FIRST
DIVISION
|
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY, INC.
and/or ENRIQUE B. LAGDAMEO, Petitioners, - versus
- DELIA V. PANADO, Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 167118 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: June 15, 2006 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
We
are urged in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
to reverse and set aside the Decision[1]
and Resolution[2] of the
Court of Appeals dated
The
records establish the following antecedents:
Petitioner
Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. (MMPCI) is a corporation duly organized and
existing under the laws of the
Petitioner Enrique B. Lagdameo is MMPCI’s executive
vice-president and chief operating officer.
Respondent Delia V. Panado was formerly employed by petitioner MMPCI as Park
Information Officer at its memorial park in Sucat, Parañaque for which she was compensated P10,300.00 monthly.[4] As Park Information Officer, respondent was
tasked with the following duties and responsibilities: attending to customer’s and client’s needs;
arranging interment/cremation; arranging tent rentals and marker orders;
receiving and filing interment order relay; handling park collections and petty
cash funds; remitting park collections either to the bank or the cashier;
typing daily interment schedule; and performing other duties as may be
assigned.[5]
Sometime in February 2000, respondent
arranged the rental of tents by the Obice family to
be used during the first death anniversary of a member of their family on
In May 2000, respondent likewise
coordinated the rentals of tents and chairs with a certain Teresita
So. The tents and chairs were supposed
to be used by the So family on
Subsequently, petitioner MMPCI
conducted an internal audit where it was revealed that a discrepancy existed
between the services supposedly rendered by petitioner MMPCI and the amount of
money it received as payment for said services.
As a result of this discovery, petitioner Lagdameo
wrote respondent a memorandum dated 19 July 2000 requesting the latter to
explain in writing within 72 hours why her employment should not be terminated
due to her alleged failure to remit or her withholding of the rental payments
for certain transactions she entered into in behalf of petitioner MMPCI.[6] Attached to the memorandum was a table
summarizing these transactions, to wit:
TENT RENTAL ACCOUNTABILITY
FOR THE PERIOD JANUARY 1 TO
|
EMPLOYEE |
NAME OF DECEASED |
DATE SERVICED |
AMOUNT |
TOTAL |
|
Delia V. Panado |
Alfredo (Obice), Jr. |
Feb. 20 |
|
|
|
|
Teresita So |
May 24 |
1,000.00 |
|
|
|
Trumencia Togonon |
June 3 |
160.00 |
|
|
|
GRAND TOTAL |
|
|
|
In her 21 July 2000 letter-response
to the aforementioned memorandum,[7]
respondent stated that she did not receive a single centavo from the rentals of
petitioner MMPCI’s properties. As regards the transaction with the So family, respondent explained that Julius Munar, her supervisor, had promised to allow the So family
free use of the tent and the chairs as the deceased member of the So family was
a cousin of his wife. It so happened
that on the day the reservation was placed over the phone, Munar
was on his day off, compelling respondent to deal with the So
family by herself.
With respect to the dealings with the
Obice and the Togonon
families, respondent stated in her letter that their respective families
undertook to drop by respondent’s office to settle their obligations.
Unfortunately, no payment was received from the Obices
and the Togonons. In
the end, respondent admitted that she was at fault because of her failure to
follow-up the payments for the rentals of petitioner MMPCI’s
properties.
During the same investigation, Erlinda Obice, wife of the
deceased Alfredo Obice, executed the following
written statement:
I, Erlinda
M. Obice, certify that I personally paid the rental
for the 2 tents during the 1st death anniversary of my husband,
Alfredo, last Feb. 20, 2000, in the presence of Mang
Aguilar Santiago.
Signed
ERLINDA
M. OBICE[8]
For his part, the witness identified in Erlinda’s
statement, Aguilar Santiago, executed a sworn
statement dated
Respondent’s explanation, however,
was not as convincing as she had hoped because on
TO : DELIA
V. PANADO
FROM : EXECUTIVE
VICE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT : NOTICE
OF TERMINATION
Your response to my
memorandum on unremitted tent rental dated
Who called whom and when?
