SALONGA HERNANDEZ
& G.R. No. 127165
ALLADO,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO,
-
versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
OLIVIA SENGCO PASCUAL Promulgated:
and THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, May 2, 2006
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Tinga,
J.:
Petitioner,
a professional law partnership, brings forth this Petition for Review assailing
the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals dated
The case
actually centers on two estate proceedings, that of Doña
Adela Pascual (Doña Adela) and the other, her
husband Don Andres Pascual’s (Don Andres), who
predeceased her. Don Andres died intestate, while Doña
Adela left behind a last will and testament. The
dispute over the intestate estate of Don Andres has spawned at least two cases
already settled by this Court.[2]
On 1
December 1973, an intestate proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of Don Andres was commenced by his widow Doña Adela before the then Court
of First Instance, now Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 23 (Intestate Court), docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 7554. Apart from his wife, who bore him no
children, Don Andres was survived by several nephews and nieces from his
full-blood and half-blood brothers.[3]
This proceeding proved to be the source of many controversies, owing to the
attempts of siblings Olivia and Hermes Pascual,
acknowledged natural children of Don Andres’s brother, Eligio,
to be recognized as heirs of Don Andres. Olivia and Hermes Pascual
procured the initial support of Doña Adela to their claims. However, on 16 October 1985, the
other heirs of Don Andres entered into a Compromise Agreement over the
objections of Olivia and Hermes Pascual, whereby
three-fourths (3/4) of the estate would go to Doña Adela and one-fourth (1/4) to the other heirs of Don
Andres, without prejudice to the final determination by the court or another
compromise agreement as regards the claims of Olivia and Hermes Pascual.[4] Subsequently, the
In the
meantime, Doña Adela died
on
Olivia Pascual then engaged the services of petitioner in
connection with the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela. Their agreement as to the professional fees due to
petitioner is contained in a letter dated
On 26
August 1987, private respondent, represented by petitioner, commenced a petition
for the probate of the last will and testament of Doña
Adela before the Probate Court, docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 136-MN and raffled to Branch 72 presided by Judge Benjamin M. Aquino, Jr.
The petition was opposed by a certain Miguel Cornejo,
Jr. and his siblings, who in turn presented a purported will executed in 1985
by Doña Adela in their
favor. [7]
After
due trial, on 1 July 1993, the Probate Court rendered a Decision[8]
allowing probate of the 1978 Last Will and Testament of Doña
Adela and disallowing the purported 1985 Will.
Letters testamentary were issued to Olivia Pascual.[9] Cornejo attempted to appeal
this decision of the Probate Court, but his notice of appeal was denied
due course by the Probate Court, said notice “not having been accompanied by
any record on appeal as required under the Interim Rules and by Rule 109 of the
Rules of Court.”[10]
On 27
July 1993, petitioner filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien equivalent to three
percent (3%) of the total gross estate of the late Doña
Adela S. Pascual as well as
the fruits thereof based on the court approved inventory of the estate,
pursuant to the retainer agreement signed by and between petitioner and Olivia
S. Pascual, on 25 August 1987. In an Order dated
Accordingly,
on
It was
at this stage, on 19 January 1994, that the Intestate Court rendered a Decision
in Sp. Proc. No. 7554, finally giving judicial approval to the aforementioned
1985 Compromise Agreement, and partitioning the estate of Don Andres by
adjudicating one-fourth (1/4) thereof to the heirs of Don Andres and
three-fourths (3/4) thereof to the estate of Doña Adela. The
On P1,198,097.02. The figure,
characterized as “tentative,” was arrived at based on a Motion to Submit
Project Partition dated P39,936,567.19. This sum was in
turn derived from the alleged value of the total estate of Don Andres,
three-fourths (3/4) of which had been adjudicated to Doña
Adela. At the same time, petitioner noted that the
stated values must be considered as only provisional, considering that they
were based on a July 1988 appraisal report; thus, the claim for execution was,
according to petitioner, without prejudice to an updated appraisal of the
properties comprising the gross estate of Doña Adela.[16]
On P1,198,097.02 was erroneous; and
that the enforcement of the writ of execution on the undivided estate of Don
Andres would prejudice his other heirs entitled to one-fourth (1/4) thereof.
