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NISSAN MOTORS
PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT and BAGONG
NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTOR PHILIPPINES, INC. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU), Respondents. x-------------------------------------x BAGONG NAGKAKAISANG LAKAS SA NISSAN MOTORS PHILIPPINES, INC.
(BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU), Petitioner, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL
DIVISION OF FIVE), SECRETARY OF LABOR and EMPLOYMENT and NISSAN MOTORS
PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents. |
G.R. Nos. 158190-91
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA,
JJ. Promulgated: June 21, 2006 G.R.
Nos. 158276 and 158283 |
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
GARCIA, J.:
Assailed and sought to be set aside in
these petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
February 7, 2003[1]
and its Resolution of May 15, 2003,[2] in CA-G.R.
SP No. 69107 and CA G.R. SP No. 69799, denying the petitions for certiorari
separately interposed by Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. (“Nissan Motor” or
“Company”) and Bagong Nagkakaisang Lakas sa Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU).
Docketed as G.R. Nos. 158190-91, Nissan Motor’s petition excepts from the assailed
ruling of the appellate court insofar as it affirmed (a) the award by the respondent
Secretary of Labor and Employment of certain
economic benefits to the company’s rank-and-file workers and (b) the recall of the
dismissal of 140 Union members. On the
other hand, the petition of BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU (“Union” hereafter), docketed as G.R. Nos. 158276 and 158283, assails the respondent
Secretary’s holding that the Union and its members engaged in a concerted work
slowdown despite the issuance of the assumption of jurisdiction order dated August 22, 2001,[3] infra,
and subsequent orders of similar
import. The same petition raises too the
issue respecting the correctness of the CA’s resolution citing the
In gist, the case turns on the labor
dispute triggered by a collective bargaining deadlock between Nissan Motor and the
Union resulting in the filing of four (4) notices of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB). Filed on December 4, 2000, the first Notice of Strike (NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-12-045-00), on the ground of alleged
unfair labor practice, stemmed from the suspension of about 140 company employees,
following the November 15, 2000 disruptive protest action arising from the
employees’ demand for payment of the 2nd half of their 13th
month pay. The Union filed the second strike notice
(NCMB-RBIV-LAG-NS-07-027-01) on July 24, 2001 on the ground of deadlock in
collective bargaining involving a mix of economic and non-economic issues.
On
What happened next is summarized in the
Decision of the respondent DOLE Secretary dated
On
xxx xxx xxx
On 12 September 2001, [the DOLE] issued an Order
directing that the 3rd Notice of Strike be consolidated with the
first two notices …; reiterating the injunction against strike or lockout, and directing the
parties to cease and desist from committing acts which may aggravate the
situation and to refrain from any slowdown.
On
On
On 18 September 2001, the Union filed a 4th
Notice of Strike … on grounds of alleged illegal dismissal of eighteen (18)
union officials, illegal lockout on account of the forced leave,
coercion/intimidation, union busting and non-payment of salaries for the period
August 15-30, 2001.
On
xxx xxx xxx
On 05 October 2001, the Company filed a Motion to
Deputize PNP Laguna to Secure, Maintain and Preserve Free Ingress and Egress of
NMPI, alleging … that despite the injunctions … against any slowdown and
strike, the Union went on actual strike on 01 October 2001, picketed and
blocked the company offices, and plant premises; unlawfully blocked and
obstructed all entrances and exits points.
On
xxx xxx xxx
On
On
The Union states further that the Company realized P3.2
Billion in gross sale for the year 2000; that it is very flexible with the
pricing of its products which price ranges from P750,000.00 to P1.3 Million;
that the estimated direct labor cost is only P68.180 Million.
On the political issues, the
The
The
The
The
On
The charge of illegal suspension of more or less 140
union members ranging from
Anent the said 13th month-pay related issue, …
the Company states that the statutory deadline for payment of the 13th
month-pay is December 24th of the applicable year, thus the demand
for early payment is not in order. The 13th
month pay was released as promised on
On the 2nd
Notice of Strike, the Company states that it is incapable of meeting the [capricious]
economic demands of the Union … [which are] being made despite the continued
losses suffered by NMPI over the last four (4) years of its operations
amounting to about P1.490 Billion.
