FIRST DIVISION
ATTY. RAMON B. CENIZA, G.R. No. 165734
Petitioner,
Present
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus
- AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
Promulgated:
DANIEL WISTEHUFF, SR.,
DANIEL WISTEHUFF III,
MARITES GONZALES-
WISTEHUFF, BRYAN K.
WISTEHUFF,
ATTY. FRANCIS M.
ZOSA, and GEMALYN PETEROS,
Respondents.
x- -
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- - - - - - - - - x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45, Rules of Court, of the Order[1]
dated
of said decision. Petitioner prays, inter
alia, that the court enjoin the Court of Appeals (CA) from enforcing its
Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 85301 granting the plea of Inmark Marketing
Philippines, Inc. (IMPI) for a temporary restraining order, as well as the Resolution
dated P50,000.00
bond.
Petitioner and
his client Daniel Wistehuff, Sr. organized and established IMPI.[3] Petitioner owns 5% of the shares of stocks of
the IMPI, and the other stockholders are respondents Daniel Wistehuff III,
Marites Gonzales-Wistehuff, and Bryan K. Wistehuff.[4]
Petitioner,
as plaintiff, filed a Complaint against IMPI and the Wistehuffs with the RTC of
Cebu City for accounting, declaration of dividends, specific performance,
damages and attorney’s fees with a plea for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. The case was raffled to Branch
11 of the court and docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC. The complaint contained the following prayer:
x x x [That a] writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction be issued ordering defendant corporation, its President Daniel
Wistehuff III and its former President Daniel Wistehuff, Sr. to: a) produce all
financial documents of the corporation from 1996 up to the present and deposit
the same with the Court; b) faithfully comply with the terms of the
Retainership Contract to pay his retainer fee of P35,000.00 per month
and the extra legal services rendered; a Management Committee of a Receiver be
constituted; ordering defendants to make full accounting; ordering the
declaration of stock and cash dividends; ordering the individual defendants to
whom legal services were rendered to pay attorney’s fees of not less than P200,000.00;
ordering defendants Daniel Wistehuff III and Daniel Wistehuff, Sr., jointly and
severally, to pay plaintiff not less than P500,000.00 in moral damages
and not less than P250,000.00 in exemplary damages, attorney’s fees of
not less than P100,000.00 and litigation expenses of not less than P10,000.00,
plus appearance fees amounting to P2,000.00 per hour. x x x[5]
Petitioner
thereafter amended his complaint, alleging therein that it had been filed by
way of a derivative suit against the defendants. He prayed for an accounting of income and
expenses of the IMPI, declaration of dividends, enforcement of his right to
financial statements, attorney’s fees, and damages.[6] In the course of the proceedings, the RTC issued
an Order on
On
WHEREFORE, in view of all
the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter as follows:
1. to make a true and correct
accounting of the earnings of the corporation which will be the basis of the
declaration of dividends;
2. to enjoin defendant Inmark
Marketing Philippines, Inc. and the individual defendants to comply with the
terms and conditions of plaintiff Ceniza’s Retainer Contract;
3. to order the individual defendants
to whom services were rendered to pay attorney’s fees of P200,000.00;
4. to order defendants Daniel
Wistehuff III and Daniel Wistehuff, Sr., jointly and severally, to pay
plaintiff the sum of P500,000.00 in moral damages and P25,000.00
in exemplary damages;
5. to order defendants Daniel
Wistehuff III and Daniel Wistehuff, Sr. to pay, jointly and severally,
attorney’s fees of P100,000.00 and litigation expenses of P10,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[8]
Petitioner
moved for the execution of the decision pending appeal. On
WHEREFORE, in view of [the] foregoing premises, the Court hereby does the following:
(a) Orders the issuance of a
writ of execution to enforce the portion of the judgment rendered in this case
on
(b) Denies the plaintiff’s
motion for immediate execution of the portions of the judgment relating to
awards for damages, attorney’s fees, and expenses of litigation; and
(c) Orders the release to Judge
Jose P. Burgos of the receiver’s cash bond in the sum of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Consequently,
a Writ of Execution[11]
was issued by the court on
Believing
that the defendants-stockholders and their counsel acted in conspiracy with
each other and willfully and deliberately refused to comply with the writ of
execution issued by the court, petitioner filed against them a petition for
indirect contempt under Rule 39, Section 11, in relation to Rule 71, Section
3(d) of the Rules of Court, in the RTC of Cebu City. Petitioner alleged therein that:
6.
