FIRST DIVISION
JOY LEE RECUERDO, G.R. No. 168217
Petitioner,
Present
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE
Respondent.
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari of the Joint Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 25983, affirming with
modification the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan
in Criminal Cases Nos. 2750-M-94, 2751-M-94 and 2807-M-94 for estafa.
As synthesized by the appellate court,
the antecedents are as follows:
In
September 1994, three separate Criminal Informations charging Joy Lee Recuerdo
of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code involving
18 worthless bank checks were simultaneously filed by the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan, the accusatory portions of which read, thus:
A. Six (6) Unitrust Checks
Crim. Case
No. 2750-M-94
“That sometime in the second week of
December, 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent to gain and by means of deceit, false
pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient
funds with the Unitrust, Makati Commercial Center Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the
following postdated checks, to wit:
|
Check No |
Date |
Amount |
|
014355 |
|
|
|
014356 |
|
22,000.00
|
|
014357 |
|
22,000.00 |
|
014358 |
|
22,000.00 |
|
014359 |
|
22,000.00 |
|
014360 |
|
22,000.00 |
with the total amount of P132,000.00
drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complaining
witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the
said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that
her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said
bank, so much that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for
encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn
against an “Account Closed”, and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P132,000.00, the said accused failed and
refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the
said amount of P132,000.00.
Contrary
to law.”
B.
Six (6) PCI Bank Checks
Crim. Case No. 2807-M-94
“That sometime in the second week of
December 1993, in the municipality of Meycauayan, province of Bulacan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain and by means of deceit, false
pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and pretending to have sufficient
funds with the PCI Bank, Makati-De La Rosa Branch, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw, make and issue the
following postdated checks, to wit:
|
Check No. |
Date |
Amount |
|
053051982A |
|
|
|
053051983A |
|
13,000.00 |
|
053051984A |
|
13,000.00 |
|
053051985A |
|
13,000.00 |
|
053051986A |
|
13,000.00 |
|
053051987A |
|
13,000.00 |
with the total amount of P78,000.00
drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complaining
witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the
said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that
her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said
bank, so much that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for
encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn
against an “Account Closed”, and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P78,000.00, the said accused failed and refused
to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in the said
amount of P78,000.00.
Contrary
to law.
C.
Six (6) Prudential Bank Checks
Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94
That on or
about the 7th day of February, 1994, in the municipality of
Meycauayan, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused Joy Lee Recuerdo, with intent of gain
and by means of deceit, false pretenses and fraudulent manifestations, and
pretending to have sufficient funds with the Prudential Bank, Legaspi Village
Branch, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously prepare, draw,
make and issue the following postdated checks, to wit:
Check No. Date Amount
0011783
0011784
0011785
0011786
0011787
0011788
with the total amount of P600,000.00
drawn against the said bank, and deliver the said checks to the complainant
witness Yolanda G. Floro as payment for pieces of jewelry she obtained from the
said complainant, knowing fully well at the time the checks were issued that
her representations were false for she had no sufficient funds in the said
bank, so much that upon presentment of the said checks with the said bank for
encashment, the same were dishonored and refused payment for having been drawn
against an “Account Closed”, and inspite of repeated demands to deposit with
the said bank the amount of P600,000.00, the said accused failed and
refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said Yolanda G. Floro in
the said amount of P600,000.00
Contrary
to law.”
Evidence
adduced by the Prosecution tend to establish that herein private respondent
Yolanda G. Floro is engaged in the business of buying and selling of jewelry
since 1985. She regularly conducts
business at her residence located at No. 51 Interior, Poblacion, Meycauayan,
Bulacan. Sometimes, though, it was Floro
who would personally visit her customers to show and offer them the pieces of
jewelry. Herein
accused-appellant/petitioner Joy Lee Recuerdo, on the other hand, a dentist by
profession, who was introduced to Floro by the latter’s cousin Aimee Aoro in
the first week of December 1993, became her customer. Sometime in the second week of December 1993,
at around 7:30 in the evening, Recuerdo went to the house of Floro in
Meycauayan, Bulacan and purchased from her two pieces of jewelry, to wit: a 2.19 carat diamond round stone in white
gold setting worth P220,000.00 pesos, and one piece of loose 1.55 karat
marquez diamond with a value of P130,000.00 pesos.
