GANIE P. OLAMA, DATU MAKAY G.R. No. 169213
S. BANTO, DARIMBANG ANTAL
SULTAN, CAMAD SANGCOPAN,
JAMIL ABIDEN TAMPUGAO, and
ABDULGAFOR
ANGINDARAT,
Petitioners, Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
represented by its Branch Manager
at
SANDORIE TAMPI DISOMANGCOP
and LAND BANK OF THE
represented by its Branch Manager,
MACLARING LUCMAN,
Respondents.
x
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ABOL M. SALIM, MUSTAPHA
BUAT, ELIAS
R. DITUCALAN,
JALIL
ABIDEN, JAMALODEN G.
DIATOR AND BATO ADAM,
Intervenors-respondents.
- versus - Promulgated:
TAHA C. ALI
Third-party defendant. June 22, 2006
x
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x
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
The petition
for review assails the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The
antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioners
Ganie P. Olama, Datu Makay Banto, Darimbang Antal Sultan, Camad Sangcopan,
Jamil Abiden Tampugao, and Abdulgafor Angindarat, alleged that they were the duly
elected Punong Barangay in Barangays Alog, Bita, Campo, Madaya, Mindamudag and
Riantaran, respectively, all of the Municipality of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur,
during the special barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan elections held on August 13,
2002. Petitioners further claimed that
notwithstanding their election and despite repeated demands, they were denied
by the respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) of their Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for the months of October, November and December 2002 and
January 2003. PNB’s refusal to release
their IRA was allegedly anchored on the refusal of Local Government Operations
Officer (LGOO) Hadji Hussein Tugaya Tabua (LGOO Tabua) to issue the
certifications requested of him by the petitioners.[4]
Thus,
petitioners filed a petition[5]
for mandamus and injunction with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or TRO with the RTC of Marawi City which was
docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 985-03 and raffled to Branch 10. It seeks the issuance of a judgment requiring
PNB to release the IRA to the petitioners and their respective appointed
Barangay Treasurers.[6]
Instead
of an answer, PNB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of
action which was denied by the trial court in its Order dated
Subsequently,
several motions for leave of court to intervene were filed by herein intervenors
Abol M. Salim,[9] Elias R.
Ditucalan, Jalil Abiden, Mustapha Buat,[10]
Jamaloden Diator and Bato Adam.[11] They alleged that each one is the incumbent
punong barangay of the same barangays that herein petitioners are claiming to
be, to wit: Bato Adam for Brgy. Riantaran; Abol M. Salim for Brgy. Alog; Elias
R. Ditucalan for Brgy. Campo; Jalil Abiden for Brgy. Madaya; and Macay Buat for
Brgy. Bita, that they will be adversely affected if the petition is granted
because they will be unlawfully and unwarrantedly ousted from their position as
Punong Barangay.
According
to the intervenors, there was a failure of election held on
Section
5. Hold Over. – All incumbent barangay officials and sangguniang kabataan officials
shall remain in office unless sooner removed or suspended for cause until their
successors shall have been elected and qualified. The provisions of the Omnibus
Election Code relative to the failure of elections and special elections are
hereby reiterated in this Act.
The
court a quo granted the motions for intervention and thereafter issued
an order[14]
requiring all the parties to submit their respective memoranda pursuant to
Section 8[15] of Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and
against respondent and intervenors:
a. Recognizing petitioners’ legal rights
to continue assuming the position as Punong Barangay in six (6) subject
barangay without prejudice to the outcome or resolution of the COMELEC EN BANC
of the pending (sic) between the parties;
b. Commanding and ordering respondent
Philippines National Bank of the Philippines, Marawi City Branch, represented
by Bai Sandorie T. Disomangcop both in her official capacity as Branch Manager
or whoever is the Acting Head/Executive officer or manager of the bank to
release to petitioners the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the month of
February 2003 and succeeding or subsequent months corresponding to the six (6)
barangay units opposite their names as follows:
Gani P. Olama --------- Brgy. alog,
Tubaran, Lanao Del Sur
Datu Makay S. Banto – Brgy. Bita,
Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Darimbang Antal ------ Brgy.
Campo, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Sultan Camad Sangcopan – Brgy.
Madaya, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
Jamil Abiden Tampogao ---- Brgy.
Mindamudag, Tubaran, Lanao del Sur.
Abdulgafor Angindarat ------ Brgy. Riantaran, Tubaran,
c. Ordering intervenors to desist, refrain,
and cease from exercising the powers and functions of petitioners as Punong
barangays of in (sic) their respective barangay aforestated.
SO
ORDERED.[16]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court for want of factual and legal basis.
Petitioners’
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
The
petitioners argue that the findings of facts made by the Court of Appeals are
contrary to those of the trial court. Verily, the issue raised
by the petitioners invite us to rule on questions of fact, contrary to the
settled rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review.
However, while it is an established dictum that it is not the function of the
Supreme Court to analyze or weigh evidence anew, the circumstances obtaining in
the present case require us to disregard the general rule and to apply one of
the recognized exceptions, i.e., when
the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial
court.[17]
Petitioners
contend that the pieces of documentary evidence they presented before the trial
court clearly established their right to the issuance of the writ of mandamus.
We
are not persuaded.