Following the willful, deliberate and contumacious refusal of
respondents, this time with the participation of, and in collusion with,
respondent Atty. Francis M. Zosa, their counsel in the intracorporate case
before Branch 23, when said counsel acting for and in behalf of respondents
willfully, deliberately, insultingly and contumaciously submitted the 2002
Financial Statement of Inmark (Annexes “E”, “F”, and “F-1” hereto attached)
which he very well knew fraudulently and incorrectly reported a loss and,
having been marked and presented by him in evidence, is not, and cannot
possibly be, in compliance with the Writ of Execution served upon him and his
client, which directed “the defendants
to make a true and correct accounting of the earnings of Inmark Marketing
Philippines, Inc. which shall be the basis of declaration of dividends.”
Plaintiff (now petitioner) then
moved the Court for a show cause order against the same respondents herein but
the Honorable Court, thru Judge Generosa A. Labra, in its Order dated 10
December 2003 ruled that indirect contempt must be initiated by a verified
petition with supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or
papers involved in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 4, Rule 71 of the
1997 Rules, hence, the instant petition;
7.
Pursuant to the above-cited Sec. 4 of Rule 71, it is within the
discretion of the Honorable Presiding Judge of Branch 23 to order the
consolidation of the present petition which is a Special Civil Action and Civil
Case No. CEB-26274-SRC which is the principal action pending before Branch 23
for joint hearing and resolution/decision.
8.
The 2002 Financial Statement is incorrect and fraudulent based on the
judgment of this Honorable Court in Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC which found
that:
1)
P28,000,000.00 was paid for the
residential lot and building occupied by defendant Daniel Wistehuff, Sr.
located at Northtown Homes (Decision, p. 6);
2)
P14,000,000.00 was paid for the
residential lot and building occupied by defendant Daniel Wistehuff III located
at Ma. Luisa Subdivision (Ibid);
9. Other hidden or misappropriated earnings of
defendant corporation were:
1)
Dollar deposits of Inmark’s fund deposited with
UCPB, Makati Branch, under Dollar Account No. 01-317-300307-0 from which are
sourced funds transferred to 317-000429-1 UCPB, Banilad Branch, which is an
Inmark account, per CPA Celso Inocente’s report dated July 5, 2002 (Annex “E”,
etc. Urgent Omnibus Motion) who at one
time was engaged as a member of the staff of the former Receiver;
2)
$75,000.00 deposited by defendant Daniel
Wistehuff III with a bank designated by the Philippine Retirement Authority in
support of his application for retiree’s visa;
3)
The amounts used for the purchases of several
cars/motor vehicles of the individual defendants with the collective value
conservatively estimated at P3,000,000.00;
4)
Funds utilized for the purchase of furnitures
and fixtures of the residences located at Northtown Homes and at the Ma. Luisa
Subdivision;
5)
And other hidden earnings/funds which are yet to
be discovered.
9. The present contempt charges arose out of or
are related to Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC before Branch 23 of this Honorable
Court which rendered the judgment which[,] being in a nature of special
judgment[,] may be enforced by contempt proceedings if the same should be
disobeyed pursuant to Sec. 11, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules.[13]
Petitioner
prayed that judgment be rendered against respondents, as follows:
1.
To require the respondents to comment on the petition within such period
as may be fixed by the Court (Sec. 3, Rule 71) and thereafter to set the date
for hearing on the contempt charge requiring all respondents to appear in
person at such hearing. (But nothing in
this section shall be so construed as to prevent the court from issuing process
to bring the respondent into court, or from holding him in custody pending such
proceedings.) [Sec. 3];
2.
If the hearing is not ordered to be had forthwith, to allow the release
of the respondents from custody upon filing bonds in amounts fixed by the Court
for their appearance at the next hearing of the charge (Sec. 6);
3.
When respondents, released on bail, fail to appear on the date set under
item 2 of the reliefs herein prayed, for this Honorable Court to issue another
order of arrest as well as to declare the bonds of respondents to be forfeited
and confiscated, or both, such bonds being understood to answer for the measure
of damages to the extent of the loss or injury sustained by petitioner by
reason of misconduct for which the contempt charge was prosecuted, with costs
of the proceedings and that such recovery shall be ordered by the Court for the
benefit of the petitioner (Sec. 9);
4. After hearing, to SENTENCE to the
maximum, in view of aggravating circumstances attendant to the commission of
the offenses, the respondents guilty of indirect contempt according to the
penalties prescribed in Sec. 7, Rule 71 which consists of a fine not exceeding P30,000.00 or imprisonment not exceeding 6
months or both, without prejudice to the provisions of Sec. 8 which calls for
an indefinite imprisonment should respondents refuse or omit to do an act which
are yet in their power to perform.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs
and remedies just and equitable in the premises.[14]
The
case was docketed as CEB-29783 and raffled to Branch 23 of the RTC of
Cebu. However, the case was re-raffled
to Branch 16 of said court.
