FIRST DIVISION
FIRST BANCORP, INC., G.R. No. 151132
Petitioner,
Present
PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
- versus - YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and JANE Promulgated:
THOMAS LIGHTNER,
Respondents.
x- -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The First Bancorp, Inc. (Bancorp for
brevity) is the registered owner of a parcel of land located in Alabang,
Muntinlupa covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 201126 issued by the
Registry of Deeds on
On
1. Plaintiff is of legal age, widowed, American citizen, and a
resident of
2. Defendant is a corporation created
under the laws of the
2.1. According
to defendant’s General Information Sheet dated
Atty. F. Arthur L. Villaraza – Chairman/President
Atty. Rafael Antonio M. Santos – Director
Atty. Jose M. Jose – Director/Corporate Secretary
Atty. Augusto A. San Pedro, Jr. – Director
Atty. Alejandro Alfonso E. Navarro – Director
Venus C. Catacutan – Treasurer
A
copy of defendant’s General Information Sheet dated
3. Plaintiff
is the widow of Donald Clifford Lightner, Jr., an American citizen who passed
away in Hongkong on
3.1. Plaintiff
and Donald C. Lightner, Jr. never obtained a valid decree of divorce, legal
separation, separation of properties, or dissolution of the conjugal
partnership.
4. Defendant
is the registered owner of a parcel of land and house and other improvements
with address at
5. Notwithstanding
the fact that title to the Property is registered in the name of defendant, the
Property in actuality belongs to the estate of Donald C. Lightner, Jr. and
plaintiff jointly.
5.1. The
Property was acquired with conjugal or community funds and therefore is a
conjugal or community asset.
5.2. The
Property was used exclusively as the primary residence of Donald C. Lightner,
Jr. and his mistress Aida Villaluz until his death. Ms. Villaluz continues to reside on the
Property.
6. In an
attempt to divest and defraud plaintiff out of her 50% undivided interest in
the Property (or in the conjugal/community funds used to acquire the Property)
as well as her compulsory inheritance from his estate’s 50% undivided interest
therein, Donald C. Lightner, Jr. caused the title to the Property to be
registered in the name of defendant.
6.1. Defendant
is apparently only a holding corporation owned by nominees. All of its stockholders, directors and
officers are lawyers and, in the case of Venus C. Catacutan, an accounting
staff person of the law firm of Carpio, Villaraza & Cruz. The total capitalization of defendant is only
P100,000 as of
She prayed that, after due
proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE,
it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered declaring that defendant
holds a 50% undivided interest in the property as trustee and in trust for the
benefit of plaintiff.
Other
relief just and equitable in the premises are also prayed for.[3]
Bancorp filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint on the following grounds:
I
THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE
DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED FIFTY PERCENT UNDIVIDED INTEREST OVER THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY CONSIDERING THAT, UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, PLAINTIFF, WHO IS AN
AMERICAN CITIZEN, CANNOT OWN REAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
A CONDITION
PRECEDENT FOR THE FILING OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED IN THE COMPLAINT HAS NOT BEEN
COMPLIED WITH CONSIDERING THAT THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP HAS NOT YET
BEEN LIQUIDATED IN THE PROPERTY ESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANT CONSIDERING THAT THE SUMMONS IN THE INSTANT CASE WERE IMPROPERLY
SERVED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE THE VALUE OF THE
REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT REAL ACTION AND FAILED TO PAY THE PROPER
DOCKET FEES.[4]
Lightner opposed
the motion, contending that she had paid the requisite docket fees. Contrary to the allegation of the defendant, her
action was not a real action; hence, she need not allege the assessed value of
the property. In any event, even if the
amount she paid as docket fees was insufficient, she should be allowed a
reasonable time to pay the deficiency. She
further claimed that the liquidation of their conjugal partnership properties
is not a condition precedent to the filing of her complaint because her action
is against defendant, a third party who is an outsider to her husband’s estate.
