FIRST
DIVISION
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VICENTE S. CENZON, Petitioner, - versus
- HON. SALVADOR ABAD SANTOS as Acting
Presiding Judge, RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, HON.
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR ANDRES MARCOS in his capacity as Public Prosecutor
of the City Prosecutor’s Office of Makati City and MARGARITA C. SIA, Respondents. |
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G.R. No. 164337 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: |
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Before
Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
with prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction, assailing the 26 February 2004 Decision[1]
and the 30 June 2004 Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72570, which affirmed the 15 February
2002[3]
and 17 June 2002[4] Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 143, Makati City, in Criminal Case No.
01-2709-10, allowing the amendment of the informations therein from NO BAIL
RECOMMENDED to BAIL SET AT P60,000.00.
The facts, as culled from the evidence
on record, follow:
Petitioner
Vicente S. Cenzon is a member of the Board of Directors of Honig Sugar Trading
Corp. (Honig). On the other hand, private
respondent Margarita C. Sia is the president of South Pacific Sugar Corp.
(South Pacific).
On 23 February 2000, petitioner Cenzon
filed with the Makati City Prosecution Office, four complaint-affidavits[5]
against private respondent Sia for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Estafa
under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, alleging that the
checks issued by South Pacific, through private respondent Sia, were dishonored
upon due presentment for having been the subject of a “stop payment order”
(SPO), and for having been “drawn against insufficient funds” (DAIF). Despite demands made upon private respondent
Sia and South Pacific to pay the amounts represented by the face value of the
subject checks, the same remained unheeded.
The particulars of the subject checks
are, to wit:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
HRR 0005306682 P15,840,000.00
HRR 0005306773 P42,625,000.00
HRR 0005306775 P 9,180,000.00
HRR 0005306774 P91,776,970.00
On P30,000.00 for each count.
On appeal by petitioner Cenzon to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), Resolution[7]
dated 31 August 2001 was issued, reversing and setting aside the Resolution
dated 31 August 2000, and directing the Makati City Prosecution Office to file
two informations for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d)[8] of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818,[9] against
private respondent Sia. In accordance therewith, Makati City
Prosecutor Edgardo Hirang filed on P15,840,000.00 and P91,776,970.00,
respectively. The City Prosecutor
recommended NO BAIL. The cases were docketed
as Criminal Case Nos. 01-2709 and 2710, and subsequently consolidated as
Criminal Case No. 01-2709-2710.
On P60,000.00
for each count of Estafa. The amendment
was sought on the strength of DOJ Department Circular No. 74, issued on
Private prosecutor’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the
In the assailed Decision of 26
February 2004, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC, ratiocinating that the
offense by which private respondent Sia is charged is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and as such, she is
entitled to bail. The appellate court,
relying on the pronouncements in People
v. Hernando[14] and People v. Panganiban,[15]
ratiocinated in the following manner:
Based on the
foregoing, it is clear that all persons are entitled to bail, as a matter of
right, provided that one is not charged with an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment. In the case at bench, We agree with the private respondent, and
concurred in by no less than the Solicitor General, that the offense by which
she is being charged is not punishable by reclusion
perpetua and so she is entitled to bail.
Thus, the respondent judge is not guilty of grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the amendment of the informations to allow accused-respondent Sia to
post bail.
This was clearly
illustrated in the leading case of People
vs. Hernando and reiterated in People
vs. Panganiban, where it was clarified that reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense as
used in PD No. 818, to wit:
“xxx xxx xxx
“Hence, if the
amount of the fraud exceeds twenty-two thousand pesos, the penalty of reclusion temporal is imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand (P10,000.00)
pesos but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30) years, which shall be
termed reclusion perpetua. As used
herein, RECLUSION PERPETUA IS NOT THE
PRESCRIBED PENALTY FOR THE OFFENSE. It merely describes the penalty actually imposed
on account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two
thousand (P22,000.00) pesos.” (Emphasis Ours.)