In
their answer to the petition, respondents averred that only the dispositive
portion of the decision on the subject execution may be enforced by the sheriff,
and that they complied with the writ issued by the court and submitted a true
and correct accounting of the earnings of the IMPI which will be the basis of
the computation of dividends.[15]
On
On
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it
is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court (preferably through another
Presiding Judge in view of the requested voluntary inhibition of Hon. Agapito
L. Hontanosas, Jr.), to RECONSIDER and SET ASIDE the order of this Honorable
Court thru Judge Hontanosas dated 15 April 2004 and for this Honorable Court
(preferably through another Presiding Judge) to ACT on petitioner’s OMNIBUS
MOTION (dated 15 January 2004):
1) TO
SET CONTEMPT CHARGE FOR HEARING AND TO REQUIRE
RESPONDENTS TO APPEAR IN PERSON;
2)
FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A HOLD DEPARTURE ORDER;
3)
TO EXPUNGE COUNTERCLAIM.[19]
On
On July
7, 2004, the RTC issued an Order[20]
denying his Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of the Court on the ground that respondents’ acquittal is not
appealable, or cannot be the subject of a motion for reconsideration as such a
motion amounted to an appeal. The court
ruled that, as in criminal proceedings, an appeal would not lie from the order
of dismissal of, or exoneration from, a charge of contempt of court.[21]
The registry return receipt showed that petitioner received a copy of the Order
on
On
Petitioner
filed a “Notice of Appeal with Alternative Motion to Squarely Rule”[23]
on
During
the hearing of the motion, the petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits “A” to
“F” and their sub-markings in support of his motion.[24]
On
Petitioner
received a copy of the
The
IMPI filed a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with the Court of Appeals for the nullification of the
Petitioner
then filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court, seeking to nullify the
I.
The Court a
quo seriously erred in not holding that Civil Case No. CEB-29783 for
Indirect Contempt being civil in nature, a Motion for Reconsideration and an
appeal from a judgment exonerating the respondents is not barred by double
jeopardy.
II.
The Court a
quo seriously erred in not finding respondents-appellees guilty as a matter
of law of Indirect Civil Contempt and sentencing them accordingly.[29]
Petitioner
avers that contempt proceedings may actually be either civil or criminal: it is
criminal when the purpose is to vindicate the authority of the court and
protect its outraged dignity; it is civil when there is failure to do something
ordered by a court to be done for the benefit of a party. He asserts that his
petition for indirect contempt below is civil in nature for the reason that the
accounting ordered by the trial court was for the benefit of one party and the
purpose of the contempt proceeding below was not to vindicate the authority of
the court and to protect its outraged dignity. He maintains that while criminal contempt
proceedings should be conducted according to the principles and rules
applicable to criminal cases, this is not so in civil contempt proceedings. Accordingly, an appeal from the decision dismissing
the same is not barred by double jeopardy.[30]
Petitioner
further posits that respondents should be found guilty of indirect contempt for
willfully and deliberately refusing to submit a full and correct accounting of
the earnings of the corporation. He posits that the 2001 Financial Statements submitted
by the corporation do not constitute compliance with the Order to render a true
and correct accounting as they do not merit faith and credence but show
documented fraud, wrongdoing and deception.[31] Petitioner prays that:
1. The challenged order of the Court a quo dated 15 April 2004 issued by
ex-judge Agapito Hontanosas, Jr. (formerly of Branch 16 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu) dismissing on the merits the petition for contempt in Civil Case
No. CEB-29783 and the other challenged order of the Court a quo issued by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. of Branch 7 of the same
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
on grounds of double jeopardy, be REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
2. Pending final outcome of this petition, and
in view of the continued, deliberate, willful and intransigent refusal of
respondents to render a true and correct, full and complete accounting of the
earnings of the corporation for over 1 year and 6 months now since the judgment
dated
3. To render a judgment FINDING respondents
Daniel Wistehuff, Sr., Daniel Wistehuff, Jr., Bryan K. Wistehuff, Atty. Francis
M. Zosa and Gemalyn Peteros (except respondent Marites Gonzales-Wistehuff)
guilty of civil contempt in said case and SENTENCING them accordingly by
ordering the continued detention of respondents (Sec. 8, Rule 71) until they
shall have fully complied with the true and correct, full and complete
accounting of the earnings of Inmark Marketing Phils., Inc. which shall be the
basis of the declaration of dividends as decreed by the Court a quo in its judgment dated 27 March 2003
in Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC;
4. In the interest of justice and equity, and on
account of extreme urgency, pending final outcome of this petition, that the
Special 18th Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. [SP] No.