For
the 2.19 carat diamond stone, accused issued and delivered to the complainant
then and there ten post-dated checks each in the amount of P22,000.00
drawn against Unitrust Development Bank, Makati Commercial Center Branch. Only six (6) postdated checks, to wit: Checks Nos. 014356, 014357, 014358, 014359
and 014360 are subject of Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94. For the 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond,
accused issued and delivered to complainant then and there ten (10) postdated
checks, each in the amount of P13,000.00 drawn against PCI Bank,
In
yet another transaction that transpired in the early evening of P768,000.00 pesos. She was given seven (7) postdated checks one
for P168,000.00 as downpayment and another six (6) postdated checks
drawn against Prudential Bank,
Legaspi Village, Makati Branch, each for P100,000.00 representing the
balance in the aggregate amount of P600,000.00 pesos (Checks Nos.
100783, 01184, 01185, 011786, 011787 and 011788, Record, Criminal Case No.
2750-M-94, pp. 138-150) subject matter of Crim. Case No. 2751-M-94.
Floro
deposited the aforementioned checks at Liberty Savings & Loan Association,
Meyc[a]uayan, Bulacan. Upon presentment
for encashment by said depositary bank with the different drawee banks on their
respective maturity dates, the six (6) Prudential Bank checks were all
dishonored for having been drawn against closed accounts. With her pieces of jewelry still unpaid,
Floro, through counsel, made formal demands requiring Requerdo to pay the
amounts represented by the dishonored checks (Record, supra, pp. 123, 138, and
151). Floro’s efforts to obtain payment,
though, only proved futile as Requerdo continuously refused to pay the value of
the purchased pieces of jewelry.
Upon
her arraignment on
By
way of defense, Recuerdo posited the theory that the trial court of Malolos,
Bulacan is devoid of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the criminal cases
against her, insisting that all the essential elements of the crime of Estafa
involving the bad checks occurred at the City of Makati, in that, all her
business transactions with Floro, to wit; the purchase of the pieces of jewelry
and the subsequent issuance of and delivery of the subject bank checks in
payment thereof which eventually
bounced, all took place and were executed at her Dental Clinic located
at the Medical Towers at Suite 306, Herrera corner Ormaza Streets Legaspi
Village Makati City. Furthermore,
Recuerdo argued that her act of issuing the dishonored checks does not
constitute the offense of Estafa considering that the subject checks were not
issued and delivered to Floro simultaneous to the purchase of the pieces of
jewelry, but only several days thereafter, when she had already thoroughly
examined the jewelry and is fully satisfied of its fine quality (TSN, Joy Lee
Recuerdo, January 16, 1996, pp. 3-18).[2]
On
WHEREFORE,
this Court finds the accused JOY LEE RECUERDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
two (2) counts of estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, par. 2[b]
(sic) of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences her as follows:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 2750-M-94 and
2807-M-94, to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prison correccional as minimum to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda Floro by
way of civil indemnity the amount of P210,000.00 pesos plus interest
from the filing of the information until fully paid; and
2. In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) minimum to twelve
(12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum and to pay Yolanda
Floro by way of civil indemnity the amount of P600,000.00 pesos plus
interest from the filing of the information until fully paid.
In
both cases, accused shall pay the costs of the suit.
SO
ORDERED.[3]
Petitioner appealed the decision to
the CA on the following assignment of errors:
I.
The Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the
Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch I did not pass upon the
merits of the criminal cases filed against the petitioner by confining and
limiting itself merely to the dispositive portion of the Joint Decision dated
28 January 1998 rendered by the latter court, instead of reading the Joint
Decision as a whole to get its true meaning and intent.
II.
The Regional Trial Court erred in affirming the
judgment of conviction rendered by the Municipal Trial Court, Meycauayan,
Bulacan, Branch II which is in derogation of the petitioner’s right against
double jeopardy considering that the latter was previously acquitted of the
same criminal cases by the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Branch
I.