Precisely, this is
the reason why DOJ Circular No. 74 came into effect, to guide all prosecutors
in recommending the amount of bail to be fixed. Public Prosecutor Marcos thus
correctly moved for the amendment of the informations, and the respondent judge
judiciously allowed it to conform with the DOJ circular brought about by the
new jurisprudence on the matter. Clearly, the ruling in People vs. Reyes cited
by the petitioner is deemed superseded.
Moreover, as cited
by the petitioner himself, courts are advised that they must not only be aware
but should consider the Bail Bond Guide due to its significance in the
administration of criminal justice. Settled also is the rule that, while not
controlling, official opinions of the justice secretary are persuasive.[16]
In the same vein, petitioner Cenzon’s
Motion for Reconsideration thereon was denied by the appellate court for lack
of merit, in the Resolution dated
Elevating the matter before this
Court via the instant Petition for
Review, petitioner Cenzon submits the following grounds for its allowance, viz:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE THAT “NO DOCTRINE OR PRINCIPLE OF LAW LAID DOWN BY THE COURT IN A DECISION RENDERED EN BANC OR IN DIVISION MAY BE MODIFIED OR REVERSED EXCEPT BY THE COURT SITTING EN BANC.”
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS
DECIDED A QUESTION OF
Petitioner Cenzon endeavors to build
his case by invoking People v. Reyes,[18]
and the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ.
According to petitioner Cenzon, the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ
recommends NO BAIL for Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, if the amount of the fraud is P32,000.00
or over. It is petitioner Cenzon’s
theory that NO BAIL is recommended in such cases, because the penalty
prescribed therein is reclusion perpetua.[19] Petitioner Cenzon posits that the 2000 Bail
Bond Guide of the DOJ was made pursuant to Section 13,[20]
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, when
evidence of guilt is strong, are not bailable.
Further, petitioner Cenzon asseverates
that in Reyes, the Court En Banc declared that Presidential
Decree No. 818, which took effect as early as 1975, provided for the penalty of
reclusion perpetua where bouncing
checks of the requisite amount are involved.[21] Proceeding
therefrom, it is petitioner Cenzon’s contention that, in the assailed Decision
of 26 February 2004, the Court of Appeals erroneously relied on DOJ Department
Circular No. 74,[22] which
disregards the rule that Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, where the amount of the
fraud is P32,000.00 or above is non-bailable.
Finally, petitioner Cenzon maintains
that the ruling in Reyes which was
rendered En Banc cannot be declared
superseded by the subsequent cases of Hernando
and Panganiban, as the latter
cases were rendered by divisions of this Court.
Citing Section 4(3),[23]
Article VIII of the Constitution, petitioner Cenzon argues that Hernando and Panganiban cannot overturn Reyes
because no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the Court in a decision
rendered En Banc or in division may
be modified or reversed except by the Court sitting En Banc.
The issue presented for our consideration
is, whether private respondent Sia, who is charged with Estafa under Article
315, par. 2(d)[24] of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 818, for having
issued bouncing checks in the amounts of P91,776,970.00 and P15,840,000.00,
may be granted bail, as a matter of right, in accordance with DOJ Department
Circular No. 74, dated 6 November 2001.
At the outset, attention must be
called to Section 4, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
provides:
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. – All persons in custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
Thus, it must be asked, is private
respondent Sia charged with an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua?
The issue that confronts us is not
novel. Perforce, in Panganiban, we settled that the term, reclusion perpetua, as utilized in Presidential Decree No. 818,
merely describes the penalty imposed
on account of the amount of the fraud involved.
The unequivocal import in Presidential Decree No. 818[25]
is that, if the amount of the fraud exceeds twenty-two thousand pesos (P22,000.00),
the penalty of reclusion temporal is
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional ten thousand
(P10,000.00) pesos, but the total penalty shall not exceed thirty (30)
years, which shall be termed reclusion
perpetua. Taking our legal bearings
from the Panganiban case, we stress that
the use of the term reclusion perpetua in
Presidential Decree No. 818 is merely to describe
the penalty imposed, but not the prescribed
penalty thereof.
