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PHILIPPINE DIAMOND HOTEL AND RESORT,
INC. (MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL), Petitioner, -versus- MANILA DIAMOND HOTEL
EMPLOYEES Respondent. |
G.R. No. 158075 Present: QUISUMBING, Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA VELASCO, JR., JJ. Promulgated: |
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D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Court of Appeals, by the assailed
decision of
On
The DOLE-NCR denied the union’s
petition as it failed to comply with legal requirements, specifically Section
2, Rule V, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code, and
was seen to fragment the employees of petitioner.[5]
On P71,692.50 at the end of his
Kimpo, who was thus directed to
explain why no administrative sanction should be imposed on him for violating
the standard procedure for remitting cash collections, informed that he was not
aware of any such procedure.
Through its president Kimpo, the union later notified petitioner of its intention
to negotiate, by Notice to Bargain,[11]
a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for its members.
Acting on the notice, the Hotel, through
its Human Resource Development Manager Mary Anne Mangalindan, advised the union
that since it was not certified by the DOLE as the exclusive bargaining agent, it
could not be recognized as such.[12]
The union clarified that it sought to
bargain “for its members only,” and declared that “[the Hotel’s] refusal
to bargain [would prompt] the union to engage in concerted
activities to protect and assert its rights under the Labor Code.”[13]
By Notice[14]
to its members dated
Petitioner thereupon issued a Final
Reminder and Warning[15]
to respondent against continuing misinformation campaign and activities which
confused the Hotel employees and disturbed their work performance.
The union went on to file a Notice of
Strike[16]
on September 29, 1997 with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
due to unfair labor practice (ULP) in that the Hotel refused to bargain with it
and the rank-and-file employees were being harassed and prevented from joining it.[17]
Conciliation conferences were
immediately conducted by the NCMB on October 6, 13, and 20, 1997 during which the
union insisted on the adoption of a CBA for its members.[18]
In the meantime, or on or about
More conferences took place between
petitioner and the union before the NCMB.
In the conference held on
The parties agreed to meet again on
In the early morning of
Petitioner thus filed on
Mary Grace, who was directed to
explain her participation in the strike, alleged that she was merely trying “to
pacify the group.”[25]
Petitioner, finding her explanation “arrogant”
and unsatisfactory as her active participation in the strike was confirmed by
an eye witness, terminated her services, by communication sent on
An NLRC representative who conducted
an ocular inspection of the Hotel premises confirmed in his Report that the
strikers obstructed the free ingress to and egress from the Hotel.[28]
By Order of
The service upon the strikers of the
TRO notwithstanding, they refused to dismantle the tent they put up at the
employee’s entrance to the Hotel, prompting the Hotel’s security guards to, on
December 10, 1997, dismantle the same during which the strikers as well as the
guards were hit by rocks coming from the direction of the construction site at the
nearby Land Bank Plaza, resulting to physical injuries to some of them.[30]
Despite the efforts of the NCMB, which
was joined by the Department of Tourism, to conciliate the parties, the same
proved futile.
On
For its part, petitioner filed on
As then DOLE Secretary Cresenciano
Trajano’s attempts to conciliate the parties failed, he, acting on the union’s Petition
for Assumption of Jurisdiction, issued on April 15, 1998 an order certifying
the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, and directing the striking
officers and members to return to work within 24 hours and the Hotel to accept
them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike.[31]
On petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, then DOLE Acting Secretary Jose Español, Jr., by Order of
April 30, 1998, modified the April 15, 1998 Order of Secretary Trajano by directing
the Hotel to just reinstate the strikers to its
payroll, and ordering that all cases between the parties arising out of
the labor disputes which were pending before different Labor Arbiters be consolidated
with the case earlier certified to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.[32] It appears that the said order of the Acting
Secretary directing the reinstatement of the strikers to the Hotel’s payroll
was carried out.
By Resolution of
On appeal by the union, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the NLRC Resolution dismissing the complaints of Mary Grace,
Agustin and Rowena and of the union. It modified
the NLRC Resolution, however, by ordering the reinstatement with back
wages of union members.
Thus it disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is granted only insofar
as the dismissal of the union members is concerned. Consequently, the ruling
of the public respondent NLRC to the effect that the union members lost their
employment status with the Hotel is hereby reversed and set aside. Private respondent Hotel is hereby ordered to immediately
reinstate the members with backwages
from the time they were terminated. The Court finds no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC, and therefore affirms the ruling of the
NLRC as follows:
(1)
that the strike is illegal;
(2)
that the union officers lost their employment status when they
formed the illegal strike; and
(3)
That the dismissal of Ms. Mary Grace U. de Leon, Vicente C. Agustin
and Rowena Junio is valid.
SO ORDERED.[34] (Underscoring supplied)
In so ruling, the appellate court noted
that petitioner failed to establish by convincing and substantial evidence that
the union members who participated in the illegal strike committed
illegal acts, and although petitioner presented photographs of the striking employees,
the strikers who allegedly committed illegal acts were not named or identified.[35]
Hence, the present appeal by
petitioner faulting the appellate court:
I
IN ORDERING THE
REINSTATEMENT AND THE PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESPONDENTS WHOSE EMPLOYMENT STATUS
WERE PREVIOUSLY DECLARED TO HAVE BEEN LOST BY THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION, THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS IN EFFECT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHICH HAS NOT YET BEFORE BEEN DETERMINED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT, [AND]
II
IN [THUS] DEVIAT[ING] FROM
ESTABLISHED DOCTRINES LONG SETTLED BY CONSISTENT JURISPRUDENCE ENUNCIATED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.[36] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that:
IT WAS THE NLRC WHICH
DECLARED THAT THE UNION OFFICERS AND MEMBERS HAVE LOST THEIR EMPLOYMENT
AS A CONSEQUENCE OF THEIR STRIKE WHICH IT ALSO DECLARED AND FOUND TO BE
ILLEGAL.
SUCH BEING THE CASE, IN THE
EVENT THE NLRC’s DECISION IS NOT UPHELD AS FAR AS THE UNION MEMBERS’
LOSING THEIR EMPLOYMENT IS CONCERNED, PETITIONER SHOULD NOT BE HELD LIABLE
TO PAY THEIR BACKWAGES.
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, NEITHER
CAN PETITIONER BE VALIDLY DIRECTED TO REINSTATE THEM.[37] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Respondents,
upon the other hand, pray for the dismissal of the petition, they arguing that:
A.
Respondent [union members] must be reinstated and paid full backwages
because their strike was legal and done in good faith.
B.
Even assuming arguendo, that the strike started as an illegal
strike, the union’s unconditional offer to return to work, coupled with the hotel’s
unfair labor practices during the strike, transformed the strike into a legal
strike.
C.
Even assuming arguendo, that the strike is illegal, the
reinstatement of the strikers and the payment of full backwages is consistent
with the ruling in Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW v. Secretary,
283 SCRA 145 which states that the individual liability of each of the union
officers and members determines whether or not strikers should be reinstated.
D.
Even assuming arguendo, that the strike is illegal, Article 264 of
the Labor Code directs the reinstatement of and payment of full backwages to
the respondents.[38] (Underscoring supplied)
As did the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals, this Court finds the strike illegal.
Article 255 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 255. EXCLUSIVE BARGAINING REPRESENTATION AND WORKERS’ PARTICIPATION
IN POLICY AND DECISION-MAKING
The labor organization designated or selected by the
majority of the employees in an appropriate collective bargaining
unit shall
be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit for the purpose of
collective bargaining. However, an
individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any time to
present grievances to their employer.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
workers shall have the right, subject to such rules and regulations as the
Secretary of Labor and Employment may promulgate, to participate in policy and
decision-making process of the establishment where they are employed insofar as
said processes will directly affect their rights, benefits and welfare. For
this purpose, workers and employers may form labor-management councils: Provided,
That the representatives of the workers in such labor management councils shall
be elected by at least the majority of all employees in said establishment. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As the immediately quoted provision declares,
only the labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the
employees in an appropriate collective bargaining unit is the exclusive representative
of the employees in such unit for the purpose of collective bargaining.
The union (hereafter referred to as respondent)
is admittedly not the exclusive representative of the majority of the employees
of petitioner, hence, it could not demand from petitioner the right to bargain collectively
in their behalf.
Respondent insists, however, that it
could validly bargain in behalf of “its members,” relying on Article 242 of the
Labor Code.[39]
Respondent’s reliance on said article, a
general provision on the rights of legitimate labor organizations, is misplaced,
for not every legitimate labor organization possesses the rights mentioned
therein.[40]
Article 242 (a) must be read in relation
to above-quoted Article 255.
On respondent’s contention that it was
bargaining in behalf only of its members, the appellate court, affirming the
NLRC’s observation that the same would only “fragment the employees” of
petitioner,[41]
held that “what [respondent] will be achieving is to divide the employees, more
particularly, the rank-and-file employees of [petitioner] . . . the other
workers who are not members are at a serious disadvantage, because if
the same shall be allowed, employees who are non-union members will be
economically impaired and will not be able to negotiate their terms and
conditions of work, thus defeating the very essence and reason of collective
bargaining, which is an effective safeguard against the evil schemes of
employers in terms and conditions of work.”[42]
This Court finds the observation
well-taken.
It bears noting that the goal of the DOLE
is geered towards “a single employer wide unit which
is more to the broader and greater benefit of the employees working force.”[43]
The philosophy is to avoid fragmentation
of the bargaining unit so as to strengthen the employees’ bargaining power with
the management. To veer away from such goal
would be contrary, inimical and repugnant to the objectives of a strong and
dynamic unionism.[44]
Petitioner’s refusal to bargain then with
respondent can not be considered a ULP to justify the staging of the strike.
The second ground alleged by respondent
to justify the staging of the strike – that petitioner prevented or intimidated
some workers from joining the union before, during or after the strike – was
correctly discredited by the appellate court in this wise:
. . . a careful study of the allegations of
petitioners in their petition reveals that it contained general allegations
that the Management of the Hotel committed unfair labor practices by refusing
to bargain with the union and by alleged acts of union interference, coercion
and discrimination tantamount to union-busting. Since it is the union who
alleges that unfair labor practices were committed by the Hotel, the burden
of proof is on the union to prove its allegations by substantial evidence.
Moreover, while petitioner
“The Court is not unmindful of this rule, but in the case at bar
the facts and the evidence did not establish events [sic] least a rational basis why the union would [wield] a strike
based on alleged unfair labor practices it did not even bother to substantiate
during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough that the union believed
that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when the
circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie [showing to] warrant [such a] belief.”
It is also evident from the records of the instant
petition, specifically from the Notice of Strike, that their principal
ground for the strike was the “refusal of the Hotel Management to bargain
collectively with the
On top of the foregoing observations, this
Court notes that respondent violated Article 264 which proscribes the staging
of a strike on the ground of ULP during the pendency of cases involving the
same grounds for the strike.
Further, the photographs taken during
the strike, as well as the Ocular Inspection Report of the NLRC representative,
show that the strikers, with the use of ropes and footed placards, blockaded
the driveway to the Hotel’s points of entrance and exit,[46]
making it burdensome for guests and prospective guests to enter the Hotel, thus
violating Article 264 (e) of the Labor Code which provides:
ART. 264 (e) No person engaged in picketing shall commit any act of
violence, coercion or intimidation or obstruct the free ingress to or egress
from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, the photographs indicate
that indeed the strikers held noise barrage[47]
and threatened guests with bodily harm.[48]
Finally, the police reports mention
about the strikers’ exploding of firecrackers, causing the guests to panic and
transfer to other areas of the Hotel.[49]
It is doctrinal that the exercise of
the right of private sector employees to strike is not absolute. Thus Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution,
provides:
SECTION 3. x x x
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane
conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Even if the purpose of a strike is
valid, the strike may still be held illegal where the means employed are
illegal. Thus, the employment of
violence, intimidation, restraint or coercion in carrying out concerted
activities which are injurious to the rights to property renders a strike
illegal. And so is picketing or the obstruction
to the free use of property or the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, when
accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and coercion as to constitute
nuisance.[50]
As
the appellate court correctly held, the union officers should be dismissed for staging and participating in the
illegal strike, following paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code which provides
that “. . .[a]ny union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during strike may be declared to have lost his
employment status . . .”
An
ordinary striking worker cannot, thus
be dismissed for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof
that he committed illegal acts during a strike, unlike a union officer who may
be dismissed by mere knowingly participating in an illegal strike and/or committing
an illegal act during a strike.[51]
The appellate court found no
convincing and substantial proof, however, that the strikers-members of
respondent who participated in the illegal strike committed illegal acts.
In the present case, private respondent Hotel failed to established [sic] by convincing and substantial
evidence that these union members who participated in the illegal strike
committed illegal acts. Consequently, they cannot be terminated from service
for their participation in an illegal strike. Moreover, private respondent
Hotel presented as evidence photographs of the striking employees, the question
that comes to our mind is: why were these strikers who allegedly participated
in illegal acts not identified or named? Instead the arbitral tribunal found it
worthy of credence to summarily dismiss all the union members without them
being named or identified . . . [52]
This Court
finds otherwise. As reflected above, the
photographs show that some of the workers-strikers who joined the strike
indeed committed illegal acts – blocking the free ingress to and egress from
the Hotel, holding noise barrage, threatening guests, and the like. The strikers were, in a list[53]
attached to petitioner’s Position Paper[54]
filed with the NLRC, named.
The list failed to specifically identify
the ones who actually committed illegal acts, however. Such being the case, a remand of the case to
the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, is in order for the purpose only of
determining the respective liabilities of the strikers listed by petitioner.
Those proven to have committed illegal
acts during the course of the strike are deemed to have lost their employment,
unless they have been readmitted by the Hotel, whereas those not clearly shown to
have committed illegal acts should be reinstated.
Whether those ordered reinstated are entitled
to backwages is, however, another matter.
For the general rule is that backwages
shall not be awarded in an economic strike on the principle that “a fair day’s
wage” accrues only for a “fair day’s labor.”[55]
Even in cases of ULP strikes, award of
backwages rests on the court’s discretion and only in exceptional instances.[56]
Thus, J.P. Heilbronn Co. v.
National Labor Union,[57]
instructs:
When in case of strikes, and according to the C[ourt
of] I[ndustrial] R[elations] even if the strike is legal, strikers may not
collect their wages during the days they did not go to work, for the same reasons if not
more, laborers who voluntarily absent themselves from work to attend the
hearing of a case in which they seek to prove and establish their demands
against the company, the legality and propriety of which demands is not yet
known, should lose their pay during the period of such absence from work. The age-old rule governing the relation
between labor and capital or management and employee is that of a “fair day’s
wage for a fair day’s labor.” If
there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay, unless
of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally
locked out, dismissed or suspended. It
is hardly fair or just for an employee or laborer to fight or litigate against
his employer on the employer’s time.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
This Court must thus hearken to its
policy that “when employees voluntarily go on strike, even if in protest against
unfair labor practices,” no backwages during the strike is awarded.
In Cromwell Commercial Employees
and Laborers Union (PTUC) v. Court of Industrial Relations,[58]
this Court made a distinction between
two types of employees involved in a ULP: those who are discriminatorily dismissed for
union activities, and those who voluntarily go on strike even if it is in
protest of an ULP. Discriminatorily
dismissed employees were ordered entitled to backpay
from the date of the act of discrimination, that is, from the day of their
discharge, whereas employees who struck as a voluntary act of protest against
what they considered a ULP of their employer were held generally not entitled
to backpay.[59]
Jurisprudential law, however,
recognizes several exceptions to the “no backwages rule,” to wit: when the employees were illegally locked to
thus compel them to stage a strike;[60]
when the employer is guilty of the grossest form of ULP;[61]
when the employer committed discrimination in the rehiring of strikers refusing
to readmit those against whom there were pending criminal cases while admitting
nonstrikers who were also criminally charged in court;[62] or when the workers who staged a voluntary ULP strike offered to
return to work unconditionally but the employer refused to reinstate them.[63] Not
any of these or analogous instances is, however, present in the instant case.
Respondent
urges this Court to apply the exceptional rule enunciated in Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compañia
Maritima[64] and similar cases where the employees unconditionally
offered to return to work, it arguing that there was such an offer on
its part to return to work but the Hotel screened the returning strikers and
refused to readmit those whom it found to have perpetrated prohibited acts
during the strike.
It must be stressed, however, that for
the exception in Philippine Marine
Officers’ Guild to apply, it
is required that the strike must be legal.[65]
Reinstatement
without backwages of striking members of respondent who did not commit illegal
acts would thus suffice under the circumstances of the case. If reinstatement is no longer possible, given
the lapse of considerable time from the occurrence of the strike, the award of
separation pay of one (1) month salary for each year of service, in lieu of
reinstatement, is in order.[66]
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated November
21, 2002 of the Court of Appeals is, in light of the foregoing ratiocinations, AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that only
those members of the union who did not commit illegal acts during the course of
the illegal strike should be reinstated but without backwages. The case is, therefore, REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter, through the NLRC, which is hereby
directed to, with dispatch, identify said members and to thereafter order
petitioner to reinstate them, without backwages or, in the alternative, if
reinstatement is no longer feasible, that they be given separation pay at the
rate of One (1) Month pay for every year of service.
SO
ORDERED.
CONCHITA
CARPIO MORALES
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A.
QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO
A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 592-610.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7]
[8] Ibid.
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Ibid.
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23] Supra note 22.
[24] Ibid.
[25]
[26]
[27] Supra note 26.
