Republic of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND DIVISION
PRISCILLA T.
RIGOR, ENRICO T. RIGOR, JESUS ROMEO T. RIGOR and NINO ANGELO T. RIGOR, Petitioners,
- versus - TENTH DIVISION OF
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MILAGROS RODRIGUEZ, Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 167400 Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: June 30, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
GARCIA, J.:
In this petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioners seek to set
aside the Decision[1] dated
September 30, 2004 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80772, reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cabanatuan City in a suit for
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order thereat commenced by
them against the private respondent, and Resolution[2] dated
January 21, 2005, denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
We RESOLVE to
dismiss the petition outright for being an improper remedy.
In certiorari
proceedings under Rule 65, judicial review is limited to correcting errors of
jurisdiction, including grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.[3]
Rule 65 cannot be more explicit on this point. It reads:
Section.1. Petition for certiorari.- When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its or his jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
xxx xxx xxx
For a writ of
certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove that the tribunal, board
or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction. He must also show that he has no plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against what he perceives to be a
legitimate grievance. A recourse affording prompt relief from the injurious
effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered
“plain, speedy and adequate” remedy.[4]
As culled from the
underlying complaint initiated by the petitioners before the RTC, the case is
all about an alleged right-of-way of the
petitioners over a portion of private respondent’s property, and turns on the
issue of whether or not private respondent can construct a gate thereon and
fence her property, thereby denying petitioners access to and egress from their
own property. After securing a favorable judgment from the trial court, but
experiencing a reversal of fortune from the CA, petitioners would have the
Court nullify the latter’s ruling on jurisdictional considerations.
To be sure, the petition has not demonstrated that
the CA, in reversing the earlier decision of the trial court, acted without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. As it were, the
assailed CA decision and resolution came about on account of an appeal thereto
taken by the private respondent from an adverse judgment of the trial court.
The jurisdictional competence of the CA to act on said appeal has never been
put in issue by the petitioners.
Reading the
petition, one key point is at once clearly discernable, i.e., petitioners’ assault against the CA decision is not anchored
on flaws involving its jurisdiction, but on their assumption that the CA erred
in its reversal disposition, or more specifically, in its appreciation of the
issue/s involved and the evidence adduced. So it is that in this recourse,
petitioners assert:
a.
The original action filed by the petitioners is for an
injunction with prayer for a temporary restraining order whereas … the [CA]
instead of resolving the issue of whether or not the private respondent has a
right to close the contested right of way chose to tackle on whether or not the
petitioners has a right to the use of the contested right of way;
b.
However, none of the parties is in a position to prove
with absolute certainty the real status of the petitioner’s right to use the
right of way since none of the parties is the owner of the right of way in
question;
c.
Thus, the [CA] gravely abused its discretion when it
rely (sic) on the private respondent’s allegation, by way of defense to the
original action of injunction that the petitioners have no right to use the
road right of way, even if the indispensable party Ligaya Rodriguez, the owner
of the contested right of way was never presented to substantiate her allegation;
d.
The [CA] chose to concentrate in the latter issue
instead of the original issue raised
by petitioners…[5] (Words
in bracket added)
But errors of
judgment not relating to jurisdiction are, as a rule, correctable only by
appeal, not by the extraordinary remedy of certiorari.[6] For, as long as a court acts within its
jurisdiction, any supposed error committed in the exercise thereof will amount
to nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable and may be corrected by a
timely appeal. To stress, the assailed CA decision came to the fore on account
of private respondent’s appeal thereto from the RTC decision. It is neither
claimed nor pretended by the petitioners that the appellate court was without
jurisdiction to entertain or act on that appeal, which appeal necessarily threw
the whole case wide open for the consideration of the appellate court, not
simply on the points urged by the petitioners, but on all other grounds found legal
and valid by that court to warrant the grant or dismissal of the appeal. In
fact, given the very nature of the complaint filed by the petitioners before
the trial court, which is to permanently
enjoin the private respondent from fencing her property wherein the
alleged right-of-way exists, the resolution of the case inevitably calls for
the determination of the question of whether, in the first place, petitioners
are entitled to the claimed right-of-way.
With the view we
take of this case, petitioners interposed the present special civil action of certiorari
as an afterthought. They did so not because it is the speedy and adequate
remedy, but to make up for the loss, through sheer negligence or oversight, of
the right of ordinary appeal. It cannot
be overemphasized, however, that the presence of a speedy and adequate remedy forbids
recourse to certiorari under Rule 65. Stated a bit differently, certiorari is
not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is
available. Here, there can be no denying the fact that the challenged decision
and resolution of the CA were not mere interlocutory orders but a final
disposition on the merits of the main case. Under the circumstances,
petitioners’ remedy was by way of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, under which only questions of law may be raised.[7]
For obvious reason,
the Rules precludes recourse to the special civil action of certiorari if
appeal by way of a petition for review is available, as the remedies of appeal
and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[8]
At any rate, an
appeal by petition for review under Rule 45, assuming its availability, is now
lost for the petitioners. An appeal is a mere statutory right to be exercised
in the manner and according to procedures laid down by law, and its timely
perfection within the statutory period is mandatory and jurisdictional.[9]
Again, going by the records, we note that petitioners received their copy of
the CA resolution denying their motion for reconsideration[10] on
Sec. 2. Time of filing; extension. – The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment. (Underscoring added.)
Hence, even on the
most liberal view of construing the instant petition as one for review under
Rule 45, the recourse must still fail.
Given the foregoing
perspective, petitioners’ other laments set forth in the petition need not
detain the Court any further.
If at all, the
present petition only demonstrates petitioners’ effort to hold at bay the
enforcement of the final decision of the CA. The Court will not tolerate this abhorrent
practice. Litigation must end sometime and somewhere. The imperatives of fair
play and an effective and efficient administration of justice demand that once
a judgment has become final, the prevailing party be not, through some clever
maneuvers devised by the unsporting loser, deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.[11]
So it must be here.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
With treble cost
against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
(on official leave) |
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of
the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo with Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (Ret.) and
Magdangal M. De Leon, concurring; Rollo, pp.
12-24.
[2]
[3] Travelaire & Tours Corp. v. NLRC,
G.R. No. 131523,
[4] NIA v. Court of Appeals, G.R, No. 129169,
[5] Rollo, pp.
3-4.
[6] Reyes v.. Camilon, G.R. No. 46198,
[7] Sec.1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.-
A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court
or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
[8] Federation of Free Workers v. Inciong, G.R. No. 49983,
v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127683,
[9] Ongpauco v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 134039, December 21, 2004, 447 SCRA 395, citing cases.
[10] See Note #2, supra.
[11] Rubenito v. Lagata, G.R. No. 140959,