PAL EMPLOYEES
G.R. No. 161110
SAVINGS AND
LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC., Present:
Petitioner,
Panganiban,
CJ,
Chairman,
Ynares-Santiago,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES, INC.,
AVELINO L. ZAPANTA and Promulgated:
ANDREW L. HUANG,
Respondents.
x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ---
-- -- -- -- x
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
|
I |
t is axiomatic that, by
their nature, interlocutory orders never become final and executory in the same manner that final judgments do.
These orders do not become final, because something more
needs to be done by the adjudging court, relative to the merits of the
case. Neither do they become executory,
because the Rules do not provide periods for their “appeal.”
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse the February 24, 2003
Decision[2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 74581, as well as its December 2, 2003
Resolution[3] denying
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
The decretal portion of the CA Decision states:
“WHEREFORE, upon
the premises, the petition is GRANTED. The Order dated
“Respondent
judge is hereby ordered to act with dispatch and resolve [respondents’] Notice
of Appeal and Motion to Fix Bond without delay.”[4]
The Facts
The factual antecedents are narrated
by the CA as follows:
“[Petitioner]
PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) is a savings and loan
association whose members are employees of petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL). PESALA accepts deposits and
contributions from its members and lends money to them, payment of which is
effected through PAL’s payroll deductions.
Aside from PESALA and other government agencies and insurance companies,
various employee unions and associations in PAL also collect dues and other
charges from their members through salary deductions x x
x.
“Due
to numerous deductions requested by the aforementioned entities, a ‘zero-net’
situation often occurred where some PAL employees went home empty-handed. To remedy the situation, PAL decided in July
1997 to limit salary deductions to not more than forty percent (40%) of the
employees’ pay effective
“On
September 3, 1997, the then Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 118
issued an Order ‘enjoining PAL and Jose Blanco and all other persons or
officials acting under them from implementing the 40% limitation on salary
deductions pertaining to the loan repayments, capital contributions and
deposits authorized by the PESALA members which will be remitted to PESALA, and
to maintain the status quo ante litem and to strictly enforce the payroll deductions in
favor of plaintiff’s posting of a credible injunction bond in the amount of One
Million (P1,000,000.00) Pesos.’
“On P12,262,719.02 and to enforce full deduction
in the succeeding pay periods in accordance with the deduction advice of the
latter.
“On P44,488,760.41
corresponding to the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits of its
members. It prayed that an Order [be]
issue[d] directing [respondents] to immediately remit to PESALA the now total
undeducted amount of P44,488,760.41.
“On P44,488,716.41 x x
x, and to cause the deductions in full in the
succeeding pay periods x x x. PESALA then filed a Motion for Execution of
the aforesaid Order dated
x
x x x x x x
x x
“Meanwhile,
[respondent] filed a petition for certiorari before [the CA] x x x assailing the Order dated
x
x x x x x x
x x
“On
“Sometime
in August 2001, Judge Nelson B. Bayot retired from service thus Civil Case Nos.
97-1026 and 00-0016 were transferred to [the] pairing court of Branch 118
Branch 119, presided over by x x x
Judge Pedro De Leon Gutierrez.
After
trial, x x x Judge
Gutierrez issued a Consolidated Decision dated
‘WHEREFORE,
the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff/petitioner and against defendants/ respondents:
‘a.
Ordering the defendants and all other officials, persons or agents acting under
them to strictly comply with and implement the arrangement between the parties
whereby defendants deduct from the salaries of the members of PESALA through
payroll deductions the loan repayments, capital contributions and deposits of
said members and to remit the same to plaintiff immediately giving full
priority to plaintiff’s deduction as contained in the Clarificatory Order dated
May 19, 2000;
‘b.
Making the writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued as permanent;
‘c.
Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff attorney’s fees of P259,000.00;
‘d.
Declaring the herein respondents Jose C. Blanco, Avelino L. Zapanta in his
capacity as President of the Philippine Airlines and Andrew L. Huang, in his
capacity as Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Philippine
Airlines, Inc., as guilty of indirect contempt for their contemptuous refusal
and failure to comply with the lawful Orders dated March 11, 199[8] which have
already become final and executory as the petition for certiorari of defendants
on the Order of this Court dated March 11, 199[8] had been denied by the Court
of Appeals per its entry of Judgment in CA-GR SP 48654 dated May 14, 1999. Hence, respondents are hereby ordered to
remit/turn over to plaintiff/petitioner the amount of P44,480,716.41
within three (3) days from receipt hereof otherwise, their arrest and detention
shall be ordered immediately.