85301, be TEMPORARILY RESTRAINED, and later PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED, from
enforcing its October 14, 2004 Resolution and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued pursuant thereto stopping the implementation of the July 15,
2004 Order of Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr. in Civil Case No. CEB-26274-SRC
appointing a commissioner tasked to conduct an accounting of the true and
correct earnings of Inmark Marketing Phils., Inc. which shall be the basis for
the declaration of dividends;
5. Pending final action on this Petition, to
further ISSUE a Hold-[D]eparture Order to the Commissioner of Immigration to
prevent the respondents from avoiding the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
and thereby preserve its authority and dignity which should be respected even
by foreigners, especially in the light of the fact that respondent Daniel
Wistehuff, Sr. has already fled from the jurisdiction of Philippine Courts; and
6. In regard to respondent Atty. Francis M.
Zosa, to require him to EXPLAIN why he should not be disbarred.
Petitioner prays for such other reliefs and
remedies just and equitable in the premises.[32]
For their
part, respondents aver that the proper remedy of petitioner to question an
order denying due course to a notice of appeal is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court and not a petition for review under Rule 45. They assert that the RTC
correctly denied the Notice of Appeal of petitioner since the Petition for Indirect
Contempt filed by him below was criminal in nature; hence, the decision of the
trial court dismissing the charge was not appealable. Moreover, the RTC
correctly dismissed petitioner’s contempt charge because they submitted the
report of the independent auditor together with the other documents, which,
according to them, serve as a true and correct accounting of the earnings of
the corporation.[33]
The issues for resolution are: (1) whether the petition states a cause of
action for the nullification of the assailed Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No.
85301; (b) whether the petition for indirect contempt filed by the petitioner
below is criminal in nature; (c) whether the assailed Orders of the RTC in
Civil Case No. CEB-29783 are appealable; and (d) whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is the proper remedy in seeking to nullify the assailed Orders of the RTC.
On the first issue, we find that the petition
fails to state a cause of action for petition for review on certiorari. The assailed Resolutions of
the
CA are interlocutory in nature and not appealable; to nullify the same, the
proper remedy of the petitioner was to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, on the allegation that the CA acted with
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the petition for review on certiorari of the petitioner for the
nullification of the assailed resolutions of the appellate court should be as
it is hereby denied. It must be stressed
that a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appealing a judgment or final order of
the CA.
Considering that the rest of the
issues are interrelated, the Court shall delve into and resolve them simultaneously.
The pertinent provision of the Rules
of Court is Section 3, Rule 71, which provides:
SEC. 3. Indirect
contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. —After a charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment
thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for
indirect contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in
the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of, or resistance to, a
lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts
or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of
executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference
with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt
under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d)
Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice;
(e)
Assuming
to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without
authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g)
The
rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so
construed as to prevent the court from issuing process to bring the respondent
into court, or from holding him in custody pending such proceedings.
Section 7 of the same Rule provides
for the punishment of indirect contempt, thus:
SEC.
7. Punishment
for indirect contempt.—If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or
higher rank, he may be punished by a fine
not exceeding thirty thousand (P30,000)
pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. If he is adjudged guilty of contempt
committed against a lower court, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding
five thousand (P5,000) pesos or imprisonment not exceeding one (1)
month, or both. If the contempt consists
in the violation of a writ of injunction, temporary restraining order or status quo order, he may also be ordered
to make complete restitution to the party injured by such violation of the
property involved or such amount as may be alleged and proved.
The
writ of execution as in ordinary civil action shall issue for the enforcement
of a judgment imposing a fine, unless the court otherwise provides.
Section 8 of the same Rule further
states:
SEC. 8 Imprisonment
until order obeyed.—When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission
to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be
imprisoned by order of the court concerned until he performs it.
In the recent case of Montenegro v. Montenegro,[34]
the Court distinguished criminal contempt from civil contempt, as follows:
Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminal contempt is “conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court to disrepute or disrespect.” On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If the purpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.[35]
Thus, contempt proceedings has a dual
function: (1) vindication of public interest by punishment of contemptuous
conduct; (2) coercion to compel the contemnor to do what the law requires him
to uphold the power of the Court, and also to secure the rights of the parties
to a suit awarded by the Court.[36]
Contempt
proceedings are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. It may not always be easy to classify a
particular act as belonging to one of those two classes. It may partake of the characteristics of
both.[37]
If it is remedial and coercive in nature, it is civil; the parties are the
individuals whose private rights and remedies they were instituted to protect
or enforce. The absence of willfulness
does not release one from civil contempt.[38] It
is civil if it is instituted to preserve and enforce the rights and administer
the remedies of the parties to which the court has to force them to obey.