On
On 14
November 1994, Olivia Pascual, filed with the Probate
Court a Motion to Declare General Default and Distribution of Testamentary
Dispositions with Cancellation of Administrator’s Bond. It was noted therein
that no creditor had filed a claim against the estate of Doña
Adela despite due notice published pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The Probate Court was also informed
of the fact that the proceedings before the Intestate Court had already been
terminated by reason of the 14 January 1994 Decision rendered by the latter
court. It was also stated “that the corresponding estate taxes had been paid as
evidenced by the Estate Tax Return filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
and of the Certificate of Authority issued by the said agency.”[20]
Interestingly, it was also manifested that two of the properties that formed
part of the estates of the spouses, “the Ongpin
Property” and “the Valenzuela Property,” had in fact already been partitioned
between the estate of Doña Adela
and the heirs of Don Andres at the ratio of three-fourths (3/4) and one-fourth
(1/4), respectively.
In
response, petitioner filed a Comment/Manifestation praying that an order be
issued:
(1) ordering the annotation of the attorney’s lien on
the properties comprising the estate of Doña Adela Pascual;
(2) a writ of
partial execution be issued for the satisfaction of the attorney’s lien of the
undersigned counsel [herein petitioner] in relation to the Ongpin
and Valenzuela properties for the amount of P635,368.14, without prejudice to the
issuance of a writ of execution after the re-appraisal of the present market
value of the estate and the determination of the amount due to [petitioner] as
attorney’s fees;
(3) ordering the appointment of a reputable appraisal
company to re-appraise the present market value of the estate of Doña Adela Pascual
including the fruits thereof for the purpose of determining the value of the
attorney’s fees of [petitioner]; and
(4) after the re-appraisal of the estate of Doña Adela Pascual
a writ of execution be issued for the full satisfaction and settlement of the
attorney’s lien of [petitioner].[21]
On 17
March 1995, the Probate Court issued an order which denied petitioner’s motion
for a re-appraisal of the property and the issuance of a partial writ of
execution “for being prematurely filed as there is no exact estate yet to be
inventoried and re-appraised, assuming re-appraisal would be proper, because
the bulk of the estate subject of this case, as far as this court is concerned,
has not yet been turned over to the executrix or to the court itself.”[22]
Through
a petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioner assailed the two orders of
the Probate Court denying its motion for the immediate execution, partial or
otherwise, of its claim for attorney’s fees: the
The Court of Appeals likewise noted that in the retainer
agreement between petitioner and Olivia Pascual, it
is stipulated that “the 3% final fee shall be payable upon approval by the
court of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the court
designated heirs of the estate.”[24]
On this score, the Court of Appeals ruled that as the petition before it did
not show “that an agreement on the distribution of properties of the estate of Doña Adela S. Pascual
has been submitted and approved by the probate court,”[25]
the filing of the motion for execution and that of the motion for re-appraisal
of the market value of the estate were both premature.
Petitioner sought to reconsider the Decision of the Court
of Appeals, but in vain.[26]
Hence this petition.
Petitioner argues that as held in Occeña
v. Marquez,[27]
the counsel seeking to recover attorney’s fees for legal services to the
executor or administrator is authorized to file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and
interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of
administration.[28] Lacson, it is alleged, was inappropriately cited, since
that case involved
an executor who
concurrently was a lawyer
who subsequently claimed attorney’s fees as part of the expenses of
administration. Petitioner also claims that the decision of the probate court
admitting Doña Adela’s will
to probate sufficiently satisfies the condition in the Retainer Agreement that the final fee be payable “upon approval
by the court of the agreement for the distribution of the properties to the
court designated heirs of the estate,” the court-approved will comprising the
agreement referred to in the contract.
