Jesus Duran and G.R. No. 125256
Demetria A. Duran,
Petitioners, Present:
QUISUMBING,
J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO
MORALES,
TINGA, and
Court of Appeals,
VELASCO, Jr., JJ.
Jorge Olivar,
Praxedes UMPAD Gantuangco,
ALBERTO GANTUANGCO,
Emilia
Dichos, Luisa NuNez,
joined by her husband,
FAUSTINO NUNEZ,
and Juanito Lawas,
Respondents.
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Jesus Duran and G.R.
No. 126973
Demetria A. Duran,
Petitioners,
- versus -
Court
of Appeals,
Mercedes
U. Gantuangco,
and her husband,
George
Olivar,
Emilio Dichos,
Juanito Lawas,
Belie Lumapat,
Luisa Nunez,
and her husband,
HON. MEINRADO P. PAREDES,
as Presiding Judge of the Promulgated:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
Respondents.
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Tinga, J.:
These consolidated petitions challenge the Decisions of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31730 dated
There is no substantial dispute
regarding the following facts which we quote from the decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31730:
The complaint in the case at bench is for Reconveyance of certain portions of a 449 square meter parcel of land situated in Mabolo, Cebu City covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 99527 (Exhibit “1”) in the name of defendant-appellant Jesus Duran who is married to Demetria Duran. Plaintiffs-appellees Jorge Olivar, Praxedes Umpad Gantuangco assisted by husband Alberto Gantuangco, Emilio Dichos, Luisa Nuñez assisted by her husband Faustino Nunez and Juanito Lawas sought to recover the portions on which they have built their respective dwellings as shown on Exhibit “A”, a Sketch Plan of the controverted lot.
Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 25018 (Exhibit “B”) shows that the prior owner of the
lot was one Antonina Oporto
who leased out the property to the plaintiffs-appellees
and the defendants-appellants. P100.00 per square meter. Defendant-appellant Jesus Duran
however was designated by plaintiffs to negotiate for the lowering of the
purchase price. This fact is practically corroborated by defendants-appellants’
claim that it was Jesus Duran who insisted that he be the one to bargain with Antonina Oporto. Subsequently
however, defendant-appellant Jesus Duran bought the lot in its entirety for
himself from Antonina Oporto
on P37,000.00 or at approximately P82.41
per square meter. The aggrieved plaintiffs-appellees
learned of the transaction only when they were summoned to appear before the barangay captain in anticipation of the filing of the case
for unlawful detainer. As a consequence, plaintiffs-appellees impute bad faith on defendant-appellant Jesus
Duran.
Defendants-appellants
filed an Unlawful Detainer case with the Municipal
Trial Court, Branch II,
In this case for Reconveyance originally filed before the RTC of Cebu City, Brach 13, the court a quo rendered judgment the decretal portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
“WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs
ordering defendants to convey the ownership and possession to the plaintiffs of
portions of Lot No. 4, Block 6 as stated in paragraph 2 of the complaint as per
sketch plan marked as Exhibit ‘A’. Plaintiffs are ordered to reimburse
defendants the sum of P44,900.00 at the rate of
P100.00 per square meter for the total area of 449 square meters within
a period of thirty (30) days from and after this decision shall have become
final and executory. Failure on the part of any
plaintiff to reimburse defendants means forfeiture of his or her right to have
the portion of the lot he/she is occupying conveyed to him/her.
“The claims for damages in the complaint as well as in the counterclaim are hereby dismissed. No cost.
“SO ORDERED.”[3]
The Court of Appeals ruled that there
was a verbal contract of agency between the parties whereby petitioner, Jesus
Duran, was constituted as an agent to negotiate the purchase of the subject
property at a lesser price. It held that
a constructive trust was created and that Jesus Duran breached his fiduciary
duty not only because he concealed the fact that the negotiations had been
successfully completed but, worse, he purchased the property for himself. Thus, he has the duty to convey the pertinent
portions of the property upon the demand of private respondents and payment by
them of the acquisition cost.
It appears that at the time this
Decision was rendered, the case for unlawful detainer
was pending before another division of the Court of Appeals. At any rate, the case ultimately landed in
the same 13th Division which decided the reconveyance case.
The appellate court, adopting the
facts in the reconveyance case, rendered judgment in favor of private
respondents ruling that the prior determination of the capacity in which
petitioners acted in purchasing the subject property is indispensable to the
correct resolution of who between the parties have a better right to physical
possession. Since it was ruled that petitioners are obliged to convey the
pertinent portions of the property to private respondents, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the complaint for unlawful detainer filed
by petitioners against them.
No motions for reconsideration were
filed.
Petitioners now dispute the appellate
court’s findings that an agency was constituted between the parties; that there
was constructive trust; and that Jesus Duran was guilty of fraud or breach of
trust. Allegedly, these findings do not
find support in the evidence on record.
Petitioners insist that Jesus Duran was only designated as the spokesman
to represent the private respondents in the negotiations for the sale of the
property.[4]
They further argue that the Court of
Appeals erred in adopting the facts in the reconveyance case and using them as
evidence in the unlawful detainer case, insisting
that an action for reconveyance of property has no effect on ejectment suits regarding the same property. Procedurally, they contend that the motion
for reconsideration of the RTC decision did not toll the period within which
the decision may be brought on petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the petition for review was filed late and should not have been taken
cognizance of.[5]
Private respondents, on the other
hand, insist that Jesus Duran was the one who suggested that he would talk to Antonina Oporto to ask her to
lower the purchase price. They then agreed that he would act as agent on behalf
of private respondents in the sale negotiations. A fiduciary relationship was
therefore created which petitioners breached when they purchased the property
for themselves. Private respondents also
argue that the petition in G.R. No. 125256 raises a question of fact because it
assails the credibility of the testimonies upon which the Court of Appeals
based its Decision.[6]
In G.R. No. 126973, private
respondents aver that while a motion for reconsideration of a decision of the
Municipal Trial Court is a prohibited pleading under the 1991 Revised Rule on
Summary Procedure, this is not the case once the matter is elevated to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). In such an
instance, the ordinary rules, which allows a motion
for reconsideration and tolls the period within which a petition for review may
be filed before the Court of Appeals, apply.
They further contend that the
appellate court correctly ruled that the issue of possession cannot be decided
independently of the question of ownership. Hence, the inquiry it made into the
title of the property as adjudged in the reconveyance case was necessary.[7]
We affirm the challenged Decisions of
the Court of Appeals.
In Morales v. Court of Appeals,[8]
we defined a trust and the categories of trust, viz:
Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created by the intention of the trustor or of the parties, while implied trusts come into being by operation of law, either through implication of an intention to create a trust as a matter of law or through the imposition of the trust irrespective of, and even contrary to, any such intention. In turn, implied trusts are either resulting or constructive trusts. Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or interest and are presumed always to have been contemplated by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands of justice and prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold.[9] [Emphasis supplied]
The burden of proving the existence
of a trust is generally on the party asserting its existence. Such proof must
be clear and must satisfactorily show the existence of the trust and its
elements. While oral evidence may be presented to prove the existence of an
implied trust, such evidence must be trustworthy because oral evidence can
easily be fabricated. Further, the
evidence must be received by the
courts with extreme caution. The existence of an implied trust should not be made
to rest on loose, equivocal and indefinite declarations.[10]
In this case, both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals declared that preponderance of evidence, in
credibility and number, exists in favor of private respondents.
The Court of Appeals quoted the
testimonies of private respondents Jorge Olivar, Praxedes Gantuangco and Emilio Dichos all to the effect that they had an agreement with Antonina Oporto to purchase the
subject property but that, upon petitioner Jesus Duran’s expression of his desire
to have the purchase price lowered, they gave their authority for the latter to
negotiate the reduction of the purchase price for the property. Unfortunately, Jesus Duran breached the trust
reposed upon him by leading private respondents to believe that he intended to
work towards the group’s objective and concealing the fact that he had already
purchased the property for himself at a reduced price.
In contrast, all that petitioners
offered in evidence was petitioner Demetria Duran’s
statement that there could not have been any such transaction because she was
always with her husband. Jesus Duran,
who was in the best position to rebut private respondents’ claims, did not even
take the witness stand and no justifiable reason was given to explain his
absence.
We find no reason to disturb the
evaluation of the trial court and the Court of Appeals of the credibility of
the testimonies of private respondents’ witnesses. It is a settled rule that the assessment of
the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge
because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on
the witness stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. And when his
findings have been affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally
binding and conclusive upon this Court.[11]
There is no showing that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals overlooked matters which, if taken under
advisement, would have altered the outcome of the case. Their factual findings regarding the agreement
between the parties and legal conclusion that a constructive trust was created
and later breached by Jesus Duran are substantially supported by the evidence
on record and, for this reason, must stand.
Petitioners’ theory that Jesus Duran
was not constituted as an agent because private respondents did not entrust
money to him for the negotiations has no merit. By his own admission, Jesus Duran
volunteered and was authorized by private respondents to represent them in the
negotiations for the sale of the property. Whether the designation was as a
spokesman or as an agent is immaterial.
His actions thereafter should have been in representation of, not only
himself, but also private respondents as dictated by the principle of equity,
which lies at the core of constructive trust.
On the matter of the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer, we find the same
correct in view of the operative antecedents.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides that
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts shall exercise “exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the
defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession.”
In this case, petitioners assert a
right to possess by virtue of their purchase of the property. Private respondents, on the other hand, also
claim ownership by virtue of constructive trust. The issue of ownership, being inextricably
linked with that of possession, should therefore be resolved for purposes of
determining the question of possession.
Given the Court of Appeals’s ruling that petitioners’ assertion of ownership
is unlawful and that private respondents are entitled to reconveyance, the
appellate court could not but take its own findings into account to determine
who among the parties has a better right to possession. It correctly dismissed
the complaint for unlawful detainer and ruled that
petitioners are obliged to turn over the possession of the pertinent portions
of the property to private respondents being the owners thereof.
As regards the procedural question of
whether the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the petition
purportedly filed late because private respondents filed a prohibited motion
for reconsideration of the RTC’s decision, it is
settled that a motion for reconsideration may be filed from a decision of the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the
inferior courts in ejectment cases.[12] Petitioners’ contention should, perforce, be
rejected.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are
hereby DENIED. The Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 31730
dated
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]G.R. No. 125256, rollo, pp. 40-54; Decision penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Ramon A. Barcelona.
[2]G.R. No. 126973, rollo, pp. 70-76; Decision penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D. Luna and Ramon A. Barcelona.
[9]
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