III.
The Regional
Trial Court erred in finding that all proceedings in the court a quo have been
made in the presence and with the authority of the public prosecutor, in the
face of the undisputed fact that the appeal initiated by the private respondent
is fatally defective because it was filed without the concurrence, permission
and authority of the public prosecutor, in this case, the provincial prosecutor
of Bulacan.[4]
Petitioner averred that the trial
court had no jurisdiction over the offenses charged because the crimes were committed
in
On
Petitioner filed the instant petition contending
that:
THE
COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE CONVICTING THE
A. THE BENEFICENT RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT
ENUNCIATED IN PEOPLE OF THE
B. WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT ENUNCIATED IN BORROMEO V. COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE V. CLORES, ET AL.,
PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA AND PEOPLE V. BENITO GO BIONG, JR. DIRECTING THAT IN
CRIMINAL CASES, ALL CIRCUMSTANCES
AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.
C. THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE ESTABLISHED
JURISPRUDENCE WHICH HOLDS THAT WHEN FACED WITH TWO PROBABILITIES, ONE
CONSISTENT WITH GUILT AND THE OTHER WITH INNOCENCE, THE SCALES OF JUSTICE
SHOULD TILT IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE.
D. THE APPLICABLE DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
WHICH DIRECTS THAT IN ESTAFA CASES, IT IS OF PRIMORDIAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION AND THE EXACT DATE OF
THE ISSUANCE OF THE CHECKS.[6]
Petitioner avers that she acted in
good faith and exerted her utmost efforts to confer with the private
complainant to settle her obligations.
She points out that she made monthly cash payments to lessen her civil liability
and later on, for convenience, deposited the monthly payments at the private
complainant’s bank account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands. She continued to make payments even during
the pendency of the case in the CA, and continues to make deposits to private
complainant’s bank account.
Petitioner asserts that her efforts to
settle her civil obligations to the private complainant indicate that she has
no intention of duping the latter, as well as the absence of deceit on her part.
That she failed to comply with her
obligations by failing to make good the checks as they fell due does not
suggest deceit, but at best only financial hardship in fulfilling her civil
obligations. Thus, there is no factual
and legal basis to convict her of estafa.
Petitioner insists that criminal intent in embezzlement is not based on technical mistakes
as to the legal effect of a transaction honestly entered into, and there can be no embezzlement if the mind of the person
doing the act is innocent or if there is no wrongful purpose.
Petitioner further avers that she
should be benefited by the Court’s ruling in People v. Ojeda,[7] considering that the facts therein are
parallel if not almost identical to this case, the only difference being that,
in the Ojeda case, the
accused-appellant was able to fully settle her civil obligations. Petitioner points out that she is still
paying her obligations to the private complainant and further argues that:
[i]n Criminal Case No. 2750-M-94, the petitioner
issued ten (10) postdated Unitrust Development Bank checks to the private
complainant for the purchase of a 2.19 carat diamond stone in white gold
setting. Out of the ten (10) checks,
four checks were duly funded when presented for acceptance and payment. In Criminal Case No. 2807-M-94, the
petitioner issued ten (10) post-dated PCI Bank checks to the private complaint
for the purchase of a 1.55 carat marquez loose diamond. The first four (4) checks were duly funded
when presented for acceptance and payment.
In Criminal Case No. 2751-M-94, the petitioner issued seven (7) post-dated
Prudential Bank checks to the private complainant for the purchase of a pair of
diamond earrings. The amount covered by
the first check was paid and settled.
The rest bounced.
The
petitioner respectfully submits that the act of the petitioner --- OF DULY
FUNDING SOME OF THE POST-DATED CHECKS WHICH SHE ISSUED, SPECIFICALLY THOSE
WHICH BECAME DUE FIRST OR EARLIER – is and should be considered in law as, a
CIRCUMSTANCE INDICATING GOOD FAITH AND ABSENCE OF DECEIT.[8]
For its part, the Office of the
Solicitor General asserts:
In
the case of Ojeda, the prosecution
failed to prove deceit. Ojeda never assured Chua the checks were
funded. Chua knew that the checks were
issued to guarantee future payments.