Petitioner also takes exception to the Probate Court’s
finding that “the bulk of the estate subject of this case, as far as this [c]ourt is concerned, has not been turned over to the
executrix or to the [c]ourt itself,” on which the
appellate court predicated its ruling that the motion for a writ of execution
was premature. Petitioner submits that the Probate Court ineluctably has
jurisdiction over the estate of Doña Adela, and has necessarily assumed control over the
properties belonging to the said estate. Thus, petitioner continues, there is
no longer need to await the turnover of the properties involved in the
intestate estate of Don Andres which constitute part of the testate estate of Doña Adela since the Probate
Court and the
Petitioner
refers to the averment made by Olivia Pascual before
the Probate Court that the proceedings before the Intestate Court had already
been terminated, and that the proceeds of the sale of the Ongpin
Property and the Valenzuela Property had in fact been already divided based on
the three-fourths (3/4) to one-fourth (1/4) ratio between the estate of Doña Adela and the heirs of Don
Andres. Petitioner further points out that the Probate Court had authorized and
approved the sale of the Ongpin Property, yet refused
to allow the partial execution of its claim for attorney’s fees.
Finally,
petitioner asserts that the Probate Court erred in refusing to grant the prayer
seeking the re-appraisal of the property of Doña Adela’s estate. Such re-appraisal, so it claims, is
necessary in order to determine the three percent (3%) share in the total gross
estate committed to petitioner by reason of the Retainer Agreement.
It
appears that the thrust of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
along these lines: that petitioner may directly claim attorney’s fees only
against Olivia Pascual and not against the estate of Doña Adela; and that petitioner’s
claim is also premature since contrary to the requisite stipulated in the
Retainer Agreement, there is no court-approved agreement for the distribution
of the properties of the estate of Doña Adela as yet.
As an
initial premise, we consider whether a lawyer who renders legal services to the
executor or administrator of an estate can claim attorney’s fees against the
estate instead of the executor or administrator. Petitioner correctly cites Occeña v. Marquez[29]
as providing the governing rule on that matter as previously settled in the
1905 case of Escueta v. Sy-Juilliong,[30]
to wit:
The rule is that when a lawyer has rendered legal
services to the executor or administrator to assist him in the execution of his
trust, his attorney's fees may be allowed as expenses of administration. The
estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for payment
resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had
paid the fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate. The procedure
to be followed by counsel in order to collect his fees is to request the
administrator to make payment, and should the latter fail to pay, either to (a)
file an action against him in his personal capacity, and not as administrator,
or (b) file a petition in the testate or
intestate proceedings asking the court, after notice to all the heirs and
interested parties, to direct the payment of his fees as expenses of
administration. Whichever course is adopted, the heirs and other persons
interested in the estate will have the right to inquire into the value of the
services of the lawyer and on the necessity of his employment.[31]
We reiterate that as a general rule, it is the executor or
administrator who is primarily liable for attorney’s fees due to the lawyer who
rendered legal services for the executor or administrator in relation to the
settlement of the estate. The executor or administrator may seek reimbursement
from the estate for the sums paid in attorney’s fees if it can be shown that
the services of the lawyer redounded to the benefit of the estate.[32]
However, if the executor or administrator refuses to pay the attorney’s fees,
the lawyer has two modes of recourse. First, the lawyer may file an
action against the executor or administrator, but in his/her personal capacity
and not as administrator or executor. Second, the lawyer may file a
petition in the testate or intestate proceedings, asking the court to direct
the payment of attorney’s fees as an expense of administration. If the
second mode is resorted to, it is
essential that notice to all the heirs and interested parties be made so as to
enable these persons to inquire into the value of the services of the lawyer
and on the necessity of his employment.
Lacson v. Reyes,[33]
cited by the appellate court, involved an executor who also happened to be the
lawyer for the heirs who had filed the petition for probate. For that reason,
that case is not squarely in point to the case at bar. It was pronounced
therein that the administrator or executor of the estate cannot charge
professional fees for legal services against the same estate, as explicitly
provided under Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court of 1985.[34]
No such rule exists barring direct recovery of professional legal fees from the
estate by the lawyer who is not the executor or administrator of the said
estate. The limitations on such direct recovery are nonetheless established by
jurisprudence, as evinced by the rulings in Escueta
and Occeña.