Moreover, her claimed right to a
declaration of a constructive trust in her favor to enable her to sell her 50%
conjugal partnership share in the proceeds of the sale is not a violation of
the Constitution. She pointed out that
when a favorable judgment is rendered in her favor, she would still be compelled
to sell the property to a qualified Filipino. Thus, the court’s mere declaration of Bancorp as
trustee is not prohibited by the Constitution.
She further alleged that Bancorp was estopped from raising such a
defense against her based on the doctrine of pari delicto.
On
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE PERFUNCTORY DENIAL OF DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS IN THE ORDER DATED 20 JANUARY 1998 VIOLATES SECTION 3, RULE
16 OF THE 1997 REVISED RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AS IT FAILED TO STATE CLEARLY
AND DISTINCTLY THE REASONS THEREFOR.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE ORDER DATED 20 JANUARY 1998 DEPRIVED
DEFENDANT OF DUE PROCESS CONSIDERING THAT ITS RIGHT TO FILE A REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF’S OPPOSITION DATED 14 JANUARY 1998 WHICH WAS GRANTED TO DEFENDANT IN
A PREVIOUS ORDER DATED 05 DECEMBER 1997 WAS ARBITRARILY CURTAILED.
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD
RECONSIDER AND SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED
A. THE
COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR THE DECLARATION OF PLAINTIFF’S ALLEGED
FIFTY PERCENT UNDIVIDED INTEREST OVER THE SUBJECT PROPERTY SINCE SUCH A CLAIM
BY AN ALIEN IS PROSCRIBED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION.
B. ASSUMING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BELONGS TO THE ALLEGED CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN
PLAINTIFF AND THE LATE DONALD C. LIGHTNER, JR., THE LIQUIDATION OF THE ALLEGED
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE PROPER ESTATE PROCEEDINGS IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT
FOR THE FILING OF THE CLAIM ASSERTED IN THE COMPLAINT.
C. THE
HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF DEFENDANT
SINCE THE SUMMONS IN THE INSTANT CASE WAS IMPROPERLY SERVED.
D. THE HONORABLE COURT HAS NOT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
THE INSTANT CASE SINCE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO ALLEGE IN HER COMPLAINT THE VALUE OF
THE REAL PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THE INSTANT REAL ACTION AND FAILED TO PAY THE PROPER
DOCKET FEES AS REQUIRED BY THE RULES OF COURT.[7]
Lightner opposed the motion.[8] This time, however, the RTC issued an Order on
[a]s a rule, the allegation set forth in the Complaint
and not the prayer for relief that determines the nature of the cause of action
of the plaintiff. In the complaint, it
is alleged that plaintiff is an American Citizen and that the subject property
purportedly belongs to the plaintiff and the estate of the late Donald C.
Lightner, Jr. The relief prayed for in
the complaint dated 08 October 1997 is premised on an alleged right of
ownership being claimed by the plaintiff as a consequence of the alleged acquisition
of the Subject Property purportedly using the conjugal funds of the plaintiff
and the late Donald C. Lightner, Jr., who are both aliens. Consequently, it is clear from the allegations
in the Complaint that plaintiff traces her alleged right to the Subject
Property to an unlawful conveyance which is clearly proscribed under the
Constitution.
“Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution
categorically provides the following prohibition:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire lands of the public domain.”
Accordingly, while plaintiff is ostensibly asking for
a mere declaration of plaintiff’s alleged fifty percent (50%) undivided
interest over the Subject Property as stated in the prayer of the Complaint
dated 08 October 1997, plaintiff in reality is demanding the declaration of the
Subject Property as owned jointly by her and the estate of the late Donald C.
Lightner, Jr. which is clearly prohibited under the Constitution.
Plaintiff, who is an alien, cannot even assert a claim
for a fifty percent (50%) undivided interest over the Subject Property as her
alleged conjugal share.
Plaintiff states that liquidation of the conjugal
partnership in the estate proceeding is not a precedent for the filing of the
suit.
It has been held that the declaration of a fifty
percent (50%) undivided interest over a parcel of land is tantamount to the conferment
of absolute title thereto, including the right to dispose and convey title to
said property. As held in the case of Meralco v. Viardo, 5 SCRA 859-868
(1962):
x x x The other
one-half undivided interest of the latter was not in litigation and therefore
the trial court correctly held that Pilar Belmonte, as the owner of this
undivided one-half interest, had a right to sell it and convey absolute title
thereto or to parts thereof. x x x
In the case of Suyon
v. Collantes, 69 SCRA 514-520 (1976), the Supreme Court ruled that in
determining whether a Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action, assuming
the truth of the allegations of fact therein, the Honorable Court should first
determine whether it could render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the Complaint. In the instant
case, plaintiff prays that she be declared the owner of the fifty percent (50%)
undivided interest in the Subject Property. For the Court to render judgment in
favor of plaintiff as prayed for in her Complaint, it is enough that the
Subject Property be shown to belong to her and the late Donald C. Lightner, Jr.
It must also be established that she is
qualified under the Constitution and our laws to own or hold the interest she
claims in the Subject Property. In the
instant case, the very allegations of her Complaint show that she is
disqualified, being an alien, from being declared the owner of fifty percent
(50%) undivided interest in the Subject Property. For this reason, plaintiff’s Complaint
clearly states no cause of action.
Plaintiff alleges that the conjugal partnership must
be liquidated in an estate proceeding applies only when the suit is filed
against the estate for the recovery of a specific asset or property. It does not apply to a suit against a third
party who is an outsider to the estate. In
this action, plaintiff has sued a third party to declare it as holding title to
the property in constructive trust for plaintiff.
Defendant, however, states that, Article 129 of the
Family Code (Executive Order 209), the conjugal partnership must first be
liquidated before the plaintiff can assert her alleged claim to any specific
conjugal partnership asset because it is in the liquidation of the alleged
conjugal partnership that a determination is made as to which properties
pertain to the conjugal partnership and what constitutes the net remainder
thereof to which the surviving spouse may become entitled.
That prior to the liquidation, plaintiff cannot assert
ownership over specific conjugal assets. What the plaintiff will eventually become
entitled to would be the net remainder of the alleged conjugal partnership
after the payment of all the debts and obligations of the alleged conjugal
partnership and the distribution of the exclusive paraphernal properties of
each of the spouses.
In the instant case, even before the alleged conjugal
partnership could be liquidated pursuant to Article 129 of the Family Code,
plaintiff is already asserting a claim to her alleged conjugal share over a
specific conjugal property, on the erroneous assumption that Subject Property
supposedly constitutes conjugal property. Clearly, plaintiff’s claim over the subject
property, even assuming the same to be conjugal, is premature as she can only
be entitled to the net remainder of the alleged conjugal partnership under the
law. At present, the net remainder of
the alleged partnership has not yet been determined considering that the
condition precedent of liquidating the alleged conjugal partnership has yet to
be complied with. Thus, plaintiff cannot assert her alleged claim for a
supposed fifty (50%) undivided interest over the Subject Property which she
claims to be part of the conjugal partnership assets.
Considering the foregoing discussions, this Court
finds it is no longer necessary to discuss further the remaining issues raised
by both parties as it is the opinion of this Court that the above mentioned
contention would be sufficient enough for this Court to finally determine the
assertion of the parties.[9]
Lightner filed
a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the questioned order
is contrary to the relevant facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.[10]
For its part, Bancorp filed a motion to
dismiss the appeal on the ground that:
THE
HONORABLE COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT APPEAL
WHICH INVOLVES PURE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND IS PROPERLY COGNIZABLE BY THE SUPREME
COURT; HENCE, THE INSTANT APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED OUTRIGHT.[11]
Lightner opposed the Motion to
Dismiss Appeal, claiming that her appeal involved both questions of law and questions
of facts.[12]
On
Lightner opposed the motion,
insisting that questions of fact or law may be raised on appeal to the CA by
writ of error. She maintained that Bancorp
indulged in speculations when it averred in its Motion to Dismiss the Appeal
that her appeal would only raise questions of law, that such an argument would
have no basis until the issues have actually been delineated and the assignment
of errors stated in her brief as appellant.
