EN BANC
|
OFFICE
OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner, - versus - JUDGE
FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - x Re:
RESOLUTION DATED x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - x LUZ
ARRIEGO, Petitioner, - versus - JUDGE
FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent. |
|
A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC A.M. No.
RTJ-06-1988 (Formerly
A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ) Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, AZCUNA, TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: March 31, 2006 |
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
“Equity
does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives.”
Justice Brandeis, Loughran
v. Loughran[1]
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first
applied for judgeship. A pre-requisite
psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services (SC
Clinic) revealed “(e)vidence of ego disintegration”
and “developing psychotic process.” Judge
Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when he applied anew, the
required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-esteem, mood
swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions.
Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded that Atty. Floro
was unfit to be a judge.
Because
of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared
favorable thus paving the way to Atty. Floro’s appointment as Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73,
Upon
Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to
After
conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane
Dacarra-Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator,
Alfredo L. Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum[3] to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among
other things, that his report be considered as an administrative complaint
against Judge Floro and that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate
psychological or mental examination.
Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro be
placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation
against him.
In a Resolution[4] dated
(a)
The
act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements regarding
qualifications and for announcing in open court during court session his
qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b)
For
allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c)
For
rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section
1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d)
For
his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is
pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct;
(e)
For
appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule
5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the
private practice of law;
(f)
For
appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme Court and
without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence on the
scheduled dates of hearing;
(g)
For
proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by
the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding
questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused;
(h)
For
using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss
Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling
the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor;
(i)
For
motu proprio and over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering the mental and physical examination
of the accused based on the ground that the accused is “mahina ang pick-up”;
(j)
For
issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he issued in open
court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide;
(k)
For
violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly
criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l)
For
the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court proceedings;
(m)
For
violation of Circular No. 13[5] dated
Per the
same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt.
Judge Floro was directed to comment within ten days from receipt of the
resolution and to subject himself to an appropriate psychological or mental
examination to be conducted “by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any
duly authorized medical and/or mental institution.” In the same breath, the Court resolved to
place Judge Floro under preventive suspension “for the duration of the
investigation of the administrative charges against him.” He was barely eight months into his position.
On
On
On
Judge Floro presented his last witness
on
In the
meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and even
after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7 March
2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he
perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list
of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his
1.
OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty.
Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial
Audit Team, Office of the Court Administrator[18]
2.
OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge
Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional Trial Court, Branch 72,
3.
AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo and Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.[20]
4.
AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management Office, Atty. Mary
Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court Management Office, both of the Office
of the Court Administrator and Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court,
Branch 73, Malabon[21]
5.
AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator
Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Consultant,
Office of the Court Administrator[22]
6.
A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[23]
7.
A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez[24]
On
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v.
Judge Florentino V. Floro,
Jr.)
This
charge is likewise the subject matter of charge “h” in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460:
“(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor.” The complainant Luz Arriego
is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN.
On
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated
As can
be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge
Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN “In Re: Petition To
Be Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner.” The resolution disposed of the motions for
voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the reconsideration of the order
denying the petition for naturalization filed by petitioner in that case, Mary
Ng Nei.
This
resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the
motion for inhibition and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the case
anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary Ng Nei,
will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges through an
impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition,
he should have continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for him to order the raffle of
the case “anew” as this violates Administrative Circular No. 1 (Implementation
of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution) dated
“8. Raffle of Cases:
x x x
x
8.3 Special
raffles should not be permitted except on verified application of the
interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and only upon a
finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is conducted,
irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The special raffle shall be conducted by at
least two judges in a multiple-sala station.
x x x x”
Based on the foregoing,
a judge may not motu proprio order
the special raffle of a case since such is only allowed upon a verified
application of the interested party seeking a provisional remedy and only upon
the Executive Judge’s finding that if a special raffle is not conducted, the
applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to the above-mentioned
Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr.
to even mention in his resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is
his benefactor in his nomination for judgeship.
It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a “padrino” (who
helped him get his position). Such
remark even if made as an expression of deep gratitude makes the judge guilty
of creating a dubious impression about his integrity and independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings
must be suppressed by the judges concerned.
A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to
influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of Judicial
Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and
the ruling on the motion for reconsideration are judicial matters which this
Office has no authority to review. The
remedy is judicial, not administrative.[29]
The OCA thus recommended that Judge
Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering the raffle of the case in violation of
Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark on page 5 of the subject
resolution that “Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped undersigned so much, in
the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x.”
In a
Resolution dated
For the
record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in this
case as well as in the second case (i.e.,
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court
directed Judge Floro as well as the other parties in these two cases to inform
the Court whether or not they are willing to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M.
No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of the pleadings filed and the
evidence so far submitted by them or to have the decision in A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On
In the interest of orderly
administration of justice, considering that these are consolidated cases, we
resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first,
the ground rules: Much has been said
across all fronts regarding Judge Floro’s alleged mental illness and its effects
on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge
Floro is indeed psychologically impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the
investigator appointed by this Court is frankly beyond our sphere of
competence, involving as it does a purely medical issue; hence, we will have to
depend on the findings of the mental health professionals who
interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our
job is simply to wade through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the
irreverent in order to determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed
guilty of the charges against him. If
the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to
determine the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally,
we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or
because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this question hinges
the applicability of equity.
As an
aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges (“c” and “g”, “h” and
“j”, “e” and “f”) will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly
discussed by the OCA. These charges
involve common facts and to treat them separately will be superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As
alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme
penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards
containing self-laudatory statements regarding qualifications AND for announcing
in open court during court session his qualifications in violation of Canon 2,
Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge
Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his name as the Presiding Judge of
RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein
that he is a “bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)” and with “full second honors” from the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B.
and LL.B.[32] The audit team likewise reported that:
“(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is
introduced as a private law practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila
University with second honors, and a bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar
Examinations with an average score of 87.55%.
Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of
Revelation according to
Judge Floro argues that, per
commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin,[34] “the
use of professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his
office and residence is not improper” and that the word “title” should be broad
enough to include a Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned
or even his
As to the charge that he had been
announcing in open court his qualifications, Judge Floro counters that it was
his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-Dizon,
who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly announce
his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and law
practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as
the introduction was done only during the first week of his assumption into
office.
Canon
2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that “a
judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.” A parallel proscription, this time for
lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: “a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false,
fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair
statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.” This means that lawyers and judges alike,
being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the
same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a leading authority in
legal and judicial ethics, “(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x using or permitting the use
of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding their qualifications
or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility), with more
reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not
actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by publicity.”[35]
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his
professional card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.,[36] we
explained that the use of an ordinary and simple professional card by lawyers
is permitted and that the card “may contain only a statement of his name, the
name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced.” In
herein case, Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered as simple and
ordinary. By including therein the
honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a bar topnotcher,
Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required of judges.
Judge
Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just
given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same.[37] The investigation by Justice Ramirez into the
matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness
from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards.[38] Worse, Judge Floro’s very own witness, a
researcher from an adjoining branch, testified that Judge Floro gave her one of
these cards.[39]
As this
charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be
measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC being more favorable to
respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before
its amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as serious charges. As
amended, a violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct may amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge,
or it may amount to simple misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may
simply be a case of vulgar and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light
charge.