‘e. Ordering the defendants/respondents to pay the cost of this
suit.’
“On
“On
“On
x
x x x x x x
x x
“On
“On
December 16, 2002, [the trial court] sheriff issued an Order of Delivery of
Money addressed to the Allied Banking Corporation requesting the latter to
deliver to him the sum of P44,480,716.41 for the satisfaction of the
writ of execution pending appeal. On P20,000,000.00. On
“Hence,
[respondents filed a] petition [with the CA].
x
x x x x x x
x x
“On
January 14, 2003, [the CA] issued a Temporary Restraining Order restraining
[RTC] Judge Pedro De Leon Gutierrez and x x x Deputy Sheriff Severino D.C. Balubar, Jr. and PESALA, and
all other persons acting in their behalf or under their instructions, from
enforcing or implementing the Order dated 10 December 2002, the Writ of
Execution pending Appeal dated 11 December 2002 and the notices of garnishment
issued pursuant to said writ.”[5]
Ruling of the
Court of Appeals
The CA ruled that respondents were
justified in filing the Special Civil Action for Certiorari despite the
pendency of their Motions[6] with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
appellate court held that certiorari prospered even without the prior filing of
a motion for reconsideration, for the following reasons: 1) the questions
raised in the certiorari proceeding had been duly raised and passed upon by the
lower court; 2) there was an urgent necessity for a resolution of the question, and any delay
would have prejudiced the interests of the government or of petitioner; 3) a
motion for reconsideration would have been useless; 4) petitioner had been
deprived of due process; and 5) there was an extreme urgency for relief.[7]
The CA
asserted that the trial court judge had shown no interest in speedily resolving
respondents’ claim despite its urgency.
In fact, the Notice of Appeal of the Consolidated Decision had not even
run its course because of the judge’s failure to act on it. Hence, the CA opined that respondents had no
other speedy and adequate remedy to protect their rights.
The
appellate court cleared respondents of forum shopping, a procedural defect that
exists only when there are two or more cases pending. But the certiorari proceeding should not be
deemed a separate case, as it merely sought to nullify the RTC’s Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal.
The CA found that grave abuse of
discretion had attended the trial court’s grant of execution pending
appeal. The RTC should not have based
its grant of execution on its Order dated
Hence, this
Petition.[8]
Issues
Petitioner raises the followings
issues for the Court’s consideration:
“A
“Whether
or not the Honorable Court of Appeals has departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings when it entertained and even granted the
respondents’ Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Injunction despite the
pendency of their Motions for Reconsideration, To Quash Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal, and To Lift Notices of Garnishment before the trial court.
“B
“Whether
or not the Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the issue on forum shopping
in a way not in accord with law and applicable decisions of this Honorable
Tribunal.
“C
“Whether
or not the Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in finding that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of
Execution Pending Appeal despite the established legal basis in doing so.
“D
“Whether
or not the Honorable Court of Appeals seriously erred when it applied the
pronouncement of this Honorable Tribunal in the case of RCBC vs. IAC (320 SCRA
279) despite the utter lack of basis.”[9]
Simply stated, the issues posed before
the Court are as follows: 1) whether the Petition for Certiorari filed in the
CA is proper; 2) whether respondents are guilty of forum shopping; and 3)
whether the trial court’s grant of the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal was
justified.
The Court’s
Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Propriety of Certiorari
Petitioner contends that the pendency
of the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents before the trial court
effectively barred them from questioning the propriety of the Writ of Execution
Pending Appeal through a petition for certiorari.
As a general rule, certiorari will not
lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal to allow it an opportunity to correct the imputed errors.[10] To this rule, the following are the recognized
exceptions:
“(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has
no jurisdiction;
(b) where the questions raised in the certiorari
proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court;
(c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government
or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable;
(d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless;
(e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is
extreme urgency for relief;
(f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is
urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable;
(g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for
lack of due process;
(h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the
petitioner had no opportunity to object; and
(i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved."[11]
Petitioner
asserts, however, that the CA should not have applied the above exceptions,
given that respondents had in fact sought a reconsideration of the RTC’s ruling
prior to filing the certiorari case with the appellate court. We disagree.