Notwithstanding the reduction of the
a. Annual Salary increase - P900.00 + P160.00
merit
increase
b. Signing bonus - P3,000.00
c. Maternity assistance -
Caesarian
– P13,000.00
Miscarriage – P 3,
900.00
xxx xxx xxx
p. Overtime
pay premium Increase for ordinary day,
special holiday, rest
day and regular day
xxx xxx xxx
The Company maintains
that the losses [in] … its last four (4) years of operations, from 1997 to
2000, resulted in net losses amounting to P1.490 Billion, owing to such factors
as the 1997 Asian economic meltdown, …, and the Company’s limited motor vehicle
market share …. Copies of its audited
financial statements were submitted as Annexes “B”, “C”, “D”, and “E” of the
Affidavit of Mr. Valentino de Leon, Exhibit “L” of the Company’s
Position Paper.
The Company contends
that overall, NMPI’s total market share in the year 2000 was lower than the
previous year … and among the lowest in the industry …. These factors militate
against drastic award of economic benefits … as such could adversely affect the
Company’s survival.
The Company states too,
that the slowdown carried out by the
Moreover, the slowdown
violates … the CBA. The Company
submitted a sworn affidavit of Mr. Manolito E. Burgos, Exhibit “O” of the
Position Paper, to prove the fact that a slowdown was in fact carried out which
adversely affected NMPI’s normal production ….
On the matter of the dismissal
of 19 Union officers and 25 members … after the issuance of the Assumption of
Jurisdiction Order …, the Company asserts that the subject employees defied the
… Order by continuing to carry on the slowdown …. The
The Company averred that
the dismissal was preceded by observance of due process. To prove this, it submitted Exhibit
“M” (Affidavit of Mr. Artemio A. del Rosario) and its Annexes …,
consisting in the notices to explain and the notices of dismissal.
xxx xxx xxx
In its Reply to the
The Company alleges that
the
xxx xxx xxx
The Company … confirmed
that it unofficially offered P3,000.00 only, however, the basis for signing
bonus no longer exist because the parties did not reach any agreement on the
CBA. The signing bonus is premised on
goodwill which no longer existed …. (Underlining
and words in bracket added; emphasis in
the original.)
On
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
discussions, this Office orders the following:
1. The suspension of the 140 employees which is
the subject of the first notice of strike is hereby affirmed;
2. The dismissal of the Union officers is hereby
sustained. However, the dismissal of the
Union members is recalled, hence, they are reinstated to their former positions
without back wages. They are imposed a
suspension of one month which is deemed already served;
3. Bagong Nagkakaisang Lakas sa Nissan Motor
Philippines, Inc. (BANAL-NMPI-OLALIA-KMU) and Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc.
are hereby ordered to conclude a Collective Bargaining Agreement embodying the
dispositions made above and all other agreements which were reached by the
parties during negotiation and conciliation.
Such agreement shall have prospective effect.
SO ORDERED.
In due time,
the
Company and the
Therefrom,
both the Company and the
On
Before
the CA, however, issued its P15,000.00.
In brief, the citation is set against the following antecedents:
1. On
February 28, 2002, in CA-G.R. SP No. 69107, the CA, per a Resolution[8]
penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, then
of the CA 5th Division, temporarily enjoined the
implementation of the DOLE underlying decision of December 5, 2001. Barely a
month after, the Union filed its own petition for certiorari,[9] docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 69799 of the court’s 11th Division- with prayer
for its consolidation with CA-G.R. SP No. 69107 which was then pending with the
CA’s 5th Division;
2. Subsequently, both
petitions were consolidated and raffled to Justice Bello, formerly of the 5th
Division, but who was at this time with the 4th Division of the CA. Justice Bello accepted the consolidation,
being, per Resolution of
3. On
4. On
Lately, upon follow-up
on the case by the workers, they learned that a reorganization as regards the
compositions of the Divisions of the entire [CA] transpired wherein JUSTICE
ELOY BELLO was transferred to the SECOND DIVISION, but surprisingly, he brought
with him the above entitled case in the Second Division which was originally
docketed with the Fourth Division, despite the fact that the workers filed a
motion to inhibit, which was denied and expunged from the records. However,
bringing with him the above-entitled case in the SECOND (2nd)
DIVISION lend credence to the allegation/accusation of the workers that JUSTICE
ELOY BELLO, has undue interest over the instant case.
6. The
CA found the foregoing imputation to be baseless and malicious and likewise
found Atty. Banzuela’s proffered explanation insufficient to justify the
utterances he made in his
We now come to the instant petitions,
which the Court, per its Resolution of
In its recourse, Nissan Motor contends
that the CA erred:
1.