Meanwhile, Lightner filed her Brief[14]
dated
I
The lower court erred in finding that the complaint
states no cause of action.
II
The lower court erred in finding that the complaint
was filed prematurely.[15]
Bancorp
filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that only legal issues
had been raised in the appellant’s brief, hence, the appeal should be
dismissed.
On
On
I. The
Honorable Court Has No Jurisdiction To Take Cognizance Of The Instant Appeal
Which Involves Pure Questions Of Law And Is Properly Cognizable By The Supreme
Court; Hence, The Instant Appeal Should Be Dismissed Outright.
II. Assuming Arguendo That The Honorable Court Has
Jurisdiction Over The Instant Appeal, The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That
Plaintiff-Appellant Lightner’s Complaint States No Cause Of Action For The
Declaration Of Her Alleged Fifty Percent Undivided Interest Over The Subject
Property Since Such A Claim By An Alien Is Proscribed Under The Constitution;
And Hence, Should Be Dismissed.
III. The Trial
Court Correctly Ruled That Plaintiff-Appellant Lightner’s Complaint Was
Prematurely Filed And, Hence, Should Be Dismissed Considering That Even
Assuming That The Subject Property Belongs To The Alleged Conjugal Partnership
Between Plaintiff-Appellant Lightner And The Late Donald C. Lightner, Jr., The
Liquidation Of Their Alleged Conjugal Partnership In The Proper Estate
Proceedings Is A Condition Precedent For The Filing Of The Claim Asserted In
The Complaint.[18]
On
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN
EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION OR ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT ASSUMED JURISDICTION AND TOOK
COGNIZANCE OF THE APPEAL OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT LIGHTNER WHEN IT CLEARLY AND
PLAINLY HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER IT AS THE SAID APPEAL INVOLVES PURE QUESTIONS
OF LAW AND IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JURI[S]DICTION OF THE HONORABLE COURT.[19]
To buttress this claim, petitioner reiterates
its arguments in the CA, in support of its motion to dismiss the appeal of
respondent.
For her part, respondent avers that,
under Section 1, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, the mode of appeal from all
final orders of the trial court is by writ of error as provided in Section
2(a), Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Conformably
with Section 15, Rule 44, questions of fact
or law or both may be raised on appeal in the CA. In any event, respondent asserts, her appeal to
the CA raises questions of fact, to wit: (1) whether the conjugal partnership
has been liquidated; and (2) whether her complaint states a cause of action. To support her contention, respondent cites
the rulings of this Court in Heirs of Coscolluela,
Sr. v. Rico General Insurance Corporation[20]
and PCGG v. Gorospe.[21]
Respondent maintains
that her appeal should not be dismissed based solely on technicalities.
The petition is meritorious.
The order of the trial court
dismissing the complaint of respondent (plaintiff below) on the ground that it
is premature and states no cause of action is final because it terminated the
proceedings so that nothing more can be done in the trial court. The order ended the litigation.[22]
There are two modes of appeal from a final
order of the trial court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction – (1) by
writ of error under Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court if questions of
fact or questions of fact and law are raised or involved; or (2) appeal by certiorari under Section 2(c), Rule 41, in
relation to Rule 45, where only questions of law are raised or involved:
Sec.
2. Modes
of appeal. –
(a) Ordinary
appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the
Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment
or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party. No record on appeal shall be
required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate
appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be
filed and served in like manner.
x x x x
(c) Appeal
by certiorari. – In all cases where only questions of law are raised or
involved, the appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.[23]
The period to appeal by writ of error
is provided in Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court:
Sec.
3. Period
of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on
appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on
appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The
period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed.
Under Section 5 of the same rule, “the
notice of appeal shall indicate the parties to the appeal, specify the judgment
or final order or part thereof appealed from, specify the court to which the
appeal is being taken, and state the material dates showing the timeliness of
the appeal.”
On the
other hand, an appeal by certiorari
is via a petition for review to be filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the final order or resolution appealed from or of the
dismissal of petitioner’s motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due
time after notice of the final order or resolution:
Section
1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court.
