corresponding TCTs have been issued over the lands covered;
2. Whether or not the petition filed by C.L. Realty before the Office of the Provincial Adjudicator should have been dismissed for non-joinder of indispensable parties;
3. Whether or not the CA failed to take into account facts and circumstances supportive of herein petitioners’ cause, and, on the other hand, accorded undue weight to the findings of the Provincial Adjudicator; and
4. Whether or not the CA erred in denying herein petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration.
The jurisdictional and procedural issues
raised at the threshold hereof cannot carry the day for the petitioners.
Vis-à-vis petitioners’ jurisdictional
challenge, it may be stated that the DAR, through its adjudication arm, i.e., the DARAB and its regional and
provincial adjudication boards, exercises quasi-judicial functions and
jurisdiction on all matters pertaining to agrarian dispute or controversy and
the implementation of agrarian reform laws.[11] In
Nuesa vs. Court of Appeals,[12]
the Court, citing the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, stated that the DARAB
has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction “to determine and adjudicate
all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of all the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program [CARP] under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 228,
229 and 129-A, R.A. 3844, as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.” The Court made a similar pronouncement on the
jurisdiction of DARAB in Bautista vs. Mag-isa Vda. De Villa.[13] Under
Section 1(f) of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, such jurisdiction of the DARAB
includes cases involving “the issuance, correction and cancellation of … (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs)
which are registered with the Land Registration Authority.” Surely, such jurisdiction cannot be deemed to
disappear the moment a certificate of title is issued. For, such certificates are
not modes of transfer of property but merely evidence of such transfer.
Needless to state, there can be no valid transfer of title should the CLOA on
which it was grounded is void.
At any rate, the petitioners are in no
position to question the jurisdiction of the DAR and its adjudicative arm at
this late junction of the proceedings. They are already estopped at this stage
to challenge the competency of the DARAB and its provincial adjudicator to have
taken cognizance of the case. This disposition becomes all the more pressing
considering the petitioners’ active participation in the proceedings below, and
their having been the recipients of a favorable decision dated August 21, 1996
of the DARAB Proper. Decisional law frowns upon a jurisdictional challenge cast
against such a milieu.
Petitioners’
thesis, under the second ground, that the DAR officials who processed and
approved the applications for issuance of CLOAs and the Register of Deeds are
indispensable parties cannot be given cogency. Surely, a final determination of
the petition for cancellation of CLOAs could be had even without joining in
such petition any of the officials adverted to. And as a matter of long and
recognized practice, a public respondent need only to be impleaded in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but even
then, the adjudicating judge, officer or tribunal would only be considered a
nominal party.[14]
In petitions for review on certiorari as a mode of ordinary appeal under
either Rule 43[15]
or 45,[16]
only the private parties to the case are to be impleaded.
The foregoing
notwithstanding, the Court still rules for petitioners due to compelling
reasons ostensibly overlooked by the appellate court. We start with respondent C.L.
Realty’s standing to question the
qualification of the petitioners as CARP beneficiaries. As the DARAB Proper aptly observed:
It is the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) or the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) together with the Barangay Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) who
screen and select the possible agrarian beneficiaries. If there are farmers who
claimed they have a priority over those who have been identified by the MARO as
beneficiaries of the land, said farmers can file a protest with the MARO or the
PARO who is currently processing the Land Distribution Folder (Administrative
Order No. 10, Series of 1990).
xxx The
landowner, however, does not have the right to select who the beneficiaries
should be. Hence, other farmers who were not selected and claimed they have
a priority over those who have been identified as such can file a written
protest with the MARO or the PARO who is currently processing the claim folder.[17]
[Emphasis supplied]
Denying a
landowner the right to choose a CARP beneficiary is, in context, only proper. For
a covered landholding does not revert back to the owner even if the beneficiaries
thus selected do not meet all necessary qualifications. Should it be found that
the beneficiaries are indeed disqualified, the land acquired by the State for
agrarian reform purposes will not be returned to the landowner but shall go
instead to other qualified beneficiaries.
Lest it be overlooked, respondent, upon
its receipt of the Notice of Acquisition
of the land in question, never disputed the propriety, let alone asked for the
lifting, of such acquisition. Respondent, from its arguments, does not,
therefore, have a claim to retaining ownership of the land. All it did was to
except from the valuation given to its former landholding. And even as to the
issue of just compensation, there is no showing that respondent ever brought the matter to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) as even respondent, in its memorandum, admits it should have done.
In this regard, respondent, citing what the Court said in Republic vs. Court of Appeals,[18] states
in its memorandum:
Thus, under the law, the Land Bank of the
Respondent
emphasizes in the above-quoted portion of its memorandum that the RTC has
jurisdiction over just compensation disputes. However, nowhere is it shown,
even in its own allegations of facts, that respondent brought this matter to
the RTC. Instead, respondent sought a conversion of the land from agricultural
to industrial/commercial use.
Under DAR Administrative
Order (AO) No. 1, series of 1990, as amended by AO No. 12, series of 1994, “[A]fter
the DAR has issued a Notice of Acquisition of an agricultural land under the
compulsory acquisition process … no application for conversion of said land
from the landowner or anyone acting on his behalf shall be given due course.” Given
this perspective, it cannot plausibly be said that the issuance of CLOAs during the pendency of
the conversion proceedings was anomalous, irregular or premature. As it were,
the application for conversion was improper from the start, the notice of
acquisition having previously been issued.
