FIRST DIVISION
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SPOUSES BONIFACIO R. VALDEZ, JR.
and venida m.
valdez, petitioners, - versus - hon. court of
appeals, spouses gabriel fabella and
francisca fabella,
Respondents. |
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G.R. No.
132424 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: May 2, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court, filed by petitioners spouses Bonifacio R. Valdez, Jr.
and Venida M. Valdez, seeks to nullify and set aside
the 22 April 1997 decision[1] and
30 January 1998 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43492,
which reversed the judgment, dated 8 January 1997, of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 3607, which, in turn, affirmed
in toto the decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch II, in Civil Case No. 2547.
This case originated from a complaint
for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida
Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella
before the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges these material facts:
2. That plaintiffs are the registered owner[s] of a
piece of residential lot denominated as
3. That defendants, without any color of title
whatsoever occupie[d] the said lot by building their
house in the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession thereof;
4. That for several times, plaintiffs orally asked the
herein defendants to peacefully surrender the premises to them, but the latter
stubbornly refused to vacate the lot they unlawfully occupied;
5. That despite plaintiffs’ referral of the matter to
the Barangay, defendants still refused to heed the plea of the former to
surrender the lot peacefully;
6. That because
of the unfounded refusal of the herein defendants to settle the case amicably,
the Barangay Captain was forced to issue the necessary Certification to File
Action in favor of the herein plaintiffs in order that the necessary cause of
action be taken before the proper court, xerox copy
of which is hereto attached marked as Annex “C”;
7. That by reason of the deliberate, malicious and
unfounded refusal of the defendants to vacate/surrender the premises in
question, the herein plaintiffs were constrained to engage the professional
services of counsel thus incurring expenses amounting to TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) representing acceptance fee and additional ONE
THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00) per appearance, who on July 12, 1994 sent a formal
demand was likewise ignored, (sic) copy of which is hereto attached as Annex
“D”;
8. That likewise by virtue of the adamant refusal of
the defendants to vacate/surrender the said premises in question, plaintiff[s]
suffered serious anxiety, sleepless nights, mental torture and moral erosion; x
x x[2]
In
their answer, private respondents contended that the complaint failed to state
that petitioners had prior physical possession of the property or that they
were the lessors of the former. In the alternative, private respondents
claimed ownership over the land on the ground that they had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession thereof for more than thirty years, as
attested by an ocular inspection report from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources. They also stressed
that the complaint failed to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91
regarding affidavits against non-forum shopping.
The
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, ordering
private respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and
occupation of the same plus attorney’s fees.
Private
respondents appealed the MTC’s decision to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The RTC, in a decision dated
Undeterred, the private respondents filed a
petition for review with the Court of Appeals on
In
a decision dated
An examination of the complaint reveals that key
jurisdictional allegations that will support an action for ejectment are
conspicuously lacking. In particular, an allegation of prior material
possession is mandatory in forcible entry, xxx and
the complaint is deficient in this respect. On the other hand, neither does there appear
to be a case of unlawful detainer, since the private respondents failed to show
that they had given the petitioners the right to occupy the premises, which
right has now [been] extinguished.
xxx
In
light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial
Court before which the action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over
the case. Consequently,
the dismissal thereof is in
order.
WHEREFORE,
the Petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and GRANTED. The decision dated
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration
which was denied in a resolution dated
Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioners submit the following
issues for the Court’s consideration[5]:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
CLEARLY MADE OUT A CASE FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
B. WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATION(S) OF THE
COMPLAINT, THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
Since
the two issues are closely intertwined, they shall be discussed together.
In
the main, petitioners claim that the averments of their complaint make out a
case for unlawful detainer having alleged that private respondents unlawfully
withheld from them the possession of the property in question, which allegation
is sufficient to establish a case for unlawful detainer. They further contend that the summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy available to the owner if another occupies
the land at the former’s tolerance or permission without any contract between
the two as the latter is bound by an implied promise to vacate the land upon
demand by the owner.