“Misconduct”
is defined as wrong or improper conduct while “gross” connotes something “out
of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant; shameful.”[40] For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial
act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the
law or a persistent disregard of well-known legal rules.[41]
With
the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating
calling cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple
misconduct in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
as it appears that Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but,
from what we can see from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst
for recognition. Concededly, the need
for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not cease to be human
upon donning the judicial robe. Considering,
however, the proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal
vainglory, they are held to a higher standard as they must act within the
confines of the code they swore to observe.
As to
the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been
announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise
violative of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of
unnecessary publicity. Judges should not
use the courtroom as platform for announcing their qualifications especially to
an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might interpret such
publicity as a sign of insecurity.
Verily, the public looks upon judges as the bastion of justice –
confident, competent and true. And to
discover that this is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his
capabilities that he has to court the litigants and their lawyers’ approval,
definitely erodes public confidence in the judiciary.
As it
is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week,
Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b) Re: Charge of allowing the use of his
chambers as sleeping quarters
The
audit team observed that “inside Judge Floro’s
chamber[s], there is a folding bed with cushion located at the right corner of
the room. A man, who was later
identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit team, the
driver immediately went out of the room.”[42]
Judge
Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the audit team saw “sleeping” on his
folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or “alalay” whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between
periods and especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not sleeping during that time
that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately left when he saw the
members thereof.
This
charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge
Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of
time during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would have been different if
there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of government funds and/or
facilities such as in the case of Presado
v. Genova[43]
wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family used his
chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the
electrical bills.
Be that
as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity
from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened
in this case. Judge Floro should have
been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of his staff who were
understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon arrangement of a judge allowing
his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without
written orders in violation of Rule 36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing
on the Motion for Release on Recognizance filed by the accused without the
presence of the trial prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of
examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch
73 that regardless of the absence of the trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr.
still proceeded with the hearing of the following matters:
(c-1)
“Motion for Release on Recognizance”
filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442
entitled “People vs. Luisito Beltran”,
“People vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.”, “People vs. Rowena Camino”, and “People vs. John Richie Villaluz”,
respectively. In the hearing of these
motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded questions (in a form of direct
examination) to the custodian of the accused without the accused being sworn by
the administering officer. (Note:
initially, Judge Floro, Jr. ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place
the accused under oath prior to the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the aforesaid motions is an
offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense. After the reading of the
sentence, Judge Floro, Jr. would automatically inform the accused that they are
qualified to apply for probation. In
fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the application
in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance will
immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As appearing in the minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes “3” to “6”),
the custodians of the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or
a member of the lupong tagapamayapa.
Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release on
recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither
rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting the motion, Judge
Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the session. Photocopies of the minutes dated
On
In his
Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of
procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that
–
Contrary to the stance of the
x x x x
Applying
the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein
respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as
amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a.
The application for release on
recognizance, although captioned as MOTION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is
primarily governed by Sec. 7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b.
Any Application for Release on
Recognizance, is given due course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its
face, the same bears the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the
City/Public Prosecutor.
c.
The consistent practice both in RTC,
METRO MANILA (all courts), especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan
(where respondent practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14 years), [and especially
the practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his being a
responsible member of the community where the accused reside/resides; the
questions propounded are in the form of direct and even cross examination
questions.
d.
The accused is not required to be placed
on the witness stand, since there is no such requirement. All that is required,
is to inform the accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as
whether he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had
previous cases, etc.
e.
Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not
conduct Court hearings on application for release on recognizance, respondent,
for caution in most of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the
applications for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a
fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in
the chambers.[45]
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability
for ignorance of the rules on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968
(Probation Law), as amended. Contrary to
his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails more than
a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the Probation Law,[46]
and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,[47]
it is incumbent upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that
the applicant is not a “disqualified offender” as “(p)utting the discharge of
the accused on hold would have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the
request for provisional liberty.”
Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem
that he completely did away with the requirement for an investigation report by
the probation officer. Under the
Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted only during the
period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the
application for probation and the resolution thereon.[48] As we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares[49]:
It
must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct case study prior to action on application
for release on recognizance, was prescribed precisely to underscore the interim
character of the provisional liberty envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated
differently, the temporary liberty of an applicant for probation is effective
no longer than the period for awaiting the submission
of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which the
law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and
report and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the
trial judge to resolve the application for probation. By
allowing the temporary liberty of the accused even before the order to submit
the case study and report, respondent Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the
detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis
supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the
release of an accused on recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly
reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court
of Appeals[50] wherein
we held that “no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical
existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the Judge to the
Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation.” Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in
his duties as judge when he did not reduce into writing his orders for the
release on recognizance of the accused in Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371,
202426 and 20442 entitled, “People v. Luisito Beltran,” “People
v. Emma Alvarez, et al.,” “People v.
Rowena Camino,” and “People v. John Richie Villaluz.”[51] From
his explanation that such written orders are not necessary, we can surmise that
Judge Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or negligence on his part but
to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In
fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s
handling of probation cases. First, he
ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the presence of the
prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose said
release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the
accused. Finally, the order granting the
release of the accused on recognizance was not reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the
accused on recognizance, as well as his eventual probation, was already a done
deal even before the hearing on his application as Judge Floro
took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing his staff to draft the application
for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny.
Thus, we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of policy, had been approving
applications for release on recognizance hastily and without observing the
requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having nothing against
courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a salutary
endeavor, but only when the situation so
warrants. In herein case, however,
we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as “the
unsolicited fervor to release the accused significantly deprived the
prosecution and the private complainants of their right to due process.”[52]
Judge Floro’s insistence that
orders made in open court need not be reduced in writing constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Likewise, his
failure to follow the basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of
the law.[53]
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to
understand the law fully and uphold it conscientiously.[54]
When the law is sufficiently basic, a
judge owes it to his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is
constitutive of gross ignorance of the law.[55] True, not every judicial error bespeaks
ignorance of the law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant
administrative sanctions.[56] To hold otherwise “would be nothing short of
harassing judges to take the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering
infallible judgments.”[57] This rule, however, admits of an exception as
“good faith in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the
parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so
simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be beyond
permissible margins of error.”[58] Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith
but his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable.[59]
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases
where he declared that he is pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule
2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team
reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in criminal
cases, he is always “pro-accused” particularly concerning detention prisoners
and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on their bonds
during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what
he did impart upon Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his
predicament of having 40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose
cases could not be tried due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to
his sala. He narrated as well to Atty.
Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the
Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his
sala from February 1997 to
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand,
categorically stated under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting,
admitted to her and the staff of Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s
Office (PAO) lawyer that he is pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated
with them especially those under detention as he, himself, had been accused by
his brother and sister-in-law of so many unfounded offenses.[60]
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is
more credible especially since it is corroborated by independent evidence,[61]
e.g., Judge Floro’s
unwarranted eagerness in approving application for release on recognizance as
previously discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: “A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.” This
means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense justice “should
not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be believed and perceived
to be impartial, independent and honest” as well.[62] Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be
pure but above suspicion.[63] Judge Floro, by broadcasting to his staff
and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself up to suspicion
regarding his impartiality. Prudence and
judicial restraint dictate that a judge should reserve personal views and
predilections to himself so as not to stir up suspicions of bias and
unfairness. Irresponsible speech or
improper conduct of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary.[64] “His language, both written and spoken, must
be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be misconstrued.”[65]
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is
objectivity if an independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused,
Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his
capacity for objectivity is put in serious doubt, necessarily eroding the
public’s trust in his ability to render justice. As we held in Castillo v. Juan[66]:
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a
trial judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than
the accused. It is not for him to
indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing
of yielding to first impressions. He is
to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself
open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being
imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as
the public that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that
he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching
an unjust decision at a minimum. It is
not necessary that he should possess marked proficiency in law, but it is
essential that he is to hold the balance true.