Respondent's ploy
for conversion having failed, and the CLOAs having been issued, respondent
resorted to seeking the cancellation of said CLOAs on the basis of the lack of
qualifications of the beneficiaries and the pendency of its application for
conversion. Needless to stress, respondent pursued a strange course of action
considering that, originally, its only grievance related to property valuation.
As stated earlier,
respondent was without personality to question the selection of beneficiaries.
However, even if it had such personality, its arguments against petitioners’
qualifications as farmer-beneficiaries do not bear sufficient weight to peremptorily
justify the cancellation of the issued CLOAs. It may be that the petitioners were
employed or self-employed. This reality, however, even if true, does not per se argue against their qualifications
as CARP beneficiaries at the time the award was made. For all the law requires, in the minimum, is that the prospective beneficiary be a landless resident
preferably of the barangay or municipality, as the case may be, where the
landholding is located, provided he has, in the language of Section 22 of RA
6657, the “willingness, aptitude and
ability to cultivate and make the land as productive as possible”. A
farmer-beneficiary need not undertake every chore in the cultivation of the
farmholding all by his personal self; he may be assisted in the farm work and
the care of plants by his immediate farm household without forfeiting his right
to continue as such beneficiary.[20]
In the case at
bench, it appears that the BARC, the MARO and/or PARO have screened and, after
investigation, identified, or at least
are presumed to have duly screened and identified, the petitioners as qualified beneficiaries of
the land in question and have found the property to be suitable for
agricultural productivity. This determination has not been overcome by proof to
the contrary. To be sure, the provincial adjudicator’s posture, as affirmed by
the appellate court, that none of the petitioners meet the qualifications of a
farmer beneficiary, since they are factory workers, private employees or
fishermen, cannot be accorded the weight of
overturning evidence. For one, the provincial adjudicator did not
identify who among the petitioners are self-employed, factory workers or
fishermen, if that be the case. And for another, the provincial adjudicator did
not point to any evidence to establish his simplistic conclusion about
petitioners not being qualified as farmer-beneficiaries.
Another argument
was that some of the beneficiaries were not even residents of Brgy. Alas-asin
where the land is located. It ought to be pointed out, however, that the
petitioners were residents of neighboring barangays, many of which were within
walking distance from Brgy. Alas-asin. While farmers or
farm workers already in the place should be given preferential rights in the
distribution of lands, even people living outside of the barangay where the
property is situated may be qualified as CARP beneficiaries. Section 22 of R.A.
No. 6657 says so:
Section
22. Qualified Beneficiaries. - The lands covered by the CARP shall be
distributed as much as possible to landless residents of the same barangay, or
in the absence thereof, landless residents of the same municipality in the
following order of priority:
a)
agricultural lessees and share tenants;
b)
regular farmworkers;
c)
seasonal farmworkers;
d)
other farmworkers;
e)
actual tillers or occupants of public land;
f)
collective or cooperative of the above beneficiaries; and
g)
others directly working on the land.
xxx xxx xxx
As stressed by the
DARAB Proper in its decision, the very essence of the CARP is to uplift and
help as many farmers as possible and make them beneficiaries of the program.
Thus, a liberal interpretation is preferred.
Section 22 of the
CARP law provides merely for an order of priority in the distribution of the
land to beneficiaries. In the case at bar, there appears to be no applicants
other than the petitioners. Thus, even if it be assumed that petitioners fall
under the last enumerated order of beneficiaries, namely, “others directly
working on the land,” still they are qualified as beneficiaries since they are
all residents of Mariveles, Bataan, where the land is located, though not
necessarily all residents of the same barangay.
It should be
stressed, at this juncture, that petitioners have had their CLOAs and
certificates of title for over eight (8) years. Some of them have fully paid
the Land Bank for the value of the land awarded them. They have been paying all
these years the real estate taxes on their landholdings, cultivating them in
the process.
As a final consideration, we note that
the CA had denied with finality petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of its underlying
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43795 dated March 31,
1999, and its Resolutions dated June 17, 1999 and October 11, 1999 are SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board in DARAB Case No. 1999 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On Leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
(NO
PART)
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Second
Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
** Acting chairperson.
[1] Penned by then Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner (ret.), with Associate Justices Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez (now a member of this Court) and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 45-50; Annex “D”, Petition.
[2]
[3]
[4] The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
[5] See Note #1, supra.
[6] G.R. No. L-70895,
[7] See item #2, supra.
[8] See Note #3, supra.
[9] Rollo, pp. 99-100.
[10]
[11] Martillano v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 148277,
[12] G.R. No. 132048,
[13] G.R. No. 152564,
[14] Section 5, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
[15] Section 6(a) ibid.
[16] Section 4(a). ibid.
[17] Rollo, pp. 39-40.
[18] G.R. No. 122256,
[19] Respondent’s Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo p. 252.
[20]
[21] See Note #1, supra.
[22] Balindong vs. CA, G.R. No. 159962,