Furthermore, Ojeda did not
only make arrangements for payment but she fully paid the entire amount of the
dishonored checks.
In
the instant case, the elements of deceit and damage were established by
convincing evidence. Petitioner Recuerdo
issued the subject bank checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry
simultaneous to the transactions, that is, on the very same occasion when the
pieces of jewelry were bought. The
issuance of the check by Recuerdo was the principal inducement to private
complainant to part with the subject jewelries (CA Decision, pp. 12-13). In addition, petitioner only promised to
replace the dishonored checks but she did not settle her obligations with
private complainant. Assuming that there
was an offer to settle her obligations, this will not overturn the findings of
the trial court and the Court of Appeals as to the presence of deceit.
The guilt of petitioner was
proven beyond reasonable
doubt.
The crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d)
of the Revised Penal Code has the following basic elements:
Postdating
or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted simultaneously at
the time the check was issued;
The
postdating or issuance was done when the offender had no funds in the bank, or
that his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the
check; and
Damage
to the payee thereof (Justice Luis B.
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Thirteenth Edition 1993, Book Two, p. 693;
People v. Panganiban, 335 SCRA 354).
The existence of the foregoing elements of the crime
was concretely established by the prosecution through convincing evidence,
warranting petitioner’s conviction of the offense of Estafa.
The
trial court found private complainant Floro’s testimony that petitioner issued
the subject checks as payment for the purchase of pieces of jewelry
simultaneous to their transactions to be categorical and credible. There was sufficient evidence established by
the prosecution that the checks were issued by the accused to the complainant
in exchange of the pieces of jewelry given to her on two separate occasions.
The
issue of deceit raised by petitioner is a factual issue and must be proved by
evidence. The finding of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the issuance of petitioner was tainted with fraud
or deceit is a factual finding that binds this Honorable Court (Jose R.
Guevarra vs. The Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100894, prom.
In reply, petitioner avers that she is
a dentist/orthodontist with a fairly established practice at the
The petition is denied for lack of
merit.
Estafa through false pretense or
fraudulent act under Paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, is committed as follows:
By
postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not
sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the
check to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the bank and/or
the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be prima
facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
The essential elements of the felony are:
(1) a check is postdated or issued in payment of an obligation contracted at
the time it is issued; (2) lack or insufficiency of funds to cover the check;
and (3) damage to the payee thereof.[10] It is criminal fraud or deceit in the
issuance of a check which is made punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and
not the non-payment of a debt.[11] Deceit
is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct by
false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have
been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he
shall act upon it to his legal injury.[12] Concealment which the law denotes as
fraudulent implies a purpose or design to hide facts which the other party
ought to have.[13] The postdating or issuing of a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank or his
funds deposited therein are not sufficient to cover the amount of the check is
a false pretense or a fraudulent act.[14]
There is no
false pretense or fraudulent act if a postdated check is issued in payment of a
pre-existing obligation.[15] As the Court emphasized in Timbal v. Court of Appeals:[16]
x x x In order to constitute Estafa under the
statutory provisions, the act of postdating or of issuing a check in payment of
an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation; accordingly, it
should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. In fine, the offender must be able to obtain
money or property from the offended party by reason of the issuance, whether
postdated or not, of the check. It must
be shown that the person to whom the check is delivered would not have parted
with his money or property were it not for the issuance of the check by the
other party.
Estafa is a
felony committed by dolo (with
malice). For one to be criminally liable
for estafa under paragraph (2)(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, malice
and specific intent to defraud are required.
General criminal intent is an element of all
crimes but malice is properly applied only to deliberate acts done on purpose
and with design. Evil intent must unite
with an unlawful act for there to be a felony.
A deliberate and unlawful act gives rise to a presumption of malice by
intent. On the other hand, specific
intent is a definite and actual purpose to accomplish some particular thing.