[28] Records,
Vol. 21, p. 307; rollo,
p. 391. In his Ocular Inspection Report
dated
x x x x
In a brief dialogue I had with the strikers, I was informed by their spokesperson, Mr. Danny Estocapio, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the respondent union that they were only preventing cars of guests/clients to enter the passage way, which was about twenty (20) meters leading to the main door of the petitioner. Some guests/clients [sic] walked their way to the Hotel. Some guests/clients, when their cars were prevented to enter the passage way and informed by the strikers that they were on strike, did not pursue their intention of checking-in to the Hotel. x x x (Underscoring supplied)
[29] Supra
note 27.
[30] Ibid.
[31]
[32] Rollo, p. 44. The consolidated cases
are as follows:
1) NLRC NCR 11-07944-97 is a case for unfair
labor practice against the Hotel and its officers. It was filed before the
strike was held, and it is from this case that brought about the instant case;
2) NLRC NCR-12-08668-97 and NLRC NCR 12-08750-97
are complaints for illegal dismissal filed by individual Mary Grace De Leon and
Vicente Agustin, respectively against the Hotel and its officers after they
were dismissed;
3) NLRC NCR 01-00465-98 is also a complaint for
illegal dismissal against the Hotel filed by Rowena Junio;
4) NLRC NCR 01-00955-98 is another unfair labor
practice complaint filed by the
5) NLRC NCR IC NO. 00760-97 is an injunction
case filed by the Hotel against the Union officers and its members;
6) NLRC NCR 01-00930-98 is the hotel’s petition
to declare the
7)
NCMB NCR 09-407-97 is the labor dispute that was the
subject of the
[33] Rollo, p. 400.
[34]
[35]
[36]
[37]
[38]
[39] Article 242. Right of legitimate labor organizations. - A legitimate labor organization shall have the right:
(a) To act as representative of its members for the purpose of collective bargaining.
x x x x
[40] Azucena, Everyone’s Labor Code, 2001 edition, p. 208.
[41] Rollo, p. 396
[42]
[43] Vide: Philtranco Service
Enterprises v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 85343,
[44] Ibid.
[45] Rollo, pp. 601-602.
[46] Vide
photographs annexed to Memorandum of petitioner filed with the NLRC on
[47] See picture nos. 101, 102, 104, 105, 107,
108, 130, 145, 146, 147, 148, 157, 166, 167 and 182. See also Police Report
dated
[48] See picture nos. 1, 6, and 8.
[49] See
Police Reports dated
[50] II Azucena, Supra at 494-495.
[51] Stamford Marketing Corp. v. Julian, G.R. No. 145496, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 633, 648; Bascon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144899, February 5, 2004, 422 SCRA 122, 130; CCBPI Postmix Workers Union v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 114521 and 123491, November 27, 1998, 299 SCRA 410, 426; Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103560, July 6, 1995, 245 SCRA 627, 637-638.
[52] Rollo, p. 607.
[53] Annex “30,” “30-A,” “30-B” (Rollo. p. 174-176) See page 29 of petitioner’s Position Paper filed with the NLRC (Rollo, p. 99).
[54] Rollo, pp. 71-107. See page 29 thereof.
[55] The Philippine Marine Radio Officers’
Association v. Court of Industrial Relations, 102 Phil. 373, 381 (1957); Manila
Trading and Supply Co. v. Manila Trading Labor Association, 92 Phil. 997,
1000 (1953); Philippines Inter-Fashion,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. L-59847,
[56] II Azucena, Supra, at 518.
[57] 92 Phil. 575, 577-578 (1953).
[58] 120 Phil. 918 (1964).
[59] Vide: Cromwell Commercial
Employees and Laborers
[60] Macleod
& Co. of the Phil. v. Progressive
Federation of Labor, 97 Phil. 205, 211 (1955).
[61] Vide: In
[62] Vide: Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd.
Employees Association-Natu v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., No.
L-25291,
[63] Vide:
Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild v. Compania Maritima, Supra at
1123; Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations, Supra at 929; People’s Bank and Trust Company v. People’s
Bank and Trust Co. Employees
[64] G. R. Nos. L-20662 and L-20663,
[65] Ibid,
p. 1122. In the said case, petitioner’s claim that it was an abuse of
discretion to disallow back wages to workers who abandoned their legal strike
but were refused reinstatement in spite of their unconditional offer to return
to work was rejected by this Court which held that this contention has for its
premises: (1) that the strike was legal; (2) that there was an unconditional
offer to return to work, and (3) that the strikers were refused reinstatement.
[66] Vide: Gold City Integrated
Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 103560, July 6, 1995, 245 SCRA 627,
642; Maranaw
Hotels and Resort Corporation v. NLRC, 363 Phil. 163, 168 (1999).