Proceedings for contempt are criminal
in nature if presented to preserve the power of the courts and to punish for
disobedience to their orders. Criminal contempt involves no element of personal
injury; it is directed against the power and dignity of the court and the
private parties have little, if any interest in the proceedings for its
punishment.[39]
The Rules of Court provides for the
following punishment for the contemnor: fine or imprisonment, or both.
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose,
that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of contempt. If it is for civil contempt the punishment is
remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the
sentence is punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court. But if the contempt consists in the refusal
of a party or a person to do an act which the court has ordered him to do for
the benefit or the advantage of a party to a suit or action pending before it,
and he is committed until he complies with the order, the commitment is in the
nature of an execution to enforce the judgment of the court, and the party in
whose favor that judgment was rendered is the real party-in-interest in the
proceedings.[40]
It is true that punishment by
imprisonment may be remedial as well as punitive, and many civil contempt
proceedings have resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable to the
complainant, but also in committing the defendant to prison. But imprisonment for civil contempt is
ordered where the defendant has refused to do an affirmative act required by
the provisions of an order which, either in form or substance, is mandatory in
its character. Imprisonment in such cases is not inflicted as
a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing the defendant to do
what he had refused to do. The order in
such cases is that the defendant stand committed unless and until he performs
the affirmative act required by the court’s order.[41] The defendant can end his imprisonment and
discharge himself at any moment by doing what he had previously refused to
do. In fine, the defendant carries the
keys of his prison in his own pocket.[42]
It may happen that, in proceedings
for criminal contempt, where the imprisonment is solely punitive to vindicate
the authority of the courts, the complainant may also derive some incidental
benefits from the fact that such punishment tends to prevent a repetition of
the disobedience. However, such indirect
consequences will not change imprisonment which is merely coercive and remedial
into that which is solely punitive in character or vice- versa.[43]
We
agree with the contention of petitioner that, as gleaned from the averments of
his petition and the relief prayed for, the indirect contempt charge filed by him
below was civil in nature. He submits
that respondents willfully and deliberately refused to comply with the decision
of the court requiring them to submit a true and correct accounting of the
earnings of IMPI which could be the basis of the declaration of dividends and
that the 2002 Financial Statement submitted by them did not comply with such decision.
Petitioner maintains that said financial statement is fraudulent, and the purpose
of the petition was to have the respondents punished for their alleged
recalcitrance and to compel them to comply with the court’s decision. Indeed, the petitioner’s prayer, that
respondents be incarcerated and remain in detention until they comply with the
decision of the court conformably with Rule 71, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court, is in the nature of an execution to enforce the judgment. Thus, the punishment
sought by petitioner for the respondents is not punitive in nature, but
designed for his own benefit and advantage, and not for the purpose of
vindicating the dignity of the court and preserving its power.
Since the proceedings below is civil
in nature, petitioner had the right to file a motion for reconsideration of the
RTC’s
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45; patently then, the remedy resorted to by petitioner is
inappropriate.
Anent
the issue of whether or not respondents are liable for indirect contempt, we
need not resolve the same in this case for the reason that the trial court had
already granted petitioner’s plea for the appointment of a commissioner to
receive the evidence of the parties. The
Order of the trial court appointing a commissioner is now the subject of the petition
filed by respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 85301.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
[1] Penned by Presiding Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr., rollo, pp. 83-90.
[2] Rollo, p. 59.
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] 58 Phil. 271 (1933).
[19] Rollo, p. 14.
[20] Penned by Judge Simeon P. Dumdum, Jr.; records, pp. 111-112.
[21] Records, p. 112.
[22] Rollo, pp. 95-98.
[23] Records, pp. 114-117.
[24]
[25] Rollo, pp. 91-94.
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32]
[33]
[34] G.R.
No. 156829,
[35]
[36] Penfield Company of
[37] People v. Godoy, 312 Phil. 977, 998
(1995).
[38] McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336
[39] Philippe v. Window Glass Cutters League of
[40] Bessette v. W.B.Conkey Co. 194
[41] Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company,
221
[42] In re Nevitt, 117 F. 448 (1902).
[43] Gompers v. Buck’s Stove & Range Company, supra note 41.
[44]
See Converse Rubber Corporation v.
Jacinto Rubber & Plastics Co., Inc.,
G.R. Nos. L-27425 & L-30505,
[45] Herrera, comments on the 1997 rules of civil procedure, Vol. 7, 1997 ed., 413.