What is equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts
doubt on his impartiality. What has been
said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics.
It is impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage
of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually dismiss Criminal Case No.
20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of settling the civil aspect of
the case, by persuading the private complainant and the accused to sign the
settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March
1999 which varies from that which he issued in open court in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The
memorandum report states:
During
the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled: “People vs. Nenita Salvador”, Judge
Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public prosecutor and considering that the
private complainant was not being represented by a private prosecutor, used his
moral ascendancy and influence to convince the private complainant to settle
and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the guise of settling its civil
aspect by making the private complainants and the accused sign the settlement.
(Copy of the signed stenographic notes is
hereto attached as Annex “8”).
x
x x x
In
an Order dated
In the
meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN,
Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as A.M.
OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her
Affidavit Complaint[67] dated
Judge
Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by
Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in
accordance with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants
concerned as they openly manifested their willingness to patch up their
differences in the spirit of reconciliation.
Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the
necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before
the TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a conversation
between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter opined that
under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of compromise in
criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some cases. With this in mind, the
Judge
Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no power
to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise any
orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The
rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus
v. Court of Appeals[68] wherein we declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory,
has juridical existence until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and
promulgated, i.e., delivered by the
Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and
implementation, and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the
parties until and unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the
modes prescribed by law. This is so even
if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the presence of
the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof somehow
read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e., filing
with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an
order or judgment, the Court rendering
it indisputably has plenary power to recall and amend or revise it in substance
or form on motion of any party or even motu
proprio, provided that in the
case of a final order or judgment, the same has not attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In
herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court –
ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement – which was amended or
revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely
stating that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations
of the parties to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor
shall have submitted its comments thereto.[69]
Considering
then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro
to revise his oral order per the Echaus ruling
and factoring in his explanation for resorting to such an amendment, we find no
basis for the charge of dishonesty (under paragraph “j” of the complaint).
Anent
the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial settlement never came to
pass. It was not judicially approved as
reflected in the revised Order of
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground
that the accused is “mahina ang pick-up”
The
audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case No.
20347-MN, Judge Floro “motu proprio ordered
the physical and mental examination of the accused by any physician, over the
strong objection of the trial prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is “mahina ang pick-up.”[70]
In
refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court
carefully observed the demeanor of the accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the
manifestations of his counsel de oficio, Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the
comment/objections of the trial prosecutor, Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a.
Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court
that the accused opted to enter a plea of not guilty;
b.
But upon query of the Court, the accused
approached the bench and he appeared trembling and stammering;
c.
Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by
respondent, readily admitted that accused is “nauutal”, has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very
nervous;
d.
Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the
accused often changed his mind regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty
and to not guilty, and so forth;
e.
Considering the grave situation, Atty.
Gallevo, upon citation by the Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of
the Rules, namely Rule 28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116,
and Sec. 5(g) of Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to
conform to justice), manifested orally that the accused is “mahina ang
pick-up”;
f.
Hence, respondent exercised his sound
discretion in issuing the ORDER OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The
MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that
“the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his
physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved.” (27 C.J.S. p.
119, cf. MARTIN, p. 107, id.).[71]
PAO
lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified that he moved for the suspension
of the arraignment of the accused Nestor Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial.[72] As reflected in the Order for suspension,
however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his Comment, Atty. Gallevo
merely manifested that accused is “mahina
ang pick-up.”
Be that
as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu proprio and “over the strong
objection of the trial prosecutor.” It
must be remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999
when the applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of
arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:
(a)
The accused appears to be suffering from
an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable to fully
understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the
suspension be made pursuant to a motion filed by the accused unlike Section
11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure which decrees
that the suspension be made “upon motion by the proper party.”[73] Thus, it was well within the discretion of
Judge Floro to order the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge
the duty to suspend the proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with
the aid of counsel, cannot make a proper defense.[74] As we underscored in People v. Alcalde[75]:
Settled is the rule that when a
judge is informed or discovers that an accused is apparently in a present condition
of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion to investigate the
matter. If it be found that by reason of
such affliction the accused could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper
defense, it is the duty of the court to suspend the proceedings and commit the
accused to a proper place of detention until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
x x x x
The constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him under the Bill
of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to effectively convey to
the accused the information to enable him to effectively prepare for his
defense. At the bottom is the issue of
fair trial. While not every aberration
of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused is
sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be
fully satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance
the law secures or gives. x x x.
Whether
or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s mental
fitness for trial is already beside the point.
If ever he erred, he erred in the side of caution which, under the
circumstances of the case, is not an actionable wrong.
(e) Re: Charge of appearing and signing
pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch
83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial
Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law
(f)
Re:
Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the Supreme
Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of absence
on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report
states:
i. Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit
team that he has personal cases pending before the lower courts in
Bulacan. He admitted that Atty.
Bordador, the counsel of record in some of these cases, is just signing the
pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro, Jr.) acts as collaborating
counsel. When attending the hearing of
the cases, Judge Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for
leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the
audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil case in the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal Trial Court,
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that
in these cases, he is appearing and filing pleadings in his capacity as party
and counsel for himself and even indicating in the pleadings that he is the
Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC, Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team,
it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed has a pending case before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98,
entitled: “In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Robert V.
Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus – Jesie V. Floro and
Benjamin V. Floro”. In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an “Ex-Parte Motion for
Issuance of Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission”
wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that he is
the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this
information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his
picture together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading.
Photocopy of the said Motion is hereto attached as Annex “9”.
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending
request with the Court Management Office, Office of the Court Administrator, to
appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several civil cases (except the
above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts.[76]
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law.
Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that:
“No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office
of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar
or give professional advice to client.”
Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on the other hand,
provides that: “A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.”
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming
that he hired lawyers to attend to his personal cases.[77]
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not
reveal any concrete proof of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his
personal cases after he had already been appointed Judge except that he
prepared a pleading (“Ex Parte Motion
For Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial
Admission”) jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed against his
brothers for the custody of their “mild, mentally-retarded” brother. He explained, however, that he prepared the
said pleading in the heat of anger as he could not accept the judgment of
dismissal in that case.[78] He likewise explained that the pleading was
signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified the same by
filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit.[79] Finally, during the hearing of this case,
Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading as petitioner and not as
counsel.[80]
The proscription against the private practice of law by
judges is based on sound public policy, thus:
[T]he
rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law
are inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers,
discretion and privileges of a judge. It
also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their
judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to their own
private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These
objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the
public interest.[81]
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that
what is envisioned by “private practice” is more than an isolated court
appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of
acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the
public as a lawyer.[82]
In herein case, save for the “Motion
for Entry of Judgment,” it does not appear from the records that Judge Floro
filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in connection
with his personal cases. It is safe to
conclude, therefore, that Judge Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of
judgment is but an isolated case and does not in any wise constitute private
practice of law. Moreover, we cannot
ignore the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in
this case as he himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of
unauthorized practice of law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for
signing a pleading wherein he indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC,
Branch 73, Malabon City and for appending to the
pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The only logical explanation we can reach for
such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously trying to influence or put pressure
on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself is a judge and is thus in the
right.[83] Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a “judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency.” By doing what he did, Judge
Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its
claim that Judge Floro has been attending the hearing of his personal cases
without filing for leave of absence. As
Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon the
OCA to prove its case. Time and again we
have held that although administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by
formal rules on evidence, the liberality of procedure in administrative actions
is still subject to limitations imposed by the fundamental requirement of due
process.[84]
(k) Re:
Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and
intemperate language during court proceedings
The memorandum report
reads:
In the course of the judicial audit,
the audit team was able to observe the way Judge Floro, Jr. conducts court
proceedings. With the assistance of the
court staff, the team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted
by Judge Floro, Jr. Attached is the
transcript of the proceedings (Annex “15”). The tape record of the court proceedings is
also submitted along with this report as Exhibit
“A”.
x x x x
The case for hearing that day was
Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty.