The general
criminal intent is presumed from the criminal act and in the absence of any
general intent is relied upon as a defense, such absence must be proved by the
accused. Generally, a specific intent is
not presumed. Its existence, as a matter
of fact, must be proved by the State just as any other essential element. This may be shown, however, by the nature of
the act, the circumstances under which it was committed, the means employed and
the motive of the accused.[17]
The law
provides that, in estafa, prima facie evidence
of deceit is established upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of the notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds. A prima facie evidence need not be rebutted by a preponderance of evidence, nor
by evidence of greater weight. The
evidence of the accused which equalizes the weight of the People’s evidence or puts the case in equipoise
is sufficient. As a result, the People will have to go forward with the
proof. Should it happen that, at the
trial the weight of evidence is equally balanced or at equilibrium and the
presumption operates against the People who
has the burden of proof, it cannot prevail.[18]
There can
be no estafa if the accused acted in good faith because good faith negates
malice and deceit.[19] Good faith is an intangible and abstract
quality with no technical meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses,
among other things, an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of
design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage. An individual’s personal good faith is a
concept of his own mind, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations
alone. It implies honesty of intention
and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. The essence of good faith lies
in an honest belief in the validity of one’s right, ignorance of a superior
claim, and absence of intention to overreach another.[20] In People
v. Gulion,[21] the Court held that:
Good
faith is a defense to a charge of Estafa by postdating a check. This may be manifested by the accused’s
offering to make arrangements with his creditor as to the manner of payment or,
as in the present case, averring that his placing his signature on the
questioned checks was purely a result of his gullibility and inadvertence, with
the unfortunate result that he himself became a victim of the trickery and
manipulations of accused-at-large.[22]
In the present case, the prosecution
adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the petitioner of the
crime charged. The trial court gave
credence and probative weight to the evidence of the People and disbelieved
that proferred by the petitioner.
Petitioner’s
insistence of her good faith and her reliance on the ruling of this Court in
the Ojeda case were raised as a mere afterthought in a last ditch effort to
secure her acquittal, as these arguments were invoked only in her motion for
reconsideration of the CA decision. In Pascual v. Ramos,[23]
this Court held that if an issue is raised only in the motion for
reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, it is as if it was never
raised in that court at all.
Petitioner’s defense of good faith is even
belied by the evidence of the prosecution and her own evidence. When the postdated checks issued by petitioner
were dishonored by the drawee banks and the private complainant made demands
for her to pay the amounts of the checks, she intransigently refused to pay;
she insisted that she issued and delivered the postdated checks to the private
complainant after the subject pieces of jewelry had
been delivered to her. Petitioner never
offered to pay the amounts of the checks after she was informed by the private
complainant that they had been dishonored by the drawee banks, the private
complainant thus charged her with estafa before the RTC. It was only during the period of
While it is
true that nine of the 17 postdated checks petitioner issued and delivered to
the private complainant were honored by the drawee banks, such a circumstance
is not a justification for her acquittal of the charges relative to the
dishonored checks. The reimbursement or
restitution to the offended party of the sums swindled by the petitioner does
not extinguish the criminal liability of the latter. It only extinguishes pro tanto the civil
liability.[25] Moreover, estafa is a public offense which
must be prosecuted and punished by the State on its own motion even though
complete reparation had been made for the loss or damage suffered by the
offended party.[26] The consent of the private complainant to petitioner’s
payment of her civil liability pendente lite does not entitle the latter
to an acquittal. Subsequent payments does not obliterate the criminal
liability already incurred.[27] Criminal liability for estafa is not affected
by a compromise between petitioner and the private complainant on the former’s
civil liability.[28]
Petitioner cannot find solace in the
Court’s ruling in the Ojeda case. The CA correctly refuted
the submission of the petitioner in its decision, thus:
This Court is in full agreement with the position
advanced by the Office of the Solicitor General that on account of the glaring
dissimilarities between the factual backdrop of the case of Ojeda,
on one hand, and the material facts obtaining in the case at bench, on the
other, the doctrine in the former case may not be applied to benefit
accused-appellant. Indeed, even
accused-appellant herself was quick to admit that the facts of her case are not
entirely on all fours with those that obtained in the case of Ojeda. At the outset, emphasis must be made of the
fact that the acquittal of the accused in the Ojeda case was brought
about by a combination of reasons not obtaining in the present case. First, the Supreme Court ruled out the
existence of deceit and intent to defraud in the case of Ojeda in view of the fact
that the accused therein performed extraordinary efforts to gradually pay and
settle her monetary obligations with the private complainant, and this
convinced the High Court that the acts of the accused were not tainted with
malice, bad faith and criminal intent. Verily, the accused in the Ojeda
case not only made determined and honest arrangements to pay the
private complainant, but was likewise able to actually satisfy with
completeness the sums she owed the latter, and this was evidenced by an
affidavit of desistance where the private complainant categorically declared
that the accused already paid in full her monetary obligations. The facts in the instant case, however, are
totally different. Contrary to the contention of accused-appellant, she never
made a determined and earnest effort to arrange and settle with Floro with the
end in view of paying her monetary obligations.