The
petition is not meritorious.
Under
existing law and jurisprudence, there are three kinds of actions available to
recover possession of real property: (a) accion
interdictal; (b) accion
publiciana; and (c) accion
reivindicatoria.[6]
Accion interdictal
comprises two distinct causes of action, namely, forcible entry (detentacion) and unlawful detainer (desahuico).[7] In forcible entry, one is deprived of
physical possession of real property by
means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth whereas in unlawful
detainer, one illegally withholds possession after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied.[8] The two are distinguished from each other in
that in forcible entry, the possession of the defendant is illegal from the
beginning, and that the issue is which party has prior de facto
possession while in unlawful detainer, possession of the defendant is
originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the
right to possess.[9]
The
jurisdiction of these two actions, which are summary in nature, lies in the
proper municipal trial court or metropolitan trial court.[10] Both actions must be brought within one year
from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from
the date of last demand, in case of unlawful detainer.[11] The issue in said cases is the right to
physical possession.
Accion publiciana
is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be
brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year.[12] It is an ordinary civil proceeding to
determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title.[13] In other words, if at the time of the filing
of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned
plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the
action will be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana. On the other hand, accion
reivindicatoria is an action to recover ownership
also brought in the proper regional trial court in an ordinary civil
proceeding.[14]
To justify an action for unlawful
detainer, it is essential that the plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must
have been present right from the start of the possession which is later sought
to be recovered.[15] Otherwise, if the possession was unlawful
from the start, an action for unlawful detainer would be an improper remedy.[16] As explained in Sarona v. Villegas[17]:
But even where possession preceding the suit is by
tolerance of the owner, still, distinction should be made.
If right at the incipiency defendant’s possession was
with plaintiff’s tolerance, we do not doubt that the latter may require him to
vacate the premises and sue before the inferior court under Section 1 of Rule
70, within one year from the date of the demand to vacate.
x x x
x
A close assessment of the law and the concept of the
word “tolerance” confirms our view heretofore expressed
that such tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer - not
of forcible entry. Indeed, to
hold otherwise would espouse a dangerous doctrine. And for two reasons: First.
Forcible entry into the land is an open challenge to the right of the
possessor. Violation of that right
authorizes the speedy redress – in the inferior court - provided for in the
rules. If one year from the forcible
entry is allowed to lapse before suit is filed, then the remedy ceases to be
speedy; and the possessor is deemed to have waived his right to seek relief in the
inferior court. Second, if a
forcible entry action in the inferior court is allowed after the lapse of a number of years,
then the result may well be that no action of forcible entry can really
prescribe. No matter how long such
defendant is in physical possession, plaintiff will merely make a demand, bring
suit in the inferior court – upon a plea of tolerance to prevent prescription to
set in - and summarily throw him out of the land. Such a conclusion is unreasonable. Especially if we bear in mind the postulates
that proceedings of forcible entry and unlawful detainer are summary in nature,
and that the one year time-bar to suit is but in pursuance of the summary
nature of the action.[18] (Underlining
supplied)
It is the nature of defendant’s entry
into the land which determines the cause of action, whether it is forcible
entry or unlawful detainer. If the entry
is illegal, then the action which may be filed against the intruder is forcible
entry. If, however, the entry is legal
but the possession thereafter becomes illegal, the case is unlawful detainer.