The character of such claim for attorney’s fees bears
reiteration. As stated in Escueta, it partakes
the nature of an administration expense. Administration expenses include
attorney’s fees incurred in connection with the administration of the estate.[35]
It is an expense attending the accomplishment of the purpose of administration
growing out of the contract or obligation entered into by the personal
representative of the estate, and thus the claim for reimbursement must be
superior to the rights of the beneficiaries.[36]
Notwithstanding, there may be instances wherein the estate
should not be charged with attorney’s fees. If the costs of counsel’s fees
arise out of litigation among the beneficiaries thereof themselves or in the
protection of the interests of particular persons, the estate generally cannot
be held liable for such costs, although when the administrator employs
competent counsel on questions which affect his/her duties as the administrator
and on which he/she is in reasonable doubt, reasonable expenses for such
services may be charged against the estate subject to the approval of the
court.[37]
It has also been held that an administrator who brings on litigation for the
deliberate purpose of defrauding the legitimate heirs and for his own benefit
is not entitled to reimbursement for counsel’s fees incurred in such
litigation.[38]
Clearly then, while the direct recovery of attorney’s fees
from the estate may be authorized if the executor refuses to pay such fees, and
claimed through the filing of the proper petition with the probate court, such
claim remains controvertible. This is precisely why Escueta
and its progenies require that the petition be made with notice to
all the heirs and interested parties.
It is
these perspectives that we apply to the case at bar. Notably, petitioner had
filed both a Notice of Attorney’s Lien and a Motion for Writ of Execution.
These two pleadings have distinct character and must be treated as such.
After Doña Adela’s will had been
admitted to probate, petitioner had initially filed a Notice of Attorney’s Lien
wherein it identified itself as “the attorney for the executrix named in the
said will, Dra. Olivia S. Pascual”,
and sought to file its “claim and/or lien for attorney’s fees equivalent to
Three Percent (3%) of the total gross estate,” pursuant to the 1987 Retainer
Agreement. Copies of this Notice of Attorney’s Lien were furnished Attys. Fortunato Viray, Jr. and Crisanto Cornejo, who appear on
record to have served as counsels for the various oppositors
to the probate of the 1978 will of Doña Adela. This Notice of Attorney’s Lien was noted by the
Probate Court in its Order of
It may
be so that petitioner, in filing this Notice of Attorney’s Lien, initially
intended to hold Olivia Pascual, and not Doña Adela’s estate, liable for
the attorney’s fees. It did identify itself as the lawyer of Olivia Pascual, and the Probate Court did note that the lien be
satisfied chargeable to the share of the executor. Yet it must also be noted
that such lien, as it is, is only contingent on the final settlement of the
estate of Doña Adela, at
such time, since the Retainer Agreement on which the lien is hinged provides
that the final fee “be payable upon approval by the court of the agreement for
the distribution of the properties to the court designated heirs of the
estate.”[39] This is
also made clear by the order noting the lien, which qualified that said lien
was chargeable only to the share of Olivia Pascual,
hence implying that at the very least, it may be claimed only after her share
to Doña Adela’s estate is
already determinate.
In
rendering its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on this
qualification made by the Probate Court that the lien for attorney’s fees was
chargeable only to the share of Olivia Pascual. Yet
the Notice of Attorney’s Lien only seeks to serve notice of the pendency of the
claim for attorney’s fees, and not the payment of such fees itself. On its own,
the Notice of Attorney’s Lien cannot serve as the basis for the Probate Court
to authorize the payment to petitioner of attorney’s fees.
On
the other hand, Escueta and its kindred cases
do explicitly recognize the recourse for the lawyer to directly make the claim
for attorney’s fees against the estate, not the executor or administrator. The
filing of the Notice of Attorney’s Lien and the qualificatory
character of the rulings thereon, do not preclude the resort to the mode of
recovery against the estate as authorized by jurisprudence. Clearly then, we
disagree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals that attorney’s fees can be
claimed only against the share of Olivia Pascual.