In
not considering and applying hereto pertinent law and jurisprudence which
provide that regardless of rank in the union, workers who defy and contravene
the [DOLE’s] assumption of jurisdiction and/or return-to-work orders are deemed
to have committed an illegal act and, as consequence thereof, have lost their
employment status.
2.
In
affirming public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment’s award of
economic benefits to private respondent Union and the rank-and-file workers
considering its own confirmatory finding of petitioner’s financial distress.
On the other hand, the
1.
Mass
dismissal and collective liability are sanctioned by law and existing
jurisprudence;
2.
Union
officers and members accused of work slowdown in defiance of assumption of
jurisdiction are entitled to due process to determine their individual
participation;
3.
The
Pari Delicto (sic) doctrine is applicable in the instant case;
4.
Respondent
company can dismiss union officers and members after it brought the issue of
illegal strike before the [DOLE] Secretary ; and
5.
The
160 Union officers and members [total] illegally dismissed are entitled to
reinstatement and full backwages.
Nissan Motor faults the CA for effectively
ordering, like the public respondent Secretary, the reinstatement of the 140
rank-and-file Union members who waged a work slowdown notwithstanding the assumption
of jurisdiction order dated
Nissan
Motor next sets its sight on the DOLE’s disposition on the economic aspect of
the case. In relation thereto, it expresses dismay over the bountiful basket of
economic benefits, inclusive of what amounts to
a signing bonus, that the CA,
following the lead of the DOLE Secretary, extended to the Union members and rank-and-file workers
in general, given the backdrop against which the award was made, viz: a) the benefits were based on confidential
“unofficial proposals” the company made before the NCMB at the start of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) negotiations; b) these proposals were made before
the Union’s work slowdown; and c) the Company is in dire financial strait, a
situation attributable to the 1997 Asian currency crisis but which the Union’s work slowdown aggravated.
For
its part, the
And
while not determinative of the final outcome of the substantive merits of this
case, the CA’s resolution of
Subject
to well-defined exceptions, the doctrinal rule is that factual determinations
of administrative and quasi-judicial agencies, such as the National Labor
Relations Commission or the DOLE, are generally accorded not only respect but
even conclusiveness if supported by substantial evidence, in recognition of
their expertise on specific matters under their consideration and jurisdiction.[17] This doctrine applies with greater force when
the appellate court passes upon and upholds such findings of facts.[18]
The
conclusion of the public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment, as
confirmed by the CA, is that the
Verily,
the DOLE’s repeated admonitions against any act that might exacerbate the labor
dispute cut both ways. Accordingly, the Court is not disposed, as Nissan Motor
and the
A perusal of the Production Plan
and Results, for the months of June [to] … September 2001 … provide[s] a vivid
picture of the extent of the reduction in production of the Company’s JIG Lines
1 and 2, Metal Line and Trim/Chassis Line No. 1 during the period covered by the labor dispute, and tend[s] to validate
the Company’s contention that a slowdown was carried out by the Union starting
24 July 2001.
As the
xxx xxx xxx
Neither is the
Thus, the
Given the above perspective, the benign
consideration which the public respondent Secretary accorded the rank-and-file
Union members who joined in the work slowdown in defiance of the assumption order
and the complementing RTWO commends itself for concurrence. As may be recalled,
the public respondent Secretary imposed on the erring Union members a one (1)
month suspension to replace the penalty of loss of employment status heretofore
meted on them by the Company. Article 263(g) in relation to Article 264
of the Labor Code governs the effects of a strike or similar prohibited acts in
assumption cases, thus:
Art. 263. Strikes,
picketing and lockouts. xxx (g) When,
in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decide it …. Such assumption …
shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified …. If
one has already taken place at the time of assumption …, all striking or locked
out employees shall immediately return to work and the employer shall immediately
resume operations and re-admit all workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike or lockout. xxx. (Underscoring supplied.)
Article 264. Prohibited
Activities.
(a)
xxx
No strike or lockout
shall be declared after the assumption of jurisdiction by … the Secretary or … during
the pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
xxx. Any union officer who knowingly participates
in illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in
the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status: ….