What is the name of the family member of Prumencia (Togonon) and Alfredo Obice whom
you talked with? Mrs. Erlinda M. Obice
paid the rental for 2 tents that very day of
In your desire to explain
why you have not remitted or why you have withheld the rental payments and why
you should not be terminated for cause, you gave ambiguous answers. However, the fact still remains that you have
been remiss of your duties and responsibilities. Not following up rental fees after the
service has been rendered especially when one (1) week or a couple of months
had passed is “gross and habitual neglect of your duties” (1104E: 4.17) and/or “willfully refusing specific
instruction” (1104E: 6.1) on Tent Rental
SOP. Both of which DISMISSAL
is the penalty.
Starting
Signed
ENRIQUE B. LAGDAMEO
Executive Vice President[10]
Thereafter,
respondent wrote a letter to petitioner Lagdameo in
an attempt to further explain her side of the story. The pertinent portion of her letter provides:
MR. ENRIQUE B. LAGDAMEO
EVP-COO
Dear Sir,
x x x
In our discussion, it
appeared that I was trying to cover-up the misdeeds of Mr. Sonny Brequillo and impliedly accused of making false statements
when I mentioned in my July 21 letter that the Obice
family promised over the phone to settle their tent rental obligation where in fact the amount
was already handed over to Mr. S. Brequillo through
Mr. S. Aguilar, MMP employee and husband of the Obice’s caretaker.
I believe both personnel could attest to the truthfulness of the
circumstances. In truth, the request of
Mrs. Obice was processed by my office February 1 or
20 days prior to the (deceased’s) death anniversary (Feb. 20).
As it was our policy to
carry out said rental transaction on pure C.B.D. (collect before delivery of
service), I emphasized this company policy when the Obice
Family called me sometime February 18th and requested to make the payment (on
February 20) which I entertained since it was inconvenient for them to travel
back and forth considering they lived in Antipolo Rizal. I was not
made aware nor advised of the tent rental payment since all the while I was
trying to reach the Obice Family thru the phone no.
registered in our office. Perhaps, I was
not so resourceful and skilled compared to our Audit Team who were successful in tracing the new address and phone no. of
the deceased’s wife, Mrs. Erlinda Obice.
I really thought when Mr. Peña forced me to sign those xerox
copy to tent rental indicated I agree for salary deduction, clear up everything
and at the same time connotes that I humbly admit that there (was) a negligence
on my part, by not following up those payments.
x x x
Respectfully yours,
Signed
Delia V. Panado[11]
In the end, respondent’s efforts
proved to be fruitless as petitioner MMPCI did not act on her letter-request
for reconsideration. This prompted
respondent to file a complaint for illegal dismissal with claim for damages,
attorney’s fees, 13th month pay, reinstatement, and backwages.
In a Decision dated
After careful examination of the facts and the evidence, We believe that the respondents terminated the services of
the complainant (respondent herein) under Article 282 (c)[13]
of the Labor Code and in a valid exercise of management prerogative. Her act of appropriating to herself company
money can only be called inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or
deceitful. With such conducts of an
employee, no employer or business can prosper, to the prejudice not only of its
owner but also to the other diligent employees who may lose their jobs upon the
downfall of the business.[14]
The
findings and conclusion of the labor arbiter were affirmed by the NLRC through
its Resolution promulgated on
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision is
hereby, AFFIRMED en toto.
The instant appeals is hereby, DISMISSED for lack of
merit.[16]
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
which ruled in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, the
petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Respondent Manila Memorial Park Cemetery,
Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate petitioner Delia V. Panado
to her former position or its equivalent without loss of seniority rights or
privileges plus full backwages computed from the time her salaries were
withheld until she is finally reinstated.[17]
The
Court of Appeals observed that, contrary to the findings of the labor arbiter
and the NLRC, the records are bereft of evidence indicating that respondent
appropriated for herself company money.
In fact, according to the Court of Appeals, it was never proven that
respondent even got hold of the money paid by the Obice
family as Aguilar claimed that he handed over the same to Brequillo
and not to respondent. Moreover,
respondent could not have possibly appropriated the payment received from the So family as even petitioner MMPCI did not deny that the So
family used the tent free of charge.