The
instant case is rooted in an incomplete attempt to resort to the second mode of
recovery of attorney’s fees as authorized in Escueta,
originating as it did from the denial of petitioner’s Motion for Writ of
Execution, and not the Notice of Attorney’s Lien. The Motion did expressly seek
the payment of attorney’s fees to petitioner. Escueta
and Occeña, among other cases, did clearly lay
down the manner under which such fees may be paid out even prior to the final
settlement of the estate as an administration expense directly chargeable to
the estate itself. The critical question in the present petition is thus whether
this Motion for Writ of Execution satisfies the requisites set in Escueta for a claim for attorney’s fees directly
chargeable against the estate. It does not.
The fact
that the prayer for attorney’s fees was cast in a motion and not a petition
should not impede such claim, considering that the motion was nonetheless filed
with the Probate Court. However, the record bears that the requisite notice
to all heirs and interested parties has not been satisfied. Doña Adela’s will designated 19
other individuals apart from Olivia Pascual, and four
(4) different institutions as recipients of devises or legacies consisting of
real properties, jewelries, and cash amounts. Yet only Olivia Pascual was served with a copy of the Motion for Writ of
Execution, the motion which effectively sought the immediate payment of
petitioner’s attorney’s fees. As early
as 29 April 1994, Olivia Pascual, in opposing the
Motion for Writ of Execution, already pointed out that petitioner had failed to
give sufficient notice to all interested parties to the estate, particularly
the several devisees and legatees so named in Doña Adela’s will.
Such
notice is material to the other heirs to Doña Adela’s estate. The
payment of attorney’s fees, especially in the amount of 3% of the total gross
estate as sought for by petitioner, substantially diminishes the estate of Doña Adela and may consequently
cause the diminution of their devises and legacies. Since these persons were so
named in the very will itself and the action for probate which was filed by
petitioner itself, there is no reason why petitioner could not have given due
notice to these persons on its claim for attorney’s fees.
The
requisite notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees is anchored on the
constitutional principle that no person shall be deprived of property without
due process of law.[40] The fact that these persons were designated in
the will as recipients of the testamentary dispositions from the decedent
establishes their rights to the succession, which are transmitted to them from
the moment of the death of the decedent.[41]
The payment of such attorney’s fees necessarily diminishes the estate of the
decedent, and may effectively diminish the value of the testamentary
dispositions made by the decedent. These heirs, devisees, and legatees acquire
proprietary rights by reason of the will upon the moment of the death of the
decedent, incipient or inchoate as such rights may be. Hence, notice to these
interested persons of the claims for attorney’s fees is integral, so as to allow
them to pose any objections or oppositions to such claim which, after all,
could lead to the reduction of their benefits from the estate.
The
failure to notify the other heirs, devisees or legatees, to the estate of Doña Adela likewise deprives
these interested persons of the right to be heard in a hearing geared towards
determining whether petitioner was entitled to the immediate payment of
attorney’s fees. Notably, petitioner, in filing its Motion for Writ of
Execution, had initially set the hearing on the motion on 29 April 1994, but
one day prior to the scheduled hearing, gave notice instead that the motion was
being submitted for the consideration of the Probate Court without further
argument.[42]
Evidently, petitioner did not intend a full-blown hearing to ensue on whether
it was entitled to the payment of attorney’s fees. Yet the claim for attorney’s
fees is hardly incontrovertible.
That the
Retainer Agreement set the attorney’s fees at three percent (3%) of the gross
estate does not imply that the basis for attorney’s fees is beyond controversy.
Attorney’s fees in this case are in the nature of administration expenses, or
necessary expenses in the first place. Any party interested in the estate may
very well, in theory, posit a myriad of objections to the attorney’s fees
sought, such as for example, that these fees were not necessary expenses in the
care, management, and settlement of the estate. Whether or not such basis for
valid objections exists in this case is not evident, but the fact remains that
all the parties interested in the estate, namely the other devisees and
legatees, were deprived of the opportunity to raise such objections as they
were not served notice of the Motion for Writ of Execution.