Abelarde was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was
appearing for the defendant. During the
hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were guiding Judge Floro,
Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge
Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
“Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may
plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila maayos ang
Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on
Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,
masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi
alam yan talo na sa akin … except … na hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …”
In
another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of
holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even condemned the Philippine justice
system and manifested his disgust on the unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
“Sabi
ko paano ko matatagpuan ang
katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang
hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman,
ako walang pera.”
He continued:
“Yung
kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid ko retarded,
bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert
Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako. Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun
… ganun … Sabi ko paano ko makikita
ang katarungan.
Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko
pa nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang
ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko inano kasi wala akong nakikitang
katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas
o may kiling eh. Yung abogado niya
malakas na malakas doon.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically
arguing that these are all hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court,
Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their
consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which
were all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the
tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the Philippine
judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done
clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic
Act No. 4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting
portions thereof. They also made it
appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding when, in fact,
this was inside his chambers.
During
the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were
submitted to the OCA sans the “yellow
notes” and the official transcribed copy thereof.[86] This means that the transcribed copy that was
submitted by the audit team as Annex “15” is but an unofficial copy and does
not, by itself, prove that what was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes, without
concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding,
cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private
conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200.[87]
Without
the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left with
only Judge Floro’s word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who
testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to criticize the
judiciary and to use intemperate language.
Resolving these particular charges would therefore depend upon which party
is more credible.
Atty.
Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of
Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he openly criticized the Rules
of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes.
Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the
alleged “kabulukan ng hustisya”. Time and again he said the Rules of Court is
of no use. He said that since theory and
the practice of law are very different, the Rules of Court does not always
apply to different cases. Not only the justice
system did he criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote “D’yan sa Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na
Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang pinakamababang lagayan diyan.”
To our mind, how can a Judge like him
openly criticize the very institution he is now serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar
and to the bench? How can he uphold courts
as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice system?
x
x x x
Q What can you say about charge letter
“L” which reads for the use of highly improper and intemperate language during
court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all
his staff, during the presence of me, the Court Interpreter, the Legal
Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters regarding practitioners in
our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady lawyer, he said, “Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan” and
then he would call even not during court session, but during office hours our
Court Interpreter “malandi, luka-luka,
may fruit of the sun”. So, it did not surprise us one time when during a
pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN “Lopez v.
Reyes and Mercado”, he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge.
Take the transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court
Administrator. It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator.
Actually, for consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed
in open Court, before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and
before the lawyer and the defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether
or not to attach in the record the stenographic notes or even the actual
transcription of the proceedings because it contained offensive languages
against the justice system, against a certain judge, against a certain Clerk of
Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted with. In fact, instead
of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the amicable
settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So, as a
Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record
because it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate
languages like for example, “putang ina”,
words like “ako ang anghel ng kamatayan,
etcetera, etcetera”.[88]
The
denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and
candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs
from Judge Floro himself.
The
Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances
are consistent with Judge Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having
graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed
13th in the bar examinations.
Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system on account of his
perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are not far
removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed
against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the
cases against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there is no direct
proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless,
evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of
his habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more
likely that he actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system
and is thus guilty of unbecoming conduct.
Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a
finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[89] In this case, there is ample and competent
proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.
(m) Re:
Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated
The
memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he
discusses matters involving his personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that “[a] judge
shall maintain order and proper decorum in the court.” A disorderly judge generates disorderly
work. An indecorous judge invites
indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to
maintain order and proper decorum in court.
When the judge respects himself, others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow
suit. Proceedings in court must be
conducted formally and solemnly. The
atmosphere must be characterized with honor and dignity befitting the
seriousness and importance of a judicial trial called to ascertain the
truth. Anything which tends to detract
from this atmosphere must be avoided.
And the judge is supposed to be in control and is therefore responsible
for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the
Administration of Justice) dated
Moreover, a judge should avoid being
queer in his behavior, appearance and movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the
visible representative of the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed
with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he
is the angel of death and that he has unseen “little friends” are
manifestations of his psychological instability and therefore casts doubt on
his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr.
once again to psychiatric or mental examination to ascertain his fitness to
remain in the judiciary.[90]
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an
offense but, as its title would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the
administration of justice following the ratification of the 1987
Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify
the fact that the 13 charges are inextricably linked to the charge of
mental/psychological illness which allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to
continue discharging the functions of his office. This being the case, we will consider the
allegation that Judge Floro proclaims himself to be endowed with psychic
powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel
of death and that he has unseen “little friends” in determining the
transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the
appropriate penalty to be imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed
above. To recapitulate, we have found
Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven
of the 13 charges against him. Thus:
1)
Charge “a” - simple misconduct
2)
Charges “c” and “g” – gross ignorance of the law
3)
Charge “d” – unbecoming conduct
4)
Charge “e” – unbecoming conduct
5)
Charges “k” and “l” – unbecoming conduct
Gross
ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as amended, a judge guilty of
a serious charge may be dismissed from the service, suspended from office
without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six
months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with
these charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And,
considering further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad
faith or with corrupt motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate
penalty. The fine is to be imposed in
the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00,
as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct as
aggravating circumstances.[91]
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC
Malabon Branch due to a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders
him unfit to discharge the functions of his office
As we
have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated
accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against
Judge Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate
mental or psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension
pending investigation. This charge of
mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the functions of his
office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges, there had
been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme
Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter
applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way
back in September 1995. The
psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D. (Director III,
Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There
are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious
during the interview. He was
argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of
marked suspiciousness. He centered on
his academic excellence, an Ateneo de Manila graduate of the College of Law,
rated top 13th place in the bar examination. He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive
method of studying, at least 15 hours per day regardless of whether it was
school days or vacation time. Vying for
honors all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this
self-discipline and self-organization.
He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures.
To emphasize his ultra bright mind and analytical system, he related
that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been experiencing “Psychic vision”
every morning and that the biggest secret of the universe are the “unseen
things.” He can predict future events
because of “power in psychic phenomenon” as when his bar results was to be
released, he saw lights in the sky “no. 13-1,” and he got the 13th
place. He has been practicing
“parapsychology” – seeing plenty of “dwendes” around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to
be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of
ego disintegration are prominent findings, both in the interview (conscious)
and psychological test results. (unconscious level).[92]
Approximately three years later, in
June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself to the Supreme Court Clinic when
he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P.
Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and Medical Officer IV) did the interview and
evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic
achievements (sic), and he takes pride in this.
During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about
his family background and would rather talk about his work and academic
achievements. However, he failed to
integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit which he can utilize to cope with
the various tasks that he undertakes.
This renders him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate
with decision-making. He also has a low
self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic
change in his personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private
practice. However, he showed a pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal
deficits. He has poor social skills and
showed discomfort with close social contacts.
Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of others’ motives as well as
perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the
mild mental retardation (68) which is below the expected cognitive efficiency
of a judge. Despite his impressive
academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character
traits such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with
paranormal and psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a
lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in
dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is
at present not intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the
responsibilities of a judge and he may decompensate when exposed to
anxiety-provoking and stress-laden situation.[93]
It would seem that the JBC disregarded
the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge Floro to seek a second opinion from
private practitioners. A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1460, however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological
capacity to preside over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of
On
The
order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic
was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge
Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions.[97]
On
On 10 November
2000,
Judge Floro moved, among other things, for
the inhibition or disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors[100]
and psychologist[101] with a
manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before
the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical
Association (PMA) and the PAP[102] for
alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act
No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics.[103]
On
Judge Floro finally complied with the
directive on 13 and
Thus,
Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in December
2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G.
Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that
“(o)ver all data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the
paranoid direction.” Dr. Celeste Vista,
for her part, stated that:
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that
Judge Floro is basically a cautious, and suspicious individual with a
compulsion to analyze and observe motives in his milieu. Despite his status,
cognitive assets and impressive educational background, his current functioning
is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and
routine situations. However, his test
protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality testing
which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an objective assessment
and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is
apt to misconstrue signals from his environment resulting to perceptual
distortions, disturbed associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs,
psychic and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become
incorporated in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has
interfered and tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in
performing his court duties as a judge.[108]
Pursuant
to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court Senior
Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –
The
findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported
by evidence. Based on the three [3]
psychological tests and evaluation of the two [2] psychiatrists, the
undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge Florentino Floro
be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective immediately.
Not one to take this last
recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted earlier psychological
evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals which were all
favorable to him. The first three
evaluations were in connection with his application as RTC Judge of
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE
CHARACTERISTICS
SUMMARY OF
INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS
1. FFJ can draw from
above average intellectual resources to cope with everyday demands. He is able
to handle both concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details,
he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship between things and
ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured
situations, where he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize
procedures and details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He
uses conventional standards to determine personal progress. Set in his views,
he may not readily accept others’ ideas and contributions especially if these
oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his
commitments is expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions
and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and
respected for his undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal
standards and tends to judge himself and others according to these standards.
When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless and
impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be
expected to comply with conventional social demands.[109]
Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s
witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-examination that “psychologically
speaking,” Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge. Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge
Floro based on his testimony here and on every available records of the proceedings,
has been claiming that he [is] possessed with Psychic Powers and he did not
tell you that in the interview. Would you consider his failure to tell you
about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
x x
x x
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Very grave one, because it will affect
the psychological outlook of the patient?
A: Yes, Sir.
x x
x x
Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been
claiming in [these] proceedings and you were here when we were cross-examining
Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we mentioned in the
course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to tell you
about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of his
psychological outlook?
x x
x x
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Fatal [flaw]?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the
course of the interview that he is capable of being in a trance?
A: He did not.
Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a
trance he could type letters?
A: He did not.
x x
x x
Q: And reality oriented and a reality
oriented person is one who will not be pronouncing or making pronouncement
concerning his psychic powers. Is this
not correct?
x x
x x
A: Yes sir.
Q: A reality oriented person is also one
who will not claim that he is capable of having trances in the course of his
private activities and even in the course of the performance of his official
duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with
that?
A: I agree with you, Sir.
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be
actually a reality oriented person.
Meaning tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman “na ako ay psychic, na ako
ay pwedeng ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng iba’t iba pang bagay at the same
time.” Yan ay
hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented
is not fit to sit as a Judge.
x x
x x
Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically
speaking.
x x
x x
A: Yes, Sir.[110]
Another
psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of the
Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the time of the
interview Judge Floro –
[W]as
enthusiastic and confident. He is well
informed about current issues, able to discuss a wide variety of topics
intelligently without hesitation. His
thinking is lucid, rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally
stable, with very good judgment. There
is no previous history of any psychological disturbances.[111]
This
was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September 1998, who stated in his
report that –
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly
groomed, be-spectacled person with graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious,
elaborative and at times approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative
and articulate in Pilipino and English.
He denied any perceptual disturbances.
Stream of thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency to
be argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought
blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was
anxious. There were no abnormal
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse
control is good. Cognition is
intact. Judgment, insight, and other
test for higher cortical functions did not reveal abnormal results.
Comments: The
over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V. Floro,
Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is seeking.[112]
On the
witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla
clarified that the interview had its limitations[113] and he
might have missed out certain information left out by his patient.[114] The following exchange is thus instructive:
JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview
that he has little unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes?
DR. JURILLA: He did not.
x x
x x
Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he
[volunteer] to you information about his claim to be the number five psychic in
the country?
x x
x x
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: He did not tell you also that he is
gifted also with this so called, psychic phenomena?
A: He did not.
x x
x x
Q: He did not tell you also that in
[traveling] from one place to another, at least four (4) kilometers apart, he
used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
A: Not during our interview.
x x
x x
A: It is possible like any other
psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have missed some information or
it is possible that our clients or patients might not [have] told us
everything.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not
tell you things such as those that Judge Floro did not admittedly tell you in the
course of the interview, your opinion of the patient would be altered a little?
x x
x x
A: The answer has something to do whether
my evaluation may be altered. Yes, Your Honor in the absence of any
corroborative contradiction.
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming
events that transpired after the interview, would that be correct?
A: The interview has its limitations.
Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell
you during the interview are confirmed by events that transpired after the interview,
would you not say you have more reason to have your evaluation altered?
A: Yes.
Q: Especially so if you will now know that
after that interview Judge Floro has been proclaiming himself as the number
five psychic in the country [where] no one has called him as a psychic at all?
x x
x x
Q: Would it be really more altered?
A: I would say so.
x x
x x
Q: Returning to the confirming proofs,
meaning after the interview, which are confirmations of what Judge Floro did
not tell you during the interview, would your finding of [J]udge
Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that
he is capable or possessed of the power of bilocation?
x x
x x
A: I would probably try to for a
diagnosis.
Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of
your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental and psychological x x x?
A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an
abnormal condition.
Q: When you said abnormal something would
have made you suspect that there was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?
A: Given the data.
Q: We will give you the data or additional
information. Would you also have your
evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that
based on record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of
typing a letter?
x x
x x
A: If there is data toward that effect
prior to September 1998, probably drastically altered.[115]
Lastly,
Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba, M.D.,[116] dated
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was
observed. Content of thought did not
reveal delusional thought. He was proud
of his achievements in line with his profession and expressed his frustration
and dissatisfaction with the way his colleagues are handling his pending
administrative cases. He was observed to
be reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal
perceptual distortions. Orientation, with
respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired. Judgment and decision-making capacity were
adequately functioning.
x x
x x
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our
clinic on
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge
Floro on
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the
psychological tests, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be
a highly intelligent person who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from
any major psychotic disorder. He is not
deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in
making sound decisions. His belief in
supernatural abilities is culture-bound and needs further studies/work-ups.