To reiterate, we quote hereunder, our pronouncement in
Panganiban:
Finally,
some clarifications on the imposable penalty.
The trial court convicted accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua, following the amendment to Article 315, par.
2(d) of the Revised Penal Code by Presidential Decree No. 818, which increased
the penalty for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks.
Presidential
Decree No. 818 provides:
SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by
means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
x x x x
As
used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion
perpetua is not the prescribed penalty for the offense, but merely
describes the penalty actually imposed on account of the amount of the fraud involved,
which exceeds P22,000.00.[26]
(Underscoring supplied.)
The Court, in Hernando was just as succinct in pronouncing that the term reclusion perpetua as used in
Presidential Decree No. 818, merely describes the penalty actually imposed on
account of the amount of the fraud involved, which exceeds twenty two thousand
(P22,000.00) pesos.[27] As used in Presidential Decree No. 818, reclusion perpetua is not the prescribed
penalty for the offense.[28]
Moreover, the Court, thru an En Banc Resolution, dated P365,750.00 and P429,000.00. We allowed aforesaid petitioners to post bail
in accordance with the provisions of DOJ Circular No. 74, dated
In Lim, we said that the intendment and provision of DOJ Circular No. 74
was to benefit the accused. Indeed, it
is a principle of statutory construction that penal laws are liberally
construed in favor of the accused and strictly against the State.[31] In like manner, we must also apply DOJ
Circular No. 74 to herein private respondent Sia.
We find inapplicable the case of Reyes.
In Reyes, the question was
whether therein accused who was convicted, inter alia, of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code and sentenced therefore to serve twenty-two
years of reclusion perpetua, with its
accessory penalties and liability for indemnification, may be allowed to remain
on bail during the pendency of her appeal from said conviction.[32] Comparatively, what is before us is an
accused charged with Estafa under paragraph 2(d), Article 316 of the
Revised Penal Code. Clearly, Reyes is not on all fours with the case
at bar. Instead, it is the later case of
Lim which finds application.
Our Resolution in Lim, dated
We said in Poblete, thus:
It was definitively
resolved when the Court adopted Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 74
ordaining that bail be allowed for the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, par.
2(d), as amended by P.D. 818, thru an En Banc Resolution dated February 26,
2002 in the case of Jovencio Lim and
Teresita Lim v. People of the
"(3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00
or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua,
bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2(a) of the
2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00 plus an additional of P2,000.00
for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however,
that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00."[34]
We are similarly not impressed with
petitioner Cenzon’s reliance on the 2000 Bail Bond Guide of the DOJ. Evidently, Department Circular No. 74 of the
DOJ amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, the salient provisions thereof, reads
thus:
WHEREAS, under the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, no bail is recommended for estafa under Art. 315 2(d), RPC, as amended by PD 818, as well as for Qualified Theft when the amount of fraud or the value of the property involved is P32,000.00 or over;
WHEREAS, such policy has already been overtaken and rendered untenable by the new jurisprudence, particularly the ruling in People vs. Hernando, 317 SCRA 621 (1999);
WHEREFORE, in estafa under Art. 315 2(d), as amended by PD 818, and Qualified Theft, the bail to be recommended shall be governed by the following rules:
A. FOR
ESTAFA (ART. 315, 2(d), RPC, as amended by PD 818:
1) Where the amount of fraud involved does not exceed P22,000.00, bail shall be computed based on the applicable provisions of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide.
2)
Where the amount of fraud involved is more than P22,000.00
but less than P32,000.00, bail shall be based on the maximum period of
the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal multiplied by P2,000.00.
3)
Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or
over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par.
2(a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an
additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00;
Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. (Underscoring supplied.)
From the foregoing, if the amount of
fraud is P122,000.00 or over, as in the case at bar, the amount of bail
is P60,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 26
February 2004 and Resolution dated 30 June 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 72570, which affirmed the Orders dated 15 February 2002 and 17 June 2002
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143, Makati City, allowing the amendment of
the informations in Crim. Case No. 01-2709-10, from NO BAIL RECOMMENDED to BAIL
SET AT P60,000.00 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate
Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Penned by Associate Justice
Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid,
concurring; Rollo, pp. 48-53.
