FIRST
DIVISION
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COCA-COLA
BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, - versus - CITY OF
Respondents. |
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G.R.
No. 156252 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June
27, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO,
J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, assailing the Order[1] of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 21, dated 8 May 2002,
dismissing petitioner’s Petition for Injunction, and the Order[2]
dated 5 December 2002, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. is a corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing and
selling beverages and maintains a sales office located in the City of
On
Aggrieved by said tax ordinance,
petitioner filed a Petition[3]
before the Department of Justice (DOJ), against the City of Manila and its Sangguniang Panlungsod, invoking
Section 187[4] of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160). Said Petition questions the constitutionality
or legality of Section 21 of Tax Ordinance No. 7988. According to petitioner:
Section 21 of the Old Revenue Code of the City of
Manila (Ordinance No. 7794, as amended) was reproduced verbatim as Section 21
under the new Ordinance except for the last paragraph thereof which reads:
“PROVIDED, that all registered businesses in the City of Manila that are
already paying the aforementioned tax shall be exempted from payment thereof”,
which was deleted; that said deletion would, in effect, impose additional
business tax on businesses, including herein petitioner, that are already
subject to business tax under the other sections, specifically Sec. 14, of the
New Revenue Code of the City of Manila, which imposition, petitioner claims,
“is beyond or exceeds the limitation on the taxing power of the City of Manila
under Sec. 143 (h) of the LGC of 1991; and that deletion is a palpable and
manifest violation of the Local Government Code of 1991, and the clear mandate
of Article X, Sec. 5 of the 1987 Constitution, hence Section 21 is “illegal and
unconstitutional.”
On
After a judicious scrutiny of the records of this
case, in the light of the pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code of
1991, this Department finds for the petitioner.
The Local Government Code of 1991 provides:
“Section 188.
Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10)
days after their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city and
municipal tax ordinances or revenue measures shall be published in full for
three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation; Provided,
however, that in provinces, cities, and municipalities where there are no
newspapers or local circulations the same may be posted in at least two (2)
conspicuous and publicly accessible places.” (R.A. No. 7160) (stress supplied)
Upon the other hand, the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991, insofar as pertinent, mandates:
“Art. 277. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue
Measures. – (a) within ten (10) days after their approval, certified true
copies of all provincial, city and municipal tax ordinances or revenue
measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a
newspaper of local circulation provided that in provinces, cities and
municipalities where there are no newspapers of local circulation, the same may
be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly accessible places.
If the tax ordinances or
revenue measure contains penal provisions as authorized under Art. 279 of this
Rule, the gist of such tax ordinance or revenue measure shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinance or measure shall be made in
accessible and conspicuous public places in all municipalities and cities of
the province to which the sanggunian enacting the
ordinance or revenue measure belongs.
xxx xxx xxx.”
(emphasis ours)
It is clear from the
above-quoted provisions of R.A. No. 7160 and its implementing rules that the
requirement of publication is MANDATORY
and leaves no choice. The use of the
word “shall” in both provisions is imperative, operating to impose a duty that
may be enforced (Soco v. Militante,
123 SCRA 160, 167; Modern Coach Corp. v. Faver 173 SE
2d 497, 499).
Its essence is simply to inform
the people and the entities who may likely be affected, of the existence of the
tax measure. It bears emphasis, that,
strict observance of the said procedural requirement is the only safeguard
against any unjust and unreasonable exercise of the taxing powers by ensuring
that the taxpayers are notified through publication of the existence of the
measure, and are therefore able to voice out their views or objections to the
said measure. For, after all, taxes are
obligatory exactions or enforced contributions corollary to taking of property.
x x x x
In the case at bar,
respondents, by its failure to file their comments and present documentary
evidence to show that the mandatory requirement of law on publication, among
other things, has been met, may be deemed to have waived its right to
controvert or dispute the documentary evidence submitted by petitioner which
indubitably show that subject tax ordinance was published only once, i.e., on
the May 22, 2000 issue of the Philippine Post.