While the employer is authorized to declare
a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his
employment,[21]
his/its option is not as wide with respect to union members or workers for the
law itself draws a line and makes a
distinction between union officers and members/ordinary workers. An ordinary
striking worker or union member cannot, as a rule, be terminated for mere participation
in an illegal strike; there must be proof that he committed illegal acts during
the strike.[22]
And lest it be forgotten, the law invests the Secretary of Labor and Employment
the prerogative of tempering the consequence of the defiance to the assumption
order. The Secretary may thus merely suspend rather than dismiss the employee
involved.[23]
This is as it should be. For as then Associate, now Chief, Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban prefaced his ponencia in Solvic Industrial Corporation vs. NLRC[24]
- “Except for the most serious
causes affecting the business of the employer, our labor laws frown upon
dismissal. Where a penalty less punitive would suffice, an employee should not
be sanctioned with a consequence so severe.”
With
the view we take of this case, the public respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment - and necessarily the CA - acted within the bounds of the law – and
certainly rendered a judicious solution to the dispute – when she spared the
striking workers or union members from the penalty of dismissal. This
disposition takes stock of the following circumstances justifying a less
drastic penalty for ordinary striking workers: a) the employees who engaged in
slowdown actually reported for work and continued to occupy their respective posts,
or, in fine, did not abandon their jobs; b) they were only following orders of
their leaders; and c) no evidence has been presented to prove their
participation in the commission of illegal activities during the strike. Not to
be overlooked is a factor which the CA, perhaps having in mind PAL vs. Brillantes,[25] regarded
as justifying the leniency assumed by the public respondent Secretary towards the
members of the
The
Court has considered the cases cited by the Company to support its brief on the
issue of dismissal, notably Union of Filipro Employees vs. Nestle
Philippines, Inc.,[26] St.
Scholastica’s College vs. Torres,[27]
and Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Court of Appeals.[28]
There, we held that
any worker who participates in a strike or otherwise engages in any prohibited
act in defiance of the assumption order may be meted the penalty of loss of
employment status. But as correctly pointed out by the public respondent
Secretary, however, the law itself authorizes the graduation of penalties,
Article 264 of the Labor Code making, as it were, a distinction between union
officers and its members or any other workers, the main differing line
contextually being that the latter do not necessarily lose their job by mere
participation in an illegal strike absent proof that they committed illegal
acts. Thus in Association of Independent
Union in the Philippines vs. NLRC,[29]
we held that the responsibility of union officers, as main players in an
illegal strike, is greater than that of the members and, therefore, limiting
the penalty of dismissal only for the
former for participation in an illegal strike is in order. Of the same tenor,
albeit formulated a bit differently is our holding in Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC.[30]
Certainly
not lost on the Court is the fact that the cited cases are not on all fours
applicable, Filipro, St. Scholastica and
Telefunken involving as they do the staging of actual strikes, resulting in
work stoppage and complete abandonment of employment. There lies the
difference. In this case, the element of
abandonment of work does not obtain, the employees engaging in work slowdown
having reported for work at their usual post. Abandonment means deliberate,
unjustified refusal of the employee to resume employment.[31]
The Court, just
like the public respondent Secretary, however, cannot lend cogency to the
At any rate, the
In view of the
legality of the disciplinary measures taken against the union officers and
members of the union, the Court need not delve on the issue of entitlement to
full backwages. Backwages is, as a rule, forthcoming only in cases where the
dismissal or suspension, as the case may be, is declared unlawful.
Apropos the
contempt citation, we sustain the CA’s order penalizing Atty. Napoleon
Banzuela, Jr. for indirect contempt for his uncalled-for and disrespectful remarks
directed against Justice Eloy Bello, Jr.
Atty. Banzuela cannot plausibly set up his ignorance of the appellate
court’s internal rules as a justification for making his contemptuous,
malicious and disparaging statements against the person and integrity of a
sitting CA justice. The Court is at loss
to understand how his lack of knowledge of such rules, if that be really the
case, can serve as excuse for his unwarranted and unfounded ascription of
interest against a member of a court. A well-intentioned mind could have
conveyed its sentiments about such perceived interest in a civil and respectful
language befitting a gentleman and an officer of the court. It behooved Atty.
Banzuela, as such officer, to uphold the dignity and authority of the men
and women in the judiciary. The innuendo embodied in the
Finally, the
disposition made by the public respondent Secretary relating to the economic
aspects of the CBA, such as, but not limited,
transportation allowance, 14th month pay, seniority pay,
separation pay and the effectivity of the new CBA, appears to be proper. However, conformably with the evidence on
record that shows the Company’s precarious financial position, there is a need to
modify the other awards she thus made:
1) The annual salary increases of P900.00 for the 1st year, P1,000.00
and P1,100.00 for the 2nd and 3rd years, respectively, which,
given the proven continued losses of the Company, are hereby modified to
minimize and mitigate its operational losses to: P900.00 annual increase for the
initial 3-year term of the CBA, effective upon execution of a new CBA. In this regard, the Court cannot sanction the
award made by the public respondent Secretary based ostensibly on the
revelation of NCMB Administrator Olalia that was sourced from the confidential
position given him by the Company. The reason for this is simple. Article 233
of the Labor Code[34]
prohibits the use in evidence of confidential information given during
conciliation proceedings. NCMB
Administrator Olalia clearly breached this provision of law. Moreover, as
correctly pointed out by the Company, this confidential information given to
Administrator Olalia was made prior to the
2) The
award for gratuity bonus of P3,000.00
per employee is vacated for lack of basis.
