|
ERIC JONATHAN YU, Petitioner, -versus- CAROLINE T.
YU, Respondent. |
G.R. No. 164915 Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO
MORALES, J.:
On
Subsequently
or on
In the meantime, the appellate court, by Resolution of
Petitioner and
respondent later filed on
On
By Resolution
of
In compliance
with the appellate court’s Resolution of
On June 12,
2003, petitioner filed his own petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage and
dissolution of the absolute community of property before the Pasig RTC, docketed as JDRC Case No. 6190, with prayer
for the award to him of the sole custody of Bianca, subject to the final
resolution by the appellate court of his petition for habeas corpus.
The
appellate court eventually dismissed the habeas corpus petition, by Resolution
of July 3, 2003, for having become moot and academic, “the restraint on the
liberty of the person alleged to be in restraint [having been] lifted.”
In
the meantime, respondent filed on July 24, 2003 before the Pasay
RTC a petition for habeas corpus,
which she denominated as “Amended Petition,” praying for, among other things,
the award of the sole custody to her of Bianca or, in the alternative,
pending the hearing of the petition, the issuance of an order “replicating and
reiterating the enforceability of the Interim Visiting Agreement” which was
approved by the appellate court. The
petition was docketed as SP Proc. No. 03-0048.
Not
to be outdone, petitioner filed on July 25, 2003 before the Pasig
RTC in his petition for declaration of nullity of marriage an urgent motion praying
for the custody of Bianca for the duration of the case.
Acting
on respondent’s petition, Branch 113 of the Pasay RTC
issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, a Hold Departure Order and Summons addressed to
petitioner, drawing petitioner to file a motion to dismiss the petition on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action, forum
shopping and litis pendentia, he
citing the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which he
filed before the Pasig RTC.
The
Pasay RTC, in the meantime, issued an Order of
Respondent
soon filed her Answer with Counter-Petition on the nullity case before the Pasig RTC wherein she also prayed for the award of the sole
custody to her of Bianca, subject to the final disposition of the habeas corpus
petition which she filed before the Pasay RTC.
By
Omnibus Order of October 30, 2003, the Pasig RTC
asserted its jurisdiction over the custody aspect of the petition filed by
petitioner and directed the parties to comply with the provisions of the
Interim Visitation Agreement, unless they agreed to a new bilateral agreement
bearing the approval of the court; and granted custody of Bianca to
petitioner for the duration of the case.
The
Pasay RTC in the meantime denied, by Order of
On the issue of forum shopping, the Pasay RTC held that it is petitioner, not respondent, who
committed forum shopping, he having filed (on June 12, 2003) the petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC while his petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals was still
pending.[4]
The Pasay
RTC held that assuming arguendo that
petitioner’s filing before the Pasig RTC of the
declaration of nullity of marriage case did not constitute forum shopping, it
(the Pasay RTC) acquired jurisdiction over the
custody issue ahead of the Pasig RTC, petitioner not
having amended his petition before the Pasig RTC as
soon as the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition for habeas corpus[5]
(on July 3, 2003).
Finally, the Pasay
RTC held that there was no litis pendentia because two elements thereof are lacking,
namely, 1) identity
of the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the
relief being founded on the same facts, and 2)
identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases
such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other case.[6]
Petitioner thereupon assailed the Pasay RTC’s denial of his Motion
to Dismiss via Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
appellate court wherein he raised the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT
JUDGE COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO
DISMISS DESPITE THE EVIDENT LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
CUSTODY, LITIS PENDENTIA, AND DELIBERATE AND WILLFUL FORUM-SHOPPING
ON THE PART OF RESPONDENT CAROLINE T. YU.[7]
B. RESPONDENT
JUDGE ACTED WHIMSICALLY, CAPRICIOUSLY AND ARBITRARILY IN ISSUING THE AUGUST 12,
2003 ORDER GRANTING RESPONDENT CAROLINE T. YU OVERNIGHT VISITATION RIGHTS
OVER THE MINOR CHILD BIANCA AND DENYING PETITIONER’S URGENT MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE SAID ORDER.[8] (Underscoring supplied)
By Decision of August 10, 2004,[9]
the appellate court denied petitioner’s petition, it holding that the assumption
of jurisdiction by the Pasay RTC over the habeas
corpus case does not constitute grave abuse of discretion; the filing by respondent before the Pasay RTC of a petition for habeas corpus could not be
considered forum shopping in the strictest sense of the word as before she
filed it after petitioner’s petition for habeas corpus filed before the
appellate court was dismissed; and it
was petitioner who committed forum shopping when he filed the declaration of
nullity of marriage case while his habeas corpus petition was still pending
before the appellate court.
