EN BANC
BOBIE ROSE V.
FRIAS, A.C. No. 6656
Complainant, (formerly
CBD-98-591)
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,*
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- v e r s
u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA and
VELASCO, JJ.
ATTY. CARMELITA
S.
BAUTISTA-LOZADA,**
Respondent.
Promulgated:
May 4, 2006
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R E S O L U T I
O N
CORONA, J.:
Respondent Atty. Carmelita Bautista-Lozada seeks reconsideration of our December 13, 2005
resolution finding her guilty of violating Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending
her from the practice of law for two years.
Respondent contends that, pursuant to
Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD)
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), the complaint against her was
already barred by prescription. She also asserts that her December 7, 1990 loan
agreement with complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of
complainant was fully protected.
Respondent’s contentions have no
merit.
Respondent anchors her defense of
prescription on Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP
which provides:
SECTION 1. Prescription. A
complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in
two (2) years from the date of the professional misconduct.
However, as early as 1967, we have
held that the defense of prescription does not lie in administrative
proceedings against lawyers.[1]
And in the 2004 case of Heck v. Santos,[2]
we declared that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does
not prescribe.
If the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath. x x x
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer….[3] (emphasis supplied)
The CBD-IBP derives its authority to
take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from this Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and
control the practice of law in the Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its
delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against lawyers, the
CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid
down by this Court.
Regrettably, Rule VIII, Section 1 of
the Rules of Procedure of the CBD-IBP which provides for a prescriptive period
for the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the
settled ruling of this Court. It should therefore be struck down as void and of
no legal effect for being ultra vires.
Moreover, assuming that prescription
is a valid defense, respondent raised it only at this late stage. We presume
she was familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest
opportunity. Instead she opted to insist
on her innocence.
On the other ground raised by
respondent, we have sufficiently discussed the implications of her loan
agreement with complainant in relation to Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in our December 13, 2005 resolution. Considering
the fiduciary character of respondent’s relationship with complainant, the
nature of their agreement and complainant’s lack of independent advice when she
entered into it, there is neither sufficient ground nor compelling reason to
reconsider our earlier resolution.
WHEREFORE, respondent’s motion for
reconsideration is hereby DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is hereby declared null and void.
Let
copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO
C. CORONA
Associate
Justice
W E C O N C U R:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
(on leave)
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice
|
MA. ALICIA M.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice
|
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice