FIRST DIVISION
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R.
No. 164460
Represented by Hon. SIMEON V.
MARCELO, Present:
Petitioner,
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairman,
Ynares-Santiago,
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr. and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
Promulgated:
CARMENCITA
D. CORONEL,
Respondent. June 27, 2006
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PANGANIBAN, CJ:
|
I |
n administrative
cases, a finding of guilt must be supported by substantial evidence. In the present case, an unauthenticated
photocopy of an alleged receipt does not constitute substantial evidence to
show that respondent is guilty of dishonesty.
In fact, absent any authentication, the photocopy is inadmissible in
evidence; at the very least, it has no probative value.
Before us is a Petition
for Review[1]
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and in
view of all the foregoing, the petition is GIVEN
DUE COURSE. The Disapproval by [Petitioner]
Ombudsman on the March 23, 200[1][[6]] Order of Graft Investigation Officer I Grace H. Morales,
granting the motion for reconsideration of [Respondent] Carmencita
D. Coronel is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE for having been done with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Consequently, the March [7], 200[1][[7]] Order of Graft Investigation Officer I Grace H. Morales
exonerating [Respondent] Carmencita D. Coronel is hereby REINSTATED
and AFFIRMED.”[8]
The Facts
According to the CA,
the facts are as follows:
“[Respondent] Carmencita D. Coronel is a Senior Accounting Processor B with Salary
Grade 10 of the Linamon Water District, Lanao del Norte. On
“In the
morning of October 14, 1998, [respondent] called for a meeting the officers of
the different Water Districts in Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur, as well as their
advisors from the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). Since it was nearing lunchtime, the group
opted to continue their meeting at Marvilla’s Store
at Barangay Bunu-un, P1,213.00), as shown in cash Invoice No. 0736 dated
“On P1,213.00).
“On P1,213.00) when in
fact, it was only Two [H]undred Thirteen [P]esos (P213.00), as reflected in the photocopy of the
original duplicate of cash invoice No. 0736 dated October 14, 1998.
“On November
27, 2000, Grace H. Morales, Graft Investigation Officer I of the OMB-Mindanao, Davao City, rendered a decision, approved by the then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto
on December 29, 2000, the dispositive portion of which reads-
‘WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this office finds and so holds that respondent CARMENCITA
D. CORONEL is guilty of DISHONESTY and is hereby DISMISSED from the service,
with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to
Section 22 (a) in relation to Sec. 9 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987. She is disqualified from re-employment in the
national and local governments, as well as in any agency, including government-owned
or controlled corporations. Let a copy
of this decision be entered in the personal records of respondent.
‘SO DECIDED.’
“On January 10, 2001, the Office of the Ombudsman, Manila,
issued an order directing the General Manager of Linamon
Water District, Lanao del Norte, to implement the
decision dated November 27, 2000.
“[Respondent] filed her motion for reconsideration dated
‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
reconsideration is granted and the Decision of this Office dated November 27,
2000 dismissing from the service respondent Carmencita
D. Coronel is hereby SET ASIDE.’
x x x x x x x x x
“On
Originally, Respondent
Coronel filed before this Court a Rule 65 Petition,[10]
seeking the nullification of petitioner’s Disapproval Order for having deprived
her of due process. In that case,[11] we said that the Petition should have been
denied outright. After all, in Fabian v. Desierto,[12]
this Court held that appeals from the decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman
(OMB) in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the CA under Rule
43 of the Rules of Court. In that case,
though, we ruled that in the interest of justice, there was a need to suspend the
application of Fabian and Circular AM
No. 99-2-02-SC. We considered
respondent’s Petition then as a petition for review under Rule 43 and referred
it to the CA for adjudication on the merits.[13]
The appellate court nullified petitioner’s Disapproval Order and
reinstated the
The CA took cognizance of the corroborating Affidavits[14]
submitted by respondent for the first time through her Motion for
Reconsideration[15]
before the ombudsman. The CA held that
those pieces of evidence adequately supported her innocence. The court a quo reiterated the
investigating officer’s finding that her administrative liability for
dishonesty had not been proven.
Further, the appellate court said that the OMB’s disapproval was tainted
with grave abuse of discretion.[16] First, petitioner ombudsman did not
consider the credible evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
Reconsideration. Second, he did
not give any justification for his disapproval of the investigating officer’s ruling. This shortcoming was in contravention of the
constitutional mandate that all decisions, even if rendered by quasi-judicial
and administrative bodies, should clearly and distinctly state the facts and
the law on which they are based. The CA
cited Eballa v. Paas,[17] in
which the Supreme Court had denounced some judges’ practice of merely noting down
their orders on the margin of the motions before them.[18]
Hence, this Petition.[19]
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in its Memorandum:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was not guilty of falsifying the amount written in the receipt.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it
was grave injustice for then Ombudsman Desierto not
to have considered the evidence presented by respondent in her Motion for
Reconsideration.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that
respondent was denied due process.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that it
was grave injustice for then Ombudsman Desierto not
to give any justification in disapproving the Order of Dismissal by GIO Grace
H. Morales.”[20]
Going over petitioner’s
arguments, the issues may be reduced to the following:
1.
Whether petitioner’s Disapproval Order,
expressed as a marginal notation, was a valid decision or order
2.
Whether the investigating officer
committed an error in admitting respondent’s “new” evidence
3.
Whether respondent was guilty of
dishonesty.
The Court’s
Ruling
The Petition is partly
meritorious.
First Issue:
Respondent maintains
that Ombudsman Desierto’s marginal notation -- which
reads, “The original decision stands” -- was violative
of her right to due process for failing to state the basis for the action.[21]
On the other hand, petitioner counters that the marginal notation met
constitutional standards. Citing Olivarez
v. Sandiganbayan,[22]
the OMB maintains that by referring to the original Decision, the notation
adopts the findings of fact and law already discussed. [23]
We agree with
petitioner. We held in Olivarez[24] that the ombudsman’s disapproval orders
written as marginal notations were valid, even if they did not specifically
spell out their factual and evidentiary basis.[25] Indeed, this doctrine was first established
in Cruz v. People[26]
and has consistently been followed in recent cases.[27] In the present controversy, it is worthwhile
to quote a relevant portion of our ruling in Olivarez:
“It may be true that, on the face
thereof, the marginal notes seem to lack any factual or evidentiary basis for
failure to specifically spell out the same.
However, that is not all there is to it.
What is actually involved here is a situation wherein, on the bases of
the same findings of fact of the investigating prosecutors, respondent special
prosecutors were of the opinion that, contrary to the former’s
recommendation, petitioner is probably guilty of the offense charged. Obviously, therefore, since it is merely a
review of the conclusions arrived at by the investigating prosecutor, another
or a new preliminary investigation is no longer necessary.”[28]
The subject notation, “The original decision stands,” was a
valid resolution. It actually adopted
the factual and legal conclusions of the original Decision. Hence, respondent should find her bearings
from that holding.
The notation does not deny respondent of her right to due
process. In administrative proceedings,
the essence of due process lies simply in the opportunity to explain one’s side
or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What is proscribed is the absolute lack of
notice or hearing.[29]
In this case, respondent was given every opportunity to be
heard. Significantly, her intelligible
pleadings before the CA and this Court indicate that she knew the bases for the
ombudsman’s Decision. In fact, she very
ably pinpointed its alleged errors that she thought would merit our review. Not having been left in the dark as to how it
was reached, respondent’s insistence on a denial of due process has no legal
leg to stand on.
Second Issue:
Admission of “New” Evidence
Petitioner cites
Section 8 of Rule III of the Office of the Ombudsman’s Rules of Procedure
(Administrative Order No. 07), which provides that a motion for reconsideration
may be filed if a newly discovered evidence would
materially affect the order or decision.
He then posits that the Affidavits of the restaurant proprietor and the
members of the luncheon meeting, as well as the Certification of the barangay captain, could not qualify as
newly discovered evidence. These were
allegedly available and could have been readily produced by respondent with
reasonable diligence during the administrative adjudication of the case.[30]
On the other hand,
respondent cites Samala v. CA[31]
to support her claim that rules of procedure must not be strictly applied to frustrate
substantial justice.[32]
Newly discovered evidence refers to that which already exists prior to
or during a trial, but whose existence is not known to the offering litigant;
or, though known, could not have been secured and presented during the trial
despite reasonable diligence.[33]
What is essential for a particular piece of evidence to be properly regarded as
“newly discovered” is that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate the evidence before or during the trial, but nonetheless
failed to secure it. Thus, a party who knows of the existence of specific
pieces of evidence cannot offer them as “newly discovered” without any
explanation for not presenting them earlier.[34]
Petitioner is correct in saying that the evidence presented by
respondent in support of her Motion for Reconsideration should not have been
considered. Her Motion for
Reconsideration[35]
did not explain the belated presentation of her corroborating affidavits, but it
merely contained the following statements:
“2. On the basis of the aforecited
decision, the respondent hereby invoke (sic) this Motion for Reconsideration,
anchored principally on the ground that, this
Office committed serious errors in [its] findings of fact and law, which if
left uncorrected will be prejudicial to the interest of the herein respondent. The respondent has also discovered new
evidence, which if considered, will materially affect the decision, which is
being sought to be reconsidered.”[36]
“The seriousness and the adverse
consequential impact of the decision of this Office as against the herein
respondent, compelled the latter to clarify facts and things with MR. MARIANO
MARZO[,] JR., who is the owner of Marvilla’s By the
Sea, the same business establishment who (sic) issued Cash Invoice Receipt No.
0736, dated October 14, 1998, which is the gist (sic) of the complainant’s
cause on the alleged tampering of receipt which (sic) he accused respondent to
have committed the same.
“After some initial backgrounder of
the case, MR. MARIANO MARZO[,] JR., personally volunteered to execute and sign
a ‘SWORN STATEMENT’, before the Office of the City Prosecutor, of the City of Iligan, detailing every fact as to the real truth of the
matter, the substance of which is reflected in his SWORN STATEMENT x x x[.]”[37]
“Additionally, in support and in
order to corroborate the Sworn Statement of Mr. Mariano Marzo,
Jr., the affidavits of MR. CEDRIC D. LAGUERTA, General Manager of Kauswagan Water District, Lanao del
Norte, MR. ROMEO J. ANGELES, General Manager of Wao
Water District, Lanao del Sur,
MR. BEDE G. GATA, of the Local Water Utilities Administration, of Balara, Quezon City, and that of
MS. RHODORA V. GUMBAN, also of LWUA, Quezon City, Philippines,
[a] Certification issued by the Punong Barangay of Buru-un, Iligan City, certifying as to the reasonableness of the
price paid by the respondent, in relation to the number of persons present
during that luncheon meeting, in relation to the prevailing price then for
meals in that area which is a tourist destination in the City of Iligan. The aforecited documents are herein simultaneously appended and
marked as Annexes ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’, and ‘G’, respectively.”[38]
We are convinced that the Affidavits do not constitute “newly
discovered evidence.” Respondent did not prove that, even with reasonable
diligence, she could not have obtained them during the investigation. There is no showing whatsoever that her corroborating
witnesses hesitated or declined to give their testimonies.
As it is, the additional evidence offered by Coronel
amount to no more than “forgotten” evidence, the belated uncovering of which
would not have justified a reconsideration of the case. Forgotten evidence
refers to evidence already in existence or available before or during a trial;
known to and obtainable by the party offering it; and could have been presented
and offered in a seasonable manner, were it not for the sheer oversight or
forgetfulness of the party or the counsel.[39] Presentation of forgotten evidence is
disallowed, because it results in a piecemeal presentation of evidence, a
procedure that is not in accord with orderly justice[40]
and serves only to delay the proceedings.
A contrary ruling may open the floodgates to an endless review of
decisions, whether through a motion for reconsideration or for a new trial, in
the guise of newly discovered evidence.
Third Issue:
Notwithstanding the
inadmissibility of the forgotten evidence of respondent, there is a basis for reversing
the ombudsman’s
Although sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence is a question of
fact and is not generally subject to review by this Court, the instant
case falls under the recognized exceptions. The original Decision of the ombudsman was not
supported by the evidence, but was grounded entirely on speculations, surmises
and conjectures.
The evidence of the prosecution consisted merely of the original
Official Receipt (OR) No. 0736, and a photocopy of the original duplicate of
that receipt. The first was a bill for P1,213; and the latter, for P213. Both pieces of evidence refer to one and the
same Official Receipt; yet, they contain different amounts. Obviously, one of them was falsified. Unfortunately, Complainant Sausal, Jr., failed to prove that it was indeed
respondent’s receipt that was falsified.
As it stands, we do not know for certain if the number “1” was inserted
in OR No. 0736 or was deleted from the unauthenticated photocopy of the
original duplicate. The evidence is
equivocal. Besides, given that there
were 8 to 10 attendees in the luncheon meeting, a bill of P1,213 for meals was not entirely improbable, even in 1998.
In administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding
of guilt is substantial evidence;[43] that
is, such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.[44]
In the instant case, the complainant did not present evidence to support his
theory that the photocopy of the original duplicate reflected the true amount, or
that OR No. 0736 had indeed been falsified.
That oversight was fatal to the discharge of his burden of proof. A reasonable mind will not carelessly jump to
the conclusion that respondent is the guilty party.
The complainant’s evidence to prove falsification consisted of an
unauthenticated[45]
photocopy of the original duplicate. He
could have obtained an affidavit from the restaurant proprietor or employee who
had issued the receipt, in order to attest to its due execution and
authenticity. Absent any proof of due
execution and authenticity, the alleged photocopy of the original duplicate of
OR No. 0736 does not convince us that it is an accurate reflection of the
actual bill incurred.
While this Court adheres to a liberal view of the conduct of
proceedings before administrative agencies, it also consistently requires some
proof of authenticity or reliability as a condition for the admission of
documents. Absent any such proof of
authenticity, the photocopy of the original duplicate should be considered
inadmissible and, hence, without probative value.[46]
Given the flimsy
charge and the paucity of the evidence against respondent, there is no need for
her to present additional evidence to vindicate herself. The Office of the Ombudsman should have
dismissed the Administrative Complaint against her in the first place. Clearly, her guilt was not proven by
substantial evidence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Respondent Carmencita
D. Coronel is hereby EXONERATED of the charge
against her for lack of substantial evidence. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief
Justice
Chairman,
First Division
W E C O N C U R:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 23-48.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Refer to Assailed CA Decision, p. 1; rollo, p. 50.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] Rollo, pp. 131-149.
[11]
Coronel v. Desierto, 448 Phil. 894,
[12]
295 SCRA 470,
[13] Coronel v. Desierto, supra at 903.
[14] Assailed Decision, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp. 55-57.
[15] Rollo, pp. 115-124.
[16]
Assailed Decision, pp. 8-9; rollo, pp. 57-58.
[17]
362 SCRA 389,
[18] Assailed Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 58.
[19]
The Petition was deemed submitted
for decision on
[20] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 225-226. Original in uppercase.
[21]
Petition dated
[22]
319 Phil. 45,
[23] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 19-21; rollo, pp. 237-239.
[24] Supra note 22.
[25] Supra at 58-59.
[26]
233 SCRA 439,
[27]
Diamante III v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 147911,
[28]
Supra at 59-60,
per Regalado, J.
[29]
Zacarias v. National Police Commission, et al, 414 Phil. 387, October 24,
2003; Navarro III v. Damasco,
et al., 316 Phil. 322,
[30] Petitioner’s Memorandum, pp. 11-14; rollo, pp. 229-232.
[31]
363 SCRA 535,
[32] Respondent’s Memorandum, rollo, pp. 260-261.
[33]
Rules of Court, Rule
37, Sec. 1 (b).
[34]
See Tumang v. CA,
172 SCRA 328,
[35] Rollo, pp. 115-124.
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
Tumang v. CA, supra note 34.
[40]
Cansino v. CA, 409 SCRA 403,
[41] Rollo, pp. 110-114.
[42]
[43]
Tapiador
v. Office of the Ombudsman, 429 Phil 47,
[44]
Velasquez v. Hernandez, 437
SCRA 357,
[45]
Rules of Court, Rule 132, Sec. 20.
[46]
PLDT Co. Inc. v. Tiamson, GR Nos.
164684-85,