[2]
[3] Penned by Acting Presiding Judge
Salvador S. Abad Santos;
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Records, Vol. I, pp. 8-10.
[8] Article 315, par. 2(d) reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa) – x x x
x
x x x
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit
the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been
dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
[9] Entitled, “Amending Article 315 of
the Revised Penal Code by Increasing the Penalties for Estafa
Committed by Means of Bouncing Checks.”
[10] The first information averred, thus:
“That on or about the 27th day of November, 1998, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then the authorized signatory of
South Pacific Sugar Corporation, with intent to defraud, by means of deceit and
false representation committed prior to or simultaneously with the fraudulent
act, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously make out and
issue United Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HRR 0005306682 postdated January
31, 1999 in the amount of P15,840,000.00 in exchange for 11,000
fifty[-]kilogram bags of sugar respondent received from the complainant, Honig
Sugar Corporation represented by Vicente S. Cenzon knowing that at the time of
its issue she has insufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the full amount of the check such that when said check was presented for
payment to the drawee bank, the same was dishonored for the reason “PAYMENT
STOPPED DAUD” and the accused, despite notice to make good the said check or pay
the amount thereof within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor of
such check failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant Honig Sugar Corporation in the aforementioned amount of P15,840,000.00. (Records, Vol. I, p. 4.)
The second information reads:
“That on or about the 16th day of November, 1998, in the City
of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the authorized signatory
of South Pacific Sugar Corporation with intent to defraud, by means of deceit
and false representation committed prior to or simultaneously with the
fraudulent act, did then and there wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously
make out and issue United Coconut Planters Bank Check No. HRR 0005306774
postdated May 24, 1999 in the amount of P91,776,970.00 in exchange for 91,776
fifty[-]kilogram bags of sugar respondent received from the complainant, Honig
Sugar Corporation represented by Vicente S. Cenzon knowing that at the time of
its issue she has insufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank to cover
the full amount of the check such that when said check was presented for
payment to the drawee bank, the same was dishonored for the reason “PAYMENT STOPPED-DAIF”
and the accused, despite notice to make good the said check or pay the amount
thereof within three (3) days from receipt of notice of dishonor of such check
failed and refused to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the said
complainant Honig Sugar Corporation in the aforementioned amount of P91,776,970.00. (
[11] Records, Vol. II, p. 389.
[12]
[13]
[14] 375 Phil. 1078 (1999).
[15] 390 Phil. 673 (2000).
[16] Rollo,
pp. 737-738.
[17]
[18] G.R. Nos. 101127-31,
[19] Rollo,
pp. 24-25.
[20] Section 13, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail
shall not be required.
[21] Rollo,
pp. 25-26.
[22] See
CA rollo, pp. 480-496.
[23] Section 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved
with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in no case,
without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is not obtained, the
case shall be decided en banc:
Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in
division may be modified or reversed except by the court sitting en banc.
[24] Article 315, paragraph 2(d) reads:
ART.
315. Swindling (estafa) –
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation
when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to
deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from
receipt of notice from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has
been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act.
[25] Sec. 1 of Presidential Decree No. 818 reads:
Section 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of
false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be
punished by:
1st. The
penalty of reclusion temporal if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and
if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed
thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties
which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua;
2nd. The penalty of prision
mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;
3rd. The penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not
exceed 6,000 pesos; and,
4th. By prision
mayor in its maximum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos.
[26] People v. Panganiban, supra note 15 at 689-690.
[27] People v. Hernando, supra note 14 at 1093.
[28]
[29] G.R. No. 149276,
[30] See
also Poblete v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128859,
[31] See
People v. Garcia, 85 Phil. 651, 656 (1950), citing STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION,
Crawford, pp. 460-462.
[32] People v. Reyes, supra note 18 at 404.
[33] Supra note 30.
[34]