The
Court of Appeals also held that while it agreed with petitioner MMPCI with
regard to respondent’s negligence in the performance of her duty, still, such
negligence did not amount to a willful breach of trust which could justify her
dismissal from service under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code. Neither can petitioner validate respondent’s
dismissal by invoking Article 282(b) of the Labor Code as it requires gross and
habitual neglect of duty to warrant the termination of employment. In this case, it was never shown that
respondent was previously remiss in the performance of her job.
Petitioner
MMPCI’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated
Now, petitioner MMPCI is before this
Court impugning the Court of Appeals’ decision on the following grounds:
THE COURT OF APPEALS’
DECISION AND RESOLUTION DECIDED A QUESTION OF
1. THE COURT
OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN ADOPTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S MISTAKEN ARGUMENTS AS
TO THE CAUSE OF HER DISMISSAL WHEN THE RECORDS OF THE NLRC SUPPORT THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WAS ESSENTIALLY TERMINATED FOR VIOLATING COMPANY RULES AND ARTICLE
282 (C) OF THE LABOR CODE.
2. THE LABOR
ARBITER AND THE NLRC’S FINDINGS ON THE MISREPRESENTATION OR DECEPTION COMMITTED
BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT UPON MMPCI ARISING FROM THE UNREPORTED PAYMENT MADE BY
THE OBICE FAMILY HAS MORE THAN SUFFICIENT EVIDENTIARY BASIS AND SHOULD NOT HAVE
BEEN SET ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
3. THE LABOR
ARBITER AND THE NLRC’S FINDINGS ON THE NEGLECT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
PERFORMANCE OF HER DUTIES ARISING FROM THE ARRANGEMENT OF THE TENT RENTAL TO
TERESITA SO FREE OF CHARGE WITHOUT A WRITTEN INSTRUCTION IS ALSO DULY SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SET ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.
4. THE
DISCIPLINARY CASES OF JULIUS MUNAR AND SONNY BREQUILLO ARE IRRELEVANT AND
IMMATERIAL TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S CASE AND SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED BY
THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THIS CASE.
5. THE
LENGTH OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S SERVICE WITH MMPCI IS NOT A BAR TO HER
TERMINATION DUE TO DISHONESTY.[19]
Essentially,
the issue presented for our consideration is whether or not there is adequate
basis to terminate respondent’s employment.
As
a preliminary matter, we shall resolve the procedural concern raised by
petitioners. They maintain that the
Court of Appeals should not have taken cognizance of the case as no grave abuse
of discretion was committed by the NLRC.
Such argument is untenable.
For
a Petition for Certiorari to prosper,
the following requisites must be present:
(1) the writ is directed against a tribunal, a board or an officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions: (2) such tribunal, board or officer has acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[20]
There
is grave abuse of discretion “when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, such as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross so as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined
or to act at all in contemplation of law.”[21]
In
the case of Daniel V. Zarate,
Jr. v. Hon. Norma C. Olegario,[22] we
held that where the NLRC or executive labor arbiter acted capriciously and
whimsically in total disregard of evidence material to or even decisive of the
controversy, the extraordinary writ of certiorari
will lie.
As
will be shown later, the NLRC’s Resolution dated
Having
disposed of the procedural matter, we shall now proceed to resolve the
substantive questions presented in this case.
Petitioners argue that the Court of
Appeals erred in declaring that the ground for respondent’s dismissal was her
alleged misappropriation of company money which is punishable under Article 282(c)
of the Labor Code. Petitioners claim
that the notice of termination sent to petitioner clearly stated that the cause
for her dismissal was her “neglect in following-up the payments for the [park]
services that she arranged, plus her failure in complying with basic company
policy of C.B.D. (collect before delivery of services)” and not her
embezzlement of company funds as the Court of Appeals held.[24] Petitioners, therefore, argue that they did
not bear the burden of presenting evidence to prove that respondent indeed
misappropriated petitioner MMPCI’s funds as
respondent was not charged with such offense in the first place.
In addition, petitioners claim that
although both the labor arbiter and the NLRC stated that “[respondent]
appropriated for herself company money which can only be called inequitable,
unfair, and dishonest or fraudulent and deceitful,” such statement should not
be treated as the ratio decidendi of their respective findings.[25] Instead, petitioners would like to direct our
attention to the labor arbiter’s and the NLRC’s
conclusions that respondent’s employment was validly terminated pursuant to
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code. The
argument fails to persuade.