In fine, the appellate court held
that since respondent filed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Pasig RTC during the pendency
of the habeas corpus case he filed before the appellate court, whereas
respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the Pasay
RTC on July 24, 2003 after the dismissal on July 3, 2003 by the appellate court
of petitioner’s habeas corpus case, jurisdiction over the issue custody of
Bianca did not attach to the Pasig RTC.
As for the questioned order of the Pasay RTC which modified the Interim Visiting Agreement,
the appellate court, noting that the proper remedy for the custody of Bianca
was filed with the Pasay RTC, held that said court
had the authority to issue the same.
Hence, the present petition filed by
petitioner faulting the appellate court for
I. . . . DECLARING
THAT PETITIONER ERIC YU COMMITTED FORUM-SHOPPING IN FILLING THE PETITION
FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE
PASIG FAMILY COURT AND THAT THE LATTER COURT WAS BARRED FROM ACQUIRING
JURISDICTION OVER THE CUSTODY ASPECT OF THE NULLITY CASE IN RECKLESS
DISREGARD OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE BEFORE THE FAMILY COURTS VESTS THE LATTER WITH EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
TO DETERMINE THE NECESSARY ISSUE OF CUSTODY.
II. . . . APPL[YING] THE
LAW OF THE CASE DOCTRINE BY RULING THAT THE
III. . . . DECLARING THAT THE PASIG FAMILY COURT
MUST YIELD TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASAY COURT INSOFAR AS THE ISSUE OF
CUSTODY IS CONCERNED IN GRAVE VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL STABILITY
AND NON-INTERFERENCE.
IV. . . .
RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT CAROLINE DID NOT COMMIT FORUM-SHOPING IN
FILING THE HABEAS CORPUS CASE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY BEFORE THE
RESPONDENT PASAY COURT DESPITE THE FACT THAT AN EARLIER FILED PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE WITH PRAYER FOR CUSTODY IS STILL PENDING
BEFORE THE PASIG FAMILY COURT WHEN THE FORMER CASE WAS INSTITUTED.
V. . . . RULING
THAT RESPONDENT CAROLINE YU DID NOT SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE PASIG
FAMILY COURT BASED ON AN ERRONEOUS FACTUAL FINDING THAT SHE FILED ON AUGUST
25, 2003 AN OMNIBUS OPPOSITION IN PETITIONER’S ACTION FOR NULLITY BEFORE THE
PASIG COURT.[10] (Underscoring supplied)
The petition is impressed with merit.
The main issue raised in the present
petition is whether the question of custody over Bianca should be litigated
before the Pasay RTC or before the Pasig RTC.
Judgment on the issue of custody in
the nullity of marriage case before the Pasig RTC,
regardless of which party would prevail, would constitute res
judicata on the habeas corpus case before the Pasay RTC since the former has jurisdiction over the
parties and the subject matter.
There is identity in the causes of
action in Pasig and Pasay
because there is identity in the facts and evidence essential to the resolution
of the identical issue raised in both actions[11]
– whether it would serve the best
interest of Bianca to be in the custody of petitioner rather than respondent or
vice versa.
Since the ground invoked in the
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC is respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity to perform her essential
marital obligations[12]
as provided in Article 36 of the Family Code,
the evidence to support this cause of action necessarily involves
evidence of respondent’s fitness to take custody of Bianca. Thus, the elements of litis
pendentia, to wit: a) identity of parties, or at least such as
representing the same interest in both actions; b) identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the
judgment that may be rendered in the pending case would, regardless of which
party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other,[13]
are present.
Respondent argues in her Comment to
the petition at bar that the Pasig RTC never acquired
jurisdiction over the custody issue raised therein.