In truth, accused-appellant simply promised to pay Floro the value of
the dishonored checks that were issued in payment for the pieces of
jewelry. However, that was all there was
to it, and lamentably said promise turned out to be an empty one as accused-appellant
never made good her commitment to pay for the value of the dishonored checks. Accused-appellant
never arranged a payment scheme with Floro, and as the facts of the case would
disclose she never made any gradual payment to Floro as shown by the fact that
the value of the dishonored checks remained unpaid, in direct contrast with the
facts of the Ojeda case where the accused was able to pay in full. Suffice it to say that accused-appellant
failed to perform any concrete act to show that she had the intention of paying
Floro for the value of the purchased pieces of jewelry, in order to somehow
rebut the fact duly established by the prosecution that deceit attended her
business dealings with Floro. It must be
reiterated that We have found that accused-appellant issued the subject bank
checks as payment for the pieces of jewelry simultaneous with her transactions
with Floro, and that was, on the very same occasion when the pieces of jewelry
were purchased, first, on the second week of December 1993, and subsequently,
on February 7,
1994. It being clear that the subject bank checks were issued simultaneous with
said transactions, it likewise became evident that deceit attended
accused-appellants’ dealings with Floro for the same only goes to show that the
bum checks were issued to Floro in order to induce her to part with the pieces
of jewelry in favor of accused-appellant.
In
addition to the foregoing, the High Court likewise found in the Ojeda
case that the prosecution miserably failed to adduce evidence to establish that
the indispensable element of notice of dishonor was sent to and was received by
the accused therein. In the case at
bench, however, it is undisputed that after the dishonor of the subject bank
checks Floro, through counsel, made repeated formal demands requiring
accused-appellant to pay for the value of the bum checks, perforce the notice
of dishonor which is required to properly prosecute and eventually convict an
accused of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code has been sufficiently met.[29]
IN
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
This
position finds support in the case of Borromeo vs. Court of Appeals, 131 SCRA
318, 327, where the Supreme Court, citing the cases of People vs. Clores, et
al., 125 SCRA 67 and People vs. Bautista, 81 Phil. 78, held that –
Finally,
EVERY CIRCUMSTANCES AGAINST GUILT AND IN FAVOR OF INNOCENCE MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT and suspicion no matter how strong should not sway judgment. Where the evidence, as here, gives rise to
TWO PROBABILITIES, one consistent with the defendant’s innocence and another
indicative of his guilt, THAT WHICH IS FAVORABLE to the accused should be
CONSIDERED. The constitutional
presumption of innocence continues until overthrown by proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, which requires moral certainty which convinces and satisfies the reason
and conscience of those who are to act upon it.
C. In criminal cases, where there are two
probabilities or where the court is faced with two conflicting statements, one
consistent with guilt and the other with innocence, that which is favorable to
the accused should be considered.
