THIRD DIVISION
|
GREATER
METROPOLITAN Petitioners, -versus- JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORPORATION and JANCOM
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY. LIMITED OF Respondents.
|
G.R.
No. 163663 Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D
E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The present petition for
review on certiorari challenges the Decision[1]
dated
In 1994, Presidential
Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued by then President Fidel V. Ramos creating
an Executive Committee to oversee and develop waste-to-energy projects for the
waste disposal sites in
Respondent Jancom International Development Projects Pty. Limited of
On
On December 19, 1997, a
Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid Waste Management Project for
the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal Site[4]
(the contract) was entered into by the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Presidential Task Force on Solid Waste Management through then
Department of Environment and Natural Resources Secretary Victor Ramos, then
Cabinet Office for Regional Development-National Capital Region Chairman
Dionisio dela Serna, and then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
on one hand, and JANCOM represented by its Chief Executive Officer Jorge Mora
Aisa and its Chairman Jay Alparslan, on the other.
On
Owing to the clamor of
the residents of Rizal, the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the
The Board of Directors of
Jancom International thereafter adopted on January 4, 2000 a Resolution[6]
authorizing Atty. Manuel Molina to act as legal counsel for respondents and
“determine and file such legal action as deemed necessary before the Philippine
courts in any manner he may deem appropriate” against petitioners.
The Board of Directors of
JANCOM also adopted a Resolution[7] on
On March 14, 2000, respondents
filed a petition for certiorari[8]
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City where it was docketed as
Special Civil Action No. 1955, to declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts
of the MMDA calling for bids for and authorizing the forging of a new
contract for the Metro Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and
void and to enjoin petitioners from implementing the Resolution and making
another award in lieu thereof.
By Decision[9] of
Petitioners thereupon
assailed the RTC Decision via petition for certiorari[11]
with prayer for a temporary restraining order with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 59021.
By Decision[12]
of
By Decision[13]
of
JANCOM and the MMDA later
purportedly entered into negotiations to modify certain provisions of the
contract which were embodied in a draft Amended Agreement[15]
dated June 2002. The draft Amended
Agreement bore no signature of the parties.
Respondents, through
Atty. Molina, subsequently filed before Branch 68 of the Pasig City RTC an
Omnibus Motion[16] dated
July 29, 2002 praying that: (1) an alias writ of execution be issued
prohibiting and enjoining petitioners and their representatives from calling
for, accepting, evaluating, approving, awarding, negotiating or implementing
all bids, awards and contracts involving other Metro Manila waste management
projects intended to be pursued or which are already being pursued; (2) the MMDA, through its Chairman Bayani F.
Fernando, be directed to immediately forward and recommend the approval of the
Amended Agreement to President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo; (3) Chairman Fernando be ordered to
personally appear before the court and explain his acts and public pronouncements
which are in direct violation and gross defiance of the final and executory May
29, 2000 RTC Decision; (4) the Executive
Secretary and the Cabinet Secretaries of the departments-members of the
National Solid Waste Management Commission be directed “to submit the contract
within 30 days from notice to the President for signature and approval and if
the latter chooses not to sign or approve the contract, the Executive Secretary
be made to show cause therefor;” and (5) petitioners be directed to comply with
and submit their written compliance with their obligations specifically
directed under the provisions of Article 18, paragraphs 18.1, 18.1.1 (a), (b),
(c) and (d) of the contract within 30 days from notice.[17]
To the Omnibus Motion
petitioners filed their Opposition[18]
which merited JANCOM’s Reply[19]
filed on
On August 21, 2002, Atty.
Simeon M. Magdamit, on behalf of Jancom International, filed before the RTC an
Entry of Special Appearance and Manifestation with Motion to Reject the Pending
Omnibus Motion[20] alleging that: (1) the Omnibus Motion was never approved by
Jancom International; (2) the Omnibus
Motion was initiated by lawyers whose services had already been terminated,
hence, were unauthorized to represent it; and
(3) the agreed judicial venue for dispute resolution relative to the
implementation of the contract is the International Court of Arbitration in the
United Kingdom pursuant to Article 16.1[21]
of said contract.
In the meantime, on
November 3, 2002, the MMDA forwarded the contract to the Office of the
President for appropriate action,[22]
together with MMDA Resolution No. 02-18[23]
dated June 26, 2002, “Recommending to her Excellency the President of the
Republic of the Philippines to Disapprove the Contract Entered Into by the
Executive Committee of the Presidential Task Force on Waste Management with
Jancom Environmental Corporation and for Other Purposes.”
By Order[24]
of
Petitioners and
respondents then filed their Memoranda[27]
on
By Order[28]
of
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let an Alias Writ
of Execution immediately issue and the Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff or any o[f] her Deputies is directed
to implement the same within sixty (60) days from receipt thereof.
Thus, any and all such bids or
contracts entered into by respondent MMDA with third parties covering the waste
disposal and management within the Metro Manila after
Respondent MMDA is hereby
directed to SUBMIT the Amended Agreement concluded by petitioners with
the previous MMDA officials, or in its discretion if it finds [it] more
advantageous to the government, to require petitioners to make adjustments in
the Contract in accordance with existing environmental laws and other relevant
concerns, and thereafter forward the Amended Agreement for signature and
approval by the President of the Philippines.
The concerned respondents are hereby further directed to comply fully
and in good faith with its institutional obligations or undertakings as
provided in Article 18 of the BOT Contract.
Let a copy of this Order be
furnished the Office of the Clerk of Court and the Commission on Audit for its
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[29] (Emphasis in the
original)
On
WHEREAS, on
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of
petitioners JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORP and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
PROJECTS PTY., LIMITED OF AUSTRALIAS [sic],
and against respondents GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
COMM., and HON. ROBERTO N. AVENTAJADO, in his capacity as Chairman of the said
Committee, METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, in his
capacity as Chairman of said Authority, declaring the Resolution of respondent Greater
Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding petitioners’
BOT Award Contract and calling for bids for and authorizing a new contract for
the Metro Manila waste management ILLEGAL
an[d] VOID.
Moreover, respondents and their agents are hereby PROHIBITED and ENJOINED from implementing the aforesaid Resolution and
disregarding petitioners’ BOT Award Contract and from making another award in
its place.
Let it be emphasized that this Court is not preventing
or stopping the government from implementing infrastructure projects as it is
aware of the proscription under PD 1818.
On the contrary, the Court is paving the way for the necessary and modern
solution to the perennial garbage problem that has been the major headache of
the government and in the process would serve to attract more investors in the
country.
SO ORDERED.
WHEREAS, on
WHEREAS, as a consequence thereof, a Writ of Execution was issued on
WHEREAS, ON
WHEREFORE, in
view of the foregoing, let an Alias Writ of Execution immediately issue and the
Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff or any of her
Deputies is directed to implement the same within sixty (60) days from receipt
thereof.
Thus, any and all such bids or contracts entered into
by respondent MMDA [with] third parties covering the waste disposal and
management within the Metro Manila after
Respondent MMDA is hereby directed to SUBMIT
the Amended Agreement concluded by petitioners with the previous MMDA
officials, or in its discretion if it finds [it] more advantageous to the
government, to require petitioners to make adjustments in the Contract in
accordance with existing environmental laws and other relevant concerns, and
thereafter forward the Amended Agreement for signature and approval by
the President of the Philippines. The
concerned respondents are hereby further directed to comply fully and in good
faith with its institutional obligations or undertakings as provided in Article
18 of the BOT Contract.
Let a copy of this Order be furnished the Office of
the Clerk of Court and the Commission on Audit for its information and
guidance.
SO ORDERED.
x x
x x (Emphasis in the original)
By letter[31]
of August 15, 2003, Chairman Fernando advised Sheriff Alejandro Q. Loquinario of the Office of the Clerk of Court and Ex-Oficio Sheriff, Pasig City RTC
that:
1. MMDA has not entered into a new contract for
solid waste management in lieu of JANCOM’s Contract.
2. JANCOM’s Contract has been referred to the Office of
the President for appropriate action.
3. Without the President’s approval, JANCOM’s Contract cannot be implemented.[32]
Petitioners later challenged the RTC
To the Amended Petition JANCOM filed on
By the
challenged Decision of
The Supreme Court ruled that
the Jancom contract has the force of law and the parties must abide in good
faith by their respective contractual commitments. It is precisely this pronouncement that the
alias writ of execution issued by respondent judge seeks to enforce. x x x
x x x x
The fact that the Jancom
contract has been declared unimplementable without the President’s signature,
would not excuse petitioners’ failure to comply with their undertakings under
Article 18 of the contract. x x x
x x x x
Petitioners complain that
respondent judge focused only on requiring them to perform their supposed
obligations under Article 18 of the contract when private respondents are also
required thereunder to post a Performance Security
acceptable to the Republic in the amount allowed in the BOT Law. Petitioners’ complaint is not justified. x x x
x x x x
It cannot x x
x be said that respondent judge had been unfair or
one-sided in directing only petitioners to fulfill their own obligations under
Article 18 of the Jancom contract.
Compliance with private respondents’ obligations under the contract had
not yet become due.
x x x x
There is no debate that the
trial court’s Decision has attained finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory,
the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right and the granting
of execution becomes a mandatory or ministerial duty of the court. After a judgment has become final and
executory, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to
file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also the winning party has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.
It is true that the ministerial
duty of the court to order the execution of a final and executory judgment
admits of exceptions as (a) where it becomes imperative in the higher interest
of justice to direct the suspension of its execution; or (b) whenever it is
necessary to accomplish the aims of justice; or (c) when certain facts and
circumstances transpired after the judgment became final which could render the
execution of the judgment unjust.
Petitioners have not shown that any of these exceptions exists to
prevent the mandatory execution of the trial court’s Decision.[37]
(Italics in the original)
Petitioners’
Motion for Reconsideration[38]
having been denied by the CA by Resolution of
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE
I
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT IS INEFFECTIVE AND
UNIMPLEMENTABLE UNTIL AND UNLESS IT IS APPROVED BY THE PRESIDENT.
II
THE SUBJECT CONTRACT ONLY COVERS THE
DISPOSITION OF 3,000 TONS OF SOLID WASTE A DAY.
III
THE ALLEGED AMENDED AGREEMENT IS ONLY A
DRAFT OR PROPOSAL SUBMITTED BY RESPONDENTS.
IV
RESPONDENTS MUST ALSO BE MADE TO COMPLY WITH
THEIR CONTRACTUAL COMMITMENTS.[40] (Underscoring supplied)
JANCOM filed on
On
On
Petitioners argue that
since the contract remains unsigned by the President, it cannot yet be
executed. Ergo, they conclude, the proceedings which resulted in the issuance
of an alias writ of execution “ran afoul of the [
Petitioners go on to
argue that since the contract covers only 3,000 tons of garbage per day while
Metro Manila generates at least 6,000 tons of solid waste a day, MMDA may
properly bid out the other 3,000 tons of solid waste to other interested groups
or entities.
Petitioners moreover
argue that the alleged Amended Agreement concluded supposedly between JANCOM
and former MMDA Chairman Benjamin Abalos is a mere scrap of paper, a mere draft
or proposal submitted by JANCOM to the MMDA, no agreement on which was reached
by the parties; and at all events,
express authority ought to have first been accorded the MMDA to conclude such
an amended agreement with JANCOM, the original contract having been concluded
between the Republic of the
Finally, petitioners
argue that respondents should also be required to perform their commitments
pursuant to Article 18[46]
of the contract.
The petition is impressed
with merit in light of the following considerations.
Section 1, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Execution upon
judgments or final orders. – Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on
motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon
the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly
perfected.
If the appeal has been duly perfected and
finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be applied for in the court of
origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true
copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.
The appellate court may, on
motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires, direct the
court of origin to issue the writ of execution.
Once a judgment becomes
final, it is basic that the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right
to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial court’s ministerial
duty, compellable by mandamus.[47]
There are instances,
however, when an error may be committed in the course of execution proceedings
prejudicial to the rights of a party.
These instances call for correction by a superior court, as where:
1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
2) there has been a change in the situation of
the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
3) execution is sought to be enforced against
property exempt from execution;
4) it appears that the controversy has never
been submitted to the judgment of the court;
5) the terms of the judgment are not clear
enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
6) it appears that the writ of execution has
been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance,
or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid
or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.[48] (Emphasis
and Underscoring supplied)
That
a writ of execution must conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially
to every essential particular thereof,[49]
it is settled. It may not thus vary the
terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce,[50] nor go beyond its terms. Where the execution is not in harmony with
the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has no validity.[51]
This
Court’s
We, therefore, hold that the Court of Appeals
did not err when it declared the existence of a valid and perfected contract
between the Republic of the
This Court’s
x x x The only question before the Court is whether or not
there is a valid and perfected contract between the parties. As to the necessity, expediency, and wisdom
of the contract, these are outside the realm of judicial adjudication. These considerations are primarily and
exclusively a matter for the President to decide. While the Court recognizes that the garbage
problem is a matter of grave public concern, it can only declare that the
contract in question is a valid and perfected one between the parties, but the
same is still ineffective or unimplementable
until and unless it is approved by the President, the contract itself providing
that such approval by the President is necessary for its effectivity.[53] (Emphasis
and Underscoring supplied)
Article
19 of the contract provides:
Article 19. Effectivity. – This
Contract shall become effective upon
approval by the President of the Republic of [the]
In issuing the alias writ
of execution, the trial court in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract
despite this Court’s unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected,
the contract shall become effective only upon approval by the President.
Indubitably, the alias writ
of execution varied the tenor of this Court’s judgment, went against essential
portions and exceeded the terms thereof.
x x x a lower court is without supervisory jurisdiction to
interpret or to reverse the judgment of the higher court x x
x. A judge of
a lower court cannot enforce different decrees than those rendered by the
superior court. x x x
The
inferior court is bound by the decree as the law of the case, and must carry it
into execution according to the mandate.
They cannot vary it, or examine it for any other purpose than execution,
or give any other or further relief, or review it upon any matter decided on
appeal for error apparent, or intermeddle with it, further than to settle so
much as has been remanded. x x x[54]
The execution directed by
the trial court being out of harmony with the judgment, legal implications
cannot save it from being found to be fatally defective.[55]
Notably, while the trial
court ratiocinated that it issued on June 23, 2003 the alias writ “to set into
motion the legal mechanism for Presidential approval and signature,”[56]
it failed to take due consideration of the fact that during the pendency of the Omnibus Motion, the contract had earlier
been forwarded for appropriate action on November 3, 2002 by Chairman Fernando
to the Office of the President, with recommendation for its disapproval, which
fact the trial court had been duly informed of through pleadings and open court
manifestations.[57]
Additionally, it bears
noting that the June 11, 2003 Order of the trial court is likewise indisputably
defective in substance for having directed the submission of the draft Amended
Agreement to the President.
The appellate court, in affirming
the June 11, 2003 Order of the trial court, overlooked the fact that the
Amended Agreement was unsigned by the parties and it instead speculated
and rationalized that the submission thereof to the President would at all
events solve the mounting garbage problem in Metro Manila:
We find that the submission of
the Amended Agreement to the President will break the impasse now existing
between the parties which has effectively halted the government’s efforts to
address Metro Manila’s mounting garbage problem. x x x
As long as petitioners refuse
to deal with private respondents, the Metro Manila garbage problem will only
continue to worsen. x x x
That the Amended Agreement
could have well been negotiated, if not concluded between private respondents
and the former MMDA administration, is not far-fetched. Petitioners do not dispute that the President
had referred the Jancom contract to then MMDA Chairman Benjamin Abalos for
recommendation. Petitioners also do not
dispute that private respondents negotiated with the MMDA for the amendment of
the contract.
Besides, the Amended Agreement
does not veer away from the original Jancom contract. x x
x[58]
The Amended Agreement was,
as petitioners correctly allege, merely a draft document containing the
proposals of JANCOM, subject to the approval of the MMDA. As earlier stated, it was not signed by the parties.[59]
The original contract
itself provides in Article 17.6 that it “may not be amended except by a written
[c]ontract signed by the parties.”[60]
It is elementary that,
being consensual, a contract is perfected by mere consent.[61] The essence of consent is the conformity of
the parties to the terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer
made by the other;[62]
it is the concurrence of the minds of the parties on the object and the cause
which shall constitute the contract.[63] Where there is merely an offer by one party
without acceptance by the other, there is no consent and the contract does not
come into existence.[64]
As distinguished from the
original contract in which this Court held in G.R. No. 147465:
x x x the signing and execution of the contract by the parties
clearly show that, as between the parties, there was concurrence of offer and
acceptance with respect to the material details of the contract, thereby giving
rise to the perfection of the contract.
The execution and signing of the contract is not disputed by the parties
x x x,[65]
the parties did not, with respect to
the Amended Agreement, get past the negotiation stage. No meeting of minds was established. While there was an initial offer made, there
was no acceptance.
Even
JANCOM President Alfonso G. Tuzon conceded, by letter[66]
of
Apropos to all these, we are seeking an
urgent EXECUTIVE SESSION on your best time and venue. We can thresh up major points to establish a
common perspective based on data and merit.
We are optimistic you shall then consider
with confidence the proposed Amended Contract which incorporates the
adjustments we committed to as stated and earlier submitted to your Office during
the incumbency of your predecessor, for evaluation and appropriate action by
NEDA in compliance with the BOT Law and Article 18.1.1 of our contract.[67]
While respondents aver
that an acceptance was made, they have not proffered any proof. While indeed the MMDA, by a letter[68]
issued by then MMDA General Manager Jaime Paz, requested then Secretary of
Justice Hernando B. Perez for his legal opinion on the draft Amended Agreement,
nowhere in the letter is there any statement indicating that the MMDA, or the
Republic of the
The pertinent portions of
the letter read:
Attention: HON. HERNANDO B. PEREZ
Secretary
Subject: Request for Opinion
Regarding the Compromise Offer of
Jancom Environmental Corporation for the Municipal Solid Waste
Management of Metro
Dear Secretary Perez:
This is to respectfully request
for an opinion from your Honorable Office regarding the Compromise Proposal offered
by JANCOM Environmental Corporation (“JANCOM”) in relation to its Contract for
the BOT Implementation of the Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal
Waste Disposal Site dated 19 December 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the BOT
Contract for brevity) with the Republic of the Philippines.
x x x x
x x x this representation is requesting your Honorable Office
to render a legal opinion on the following:
Does the offer of JANCOM to
temporarily set aside the waste-to-energy plant and implement only the other
two major components of the BOT Contract amount to a novation
of the BOT Contract, and therefore necessitating a re-bidding? If the same does not amount to a novation, by what authority may Jancom set aside
temporarily a major component of the BOT Contract?
x x x x[69]
Only an absolute or
unqualified acceptance of a definite offer manifests the consent necessary to
perfect a contract.[70] If at all, the MMDA letter only shows that
the parties had not gone beyond the preparation stage, which is the period from
the start of the negotiations until the moment just before the agreement of the
parties.[71] Obviously, other material considerations
still remained before the Amended Agreement could be perfected. At any time prior to the perfection of a contract,
unaccepted offers and proposals remain as such and cannot be considered as
binding commitments.[72]
Respecting petitioners’
argument that respondents should be directed to comply with their commitments
under Article 18 of the contract, this Court is not convinced.
Article 18.2.1 of the
contract provides:
18.2.1 The BOT COMPANY hereby undertakes to
provide the following within 2 months from execution of this Contract as an
effective document:
a) sufficient proof of the actual equity
contributions from the proposed shareholders of the BOT COMPANY in a total
amount not less than PHP 500,000,000 in accordance with the BOT Law and the
implementing rules and regulations;
b) sufficient proof of financial commitment from
a lending institution sufficient to cover total project cost in accordance with
the BOT Law and the implementing rules and regulations;
c) to support its obligation under this
Contract, the BOT COMPANY shall submit a security bond to the CLIENT in
accordance with the form and amount required under the BOT Law. (Underscoring
supplied)
As
this Court held in G.R. No. 147465:
As clearly stated in Article
18, JANCOM undertook to comply with the stated conditions within 2 months from
execution of the Contract as an effective document. Since the President of the
A final point. The argument raised against the authority of
Atty. Molina to file respondents’ Omnibus Motion before the RTC does not lie.
Representation continues
until the court dispenses with the services of counsel in accordance with Section
26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[74] No substitution of counsel of record is
allowed unless the following essential requisites concur: (1) there must be a written request for
substitution; (2) it must be filed with
the written consent of the client; (3)
it must be with the written consent of the attorney to be substituted; and (4) in case the consent of the attorney to be
substituted cannot be obtained, there must be at least a proof of notice that
the motion for substitution was served on him in the manner prescribed by the
Rules of Court.[75]
In the case at bar, there
is no showing that there was a valid substitution of counsel at the time Atty.
Molina filed the Omnibus Motion on
While clients undoubtedly
have the right to terminate their relations with their counsel and effect a
substitution or change at any stage of the proceedings, the exercise of such
right is subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements. Otherwise, no substitution can be effective
and the counsel who last appeared in the case before the substitution became
effective shall still be responsible for the conduct of the case.[76] The rule is intended to ensure the orderly
disposition of cases.[77]
In the absence then of
compliance with the essential requirements for valid substitution of the
counsel of record, Atty. Molina enjoys the presumption of authority granted to
him by respondents.
In light of the foregoing
disquisition, a discussion of the other matters raised by petitioners has been
rendered unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decision dated
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief
Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 6-20 (First half of rollo is paged 1-391 the next half is paged 292-345).
[2]
[3] Penned by Justice Noel G. Tijam and concurred in by Justices Ruben T. Reyes (now Presiding Justice) and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[4] Rollo, pp. 330-367.
[5] Records, Vol. 1, p. 70.
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 73-76.
[10] The dispositive portion of the decision reads, quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of petitioners JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL CORP., and JANCOM INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS PTY., LIMITED OF AUSTRALIA, and against respondents GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT COMM., and HON. ROBERTO N. AVENTAJADO, in his Capacity as Chairman of the said Committee, METRO MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY and HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY, in his capacity as Chairman of said Authority, declaring the Resolution of respondent Greater Metropolitan Manila Solid Waste Management Committee disregarding petitioners’ BOT Award Contract and calling for bids for and authorizing a new contract for the Metro Manila waste management ILLEGAL and VOID.
Moreover, respondents and their agents are hereby PROHIBITED and ENJOINED from implementing the aforesaid Resolution and disregarding petitioners’ BOT Award Contract and from making another award in its place.
Let it be emphasized that this Court is not preventing or stopping the government from Implementing Infrastructure projects as it is aware of the proscription under PD 1818. On the contrary, the Court is paving the way for the necessary and modern solution to the perennial garbage problem that has been the major headache of the government and in the process would serve to attract more investors in the country.
SO ORDERED.
[11] Records, Vol. I, pp. 279-311.
[12] Rollo, pp. 77-96.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Records, Vol. II, pp. 590-596.
[19]
[20]
[21] 16.1 Dispute Resolution
The parties agree to settle amicably any dispute or controversy arising in connection with this Contract. In the event such dispute or disagreement cannot be resolved, the matter shall be submitted to arbitration.
Consequently, no Party shall be entitled to commence or maintain any action in court of law upon any matter in dispute until such matter shall have been submitted and determined by arbitration as provided below and then only for the enforcement of such arbitration and thereafter until the arbitrators publish their award, the Parties shall continue to perform all their obligations under this Agreement without prejudice to a final adjustment in accordance with such award.
The Parties agree that the arbitration proceedings shall be
in the English language, under the rules of conciliation and arbitration of the
International Chambers of Commerce, at
Upon mutual agreement the Parties may submit their dispute
for Arbitration under the Republic Act No. 876 of
[22] Records, Vol. II, p. 759.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28] Rollo, pp. 199-204.
[29]
[30] Records, Vol. II, pp. 859-861.
[31]
[32] Ibid.
[33] Rollo, pp. 205-220.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39]
[40]
[41]
[42]
[43]
[44]
[45]
[46] 18.1.5. To support its obligation under this Contract, the BOT COMPANY (JANCOM) shall post Performance Security either in the form of cash, manager’s check, bank draft or other security reasonable and acceptable to the CLIENT (the Republic) in the amount allowed in the BOT Law.
[47] Gatchalian
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161645, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 681, 688
(citation omitted), Adlawan v. Tomol, G.R. No. 63225,
[48] Reburiano
v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 294, 302 (1999) (citation omitted), Limpin, Jr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
G.R. No. L-70987,
[49] Separa v. Atty. Maceda, 431 Phil 1, 8 (2002) (citation omitted), Philippine Bank of Communications v. Court of Appeals, 344 Phil 777, 791 (1997), Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103590, January 29, 1993, 218 SCRA 233, 250, Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 227 Phil 289, 292 (1986).
[50] Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Adm. v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-34628,
[51] Equatorial
Realty Dev’t, Inc. v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., 387
Phil 885, 895 (2000) (citations omitted), Nazareno v. Court of Appeals,
383 Phil 229, 231 (2000) (citation omitted), Bobis
v. Provincial Sheriff of Camarines Norte, 206
Phil 26, 33 (1983) (citation omitted), Windor
Steel Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-34332,
[52] Metropolitan
[53] Rollo, p. 318.
[54] Doliente v. Blanco, 87 Phil 670, 674 (1950) (citation omitted).
[55] Bank of the Philippine
[56] Rollo, p. 202.
[57]
[58] Rollo, p. 17.
[59] Vide: Luxuria
Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (361 Phil. 989, 1004 [1999]) where this
Court found: “Although it appears that
there was an agreement for the development of the area, there is no showing
that the same was ever perfected and finalized. Private respondents presented
in evidence only drafts of a proposed management contract with petitioner’s
handwritten marginal notes but the management contract was not put in its final
form. The reason why there was no final
uncorrected draft was because the parties could not agree on the stipulations
of said contract x x x. As a consequence the management drafts
submitted by the private respondents should at best be considered as mere
unaccepted offers;” and Riker v. Ople
(G.R. No. L-50492,
[60] Rollo, p. 358.
[61] Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128120, October 20, 2004, 441 SCRA 1, 18 (citation omitted), Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Asset Builders Corporation, G.R. No. 147410, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 148, 159-160 (citations omitted).
[62] Firme v. Bukal Enterprises and Development Corporation, G.R. No. 146608, October 23, 2003, 414 SCRA 190, 206 (citation omitted), Salonga v. Farrales, 192 Phil. 614, 622-623 (1981).
[63] IV A. Tolentino, commentaries and jurisprudence on the civil code of the
[64] Ibid.
[65] Rollo, pp. 108-109.
[66] CA rollo, pp. 102-103.
[67]
[68]
[69]
[70] Weldon Construction Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35721,
[71] Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 412 Phil. 14, 28 (2001) (citation omitted).
[72] Luxuria Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 59 at 1005.
[73] Metropolitan
[74] Rollo, p. 22.
[75] Pioneer Insurance & Surety Corporation v. De Dios Transportation Co., Inc., 454 Phil. 409, 427 (2003) (citation omitted), Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, 414 Phil. 47, 61 (2001) (citations omitted), Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 341 Phil. 413, 425-6 (1997) (citations omitted), Nacuray v. NLRC, 336 Phil. 749, 754-5 (1997) (citation omitted), Rinconada Telephone Company, Inc. v. Buenviaje, G.R. No. 49241-42, April 27, 1990, 184 SCRA 701, 754-755, Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 197 Phil. 465, 477 (1982).
[76] Nacuray v. National Labor Relations Commission, supra note 75 at 755.
[77] Santana-Cruz v. Court of Appeals, supra note 75 at 62 (citation omitted).