It
is undisputed that in his Decision, the labor arbiter referred to the
aforementioned provision of the Labor Code as the legal basis for the
termination of respondent’s employment.
A reading of the remainder of the paragraph where Article 282(c) of the
Labor Code was alluded to, however, would reveal that ultimately, the labor
arbiter validated petitioners’ personnel action based on her purported
misappropriation of company funds, thus:
After careful examination of the facts and the evidence, We believe that the respondents (petitioners herein)
terminated the services of the complainant (respondent herein) under Article
282(c) of the Labor Code and in a valid exercise of management
prerogative. Her act of appropriating to
herself company money can only be called inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or
fraudulent, or deceitful. With such
conducts of an employee, no employer or business can prosper, to the prejudice
not only of its owner but also to the other diligent employees who may lose
their jobs upon the downfall of the business.[26]
Based
on the above-quoted paragraph, it is crystal clear that the labor arbiter’s
finding of “fraud or willful breach”[27]
of petitioners’ trust committed by respondent was based not on the grounds
contained in the notice of termination that petitioners sent to respondent but
on her alleged misappropriation of petitioner MMPCI’s
money. The NLRC, through its
In the case at bar, the records clearly show that the
respondents-appellees were able to establish that
herein complainant-appellant was terminated from the service under Article 282(c)
of the Labor Code, as amended, and, in a valid exercise of management
prerogative. As established, the
complainant-appellant appropriated to herself company money which can only called “inequitable, unfair and dishonest or fraudulent, or
deceitful” (Records, p. 106). The
documents as adduced by respondents-appellees and as
admitted by the complainant-appellant herself, (1) the Obice
family paid the cost of rental; (2) that as early as February 1, 2000, the
complainant-appellant already knew about this payment, and, (3) notwithstanding
said knowledge, complainant-appellant misrepresented to the respondent-appellee company that the Obice
family had not yet paid the cost of the tent rental.[28]
With
this conclusion, the question inevitably posed is whether or not evidence
exists to support the claim that respondent misappropriated company funds. On this point, we sustain the Court of
Appeals’ evaluation that –
[There is] no evidence
extant in the records that shows -- or even suggests – that petitioner Panado indeed appropriated for herself company money,
contrary to the findings made by the Labor Arbiter and affirmed by public
respondent NLRC. In fact, the evidence
shows that petitioner Panado never got hold of any
company money as far as the transactions involving the Obice
and So families are concerned. In the matter of the rentals paid by the Obice family, her co-employee Santiago Aguilar admitted
having received payment from Obice but that he
remitted the same to Sonny Brequillo, another
employee. No mention was made of
petitioner Panado.
Upon the other hand, respondent MMPCI does not deny that the tent and
chair rentals of the So family were arranged free of
charge because the latter are relatives of petitioner’s supervisor Julius Munar. Hence, there
was no rental payment to speak of or to appropriate. It is clear that the conclusion of public
respondent NLRC that petitioner Panado committed
fraud or willful breach of trust in that she appropriated for herself company money was founded on pure speculation and is
downright erroneous.[29]
Petitioners
next argue that despite the lack of evidence establishing that respondent
profited from her transactions with the Obice family,
her dismissal from service was still sanctioned by Article 282(c) of the Labor
Code. According to petitioners,
respondent flaunted her dishonesty when she initially stated, through her
letter dated
First,
as the park information officer, respondent was tasked to inquire as to whether
the Obice family had already paid their obligation to
petitioner MMPCI. The length of time
that had lapsed from 20 February 2000, when the Obice
family paid for their use of the tent, until 21 July 2000, when respondent
wrote her letter-explanation to petitioners’ memorandum of 19 July 2000,
provided respondent with ample opportunity to find out if the Obice family still owed petitioner MMPCI for their use of
the tent.
