FIRST DIVISION
|
SPS.
PROCESO AMURAO and MINERVA AMURAO, Petitioners,
- versus - SPS.
JACINTO VILLALOBOS and HERMINIGILDA VILLALOBOS,
Respondents. |
|
G.R. No. 157491 Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR. and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June 20, 2006 |
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Assailed in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure are the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 13 September 2002 that annulled and set aside the Decision
and Order dated 4 January 2002 and 26 February 2002, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5, in Civil Case No. 136-2000, and its
Resolution[2]
dated 4 March 2003 denying petitioners Proceso Amurao and Minerva Amurao’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
The
antecedents are summarized by the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners
are the owners of a parcel of land covered and embraced by Tax Declaration No.
90-000504 located at Arumahan, Lemery,
Batangas, with an area of 38,727 square meters, more
or less. Petitioners bought the said
parcel of land from a certain Ruperto Endozo sometime in 1987.
At the time of the sale, respondents, who were tenants of Ruperto Endozo, were cultivating
the said land. Petitioners, nonetheless,
allowed respondents to continue cultivating the subject land until such time
when the former’s need for it arises.
Sometime in 1994, petitioners and
respondents entered into a contract denominated as “Kasulatan Tungkol sa Lupang
Pagtatayuan ng Bahay” (hereinafter referred to as “KASULATAN”) before the Arumahan barangay officials by
virtue of which respondents promised to surrender the possession of the land to
petitioners should the latter need it for their personal use, while
petitioners, on the other hand, bound themselves to give respondents a portion
of the land covering an area of 1,000 square meters upon surrender thereof.
When petitioners finally demanded
respondents to vacate the land and surrender its possession to them since they
are going to use it personally, respondents refused to vacate the place and to
accept the 1,000 square meters given to them pursuant to their agreement. The parties then brought the matter to the Barangay but no compromise was reached. On
In their Answer with Motion to Hear Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondents claimed that prior to petitioners’ acquisition of the subject land, they were already occupying and working on the same as agricultural tenants since 1953 and have been religiously paying the agricultural lease rentals of the land to the former owners as well as to the petitioners. It is alleged that petitioners only wanted to take possession of the property so that they can avoid their duties and obligations to respondents as agricultural tenants. The controversy between the parties being an agrarian dispute, respondents asserted that it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) and not the court which has jurisdiction over the case.[3]
On
As
directed, the parties filed their respective position papers.[6]
On
IN THE
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff[s] ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them
to vacate the premises in question; to pay plaintiff[s] reasonable compensation
for the use and occupation of the subject premises at P500.00 a month,
plus reasonable attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 and costs of suit.[7]
The MCTC ruled that it has
jurisdiction over the case because respondents spouses Jacinto Villalobos and Herminigilda ceased to be agricultural tenants after they
executed the “Kasulatan Tungkol sa Lupang
Pagtatayuan ng Bahay” (“Kasunduan” or “Kasulatan”) where they expressly waived their status as
tenants after having been given one thousand (1000) square meters of the land
in question. It explained that the Kasulatan is the law between the
parties. And considering that
petitioners have complied with their duty – to give respondents 1000 square
meters – stated under the Kasulatan,
respondents should fulfill their own commitment which is to turn over the
possession of the property in question to petitioners. It added that there being no justifiable
reason advanced by respondents in refusing to surrender possession of the subject
land and there being a verbal demand to vacate the subject premises from the
petitioner, respondents can be ejected therefrom and
should be liable for damages.
Via a Notice
of Appeal,[8]
respondents appealed the Decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5,
docketed as Civil Case No. 136-2000.
On
WHEREFORE,
FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, the judgment appealed from is hereby modified as
follows:
In
consonance with the terms and conditions of the Kasulatan Tungkol
sa Lupang Pagtatayuan ng Bahay, plaintiffs/appellees are
ordered to execute a public instrument embodying therein the conveyance or transfer
of the full and absolute ownership to the defendants/appellants the area of
1,000 square meters of land specifically the portion where their house is
presently erected.
With
the exception to the portion of the land mentioned in the preceding paragraph,
the defendants/appellants and all persons claiming rights under them are also
ordered to surrender full possession and/or vacate the land in question in
favor of the plaintiffs/appellees.
Let the records of this case be remanded to the Court a quo for further proceedings.[9]
The
RTC likewise ruled that it has jurisdiction over the case and that respondents
are bonafide tenants in petitioners’ land.
It explained that the MCTC anchored its decision on the assumption that
respondents were already occupying the 1,000 square meters of land embodied in
the Kasulatan. It found that it was unclear whether the
terms and conditions contained in the Kasulatan
have been observed and complied with by petitioners because there was no
documentary evidence showing that the 1,000 square meters of land have been
transferred to the respondents. It
upheld the MCTC’s finding that the Kasulatan is the law between the parties,
and to be binding, the parties should comply with its terms and
conditions. Thus, for the Kasulatan’s
enforcement, it found it necessary that petitioners execute a document
transferring full and absolute ownership over the 1,000 square meters of land
to the respondents.
The
Motion for Reconsideration[10]
filed by petitioners was denied on
Aggrieved,
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of Petition for Review
under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In
its
It
is evident that both courts relied heavily on the KASULATAN in resolving to
eject respondents from the subject land.
However, We believe that contrary to the appreciation of both courts,
the general law on property and contracts finds no application in the present conflict. The facts of the case reveal that this is not
a mere case of recovery of possession of property but rather involves tenurial arrangements
which give rise to an agrarian dispute over which both courts have no power to
adjudicate. The tenancy relationship
between petitioners and respondents is an established fact in this case. By the execution of the KASULATAN, the
parties had endeavored to fix or arrange the terms or conditions of such
tenurial relations.
x x x x
Indeed, the case filed by petitioners against respondents was a clever way to circumvent our agrarian laws and deprive bona fide tenants such as herein respondents of benefits granted thereunder by way of contractual surrender of their rights as such agricultural tenants. While the case was seemingly for ejectment, it is on closer scrutiny, a subtle attempt to disguise the issues incident to or arising from an agrarian relationship. Evidently, the resolution of the agrarian dispute between the parties is a matter beyond the legal competence of regular courts. Such lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings – even on appeal – and even if not raised, an error in jurisdiction may be taken up. The judgment of the court a quo having been rendered without jurisdiction, the same is null and void.[12]
Thus, it disposed of the case as
follows:
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit.
The questioned Decision and Order dated January 4, 2002 and February 26,
2002, respectively, both rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Lemery, Batangas, Branch 5, in
Civil Case No. 136-2000, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having been
rendered without jurisdiction.
With costs against the petitioners.[13]
On
Petitioners
are now before this Court assigning the following as errors:
1.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT OF
THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ARE NULL [AND] VOID
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITHOUT JURISDICTION.
2.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THE KASUNDUAN IS
NULL AND VOID.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE STILL EXIST (sic) A LANDLORD AND TENANT RELATIONSHIP.[17]
Petitioners argue that the instant
case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the inferior court (MCTC)
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. They contend that the agricultural landlord
and tenant relationship between them and respondents was terminated upon the
execution of the Kasulatan,
the same already being final and executory. Alleging that the Kasulatan is a valid contract
between the parties, they insist that it should be enforced. In other words, what they are implying is that
there is no agrarian dispute over which the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR), through the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),
can take cognizance of.
From the records, it is without
dispute that the land subject of this case was previously owned by Ruperto Endozo which petitioners
bought in 1987. At the time, Endozo sold said land to petitioners, respondents were
tenants of Endozo and were cultivating the land. As tenant or agricultural lessee, respondents
enjoy certain rights under Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise known as the
“Agricultural Land Reform Code.” Section
10 of this law provides that the existence of an agricultural leasehold
relationship is not terminated by changes in ownership in case of sale or
transfer of legal possession.[18] Said section reads:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished By Expiration of Period, etc. – The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the landholding, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.
Accordingly, when petitioners bought
the land from Ruperto Endozo
in 1987, they were subrogated to the rights and obligations of Endozo. The tenancy
relationship was not affected by the transfer of the ownership of the
landholding. The new owner was bound to
respect and maintain the tenant’s landholding because the tenancy right
attached to the land regardless of who its owner may be. The purpose of the law is to strengthen the
security of tenure of the tenants.[19] Thus, the rights enjoyed by respondents as
tenants of Endozo remained when petitioners acquired
the land.