Indeed, to vest the court
jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the
complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly
within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature.[19] The complaint must show enough on its face
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol
testimony.[20]
The jurisdictional facts must appear
on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was affected or how and when
dispossession started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria in the proper regional
trial court.[21] Thus, in Go,
Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[22]
petitioners filed an unlawful detainer case against respondent alleging that
they were the owners of the parcel of land through intestate succession which
was occupied by respondent by mere tolerance of petitioners as well as their
deceased mother. Resolving the issue on
whether or not petitioners’ case for unlawful detainer will prosper, the court
ruled[23]:
Petitioners alleged in their complaint that they
inherited the property registered under TCT No. C-32110 from their parents;
that possession thereof by private respondent was by tolerance of their mother, and after
her death, by their own tolerance; and that they had served written demand on
December, 1994, but that private respondent refused to vacate the property. x x x
It is settled
that one whose stay is merely tolerated becomes a deforciant
illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to leave. It is essential in unlawful detainer cases of
this kind, that plaintiff’s supposed acts of tolerance must have been present
right from the start of the possession which is later sought to be
recovered. This is where petitioners’
cause of action fails. The appellate
court, in full agreement with the MTC made the conclusion that the alleged
tolerance by their mother and after her death, by them, was unsubstantiated. x x x
The evidence revealed that the possession of defendant
was illegal at the inception and not merely tolerated as alleged in the
complaint, considering that defendant started to occupy the subject lot and
then built a house thereon without the permission and consent of petitioners
and before them, their mother. xxx Clearly, defendant’s entry into the
land was effected clandestinely, without the knowledge of the owners,
consequently, it is categorized as possession by stealth which is forcible
entry. As explained in Sarona vs. Villegas, cited in Muñoz vs. Court of Appeals [224 SCRA
216 (1992)] tolerance must be present right from the start of possession sought
to be recovered, to categorize a cause of action as one of unlawful detainer not
of forcible entry x x
x.
And in the case of Ten Forty Realty and Development Corp. v.
Cruz,[24]
petitioner’s complaint for unlawful detainer merely contained the bare
allegations that (1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after
its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and (2) her
allegedly illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance. The court, in finding that the alleged
tolerance did not justify the action for unlawful detainer, held:
To justify an action for unlawful detainer, the
permission or tolerance must have been present at the beginning of the
possession. x x x
x x x
x
In this case, the Complaint and the other pleadings do
not recite any averment of fact that would substantiate the claim of petitioner
that it permitted or tolerated the occupation of the property by Respondent
Cruz. The complaint contains only bare
allegations that 1) respondent immediately occupied the subject property after
its sale to her, an action merely tolerated by petitioner; and 2) her allegedly
illegal occupation of the premises was by mere tolerance.
These allegations contradict, rather than support,
petitioner’s theory that its cause of action is for unlawful detainer. First, these arguments advance the
view that respondent’s occupation of the property was unlawful at its
inception. Second, they counter
the essential requirement in unlawful detainer cases that petitioner’s supposed
act of sufferance or tolerance must be present right from the start of a
possession that is later sought to be recovered.[25]
In the instant case, the allegations
in the complaint do not contain any averment of fact that would substantiate
petitioners’ claim that they permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
property by respondents. The complaint
contains only bare allegations that “respondents without any color of title
whatsoever occupies the land in question by building their house in the said
land thereby depriving petitioners the possession thereof.” Nothing has been said on how respondents’
entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started. Admittedly, no express contract
existed between the parties. This
failure of petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts constitutive of
unlawful detainer is fatal.[26]
Since the complaint did not satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the municipal trial court had no jurisdiction over
the case.[27] It is in this light that this Court finds
that the Court of Appeals correctly found that the municipal trial court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and
the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No.
2547 of the MTC Antipolo, Rizal for lack of jurisdiction is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Hector L. Hofileña with Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Artemio G. Tuquero, concurring.
[2] Rollo, pp. 88-90.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Javier v.
Veridiano II, G.R. No. L-48050,
[7]
[8] Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 415 Phil. 172, 184 (2001).
[9]
[10] Javier v. Veridiano II, supra
note 6, pp. 572-573.
[11]
[12]
[13] Lopez v. David, Jr., G.R. No. 152145,
[14] Javier v. Veridiano II, supra note 6, pp. 572-573.
[15]
[16]
[17] 131 Phil. 365 (1968).
[18]
[19] Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 320 Phil. 146, 156 (1995).
[20]
[21]
[22] Supra note 8.
[23]
[24] Supra note 5.
[25]
[26] Unida v.
Heirs of Ambrosio Urban, G.R. No. 155432,
[27]