To repeat, a petition for certiorari
is premature if petitioner still has an adequate and more expeditious remedy in
the lower tribunal; that is, a motion for reconsideration.[12] This rule is not without its own
exceptions.
In Conti
v. Court of Appeals,[13] this
Court held that the failure of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) to resolve a
Motion for Reconsideration for a considerable length of time amounted to a
denial of the petitioner’s right to due process and speedy case
disposition. Hence, this Court allowed
the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed with the CA,
despite a pending Motion for Reconsideration with the CSC. The Court explained that “it is the
inadequacy, not the total absence, of all other legal remedies, and the danger
of the failure of justice without the writ, that should determine the propriety
of certiorari. x x
x [A] recourse to certiorari is proper not only where
there is a clear deprivation of petitioner’s fundamental right to due process;
but so also from where other special
circumstances warrant immediate and more direct action.”[14]
In Equitable
Banking Corporation v. NLRC,[15] this
Court recognized the prematurity of a Petition for Certiorari filed by the
petitioners without awaiting the NLRC’s resolution of their Motion for
Reconsideration, but gave due course to the Petition in order not to delay
unduly the final disposition of the case on the merits.
Pastor
v. Court of Appeals[16]
considered the actual garnishment of the major source of income of the
petitioners, when it ruled that filing a petition for certiorari in the CA was
the feasible remedy for them, despite the pendency of their Motion for
Reconsideration[17]
in the probate court.
We hold that this case falls squarely
under the specific exceptions cited in the cases above. The CA noted that “respondent judge had shown
no interest in resolving [respondents’] pending motions despite their urgency
and moreover had shown a peculiar interest in the settlement of the case
despite petitioner’s legitimate refusal to settle.”[18] Thus, the immediate recourse to certiorari
cannot be considered premature. In fact,
it was respondents’ only plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
Petitioner assails the CA findings
that the RTC failed to resolve respondents’ Motions with dispatch. It is settled, however, that in a petition
for review on certiorari, this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law, absent
any showing that the CA’s findings of fact are not supported by the records or are glaringly erroneous.[19]
In the present case, the findings of the appellate court are amply
supported by the records.
Petitioner asserts that through an
Order[20] dated
“Considering
the absence of the counsel of the plaintiff, Atty. Acerey Pacheco in today’s
hearing, the latter is directed to submit his Comment/Opposition to the Urgent
Motions For Reconsideration To Quash Writ of Execution Pending Appeal And To
Lift Notices of Garnishment of the defendants within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof which upon receipt by this Court the incident shall be deemed submitted
for resolution.
“Atty. Nelson Reyes for the defendants
is notified in open Court.”
Records
show, however, that respondents filed on
Further, petitioner cites the CA’s
finding that the trial court’s “peculiar interest” in the settlement of the
matter[23] had
allegedly stemmed from the policy of this Court to encourage compromise as an
accepted and desirable practice for settling disputes. While we have indeed encouraged the use of
alternative modes of dispute resolution, this policy does not apply when the
rights of a party to a case may be prejudiced by coercing it into a
settlement. Since the parties had failed
to reach a compromise, despite diligent efforts, the judge gravely abused his
discretion when he did not speedily decide the urgent pending incidents before
him.
As found by the CA, the RTC had failed
to protect the rights of respondents while their Motions pended before the
trial court. The RTC sheriff had
continued to garnish the accounts of PAL with its depository banks, effectively
crippling its operations.[24] Even worse, despite the obvious urgency of
the matter involved, the lower court not only failed to act expeditiously on
the pending incidents, but also showed a reticence to do so by failing to set
the Motions for hearing.
Moreover, considering that
respondents’ Notice of Appeal of the merits of the case had yet to run its
course because of the RTC’s failure to act upon it, the CA correctly ruled that
respondents had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy, other than a petition
for certiorari.
Second Issue:
Forum Shopping
Petitioner asserts that respondents
committed forum shopping by filing a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, prior
to the RTC’s resolution of their Motions for Reconsideration, to Quash
Writ of Execution Pending Appeal, and to Lift Notices of Garnishment.