On
cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge
Floro was unfit to be a judge.[117] The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and
Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong
with a judge who shall claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
x x x x
DR. MAABA: A
reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at one
time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is
wrong also with a judge claiming in the course of his testimony and in this
very case that while [he] was so testifying there is another spirit, another
person, another character unseen who is with him at the same time or in tagalog
“sumapi sa kanya”.
x x x x
A: The observation that Judge Floro had
unseen companion “sumapi” to me is
unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering
from some delusion?
x x x x
A: It could be and it could not be
considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe
yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe
worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person
declaring in a proceeding as a witness about hallucinatory matters would turn
out to be fit to become a judge?
x x x x
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are
part and parcel of a major psychiatric disorder like schizophrenia or an
organic mental disorder, this individual suffering from hallucinations or
delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this symptom might
also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and delusions
could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a
judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the
field of which you are practicing with psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in
the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative proceedings
particularly in the course of his testimony that while he was doing so, he was
under trance normal.
x x x x
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance
it is usually considered in the Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome
and it could also be an indication … Basically the phenomenon of trance are
often seen in cases of organic mental disorder. It is also common in culture
bound syndrome and the effect of person is usually loss of concentration in a
particular settings or situations so that a person or a judge hearing a case in
court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to follow up testimony
of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the defense and also
for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in manners of
attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge experience
trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is
manifested by flashing of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to
control expressions or as well as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that
in the course of a proceeding, he was in a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown
records of one maybe such claim you will call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the
stenographic notes of the proceedings in these cases held on
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge
Floro in these proceedings also and I will show to you the transcript of
stenographic notes later have claimed that he had, always had and still had a
so–called counter part, his other side, other self, what can you say to that
claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally
sound is of course not fit to sit as judge?
x x x x
A: Yes.[118]
Based on
the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of
his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves Celeste and Eduardo L.
Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit because of insanity
to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for
respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that President
Estrada would not finish his term as President.
It is unusual and queer of him to state in his calling card that he is a
graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of
87.55% and include in his address the name Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was
involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is
it strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing
decisions in the cases assigned to his court.
It is improper and grandiose of him to express superiority over other
judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him to say that he is
very successful over many other applicants for the position he has been
appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to
distribute self-serving propaganda. One
who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge
suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while
presiding at the hearing of a case in court.
One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist
to determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit
or insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and
functions of a judge. The life, liberty
and property of the litigants in the court presided by such judge are in his
hands. Hence, it is imperative that he
is free from doubt as to his mental capacity and condition to continue
discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully
recommended that by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73, respondent
Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from such office.[119]
We are
in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge because
of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the
functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the
OCA nor this Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is “insane” as, in
fact, the psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When
Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service due
to “insanity,” he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a general layman’s term, a
catch–all word referring to various mental disorders. Psychosis is perhaps the
appropriate medical term[120] as
this is the one used by Drs. Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and 2000 psychological
evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts
exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and happiness of
the people.[121] An honorable, competent and independent
judiciary exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of
government, and the well-being of the people.[122] Carrying much of the weight in this daunting
task of administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over
courts of law and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and
institutions. As it has been said,
courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over them are
truly honorable men, competent and independent.[123]
There
is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an
honorable man. And, in fact, in our
disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty of
gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the
mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.
Moreover,
Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in “psychic visions,” of
foreseeing the future because of his power in “psychic phenomenon.” He believes in “duwendes” and of a covenant with his “dwarf friends Luis, Armand
and Angel.” He believes that he can
write while on trance and that he had been seen by several people to have been
in two places at the same time. He has
likened himself to the “angel of death” who can inflict pains on people,
especially upon those he perceived as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon.
He took to wearing blue robes during
court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that Judge Floro explained
that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge his psychic powers.
Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers during his
break time. All these things validate
the findings of the Supreme Court Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs
and that such beliefs have spilled over to action.
Lest we
be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However,
such beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with
the critical and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial
system.
Psychic
phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty bound to
apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles in
resolving controversies. Thus, Judge
Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in the decision he rendered in the case
of People v. Francisco, Jr.[124] sticks out like a sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited
the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the
testimony was a “fairytale” or a “fantastic story.”[125] He then went to state that “psychic
phenomena” was destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the
testimony of the witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is
quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecution’s
PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is
full of inconsistencies (major and not regarding minor points), ergo, the court
concludes that due to several indicia of fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable
deception of the Court), his testimony is not worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia
argumenti, that the same may be admissible, and his Court narrative is
hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a crime scene that is
acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing.
The following details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:
a.)
NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were “sinalubong” by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m.
at alley Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the “nagpambuno” between
Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS NO LONGER THERE, but
he still saw the “nagpambuno”; MORE IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the
ACCUSED P. Francisco THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.)
The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th
HOUR CONCOCTION (Big Lie, having been asked to submit false testimony); for how
could have he witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the
following day? (TSN dated
In State Prosecutors v. Muro[127] we held that –
What is required on the part of
judges is objectivity. An independent
judiciary does not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as
they please. There are both implicit and
explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits include accepted legal values
and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural rules of law.[128]
The judge, even when he is free, is
still not wholly free. He is not to
innovate at pleasure. He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration
from consecrated principles. He is not
to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinate to the
“primordial necessity of order in the social life.”[129]
Judge
Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for
judicial tasks leaves much to be desired.
As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and
achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have problems with
decision-making. His character traits
such as suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and
psychic phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his
judgment, and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x[130]
Judge Floro’s
belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he served as
RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge.
Verily,
Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial
robes, he has accepted and identified himself with large components of the
judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired
to a judge’s status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less
unconsciously, in the fashion of one who is said to have “the judicial
temperament.” He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judge’s role demands. A large proportion of his experiences on the
bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The ritualistic elements of investiture and
of court procedure, the honorific forms of address, and even the imposing
appearance of some court buildings serve to emphasize the demands upon his
behavior. Even the most unscrupulous
former ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political
organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as
a judge.[131]
The
expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of other
public officials. Judges are seen as
guardians of the law and they must thus identify themselves with the law to an
even greater degree than legislators or executives.[132]
As it
has been said, “[j]udges administer justice
judicially, i.e., not according to
some abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down
by society in its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of
the judge is primarily adjudication. This
is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art, whether we call
it legislative or not, which requires great ability and objectivity.”[133] We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in
speaking of the functions of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the
To
practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no
doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude
that one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not
shared. But these are precisely the
presuppositions of our judicial process.
They are precisely the qualities society has a right to expect from
those entrusted with … judicial power.
x
x x x
The
judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice
and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment.[134]
In
fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus be allowed to continue as
judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to the existence of a
critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge
Floro backwages and other economic benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In
retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the
judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have
assiduously reviewed the history of this case and we cannot hold anyone legally
responsible for such major and unfortunate faux
pas.
Judge
Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for
judgeship. He went through the entire
gamut of tests and interviews and he was nominated by the JBC on the strength
of his scholastic achievements. As to
having failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be
pointed out that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floro’s submission
of psychiatric evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the
private sector and which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that
Judge Floro acted less than honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The
JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for
a second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions, the JBC had been
guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that members of the
Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of proven
competence, integrity, probity and independence.[135] It was
only on
SECTION
1. Good health. – Good physical
health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant
play a critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task
of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric
tests. – The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to
be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic or by a psychologist and/or
psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It
would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the
evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the
JBC. Thus, the JBC cannot be faulted for
accepting the psychological evaluations of mental health professionals not
affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge
Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait
accompli. What awaits us now is the seemingly
overwhelming task of finding the PROPER, JUST
AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost seven years of suspension in the light of the fact that the penalty
imposed herein does not merit a suspension of seven years.
Verily,
the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts.[137] The Constitution limits this power through
the admonition that such rules “shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts
of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.”[138]
Rule
140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the
steps to be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending
investigation. This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No.
01-8-10-SC which took effect on
The
Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.[139] This power -- consistent with the power to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts --
is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes that an adjective law
cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.