In the instant case, the MCTC found that
there exists a tenancy relationship between the parties which finding was
upheld by both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The indispensable elements of a tenancy
relationship are as follows: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner;
(4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation;
and (6) there is sharing of the harvests.[20] The existence of this relationship was
admitted by petitioners but they insist that same was terminated with the
execution of the Kasulatan.[21]
Despite this admission, petitioners advance
the argument that respondents are no longer tenants when they (petitioners)
bought the land from Endozo because their (respondents)
rights as tenants over the land have already been paid off. We find the argument to be unsubstantiated by
competent evidence. Their bare
allegation, without any documentary evidence will not suffice. The fact that a Kasulatan was subsequently executed
in 1994 is sufficient proof that there exists a landlord and tenant
relationship between the petitioners and the respondents. If there were none, why execute a Kasulatan that
would give respondents 1,000 square meters of the land they were cultivating as
a lot where they could construct their house?
It cannot be denied that a tenancy
relationship existed between the parties from the time petitioners bought the
subject land from Endozo. The question as to whether or not such
relationship continued after the execution of the Kasulatan is another matter that
still needs to be resolved. Petitioners
maintain that the Kasulatan
terminated the tenancy relationship. And
there being no more tenancy relationship, the case, they claim, is within the
jurisdiction of the regular courts because there is no longer any agrarian
dispute involved.
The question to be resolved is: Is
there an agrarian dispute in the instant case?
We rule that there is.
As defined under Section
3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law,” an agrarian dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers’
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor
and lessee. It refers to any controversy
relating to, inter alia,
tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.[22]
The instant case undeniably
involves a controversy involving tenurial arrangements because the Kasulatan will
definitely modify, nay, terminate the same.
Even assuming that the tenancy relationship between the parties had
ceased due to the Kasulutan,
there still exists an agrarian dispute because the action involves an incident
arising from the landlord and tenant relationship.
In Teresita S. David v. Agustin Rivera,[23]
this Court held that:
[I]t is safe to conclude that the existence of prior
agricultural tenancy relationship, if true, will divest the MCTC of its
jurisdiction the previous juridical tie compels the characterization of the
controversy as an “agrarian dispute.” x x x Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the
action still involves an incident arising from the landlord and tenant
relationship. Where the case involves
the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land claimed
to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation of the
tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the Court has already ruled:
Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act
No. 1199, provides that ‘all cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by
the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and disposition of
disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant … shall be under
the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations.’ This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the relationship
of landlord and tenant – at the time of the dispute. The same may have
arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed
immediately, or shortly, before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof
is whether or not said relationship has been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute springs or originates from
the relationship of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable by
the Court of Agrarian Relations . . . .
In
the case at bar, petitioners’ claim that the tenancy relationship has been
terminated by the Kasulatan
is of no moment. As long as the subject
matter of the dispute is the legality of the termination of the relationship,
or if the dispute originates from such relationship, the case is cognizable by
the DAR, through the DARAB. The
severance of the tenurial arrangement will not render the action beyond the
ambit of an agrarian dispute.[24]
There
being an agrarian dispute, the action is properly within the jurisdiction of
the DAR, through the DARAB. This Court
in Hon. Antonio M. Nuesa
v. Court of Appeals[25]
held:
[T]he DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian
reform program. The DARAB has primary,
original and appellate jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate all agrarian
disputes, cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657,
E.O. Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
As regards the second and third assigned errors, we find no need to rule
on the same. To do so would be to pre-empt
the DARAB in the adjudication of a matter within its jurisdiction and
competence.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
|
|
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
|
Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
|
|
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA rollo, pp. 68-75. Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring.
[2]
[3] CA rollo, pp. 69-70.
[4] Records, pp. 59-63.
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12] CA rollo, pp. 72-74.
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17] Rollo, p. 11.
[18] Planters
Development Bank v. Francisco Garcia, G.R. No. 147081,
[19]
[20] Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. Herminigildo De Jesus, G.R. No. 167748, 8 November 2005, 474 SCRA 366, 374.
[21] Rollo, p. 17; Petition for Review, p. 10.
[22] Flordeliza Rivera v. Gregoria Santiago, G.R. No.
146501,
[23] G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159,
[24] Eugenio Bautista v. Susana Mag-isa Vda. de Villena, G.R. No.
152564,
[25] G.R. No. 132048,