– A party desiring to appeal by certiorari
from a judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan,
the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.[24]
If the aggrieved party appeals by writ
of error under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to the CA and it turns out, from the
brief of appellant, that only questions of law are raised, the appeal shall be
dismissed:
Sec.
2. Dismissal
of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. – An appeal under Rule 41 taken
from the Regional Trial Court to the Court of Appeals raising only questions of
law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said
court. Similarly, an appeal by notice of
appeal instead of by petition for review from the appellate judgment of a
Regional Trial Court shall be dismissed.
An
appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to
the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright.[25]
The nature of the issues to be raised on
appeal can be gleaned from the appellant’s notice of appeal filed in the trial
court and in his or her brief as appellant in the appellate court.[26]
The provision relied upon by
respondent, Section 15, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court, reads:
Sec.
15. Questions
that may be raised on appeal. – Whether or not the appellant has filed a motion
for new trial in the court below, he may include in his assignment of errors
any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which
is within the issues framed by the parties.
This rule, however, does not relate to
the nature of the issues that may be raised on appeal by the aggrieved party, whether
issues of fact or issues of law, or the mode of appeal of the aggrieved party from
a final order or resolution of the trial court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; it merely provides the nature of the issues appellant may include
in his assignment of error incorporated in his Brief as appellant. It may happen that the appellant may have
raised in the trial court errors of fact or law or both, and need not include
all said issues in his appeal in the appellate court. The appellant has the right to choose which
issues of law he or she may raise in the CA in addition to factual issues already
raised.
A question of fact exists when a doubt
or difference arises as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. If the query requires a reevaluation of the
credibility of witnesses or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances
and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. On the other hand, there is a question of law
when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on certain state of
facts and which does not call for an existence of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the parties-litigants. In a case involving a question of law, the
resolution of the issue rests solely on what the law provides on the given set
of circumstances.[27]
Ordinarily, the determination of whether
an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best
left to the appellate court.[28]
All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions
of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an
error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.[29]
In the present case, respondent
appealed the order of the trial court, which dismissed her complaint on the
ground that it failed to state a cause of action against petitioner (defendant
therein), and for prematurity, as the conjugal partnership between her and her
deceased husband had not yet been liquidated prior to its filing.
Petitioner maintains that the trial
court acted in accord with law when it dismissed the complaint. While it admits
that when it filed its motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint of
respondent states no cause of action, it theoretically admitted the truth of
the factual and material allegations in the complaint and not mere inferences
or conclusions from facts not stated; nor conclusions of law; nor matters of
evidence; nor surplusage and irrelevant matter.[30] Petitioner agrees that the court may not
inquire into the truth of the allegations and find them to be false before a
hearing is had on the merits of the case; and it is improper to inject in the
allegations of the complaint facts not alleged or proved, and use these as
basis for said motion.[31] The test of the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts alleged, the
court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
of plaintiff. A complaint may also be
dismissed for failure of plaintiff to comply with a condition precedent. There can be no cause of action for filing a
complaint in court unless the condition precedent has been complied with. Performance or fulfillment of all conditions
precedent whether proscribed by statement or by agreement of the parties or
implied by law upon which a right of action depends must be sufficiently
alleged.[32]
With the foregoing premises, we agree with
petitioner’s contention that a question of whether or not a complaint states a
cause of action against defendant or that the action is premature is one of
law. The determination thereof is one of
law and not of facts.[33]
Indeed, in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[34]
the Court ruled that:
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a
cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or “doubt or difference
as to the truth or falsehood of facts,” simply because there are no findings of
fact in the first place. What the trial
court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint,
assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom
could only raise questions of law or “doubt or controversy as to what the law
is on a certain state of facts.”