The
resolution of
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to
answer the foregoing charges against him within ten (10) days from notice; (2)
REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the
Court Administrator for investigation, report and recommendation, within sixty
(60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3) SUBJECT Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted
by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or
mental institution.
Moreover,
the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective immediately under
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation of the administrative
charges against him.[140]
As can be gleaned from the
above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension, albeit indefinite, was for
the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against him which the Court
pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator of the records
of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now
states that “(t)he investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the
investigation within ninety (90) days from the date of its commencement or
within such extension as the Supreme Court may grant”[141] and,
“(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the investigation, the
investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a report
containing findings of fact and recommendation.”[142]
From the foregoing, the rule now is
that a Judge can be preventively suspended not only for the entire period of
his investigation which would be 90 days (unless extended by the Supreme Court)
but also for the 30 days that it would take the investigating judge or justice
to come up with his report. Moreover,
the Court may preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final
decision is reached in the administrative case against him or her.[143] This is because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees,
judges who are charged with a serious offense warranting preventive suspension
are not automatically reinstated upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period,
as mandated above. The Court may preventively suspend a judge until a final
decision is reached in the administrative case especially where there is a
strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the offense charged. Indeed,
the measure is intended to shield the public from any further damage or
wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of office by the
erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples of
justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice
solemnly dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that
a judge must bear for the privilege of occupying an exalted position. Among
civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all its own. After all, in the
vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights looked upon as the
embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate weapons against
justice and oppression.[144]
In the case of Judge Floro, he is
under preventive suspension up to the present because of the serious charge of
mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the actual investigation into his
cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90 days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most
part, can be directly ascribed to Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only
did Judge Floro move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he
likewise dragged his feet with respect to the order to submit himself to the
appropriate psychological/mental examination.
Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10
cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and law.[145] All in
all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had connived to
remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on
Be that
as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case
considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been
expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled
similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we
cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under preventive
suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the
preventive suspension. The inequity of
the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly apparent, given the peculiar
circumstance in which a judge finds himself preventively suspended by the Court
“until further orders”.
In this case, Judge
Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during which period he was
not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for a teaching job that the Court
permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the administrative case, Judge
Iturralde had no other source of income.
He thus incurred several loans to provide for his family’s basic needs.
It would thus be unjust
to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits for the entire period that he was preventively suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension pending
investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that ninety (90) days is ample time
to conclude the investigation of an administrative case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive
suspension is no longer justified.
Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries,
allowances and other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his
preventive suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, should
likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be
instances when an investigation would extend beyond ninety (90) days and such
may not be entirely unjustified.
Nevertheless, we believe that in such a situation, it would be unfair to
withhold his salaries and other economic benefits for the entire duration of
the preventive suspension, moreso if the delay in the resolution of the case
was not due to his fault. Upon being
found innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension
exceeding the ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would
indeed be nothing short of punitive. It
must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely removed the cause
for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily, therefore, we must rectify its
effects on just and equitable grounds.[147]
Taking
off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise
entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find
themselves preventively suspended by the Court “until further orders” or, as
this case, “for the duration of the investigation.” Judge Iturralde’s suspension of 13 ½ months
even pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s suspension of 81 months, more or
less. During this entire excruciating
period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his profession, thus putting
him solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And, though he was given donations by those
who came to him for healing, obviously, these could not compensate for his loss
of income as Judge.
Unlike
the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of
suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back
salaries, we hold that, as a matter of equity,
Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries, allowances and other economic
benefits for a period corresponding to three of his almost seven years
suspension. We cannot apply the ruling
in Gloria that any suspension served
beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect, rewarding Judge
Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the
indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived
connived to oust him out of office. In
Judge Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed through any fault of
his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde
was ultimately held innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess of 90 days was
already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced precisely
because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the other hand, and as
already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation of his
cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde,
Judge Floro has not been adjudged innocent of all the 13 charges against
him.
These
facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond the
reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice
Brandeis, equity does not demand that its suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach
and do complete justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their
rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances
of cases, are incompetent so to do.
Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and not the
form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously expressed
by different courts.[148]
In
fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay
in the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award
him back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period
corresponding to three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is
not a penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon Judge Floro out of
necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind which renders him
unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of his
office.
The
period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the
circumstances. As discussed, if we were
to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc., then it would seem
that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution of these
cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on
Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against
him docketed as A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re:
Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) A.M.
No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino
V. Floro, Jr.), on the other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge
Floro’s separation from the service renders moot the complaint in A.M. No.
99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most
favorable of resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s
decision to separate Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot
and academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a
replica of charge “h” in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and considering that charge “h”
is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz Arriego
must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it
forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from
appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
As Judge Floro’s separation from the
service cannot be considered a penalty, such separation does not carry with it
the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from
appointment to any other public office including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
In fact,
the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the
finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify
him from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him
to dispense justice. The reports contain
statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that the Court cannot overlook in
all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They mention Judge Floro’s assets and
strengths and capacity for functionality, with minor modification of work
environment. Thus:
a.
High intellectual assets as a result of “self-discipline
and self- organization.”[149]
b.
“(I)mpressive
academic achievements” with “no drastic change in his personality and level of
functioning as a lawyer in private practice.”[150]
c.
“(C)haracter
traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation with paranormal and
psychic phenomena … not detrimental to his role as a lawyer.”[151]
d.
“Everyday situations can be comprehended
and dealt with in moderate proficiency …. His concern for the details that make
up a total field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious.”[152]
e. “(E)quipped with analytical power.”[153]
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the
sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of
endeavor.
Putting
all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s
current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was duly appointed to judgeship and his
mental problems, for now, appear to render him unfit with the delicate task of
dispensing justice not because of any acts of corruption and debasement on his
part but clearly due to a medically disabling condition.
Finally,
if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics[154] and/or
adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information
is not available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or
adverse environment – factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1)
FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total
amount of FORTY THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges
against him in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2)
RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his
functions as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon
City and consider him SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling
condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his
office, effective immediately;
3)
As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding
to three (3) years;
4)
DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
for LACK OF MERIT; and
5)
DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for
MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate
Justice |
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate
Justice |
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice |
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate
Justice |
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ANTONIO
T. CARPIO Associate
Justice |
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice |
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RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice |
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DANTE O. TINGA Associate
Justice |
CANCIO
C. GARCIA
Associate Justice |
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[1] 292 US 216, 229, 78 L ed
1219, 1227, 54 S Ct 684.
[2] OCA’s Annexes “A” to “C”.
[3] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 1-15.
[4]
[5] Guidelines In the Administration of Justice.
[6] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 114-141.
[7] Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 428-432.
[8] TSN,
[9] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 481-484.
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14] Rollo, Vol. II, p. 218.
[15] Resolution
of the Court dated
[16] Danilo Cuarto, TSN,
[17] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 691-700.
[18] To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated
On
On
[19] To paraphrase the OCA in
its Memorandum dated
On
On
[20] To paraphrase the OCA in
its Memorandum dated
On
In a resolution dated
[21] To paraphrase the OCA in
its Memorandum dated
On
In an order dated
In a resolution dated 30 January
2001, this Court noted the order dated 30 August 2000 of the Commission on Bar
Discipline and the letter of Judge Floro praying for the consolidation of this
case with A.C. No. 5286. In a resolution
dated
[22] To paraphrase the OCA in
its Memorandum dated
On
On
[23] To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated
In a Complaint dated
[24] To paraphrase the OCA in its Memorandum dated
On
[25] See temporary rollo on the matter.