The
instant claim for attorney’s fees is thus precluded by the absence of the
requisite notices by petitioner to all the interested persons such as the
designated heirs, devisees, legatees, as required by the jurisprudential rule
laid down in Escueta. However, the Court of
Appeals held that it was the prematurity of the claim
for attorney’s fees that served as the fatal impediment. On this point, the
Court does not agree.
Again,
the remaining peripheral questions warrant clarification.
Escueta itself provides for two alternative approaches through which
counsel may proceed with his claim for attorney’s fees. The first involves a
separate suit against the executor or administrator in the latter’s personal
capacity. The second approach is a direct claim against the estate itself, with
due notice to all interested persons, filed with the probate court.
In the
same vein, the existence of the Retainer Agreement between petitioner and
Olivia Pascual allows petitioner two possible causes
of action on which to claim attorney’s fees in connection with the
administration of the estate of Doña Adela. The first possible cause of action pivots on the
Retainer Agreement, which establishes an obligation on the part of Olivia Pascual to pay the final fee of 3% of the gross total
estate of Doña Adela,
payable upon approval by the Probate Court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties to the court— designated heirs of the estate.
Necessarily, since the recovery of attorney’s fees is premised on the Retainer
Agreement any award thereupon has to await the final ascertainment of value of
the gross total estate of Doña Adela,
as well as the approval by the Probate Court of the agreement for the
distribution of the properties. The Retainer Agreement makes it clear that the
final payment of attorney’s fees is contingent on these two conditions,[43]
and the claim for attorney’s fees based on the Retainer Agreement cannot ripen
until these conditions are met.
Moreover,
it cannot be escaped that the Retainer Agreement was entered into between
petitioner and Olivia Pascual prior to the filing of
the probate petition, and that at such time, she had no recognized right
to represent the
estate of Doña Adela
yet. This
circumstance further
bolsters our opinion that if petitioner insists on the judicial enforcement of
the Retainer Agreement, its proper remedy, authorized by law and jurisprudence,
would be a personal action against Olivia Pascual,
and not against the estate of Doña Adela. If this were the recourse pursued by petitioner, and
Olivia Pascual is ultimately held liable under the
Retainer Agreement for attorney’s fees, she may nonetheless seek reimbursement
from the estate of Doña Adela
if she were able to establish that the attorney’s fees paid to petitioner were
necessary administration expenses.
The
second or alternative recourse is the direct claim for attorney’s fees against
the estate, as authorized under Escueta. The
character of this claim is not contractual in nature, but rather, as a
reimbursement for a necessary expense of administration, and it will be allowed
if it satisfies the criteria for necessary expenses of administration. Its
entitlement can be established by the actual services rendered by the lawyer
necessary to the accomplishment of the purposes of administration, and not
necessarily by the contract of engagement of the attorney’s services.
By
filing their claim directly against the estate of Doña
Adela, petitioner has clearly resorted to this second
cause of action. There are consequent advantages and disadvantages to
petitioner. Since the claim arises irrespective of the contingencies as
stipulated in the Retainer Agreement, the attorney’s fees may be collected
against the estate even before the final determination of its gross total value
or the final approval of the project of partition. As earlier stated, such
claim for reimbursement is superior to the right of the beneficiaries to the
estate, and as such, there is need to finally determine the respective shares
of the beneficiaries before attorney’s fees in the nature of administration
expenses may be paid out.
The one
distinct disadvantage, however, is that the Retainer Agreement cannot be deemed
binding on the estate or the Probate Court since the estate is not a party to
such contract. This would not preclude the Probate Court from enforcing the
provisions of the Retainer Agreement if, in its sound discretion, the terms of
payment therein are commensurate to the value of the actual services necessary
to the administration of the estate actually rendered by petitioner. Yet if the
Probate Court does choose to adopt the Retainer Agreement as binding on the
estate of Doña Adela,
petitioner may again be precluded from immediate recovery of attorney’s fees in
view of the necessity or precondition of ascertaining the gross total value of
the estate, as well as the judicial approval of the final agreement of
partition.