“[T]he subsequent dismissal of the habeas corpus
petition by the Court of Appeals on 3 July 2003 could not have the effect of
conferring jurisdiction over the issue on the Pasig
court. For the
And respondent cites Caluag v. Pecson,[15]
wherein this Court held:
Jurisdiction of the subject matter of a particular
case is something more than the general power conferred by law upon a court to
take cognizance of cases of the general class to which the particular case belongs. It is not enough that a court has power in
abstract to try and decide the class litigations [sic] to which a case belongs;
it is necessary that said power be properly invoked, or called into
activity, by the filing of a petition, or complaint or other appropriate
pleading. (Underscoring supplied by Caroline.)[16]
Specific provisions of law govern the
case at bar, however. Thus Articles 49
and 50 of the Family Code provide:
Art. 49. During the pendency
of the action [for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] and
in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the
spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody
and support of their common children. x x x It shall also provide for appropriate visitation
rights of the other parent. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)[17]
Art. 50. x x x x
The final
judgment in such cases [for the
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage] shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the
custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of
their presumptive legitimes, unless such other
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.” (Emphasis and underscoring added)
By petitioner’s filing of the case
for declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig
RTC he automatically submitted the issue of the custody of Bianca as an
incident thereof. After the appellate
court subsequently dismissed the habeas corpus case, there was no need for
petitioner to replead his prayer for custody for, as
above-quoted provisions of the Family Code provide, the custody issue in a
declaration of nullity case is deemed pleaded.
That that is so gains light from Section 21 of
the “Rule on Declaration Of
Absolute Nullity Of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages”[18]
which provides:
Sec. 21. Liquidation, partition and distribution,
custody, support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes.–Upon entry of the judgment
granting the petition, or, in case of appeal, upon receipt of the entry of
judgment of the appellate court granting the petition, the Family Court, on
motion of either party, shall proceed with the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, including custody,
support of common children and delivery of their presumptive legitimes pursuant to Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code
unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Since this immediately-quoted provision
directs the court taking jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage to resolve the custody of common children, by mere
motion of either party, it could only mean that the filing of a new action
is not necessary for the court to consider the issue of custody of a minor.[19]
The only explicit
exception to the earlier-quoted second paragraph of Art. 50 of the Family Code is when “such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings,” which is not the case here.
The elements of litis pendentia
having been established, the more appropriate action criterion guides
this Court in deciding which of the two pending actions to abate.[20]
The petition filed by
petitioner for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Pasig RTC is the more appropriate action to determine the
issue of who between the parties should have custody over Bianca in view of the
express provision of the second paragraph of Article 50 of the Family
Code. This must be so in line with the
policy of avoiding multiplicity of suits.[21]
The appellate court thus
erroneously applied the law of the case doctrine when it ruled that in
its
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal. It is
a term applied to an established rule that when
an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower
court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes
the law of the case upon subsequent appeal.
It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general
principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was
predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.” (Emphasis and underscoring supplied, italics
in the original)[22]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The August 10, 2004 decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING Pasay
City Regional Trial Court Sp. Proc. No. 03-0048-CFM and ordering Branch 69
of Pasig City Regional Trial Court to continue, with
dispatch, the proceedings in JDRC No. 6190.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairman’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] 322 Phil. 737 (1996).
[2]
[3] “Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Minors,” approved by the Supreme Court en banc on 22 April 2003, effective 15 May 2003.
[4] RTC Records, Vol. 2, p. 171.
[5]
[6]
[7] CA rollo, p. 17.
[8]
[9] Penned by Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurring; Rollo, p. 55, Annex “A.”
[10] Rollo, p. 21.
[11] Vide Escareal v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., G.R.
No. 151922,
[12] CA rollo, pp. 87-91.
[13] Vitrionics Computers, Inc. v. RTC, Br. 63,
[14] Rollo, p. 365.
[15] 82 Phil. 8 (1948).
[16]
[17] Vide Pablo-Gualberto v.
Gualberto V, G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 450, 469.
[18] A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, approved by the
Supreme Court En Banc on
[19] Vide Asset
Privatization Trust v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121171,
By its own action, Branch 62 had lost jurisdiction over the case. It could not have reacquired jurisdiction over the said case on mere motion of one of the parties. The Rules of Court is specific on how a new case may be initiated and such is not done by mere motion in a particular branch of the RTC. (Emphasis added)
[20] Vide Victronics Computers, Inc. v. RTC,
[21] Vide Calahat v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75257-58, February 15, 1995, 241 SCRA 356, 360; Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77808, September 12, 1990, 189 SCRA 440, 444.
[22] Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290, 300-301. (Citation omitted)