The
petitioner has in her favor the presumption of innocence. Under this presumption, it is required that
where the court is confronted with two probabilities, one consistent with guilt
and the other with innocence, the later (sic) should prevail. It is thus required that every circumstance
against guilt and in favor of her innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against her must survive the test
of reason.” This presumption of
innocence is a “conclusion of law in favor of the accused, whereby his
innocence is not ONLY ESTABLISHED BUT CONTINUES until sufficient evidence is
introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created – that is, his
INNOCENCE….”
In
the case at bar, the parties gave two versions as to the circumstances
surrounding their transactions. The
version of the prosecution is that the checks were issued at the time that she
parted with her pieces of jewelry. This
claim is supported by the lone and uncorroborated testimony of the private
complainant.
The
version of the petitioner is different.
She claims that the private complainant left the pieces of jewelry to
her at her office and that she issued the checks about a week thereafter. Her claim is that the checks were issued a
few days after the private complainant had already parted with the pieces of
jewelry. The transactions were not
simultaneous. This claim is in a way
corroborated by the testimony of another witness, a dental aide, who affirmed
the petitioner’s testimony that in fact, it was the private complainant who
went to petitioner’s office in
Conformably
with the constitutional presumption of innocence, the version of the
petitioner, as testified by her and corroborated by her dental aide, and which
excludes the presence of deceit, should have received more weight than the
uncorroborated version of the private complainant. When the testimonies are conflicting, the scales should tip in favor of the
accused.
D.
In estafa, it is of primordial significance for the
prosecution to prove the exact date of transaction and the exact date of the
issuance of the checks
In Crim. Case Nos. 275-M-94 and 2807-M-94, the
prosecution could not even place the specific dates when the pieces of jewelry
were delivered to the petitioner and the checks were issued to the private
complainant, save for saying that the offense happened in the second week of
December 1993. In the prosecution for
estafa under Art. 315, par. 2(b) of the Revised Penal Code, the date when the
reciprocated receipt of benefits took place is crucial.
When the law and jurisprudence require as one of the
elements for estafa that the check
should have been issued as the “IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION for the RECIPROCATED
RECEIPT of benefits”, said checks should have been issued “CONCURRENTLY WITH”
and “IN EX[C]HANGE” for the material gain derived. If the checks were issued a day or two after
the receipt of benefits, there will no longer be a case of estafa since the
obligation would already be pre-existing.
Therefore, it is of primordial significance for the prosecution to prove
the EXACT DATE OF THE TRANSACTION and the EXACT DATE of the issuance of the
checks. Otherwise, any conviction for
estafa would be impermissibly premised on conjectures, suppositions, and
conclusions of facts. Any such conviction
would fail to meet the beyond-reasonable-doubt standard required in criminal
cases.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang with Associate Justices Andres
B. Reyes, Jr. and Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa concurring, rollo, pp. 38-56.
[2] Rollo, pp. 39-44.
[3]
[4]
[5] G.R.
Nos. 104238-58,
[6] Rollo, pp. 22-23.
[7] Supra note 5.
[8] Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[9]
[10] People v. Ojeda, supra note 5, at
444-445.
[11] Vallarta v. Court of Appeals,
[12] Guinhawa v. People, G.R. No. 162822,
[13]
[14] Vallarta v. Court of Appeals, supra note
11, at 344 (1986).
[15] People v. Go Bio, Jr., 226 Phil. 170,
182 (1986).
[16] 423 Phil. 617, 622 (2001).
[17] W.L. Burdick, Law of Crime, Vol. I
139-140 (1946).
[18] Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137,
[19] People v. Ojeda, supra note 5 at 445.
[20] Philippine National Bank v. De Jesus, G.R.
No. 149295, September 23, 2003, 411 SCRA 557, 561.
[21] 402 Phil. 653 (2001).
[22]
[23] 433 Phil. 449, 459 (2002).
[24] Rollo, pp. 67-70.
[25] Sajot v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil.
182, 187 (1999).
[26] People v. Ladera, 398 Phil. 588, 602 (2002).
[27] See Dayawon v. Badilla, A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1309,
[28] See People v. Ladera, supra note 26 at 602.
[29] Rollo, pp. 59-61.