This Court does not agree. Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present, or when a
final judgment in one case will amount to res
judicata in another.[25]
There is forum shopping when the
following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the parties
who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of the rights
asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of
facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.[26]
Although there is an identity of parties in the present
case, there is, however, no identity of reliefs prayed for. The Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Injunction[27]
filed by respondents asked the CA to restrain and prohibit the trial judge from
enforcing the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal and from further acting on Civil
Case Nos. 97-1026 and 00-0016. This
Petition was filed in the light of the supervening factual circumstances that
had shown his unjustified reticence to resolve the pending Motions before
him. In their Motion for Reconsideration,
respondents prayed for the quashal of the Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal. Their prayer for relief in their
Petition before the CA was a necessary consequence of the RTC’s inaction on
their Motions. Had they not filed the
Petition containing that prayer, they would have had no other avenue to protect
their rights.
Without
having to repeat our discussion earlier, suffice it to say that the
circumstances in the instant case justify the Petition of respondents before
the CA. Since their Motions before the
RTC have been rendered useless, they had no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to protect their rights.[28]
Third Issue:
Propriety of Execution
Pending Appeal
Petitioner notes the Entry of Judgment
of the CA’s earlier dismissal of respondents’ Petition for Certiorari assailing
the Order dated
This contention is untenable. Distinguishing a “final” judgment or order
from a “final and executory” order, the Court in Intramuros Tennis Club, Inc. v. Philippine Tourism Authority[29] issued the following clarification:
“A
‘final’ judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more for the court to do in respect thereto — such as an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial,
declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and
which party is in the right, or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on
the ground of res judicata or
prescription, for instance. It is to be distinguished from an order that is
‘interlocutory,’ or one that does not finally dispose of the case, such as an
order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, or
granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading. As such, only final
judgments or orders (as opposed to interlocutory orders) are appealable. Now, a
‘final’ judgment or order in the sense just described becomes ‘final and
executory’ upon expiration of the period to appeal therefrom where no appeal
has been duly perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment
of the [appellate] court in turn has become final. It is called a ‘final and
executory’ judgment because execution at such point issues as a matter of
right.”[30]
In the present case, the Order merely
granted petitioner a remittance of the allegedly undeducted amount of P44,488,716.41. That sum corresponded to the pay period
September 1997 to
Petitioner points out that on
It is axiomatic that, by their nature,
interlocutory orders can never become final
and executory in the same manner that final judgments do.[31] Explaining final and executory judgments,
this Court said:
“x x x.
[A judgment or order becomes] not only
final -- because finally disposing of the case and leaving nothing more to be
done by the adjudging court relative to its merits, but also executory
-- because the period for appeal has expired without an appeal having been
taken, or an appeal having been perfected, x x x. Indeed, the
correctness of such an interlocutory order may subsequently be impugned
on appeal by any party adversely affected thereby, regardless of whether or not
he had presented a motion for the reconsideration thereof, if he has otherwise
made of record his position thereon.”[32]
The Court agrees that the CA may
review the propriety of the RTC’s grant of the execution of the Decision
pending appeal. The appellate court erred, however, when it found that the
actions involved in that Decision were not for injunction, but for specific
performance, damages, declaratory relief and indirect contempt.
The records show that, based on its
title, the Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 97-1026 filed before the RTC was
for “Specific Performance, Damages or Declaratory Relief with a Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction.” The allegations and the prayer in the Complaint
sought to enjoin respondents from implementing the 40 percent cap on salary
deductions. Thus, the CA erred in its
finding of the inapplicability of Section 4 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court,
which provides as follows:
“SEC. 4. Judgments not
stayed by appeal. — Judgments in actions for injunction, receivership,
accounting and support, and such other judgments as are now or may hereafter be declared to be immediately executory, shall
be enforceable after their rendition and shall not be stayed by an appeal taken
therefrom, unless otherwise ordered by the trial court. On appeal therefrom, the appellate court in
its discretion may make an order suspending, modifying, restoring or granting
the injunction, receivership, accounting, or award of support.
“The
stay of execution shall be upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as may be
considered proper for the security or protection of the rights of the adverse
party.”
