THIRD DIVISION
CERILO
BRICENIO, Petitioner, - versus - |
G.R. No. 157804 Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
Promulgated: June 20, 2006 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition for review on certiorari before us assails
the Decision[1]
dated
In an information dated
That
on or about the 12th day of March 1992, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
and with intent to kill, attack, assault and strike ROY RIVERA with a stool,
thereby inflicting upon the latter Neurogenic shock
secondary to coup contre-coup injuries of the brain with bilateral cerebellar
tonsillar herniations and severe skull fractures due to multiple blunt injuries
on the head and face, which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Petitioner pleaded not guilty.[4] In the ensuing trial, the prosecution
presented seven witnesses: Renato
Concepcion, Danny Singson, SPO1 Wilfredo Cabanayan, Dr. Emmanuel Fernandez,
Felicisima Francisco, Carina Madrigal-Javier, and Leticia Rivera. Taken altogether, the evidence for the
prosecution established the following facts:
At around
Singson,
while waiting for a taxicab noticed the commotion inside the restaurant. He saw
At approximately
Dr. Manuel Fernandez, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy
on the cadaver, found the cause of death of Rivera as “neurogenic shock
secondary to coup, contre-coup injuries of the brain with bilateral cerebellar
tonsillar herniations and severe skull fractures due to multiple blunt injuries
on the head and face.”[5]
Leticia Rivera, mother of the victim, testified that she spent P60,000 for the burial of his son.
For its part, the defense proffered
the testimonies of petitioner and Noe Sapguian to prove that it was not
petitioner who caused the death of Rivera.
Petitioner testified that at about
Noe Sapguian testified that at about
The trial court rendered judgment on
WHEREFORE, the court
finds the accused Cerilo Bricenio y Omorong GUILTY of the crime of homicide;
there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstance, the court sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor minimum as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal medium as maximum; and to pay the heirs of the victim
Roy Rivera the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnification, P60,000.00 for
actual damages and P200,000 moral damages; and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Court of Appeals affirmed Bricenio’s conviction and
sentence, but with modification as to the amount of damages, to wit:
WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the
actual damages is hereby reduced to P16,040.00 and the moral damages to
P100,000.00, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 9792-R is AFFIRMED in all other respects. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Bricenio filed the instant petition
for review, raising a single issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER IS GUILTY OF THE
CRIME CHARGED.[8]
Petitioner submits that this case constitutes an exception to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that
limits the issues that may be raised in an appeal by certiorari to questions of law. Still, petitioner insists that he is innocent;
that his guilt had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that the testimony
of witness Renato Concepcion was not in accord with ordinary human experience,
that it was fabricated and incredible; and that the trial court simply ignored his
testimony that the actual killers were his co-security guards, Armando Tualla
and Bernabe Foronda.
The Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for the State, challenges
the petition on the ground that the petition does not raise questions of law,
neither does it fall under any of the exceptions. According to the Solicitor General, petitioner’s
guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the decisions of the trial court
and of the Court of Appeals were well supported by the evidence on record. The Solicitor General prays that this Court
affirm the Court of Appeals’ decision, except regarding the amount of damages.
Time and again this Court has said
that as a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of fact are not proper subjects for
this Court unless there
is clear and convincing proof that the judgment of the Court of Appeals is
based on a misapprehension of facts; or when the Court of Appeals failed to
notice and appreciate certain relevant facts of substance which if properly
considered would justify a different conclusion; and when there is a grave
abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts in the light of the evidence
on record.[9] In this petition, petitioner has failed to
persuade us to depart from this well-established doctrine.
The prosecution and the defense relied on the testimonies of their respective
witnesses. We have consistently ruled
that on matters involving the credibility of witnesses, the trial court is in
the best position to assess the credibility of witnesses since
it has observed firsthand their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.[10]
Absent any showing of a fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which would appear to have been overlooked
and, if considered, could affect the outcome of the case, the factual findings and
assessment on the credibility of a witness made by the trial court remain
binding on an appellate tribunal.[11]
Petitioner averred that the behavior of Concepcion and Singson cast
serious doubts on their credibility inasmuch as their behavior
are contrary to how men normally would behave. Petitioner relates that when the two men
arrived at the scene, Concepcion and Singson fled instead of asking for help. In addition, they did not immediately narrate
the incident to the police officers nor ask the police officers to visit the
scene of the incident. We have said
repeatedly that given stressful and life threatening situations, the workings
of the human mind are unpredictable and cause different reactions in men.[12]
Thus, there is no standard behavior for a
person confronted with a shocking incident.[13] Consequently, as far as the alleged “unusual”
behavior of Concepcion and Singson is concerned, we find no sufficient reason to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
The prosecution witnesses had full view of the petitioner identified as
the culprit. In addition, there was no
showing of ill motive on their part to testify falsely against petitioner. Where there is no evidence to show any dubious
or improper motive why a prosecution witness should bear false witness against
the accused, or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony of said
witness is worthy of full faith and credit.[14]
More important, here the witnesses
positively identified petitioner as the culprit.[15]
We are likewise not persuaded by petitioner’s contention that the trial
court and the Court of Appeals failed to give credence to his testimony on the
real perpetrators. Since he claimed he
knew the real perpetrators, he should have disclosed this information even
before the trial.
In addition, the records show that the petitioner offered the prosecution witnesses a compromise involving a separate case that he filed against them.[16]
In criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or those allowed
by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.[17]
Petitioner’s claim that an indication of his innocence
was his bringing the victim to the hospital. We reiterate one pronouncement in People v.
Lotoc,[18]
where we held that the accused, in helping bring the victim to the hospital,
does not by itself prove his
innocence, for it could have been motivated by feelings other than a genuine
desire for the victim to recover.
On the matter of damages, we sustain the award of actual damages. However, we agree with the Solicitor General that
the amount of moral damages should be reduced to P50,000
in accordance with existing jurisprudence.[19]
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated P50,000 and not P100,000 as moral damages.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 26-42. Penned by Associate Justice Rebecca De Guia-Salvador, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (now a member of this Court), and Bernardo P. Abesamis concurring.
[2]
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4]
[5] Exhibit “B-15,” records, p. 194.
[6]
[7] Rollo, p. 41.
[8]
[9] Arcilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135270,
[10] Mabunga v.
People, G.R. No. 142039,
[11] People v. Ticalo, 425 Phil. 912, 917 (2002).
[12] See People v. Layaguin, 330 Phil. 756, 764 (1996).
[13] People v. Paraiso, 377 Phil. 445, 460 (1999).
[14] Ureta v. People, 436 Phil. 148, 160 (2002).
[15] See People v. Marquez, 417 Phil. 516,
533 (2001).
[16] TSN,
[17] Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 27, par. (b).
[18] G.R. No. 132166,
[19] People v. Quening, G.R No. 132167, January 8, 2002, 373 SCRA 42, 54 citing People v. Verde, G.R No. 119077, February 10, 1999, 302 SCRA 690, 706.