Second, respondent admitted that as
early as
Third, respondent was aware that the Obice family would be in the memorial park on
Lastly, petitioners assert that
respondent was obviously lying when she claimed that she had a difficult time
communicating with the Obice family. Petitioners maintain that respondent knew
fully well that the members of the Obice family would
be within the park premises on
The inconsistent and dubious
assertions of respondent with respect to her transaction with the Obice family unmasked her untruthfulness and constituted
infidelity or breach of her employer’s trust.[31]
It is undeniable that an employer has
the right, under the law, to dismiss an employee based on fraud or willful
breach of the trust bestowed upon him by his employer or the latter’s
authorized representative. This right of an employer is a means to ensure his
self-protection for understandably, he is not expected to keep in his employ a
person whose fidelity and credibility, at least as far as his employment is
concerned, had already been tarnished.
An employer’s prerogative to dismiss
his employee, however, is not absolute.
The court, in the exercise of its inherent power to interpret the law,
has declared the guidelines that every employer must observe in terminating the
services of his employee. Particularly
in the case of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, this Court has made the
following pronouncement:
It is of course settled that an employer may terminate
the services of an employee due to loss of trust and confidence. However, the loss must be based not on
ordinary breach by the latter of the trust reposed in him by the former, but, in
the language of Article 282(c) of the Labor Code, on willful breach. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done
carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Elsewise stated, it must rest
on substantial grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims,
caprices or suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the
mercy of the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should
it appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith
or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an
occasion for abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be an actual breach of
duty committed by the employee which must be established by substantial
evidence.[32] (Underscoring ours.)
In this case, petitioners miserably
failed to abide by the requirement of the law.
They charged respondent with fraud and willful breach of employer’s
trust based on her contradictory statements relating to the transaction
involving the Obice family. Unfortunately for petitioners, we do not see
any semblance of fraud or willful breach of trust on respondent’s part. Concededly, petitioners are correct in saying
that a comparison of respondent’s letters to petitioner Lagdameo
would reveal their inconsistency; still, the discrepancy is innocuous and did
not give rise to fraud and willful breach of trust as petitioners claim.
Petitioners also insist that respondent
was guilty of misrepresentation and deception in that she initially tried to
conceal her knowledge of the fact that the Obice
family had already paid their obligation to petitioner MMPCI.[33] This assertion is rather incredulous
considering that among respondent’s responsibilities in office were to arrange
tent rentals, handle park collections, and remit the same to the bank or
cashier; therefore, it would have benefited respondent had she admitted at the
earliest instance that the Obice family had already
settled their obligation. Such admission
on her part would have shown that she was performing her duties as park
information officer. The fact, however,
that respondent disavowed any knowledge of payment from the Obice
family in her first letter to petitioner Lagdameo
only proves that she was not aware, during
that time, that the Obice family had already paid
the tent rental. This conclusion also
finds support in the sworn statement of Aguilar wherein he asserted that he was
the one who received the payment from the Obice
family and that he remitted the same to Brequillo. Clearly, respondent did not have any
participation as far as receipt of the Obice family’s
payment was concerned which should explain her lack of
knowledge on the matter. It could very
well be that respondent became aware of said payment only during the conduct of
the investigation conducted by petitioner MMPCI when she was confronted with
the written statements of Obice and Aguilar.
Similarly, we cannot justify
respondent’s termination from service for fraud or willful breach of trust based
solely on the grounds enumerated by petitioners in their Petition and Memorandum. Said enumeration is utterly lacking in
substantial evidence and does not constitute a sound foundation for
petitioners’ contention that respondent committed misrepresentation warranting
her severance from service.
Moreover,
it is well-settled that the term “trust and confidence” is restricted to managerial
employees[34] or
those “who [are] vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute
management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay-off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions.”[35]
We
cannot, however, completely disregard respondent’s negligence as by her own
admission in her
Article
282(b) of the Labor Code, however, imposes a stringent condition before an employer
may terminate an employment due to “gross and habitual neglect by the employee
of his duties.”
To
sustain a termination of employment based on this provision of the law, the
negligence must not only be gross but also habitual. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of
or a failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard
of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them.[36]
We
sustain the finding of the Court of Appeals that in this case, respondent’s
negligence falls below the standard provided by law. Notably, petitioners did not deny that at the
time this dispute arose, respondent had been in petitioner MMPCI’s
employ for more than twelve years without any blemish in her record. In addition, the amount involved in this transaction
was only P1,000.00.[37] Given these factors, we find that dismissal
is too severe a penalty to mete out on respondent.