As a rule, immediately executory
judgments in actions for injunction shall not be stayed by appeal. This rule, however, allows for
exceptions. The phrase “unless otherwise
ordered by the trial court” provides the RTC ample discretion to stay the
execution if warranted by the circumstances.
The last paragraph of Section 4 of Rule 39 confirms that the immediate
execution of an injunction may be stayed on appeal. Further, a stay of execution may also be
ordered on appeal by the CA.
Being mere tools to enforce justice,
procedural rules cannot be blindly followed if unwarranted by the circumstances.[33] Under the present factual circumstances, the
staying of the interlocutory award of P44,488,716.41
was proper.
First, the basis of the award was
unsubstantiated and therefore dubious.
The amount in contention was merely deemed admitted by the trial judge,
despite petitioner’s failure to prove how it had been computed. The judge completely disregarded the
assertions of PAL that it could not deduct the total amounts petitioner had
claimed, because of the
“zero net pay” status of some of the employees, leaving them no
more salaries to deduct from.
Second, after the period in question,
PAL started remitting the employees’ contributions and loan payments to
petitioner.[34]
Third, the amount prayed for was
not the money of PAL, but the salaries already paid to its employees. Neither was that sum
the subject of the injunction case.
Finally,
petitioner has adequate remedies to recover the entire amount should it win the
appealed case on the merits.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chairman,
First Division
W E C O N C U R:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 9-53.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] CA
Decision, pp. 2-14; rollo, pp. 59-71.
[6] Urgent
Motions for Reconsideration, to Quash Writ of Execution Pending Appeal, and to
Lift Notice of Garnishment dated
[7] Assailed
CA Decision, pp. 15-16 (citing Tan, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 292 SCRA 452,
July 10, 1998); rollo, pp. 72-73.
[8] The
case was deemed submitted for decision on
[9] Petitioner’s
Memorandum, pp. 13-14; rollo, pp. 525-526. Uppercase in the original.
[10]
[11] Metro Transit Organization, Inc. v. CA, 440
Phil. 743, 751, November 19, 2002, per Carpio, J. (citing Abraham v. NLRC, 353 SCRA 739, 744, March
6, 2001, per Gonzaga-Reyes, J.).
[12] C&C Commercial Corporation v. Philippine
National Bank, 175 SCRA 1, July 5, 1989;
Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 97 SCRA 297, April
28, 1980. See also Aguas v. Court of Appeals, 348 Phil. 417,
[13] 366
Phil. 956,
[14]
[15] 339
Phil. 541,
[16] 207
Phil. 758,
[17] See
also Developers Group of Companies, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 715, March 8, 1993; Philippine Airlines Employees Association v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.,
197 Phil. 205, January 30, 1982.
[18] CA
Decision, p. 16; rollo, p. 73.
[19] Heirs of Conahap v. Heirs of Regaña, 458
SCRA 741, May 17, 2005; Yang v. CA,
409 SCRA 159, August 15, 2003; Bernaldez
v. Francia, 446 Phil. 643,
[20] CA
rollo, p. 486.
[21]
[22]
[23] CA
Decision, p. 16; rollo, p. 73.
[24] CA
Decision, p. 16; rollo, p. 73.
[25] Bardillon v. Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna, 402
SCRA 440, April 30, 2003; Prubankers
Association v. Prudential Bank and Trust Company, 361 Phil. 744, January
25, 1999; First Philippine International
Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 280, January 24, 1996.
[26] Philippine Nails and Wires Corporation v.
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., 445 Phil. 465, February 14, 2003; Prubankers Association v. Prudential Bank
and Trust Company, supra; First
Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[27] Rollo,
pp. 259-296.
[28] See
Quinsay v. Court of Appeals, 393 Phil. 838,
[29] 395
Phil. 278,
[30]
[31] Montilla v. Court of Appeals,
161 SCRA 167,
[32] Montilla v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
171-172, per Narvasa, J.
[33] Remulla v. Manlongat, 442 SCRA 226,
November 11, 2004; Posadas-Moya &
Associates Construction Co., Inc. v. Greenfield Development Corporation, 451
Phil. 647, June 10, 2003.
[34] CA
Decision, p. 18; rollo, p. 75.