As no less pointed out by the public respondent Secretary, the
Parenthetically, the Company’s lament
about the public respondent Secretary being in error when she proceeded to extend
to members of the rank-and-file of the bargaining unit the privilege of
obtaining half a month’s pay/salary by way of a salary loan for the employee’s
benefit or that of the immediate members of his family every start of the
semestral school year is unacceptable. According to the Company, such
arrangement, as opposed to the present practice wherein the Company accords a P5,000.00
educational loan semestrally for its employees or that of the immediate members
of the employee’s family, while seemingly innocuous, would in reality weigh
heavily on its finances. Far from being
burdensome and confiscatory, as argued by the Company, this particular award
appears to the Court, as it did to the CA and the DOLE, to be reasonable and
modest increase in benefits, being in the form of a loan. A loan suggests
repayment. At the end of the day, therefore, the Company will get its money
back and will be doing its share to promote industrial peace.
WHEREFORE,
the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
1.
The
award of annual salary increases shall be at P900.00 effective during
the initial three-year term of the CBA; and
2.
The
award of gratuity bonus of P3,000.00 per covered employee is deleted.
ACCORDINGLY, except insofar as they
delved on the awards immediately referred to above, the petition of Nissan
Motor Philippines, Inc. in G.R. Nos. 158190-91, and the petition of Bagong
Nagkakaisang Lakas Sa Nissan Motor Philippines, Inc. in G.R. Nos. 158276 and
158283 are both DENIED.
No Costs.
SO
ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO
C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
A T T
E S T A T I O N
I
attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO
S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R
T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De-Guia-Salvador, concurred in by Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam, with Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. (ret.) and Associate Justice Danilo B Pine (ret.) dissenting; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158276 & 158283), pp. 53 et seq.
[2]
[3] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158190-91), pp. 122-125.
[4] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158276 & 158283), pp. 199-232.
[5]
[6] See Note #1, supra.
[7] Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello (ret.) and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Rebecca De Guia-Salvador; Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158276 & 158283) pp. 72-73.
[8] CA Rollo, p. 1048.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Rollo (G.R. Nos. 158276 & 158283), p. 706.
[14]
[15]
Page 15 of the Secretary of
Labor’s decision;
[16] See Note #7, supra.
[17] Baybay Water District vs. COA, G.R. Nos. 147248-49, Jan. 23, 2002, 374 SCRA 482; Brahm Industries, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 118853, Oct. 16, 1997, 280 SCRA 82 and other cases.
[18] San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union-Alliance of Filipino Workers vs. San Juan De Dios Educational Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 143341, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 193, citing Shoppes Manila vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 147125, Jan. 14, 2004, 419 SCRA 354 and other cases.
[19] CA Decision, p. 3.
[20] At pp. 13-15.
[21]
[22] Ibid.
[23] PAL vs. Brilliantes, G.R. No. 119360,
[24] G.R.
No. 125548,
[25] See Note # 23, supra.
[26] G.R.
Nos. 88710-12,
[27]
G.R. No. 100158,
[28]
G.R. Nos. 143013-14,
[29]
G.R. No. 1120505,
[30] See Note # 22, supra.
[31] C.A. Azucena, The Labor Code With Comments and Cases, Vol. II, Revised 1999 ed., p. 458, citing NEECO vs. Minister of Labor, G.R. No. 61965, 184 SCRA 25.
[32] Rollo (G.R. Nos.158190-91), pp. 1538-1622.
[33] R. Transport Corporation vs. Ejandra,
G.R. No. 148508,
[34] Article 233. Privileged Communications.- Information and statements made at conciliation proceedings shall be treated as privileged communication and shall not be used as evidence in the Commission. xxx.
[35] Art. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING, AND LOCKOUTS xxx (c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may file a notice of strike or the employers may file a notice of lockout with the Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15 days ….