Anent the charge involving the So family, petitioners assert that petitioner MMPCI has
guidelines with respect to rendering free services to its customers. Petitioners explain that respondent should
have first obtained the written permission of Munar,
the deceased’s relative and respondent’s supervisor, or asked Teresita So to present written instructions from Munar before respondent approved the free use of tent by
the So family. We rule in favor of
petitioners in this point.
In resolving this issue, the Court of
Appeals gave significance to the affidavit executed by Munar
where the latter admitted that while it was respondent who transacted with the
So family, it was he who told the So family not to pay the rentals and ordered Brequillo to deliver the tent and chairs to the So family
plot.[38] The admissions contained in this sworn
statement cannot obliterate respondent’s fault since she was well-informed of
petitioner MMPCI’s policy on the matter. Despite her knowledge of the pertinent
guideline, respondent still opted to disregard the same without offering a
viable explanation therefor.
Petitioners
implore us to sustain the dismissal of the respondent from employment based on the
combination of infractions in her transactions with the Obice
and the So families pursuant to our holding in the
case of Mendoza v. National Labor Relations Commission,[39]
to wit:
Petitioner also assails the severity of the penalty
imposed upon him alleging that he should have merited a suspension only
considering his past performance.
Unfortunately petitioner does not appear to be a first
offender. Aside from the infractions he
was found to have committed, it appears that petitioner falsified the truth
when he made a false report about the incident to private respondent SMC to
cover up for his misdeeds. Moreover on
previous occasions, petitioner committed violations of company rules and regulations
concerning pricing as a salesman of the company in a way that is detrimental to
his employer. On one occasion, he failed
to remit collections, so that in 1986 he was suspended for thirty days. Thus, the totality of the infractions that
petitioner has committed justifies the penalty of dismissal.[40]
The
above-cited jurisprudence finds no application in this case. In
This Court had consistently adhered
to the principle that the penalty to be imposed on an erring employee must be
commensurate with the gravity of his offense.
In the words of our esteemed brother, former Justice Florenz
Regalado –
While an employer has its own interests to protect and, pursuant thereto, it may terminate an employee for a just cause, such prerogative to dismiss or lay off an employee must not be abusively exercised. Such power should be tempered with compassion and understanding. The employer should bear in mind that, in the execution of said prerogative, what is at stake is not only the employee’s position but his livelihood as well.[41]
Indeed,
while an employer has the prerogative to discipline an erring employee, such
right must not be arbitrarily exercised and must yield to the constitutional
precept guaranteeing full protection to labor.
Transgressions committed by an employee should merit only the
corresponding sanction demanded by the situation.[42] Even where there exists
an agreement between an employer and his employees regarding dismissal, the
State is not precluded from inquiring on whether its strict application would
work too harshly on an employee.[43]
WHEREFORE,
the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ Decision dated
rights or privileges plus full backwages
computed from the time her salaries were withheld until she is finally
reinstated. With
costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos with Associate Justices Perlita J. Tria-Tirona and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente concurring; Rollo, pp. 66-74.
[2] Rollo, pp. 76-78.
[3] Dated
[4] Rollo, p. 11.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Labor Code, Art. 282(c) reads:
ART. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
x x x
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative; x x x.
[14] Rollo, p. 138.
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] Eduardo Cuison v.
Court of Appeals, 351 Phil. 1089, 1102 (1998).
[21] Chua
Huat v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
53851 and 63863,
[22] 331 Phil. 278 (1996).
[23] Rollo, pp. 152-158.
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27] Labor Code, Art. 282(c).
[28] Rollo, pp. 155-156.
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, 335 Phil. 932,
942-943 (1997).
[33] Rollo, p. 274.
[34] Dela Cruz v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 32 at 943; Wenifredo Farrol v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 212, 220 (2000).
[35]
[36] Union
Motor Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 159738,
[37] Rollo, p. 113.
[38]
[39] G.R. No. 94294,
[40]
[41] Philippine
Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R.
No. 80600,
[42] Wenifredo Farrol
v. The Honorable Court of
Appeals, supra note 34 at 220.
[43] Caltex Refinery Employees Association (CREA) v. National Labor Relations
Commission, 316 Phil. 335, 343-344 (1995).