Clearly, therefore, herein respondents failed to satisfy the requirement
that said ordinance shall be published for three (3) consecutive days as
required by law.
x x x x
In view of the foregoing, we
find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Tax Ordinance No. 7988
of the City of
The City of
On
In the attached Resolution dated August 17, 2000 of
the Department of Justice, it is stated that “x x x Ordinance No. 7988 of the City of Manila is hereby declared
NULL AND VOID AND WITHOUT LEGAL EFFECT for having been enacted in contravention
of the provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991 and its implementing
rules and regulations.”
x x x
x
In view thereof, that Office is hereby instructed to
cease and desist from implementing the aforementioned Manila Tax Ordinance No.
7988, inviting attention to Section 190 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of
1991, quoted hereunder:
“Section
190. Attempt to Enforce Void or
Suspended Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures.- The enforcement of any tax
ordinance or revenue measures after due notice of the disapproval or suspension
thereof shall be sufficient ground to administrative disciplinary action
against the local officials and employees responsible therefore.”
Be guided accordingly.[6]
Despite the
Resolution of the DOJ declaring Tax Ordinance No. 7988 null and void and the
directive of the BLGF that respondents cease and desist from enforcing said tax
ordinance, respondents continued to assess petitioner business tax for the year
2001 based on the tax rates prescribed under Tax Ordinance No. 7988. Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint with the
RTC of Manila, Branch 21, on
On
The defendants did not follow the procedure in the
enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 7988. The Court agrees with plaintiff’s
contention that the ordinance should first be published for three (3)
consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation aside from the posting of
the same in at least four (4) conspicuous public places.
x x x
x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the injunction permanent. Defendants are enjoined from
implementing Tax Ordinance No. 7988. The bond posted by the plaintiff is hereby
CANCELLED.[7]
During the pendency of the said case, the City Mayor of Manila
approved on
On
After a careful
examination/evaluation of the records of this case and applying the pertinent
provisions of the Local Government Code of 1991, this Department finds the
instant petition of Coca-Cola Bottlers, Philippines, Inc. meritorious.
It bears stress, at the outset,
that the subject ordinance was passed and approved by the respondents
principally to amend Ordinance No. 7988 which was earlier nullified by this
Department in its Resolution Dated August 17, 2000, also at the instance of the
herein petitioner. x x x
x x x x
x x x [T]he only logical
conclusion, therefore, is that Ordinance No. 8011, subject herein, is also null
and void, it being a mere amendatory ordinance of Ordinance No. 7988 which, as
earlier stated, had been nullified by this Department. An invalid or unconstitutional law or
ordinance does not, in legal contemplation, exist (Manila Motors Co., Inc. vs. Flores, 99 Phil. 738). Where a statute which has been amended is
invalid, nothing, in effect, has been amended.
As held in People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091:
“If an order or law sought to
be amended is invalid, then it does not legally exist. There would be no occasion or need to amend
it; x x x” (at p. 1097)
Instead of amending Ordinance
No. 7988, herein respondent should have enacted another tax measure which
strictly complies with the requirements of law, both procedural and
substantive. The passage of the assailed
ordinance did not have the effect of curing the defects of Ordinance No. 7988
which, any way, does not legally exist.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
Tax Ordinance No. 8011 is hereby declared NULL
and VOID and LEGALLY NOT EXISTING.[8]
Respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of the DOJ was subsequently denied
in a Resolution,[9] dated
The City of
From whatever angle the recourse of herein petitioners
was viewed, either from the standpoint of Section 1, Rule 43, or Section 1 and
the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, the conclusion was inevitable that petitioners’
remedial measure from dispositions of the Secretary of Justice should have been
ventilated before the next judicial plane. x x x
Accordingly, by reason of the foregoing premises,
Civil Case No. 02-103372 for “Certiorari” is DISMISSED.
Consequently,
respondents appealed the foregoing Order, dated
Pursuant to Rule 45 and other
related provisions of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure as amended governing
appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court, only petitions which are
accompanied by or which comply strictly with the requirements specified therein
shall be entertained. On the basis
thereof, the Court resolves to DENY the instant petition for review
on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 17
dated December 2, 2002 and March 7, 2003 for the late filing as the petition
was filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen
(15) days fixed in Sec. 2, Rule 45 in relation to Sec. 5(a), Rule 56.
The omnibus motion of
petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of
Respondents’
Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied in a Resolution, dated
Acting on the motion of
petitioners for reconsideration of the resolution of
Meanwhile, on
the basis of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011, the City of Manila filed
a Motion for Reconsideration with the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, of its
Decision, dated 28 November 2001, which the court a quo granted in the herein assailed Order dated
Considering that Ordinance No. 7988 (Amended Revenue
Code of the City of Manila) has already been amended by Ordinance No. 8011
entitled “An Ordinance Amending Certain Sections of Ordinance No. 7988”
approved by the City Mayor of Manila on February 22, 2001, let the
above-entitled case be as it is hereby DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to
costs.”[10]
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the abovequoted Order was denied by the trial
court in the second challenged Order, dated
The case at
bar revolves around the sole pivotal issue of whether or not Tax Ordinance No.
7988 is null and void and of no legal effect.
However, respondents, in their Comment and Memorandum, raise the
procedural issue of whether or not the instant Petition has complied with the
requirements of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure; thus, the Court resolves to
first pass upon this issue before tackling the substantial matters involved in
this case.
Respondents
insist that the instant Petition raises questions of fact that are proscribed
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which states that Petitions
for Certiorari before the Supreme
Court shall raise only questions of law.
We do not agree. There is a
question of fact when doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of
the alleged facts, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether
or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a
question of law.[11] A thorough reading of the Petition will
reveal that petitioner does not present an issue in which we are called to rule
on the truth or falsity of any fact alleged in the case. Furthermore, the resolution of whether or not
the court a quo erred in dismissing
petitioner’s case in light of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011,
allegedly amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988, does not necessitate an incursion into
the facts attending the case.
Contrarily, it
is respondents who actually raise questions of fact before us. While accusing petitioner of raising
questions of fact, respondents, in the same breath, proceeded to allege that
the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, in its Decision, dated 28 November 2001, failed
to take into account the evidence presented by respondents allegedly proving
that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was published for four times in a newspaper of
general circulation in accordance with the requirements of law. A determination of whether or not the trial
court erred in concluding that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 was indeed published for
four times in a newspaper of general circulation would clearly involve a
calibration of the probative value of the evidence presented by respondents to
prove such allegation. Therefore, said
issue is a question of fact which this Court, not being a trier
of facts, will decline to pass upon.
Respondents
also point out that the Petition was not properly verified and certified
because Nelson Empalmado, the Vice President for Tax
and Financial Services of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. who verified the
subject Petition was not duly authorized to file said Petition. Respondents assert that nowhere in the
attached Secretary’s Certificate can it be found the authority of Nelson Empalmado to institute the instant Petition. Thus, there being a lack of proper
verification, respondents contend that the Petition must be treated as a mere
scrap of paper, which has no legal effect as declared in Section 4, Rule 7 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
An inspection
of the Secretary’s Certificate attached to the petition will show that Nelson Empalmado is not among those designated as representative
to prosecute claims in behalf of Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc. However, it would seem that the authority of
Mr. Empalmado to file the instant Petition emanated
from a Special Power of Attorney signed by Ramon V. Lapez,
Jr., Associate Legal Counsel/Assistant Corporate Secretary of Coca-Cola Bottlers
Philippines, Inc. and one of those named in the Secretary’s Certificate as
authorized to file a Petition in behalf of the corporation. A careful perusal of said Secretary’s
Certificate will further reveal that the persons authorized therein to
represent petitioner corporation in any suit are also empowered to designate
and appoint any individual as attorney-in-fact of the corporation for the
prosecution of any suit. Accordingly, by
virtue of the Special Power of Attorney executed by Ramon V. Lapez, Jr. authorizing Nelson Emplamado
to file a Petition before the Supreme Court, the instant Petition has been
properly verified, in accordance with the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Having
disposed of the procedural issues raised by respondents, We now come to the
pivotal issue in this petition.
It is
undisputed from the facts of the case that Tax Ordinance No. 7988 has already
been declared by the DOJ Secretary, in its Order, dated 17 August 2000, as null
and void and without legal effect due to respondents’ failure to satisfy the
requirement that said ordinance be published for three consecutive days as
required by law. Neither is there quibbling
on the fact that the said Order of the DOJ was never appealed by the City of
Manila, thus, it had attained finality after the lapse of the period to
appeal.
Furthermore,
the RTC of Manila, Branch 21, in its Decision dated 28 November 2001,
reiterated the findings of the DOJ Secretary that respondents failed to follow
the procedure in the enactment of tax measures as mandated by Section 188 of
the Local Government Code of 1991, in that they failed to publish Tax Ordinance
No. 7988 for three consecutive days in a newspaper of local circulation. From the foregoing, it is evident that Tax
Ordinance No. 7988 is null and void as said ordinance was published only for
one day in the
Despite the
nullity of Tax Ordinance No. 7988, the court a quo, in the assailed Order, dated 8 May 2002, went on to dismiss
petitioner’s case on the force of the enactment of Tax Ordinance No. 8011,
amending Tax Ordinance No. 7988. Significantly,
said amending ordinance was likewise declared null and void by the DOJ Secretary
in a Resolution, dated 5 July 2001, elucidating that “[I]nstead of amending Ordinance No. 7988,
[herein] respondent should have enacted another tax measure which strictly
complies with the requirements of law, both procedural and substantive. The passage
of the assailed ordinance did not have the effect of curing the defects of
Ordinance No. 7988 which, any way, does not legally exist.” Said Resolution of the DOJ Secretary had, as
well, attained finality by virtue of the dismissal with finality by this Court
of respondents’ Petition for Review on Certiorari
in G.R. No. 157490 assailing the dismissal by the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, of
its appeal due to lack of jurisdiction in its Order, dated 11 August 2003.
Based on the
foregoing, this Court must reverse the Order of the RTC of Manila, Branch 21,
dismissing petitioner’s case as there is no basis in law for such dismissal. The amending law, having been declared as
null and void, in legal contemplation, therefore, does not exist. Furthermore, even if Tax Ordinance No. 8011
was not declared null and void, the trial court should not have dismissed the
case on the reason that said tax ordinance had already amended Tax Ordinance
No. 7988. As held by this Court in the
case of People v. Lim,[12] if
an order or law sought to be amended is invalid, then it does not legally
exist, there should be no occasion or need to amend it.[13]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Orders of the RTC of Manila, Branch 21,
dated
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Civil Case No. 01-99848, penned by
Judge Amor A. Reyes; Rollo, p. 36.
[2] Rollo, p. 37.
[3] Records, pp. 42-48.
[4] Section 187. Procedure
for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and
Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval
of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided,
That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment
thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality
or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal
within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof
to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days
from the date of receipt of the appeal x x x. (Emphasis ours)
[5] Resolution pp. 2-5; Rollo, pp. 48-51.
[6] Rollo, p. 52.
[7] Rollo, p. 56.
[8] DOJ Resolution, pp. 3, 5-6; Rollo, pp. 59, 61-62.
[9] Rollo, pp. 64-68.
[10] Rollo, p. 36.
[11] Morales
v. The Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines, G.R. No.
161172, 13 December 2004, 446 SCRA 227, 237, citing Far East Marble (Philippines), Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
94093, 10 August 1993, 225 SCRA 249, 255.
[12] 108 Phil. 1091 (1960).
[13]