A
writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy granted by courts of
appellate jurisdiction, directed to some corporation, officer, or inferior
court, requiring the performance of a particular duty therein specified, which
duty results from the official station of the party to whom the writ is
directed from operation of some law.[18] Under the Rules of Court, the writ of mandamus
is available as a remedy only under these circumstances:
When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there in no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the respondent.
x x
x x.[19]
Thus,
as an extraordinary remedy, mandamus may be availed of only if the legal right
to be enforced is well defined, clear and certain. It lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. The duty is ministerial only when its
discharge requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.[20]
Further,
it is settled that in order that a writ of mandamus may aptly issue, it is
essential that, on the one hand, the
person petitioning for it has a clear legal right to the claim that is sought
and that, on the other hand, the respondent has an imperative duty to perform
that which is demanded of him. Mandamus
will not issue to enforce a right, or to compel compliance with a duty, which
is questionable or over which a substantial doubt exists. The principal
function of the writ of mandamus is to command and to expedite, not to inquire
and to adjudicate; thus, it is neither the office nor the aim of the writ to
secure a legal right but to implement that which is already established. Unless the right to the relief is unclouded,
mandamus will not issue.[21]
We
have carefully reviewed the records of this case and we find that the arguments
raised by the petitioners clearly fall below the yardstick of the clear legal
right required to be possessed by someone petitioning for the issuance of the
writ of mandamus.
Contrary
to the contention of the petitioners that they have established their legal
right to the relief that they are seeking, their claim rests on very doubtful
grounds. Petitioners allege that they
were the duly elected heads of their respective barangays based on the
Certificates of Canvass of Votes and Proclamations of Winning Candidates for
Punong Barangay and Kagawad ng Sangguniang Barangay by the Barangay Board of
Canvassers[22] which
showed that they garnered the highest number of votes for punong barangay in
their respective areas. However, petitioners
failed to explain why each of the said certificates bore identical serial
numbers.
As
the Court of Appeals aptly observed:
Appellees
(herein petitioners) failed to establish that they have been elected and
proclaimed as punong barangays. What they submitted were xerox copies of
supposedly certified copies of Certificates of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (hereafter Certificates) which curiously enough bear the same
serial number. No evidence has been adduced to explain these patent irregularities
and the non-production in the trial court of the original Certificates. EO ALI
who purportedly certified as true and correct
the Certificates in question does not appear to have any right to the custody of the records nor does he appear
to have authority to furnish authenticated copies thereof. Worse, EO ALI was
not even presented in court to attest to
the said Certificates and the statements he made in his letter to LGOO which
Appellees claimed will prove that they were elected and proclaimed as punong
barangays. All these cast serious doubts on the authenticity and admissibility
of the said documents.
The
authenticity of the Certificates was not established in accordance with the
Rules of Evidence. Section 24 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court
provides that an official record or entries therein may be proved by an
official publication or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody
of the record or by his deputy. Section 25 of the same Rule further states that
whenever a copy of a document or record
is attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part
thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any.[23]
To our mind,
the attitude manifested by the petitioners towards establishing the veracity of
their respective Certificates of Canvass, a piece of evidence upon which they
greatly anchor their petition before us, is contrary to the behavior of one who
is convinced that his claim is valid. Petitioners
failed to offer any satisfactory explanation on the patent irregularity that
attended their Certificates of Canvass.
Worse, a perusal of the respective certificates of assumption of office[24]
of each petitioner will show that these documents were executed and certified
by the petitioners themselves. We agree
with the Court of Appeals that no probative value can thus be accorded to these
certificates, they being uncorroborated and evidently, self serving.
From the
foregoing, it is not correct to say, as petitioners claimed, that the refusal
of the respondent PNB to release the IRA is unjustified. PNB has the right to require petitioners to
present the proper certification as duly elected punong barangays from the
Local Government Operations Officer of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur. Since the latter did not issue the
certifications to the petitioners, there must be compelling reasons for such
refusal as shown in the foregoing discussion.
To
be given due course, a petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a
party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or
person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal
right. The petitioner in every case must
therefore be an aggrieved party in the sense that he possesses a clear right to
be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed. The Court will exercise its power of judicial
review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal
standing to raise the constitutional or legal question. “Legal standing” means a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the government act that is being
challenged.[25] Clearly, not only did the petitioners fail to
establish a clear legal right to the relief they are seeking, they also failed
to make a case of locus standi for themselves in this case. The principle echoed and reechoed is that
legal rights may be enforced by mandamus only if those rights are well defined,
clear and certain. Mandamus never issues in doubtful cases.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
The assailed Decision dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 9-22. Penned by Associate Justice Myrna Dimaranan
Vidal and concurred in by Associate Justices
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Edgardo A. Camello.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR SYNCHRONIZED BARANGAY AND SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ELECTIONS,
AMENDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE “LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991”, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
[14] Rollo, pp. 136-137.
[15] SECTION 8.
Proceedings after comment is filed. – After the comment or other
pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof
has expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit
memoranda. If after such hearing or
submission of memoranda or the expiration of the period for the filing thereof
the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled.
The court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be patently without
merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
[16] Rollo, pp. 203-204.
[17] Buduhan v. Pakurao, et al., G.R. No.
168237,
[18] Garcia v. Sweeney, 4 Phil. 751, 754
(1904). See also Systems Plus Computer College of Caloocan City v. Local Government of
Caloocan City, G.R. No. 146382, August 7, 2003, 408 SCRA 494, 497.
[19]
RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 3.
[20] Civil Service Commission v. Department of
Budget and Management, G.R. No. 158791, July 22, 2005, 464 SCRA 115,
133-134.
[21] BPI Family Savings Bank, Inc. v. Manikan,
G.R. No. 148789, January 16, 2003, 395 SCRA 373, 375.
[22] Rollo, pp. 175-180.
[23]
[24]
[25] Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive
Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005, 462 SCRA 622, 630.
[26] Vda. De Serra v. Salas, No. L-27150,