[26] On
[27] OCA
Memorandum dated
[28] Rollo (A.M. Mo. 99-7-273-RTC), p. 4.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 6.
[33]
[34] Rules of Court, Vol. 6, pp. 122-123 (1981
ed.).
[35] LEGAL
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, E. L. Pineda, pp. 341-342 (1994 ed.).
[36] Bar
Matter No. 553,
[37] TSN,
[38] See testimony of Branch Clerk of Court
Esmeralda Galang-Dizon , TSN,
[39] Testimony
of Ma. Enrina Talag-Pascual, TSN,
[40] Office of the Court Administrator v.
Fernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1511,
[41] Francisco v. Cosico, A.M. No. CA-04-37,
[42] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 4.
[43] A.M.
No. RTJ-91-657,
[44] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 4-5.
[45] Answer/Compliance,
rollo, Vol. I, pp. 151-152.
[46] Section
9 of
Sec.
9. Disqualified Offenders. – The
benefits of this Decree shall not be extended to those:
(a) sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six years;
(b) convicted of subversion or any crime
against the national security or the public order;
(c) who have previously been convicted by
final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day/or a fine of not less that Two Hundred Pesos;
(d) who have been once on probation under the
provisions of this Decree; and
(e) who are already serving sentence at the
time the substantive provisions of this Decree became applicable pursuant to
Section 33 hereof.
[47] A.M.
No. RTJ-02-1693, 436 Phil. 295, 318 (2002).
[48] P.D.
No. 968, Section 7 as amended, provides:
SEC.
7. Period for Submission of
Investigation Report. - The probation officer shall submit to the court the
investigation report on a defendant not later than sixty days from receipt of
the order of said court to conduct the investigation. The court shall resolve
the petition for probation not later than five days after receipt of said
report.
Pending submission of the
investigation report and the resolution of the petition, the defendant may be
allowed on temporary liberty under his bail filed in the criminal case; Provided, That, in case where no bail
was filed or that the defendant is incapable of filing one, the court may allow
the release of the defendant on recognizance to the custody of a responsible
member of the community who shall
guarantee his appearance whenever required by the court
[49] Supra
note 47, pp. 317-318.
[50] G.R.
No. 57343,
[51] As
to Judge Floro’s Annex “C-2,” which purportedly disproves the audit team’s
allegation that he did not reduce into writing his orders made in open court,
the same is immaterial as it refers to a totally different case (Crim. Case No.
20774, People of the Philippines v. Joel Solivar y Sta Ana); Rollo, Vol. I, p. 217.
[52] Supra
note 47, p. 318.
[53]
[54]
[55]
[56]
[57]
[58]
[59] Gil v. Judge Lopez, Jr., 449 Phil. 677,
686 (2003).
[60] TSN,
[61] See TSN,
[62] Sps. Nazareno v. Judge
Almario, 335 Phil. 1122, 1129 (1997); Bunyi v. Hon. Caraos, 394
Phil. 211, 218 (2000).
[63] Dacera, Jr. v. Judge Dizon,
Jr., 391 Phil. 835, 843 (2000).
[64] cf. Cacatian v. Liwanag, A.M. No.
MTJ-02-1418,
[65] Fecundo v. Berjamen, G.R. No. 88105,
[66] G.R.
Nos. L-39516-17,
[67] Rollo in OCA I.P.I. 99-812-RTJ, pp. 10-23.
[68] Supra
note 50, pp. 674-675 (citations omitted).
[69] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 63-64.
[70]
[71]
[72] TSN,
[73] Cf. People v. Alcalde, 432 Phil. 366, 377
(2002).
[74]
[75] Supra
note 73, pp. 378-380 (citations omitted).
[76] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 6
[77]
[78]
[79]
[80] TSN,
[81] Carual v. Judge Brusola,
375 Phil. 464, 477 (1999).
[82] Ziga v. Judge Arejola,
451 Phil. 449, 459 (2003).
[83] Cf. Perez v. Costales, A.M. No.
RTJ-04-1876,
[84] Sps. Daracan v. Judge
Natividad, supra note 58, p. 370.
[85] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 8-9.
[86] TSN,
[87] SEC.
4. Any communication or spoken word, or
the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or
any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by
any person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be
admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.
[88] TSN,
[89] Cf. Español v. Mupas, A.M. No.
MTJ-01-1348,
[90] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 13.
[91] On
the other hand, if we were to give separate penalties for the findings of
simple misconduct and unbecoming conduct, the result would still be the same
under the circumstances.
[92] Rollo, Vol. VIII, pp. 42-43.
[93]
[94] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 405.
[95] Per the Court’s
Resolution dated
[96]
[97] Rollo, Vol. II, pp. 471-472.
[98]
[99]
[100] R.
Mendoza and C. Vista.
[101] Beatriz
O. Cruz.
[102] Judge
Floro must be referring to the Psychological Association of the
[103] Rollo, Vol. III, pp. 283-320.
[104]
[105]
[106] Report
of Francianina G. Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist, Chief Judicial Staff Officer
of the SC Clinic.
[107] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 635.
[108] Rollo, Vol. VIII, p. 216.
[109] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 362.
[110] TSN,
[111] Rollo, Vol. I, p. 364.
[112]
[113] TSN,
[114]
[115] TSN,
[116] Psychiatrist
connected with the Niño Jesus Clinic in Bulacan;
[117] TSN,
[118] TSN,
[119] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 691-700.
[120] See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (DSM-IV-TR), pp. 297-344 (Fourth Edition).
[121] Canon
1, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
[122] Preamble,
Code of Judicial Conduct.
[123] LEGAL
AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, E.L. Pineda, p. 327 (1995 ed.).
[124] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 49-61.
[125]
[126]
[127] Supra
note 66, pp. 482-483.
[128] Citing Yash Vyas, quoted in The Lawyers Review, Vol. VIII,
[129] Citing Justice B.N. Cardozo, quoted in The
Lawyers Review, id.
[130] Rollo, Vol. VIII, pp. 49-50.
[131] THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION, David B. Truman, p.
484 (Ramdom House of Canada Ltd., 1964).
[132]
[133] The Art of Being a Judge by Leon R. Yankwich, HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES, edited by Glenn R. Winters,
p. 4 (The American Judicature Society, 1975).
[134]
[135] Constitution, Article VIII, Section
7.
[136] WHEREAS
clause, JBC-009.
[137] CONSTITUTION,
Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5).
[138]
[139] CONSTITUTION,
Art. VIII, Sec 6.
[140] Rollo, Vol. I, pp. 87-89.
[141] RULES
OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 4, par. (b).
[142] RULES
OF COURT, Rule 140, Sec. 5.
[143] Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic
Benefits of Judge Philbert I. Iturralde, RTC Branch 58, Angeles City, A.M.
No. 01-10-12-0, 29 March 2005.
[144]
[145] Three
are against Judge Floro while the seven are cases filed by him.
[146] These
cases have since been dismissed per Resolution dated
[147] Re: Payment of Backwages and Other Economic
Benefits of
[148] Poso v. Judge Mijares,
supra note 47, p. 324 (citations omitted).
[149] See September 1995 Report of Dr. Cecilia
Villegas, Dir. III, Chief, SC Clinic; Rollo,
Vol. VIII, p. 42.
[150] See
[151]
[152] See 2000 Report of Clinical Psychologist
Francianina G. Sanchez, Chief Judicial Staff Officer of the Supreme Court
Clinic; Id., p. 212.
[153]
[154] Judge
Floro has admitted that he has a brother who is “mildly retarded.”