Therefore, a decision dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a
cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the same decision on
questions of fact. One is the legal and
logical opposite of the other.[35]
The Court further ruled that a review
of a finding of lack of cause of action based on the factual and material
allegations of the complaint would only limit itself to whether the law was
properly applied given the facts alleged in the complaint. What would inevitably arise from such a review
are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact:
JADEBANK
in its Appellant’s Brief raised the
following questions, which it erroneously designated as questions of fact, in
an attempt to place its appeal within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals:
4.1.1. Whether or not the amended complaint together
with the Annexes attached and forming an integral part thereof, states a
sufficient cause of action against the defendant-appellee;
4.1.2. Whether or not there was an unwarranted
reversal of the Honorable Regional Trial Court’s Orders stating that the
complaint states a sufficient cause of action;
4.2.1. Whether or not the Motion to Dismiss the
complaint can be considered also as a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint.
We
fail to see how these issues raised by JADEBANK could be properly denominated
questions of fact. The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is
not the appellation given to such question by the party raising the same;
rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised
without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question
of law; otherwise, it is a question of fact.
Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private
respondent raises pure questions of law which are not proper in an ordinary
appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
We
agree with private respondent that in a motion to dismiss due to failure to
state a cause of action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings filed,
including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the
trial court does not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely
includes such documents in the hypothetical admission. Any review of a finding
of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not involve a
calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only
limit itself to the inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the
facts and these supporting documents. Therefore, what would inevitably arise
from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of fact.[36]
Respondent cannot find solace in the
ruling of this Court in Heirs of
Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[37]
In that case, the trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground, inter alia, that it failed to state a
cause of action and that plaintiffs had their right of action against
defendants because they had not established their status as heirs. Instead of appealing the order of the court,
plaintiff filed a special civil action for certiorari
in this Court under Rule 65. The Court
dismissed the petition, declaring that the proper remedy was to appeal the
order and not file a petition for certiorari.
It must be
stressed that an order of dismissal, be it right or wrong, is a final order
which is subject to appeal, not the proper subject of certiorari. Where appeal is
available as a remedy, certiorari
will not lie. In Meneses v. Court of
Appeals,[38]
the Court reiterated the rule that:
It
must also be stressed that the trial court’s order of 5 June 1992 dismissing
the petitioner’s complaint was, whether it was right or wrong, a final order
because it had put an end to the particular matter resolved, or settled
definitely the matter therein disposed of and left nothing more to be done by
the trial court except the execution of the order. It is a firmly settled rule that the remedy
against such order is the remedy of appeal and not certiorari. That appeal may
be solely on questions of law, in which case it may be taken only to this
Court; or on questions of fact and law, in which case the appeal should be
brought to the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to Murillo v. Consul, the appeal to this Court should be by petition
for review on certiorari in
accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In
the instant case then, if the petitioner had chosen to appeal from the
dismissal order of the trial court solely on questions of law, then he should
have filed a petition for review on certiorari
with this Court. If he wanted to raise in his appeal both questions of law and
of fact, then he should have pursued the remedy of an ordinary appeal to the
Court of Appeals and not by way of a petition for review under Rule 45. The
Court of Appeals did not then commit any reversible error when it dismissed the
petition for review of the petitioner in CA-G.R. SP No. 29328.[39]
Thus, the appeal of respondent to the
CA by writ of error is a wrong mode of appeal; consequently, the appeal should
have been dismissed.
IN
LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are SET
ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo,
pp. 60-62.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20] G.R.
No. 84628,
[21] Minute
Resolution dated
[22] Metropolitan
[23] Rules of Court, Rule 41, Section 2.
[24] Rules of Court, Rule 45, Section 1.
[25] Section 2, Rule 50, Rules of Court.
[26] Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
158397,
[27] Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
139278,
[28] See Philippine National Bank v. Romillo, Jr.,
No. L-70681,
[29]
[30] De Dios v.
[31] Rava Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 96825, July 3, 1992, 211 SCRA 144; Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 87678,
June 16, 1992, 210 SCRA 33, 38.
[32] Philippine American General Insurance Co.,
Inc. v. Sweet Lines, Inc., G.R. No. 87434, August 5, 1992, 212 SCRA 194,
207.
[33]
See Parañaque Kings Enterprises,
Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1184 (1997).
[34] Supra note 29.
[35]
[36]
[37] 363 Phil. 393 (1999).
[38] G.R.
No. 109053,
[39]