In any
event, whether the claim for attorney’s fees was pursued through a separate
suit against Olivia Pascual (in her personal
capacity) for the enforcement of the Retainer Agreement, or against the estate
of Doña Adela as
reimbursement for necessary administration expenses, it remains essential that
a hearing be conducted on the claim. In either case too, the hearing will focus
on the value of the services of the petitioner and the necessity of engaging
petitioner as counsel.
We
reiterate that the direct claim against the estate for attorney’s fees must be
made with due notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees. The failure of
petitioner to give such notice renders its present claim inefficacious for now.
Indeed, there is sufficient cause to dismiss outright petitioner’s Motion for
Writ of Immediate Execution filed with the Probate Court, for its failure to
notify therein the other persons interested in the estate of Doña Adela. Nonetheless, to
authorize said outright denial at this stage could unduly delay the settlement
of the estate of Doña Adela,
considering the likelihood that petitioner would again pursue such claim for
attorney’s fees as the right to which is affirmed by law and jurisprudence.
Hence,
in order not to unduly protract further the settlement of the estate of Doña Adela, the Court deems it
proper instead to mandate the Probate Court to treat the Motion for Writ of
Immediate Execution as a petition seeking a court order to direct the payment
of attorney’s fees as expenses of administration, but subject to the condition
that petitioner give due notice to the other designated devisees and legatees
so designated in the will of the claim prior to the requisite hearing
thereon. Petitioner may as well seize
such opportunity to formally amend or reconfigure its motion to a petition to
direct payment of attorney’s fees. Once this step is accomplished, there should
be no impediment to petitioner’s claim for recovery of attorney’s fees as
reimbursement for necessary administration expenses, within the terms
established by law, jurisprudence, and this decision.
One
final note. Petitioner’s final prayer before this court is that it be issued a
partial writ of execution, consistent with its position before the Probate
Court that it is already entitled to at least a partial payment of its
attorney’s fees. This prayer cannot obviously be granted at this stage by the
Court, considering the fatal absence of due notice to the other designated
beneficiaries to the estate of Doña Adela. Still, we do not doubt that the Probate Court,
within its discretion, is capacitated to render the award of attorney’s fees as
administration expenses either partially or provisionally, depending on the
particular circumstances and its ultimate basis for the determination of the
appropriate attorney’s fees.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T.
CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]Penned by then Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Justice) Alicia Austria-Martinez, concurred in by Associate Justices Jaime M. Lantin and Bernardo LL. Salas.
[2]Namely Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista,
G.R. No. 84240,
[7]See Rollo, p. 40.
[11]
[12]Records,
p. 2154. It appears that the Order was
subsequently published in the three (3) consecutive editions of the Guardian
newspaper in December 1993 and January 1994.
[17]Particularly,
Sato v. Rallos, cited as 12 SCRA 89 (sic) [
[31]Occeña v. Marquez, supra
note 29, at 256-257; citing Escueta v. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil. 405; Piliin v. Joson, et. al.,
41 Phil. 26. See also Ramos v. Bidin, Nos. L-53650 & L-55460,
[32]See Gonzales-Orense v. Court of Appeals, No. L-80526, 18 July 1988, 163 SCRA 477, 480; citing Uy Tioco v. Imperial, 53 Phil. 802; Aldamiz v. Judge of the CFI Mindoro, et al., 85 Phil. 228.
[33]G.R.
No. 86250,
[34]“When the executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional fees for legal services rendered by him.”
[35]V. Francisco, V-B The Revised Rules of Court
in the
[43]On that score, petitioner submits before us that the
probated will serves as the basis for the distribution of the estate, and may
be considered as the court-approved agreement for the distribution of the
estate, as referred to in the Retainer Agreement. This argument contradicts the
well-settled rule that for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry
is limited to the extrinsic validity thereof, and not the intrinsic validity or
efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy.
See e.g., Sumilang v. Ramagosa, et al., 129 Phil. 636, 639 (1967);
citing Nuguid v. Nuguid, No.
L-23445,