Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Private Enterprise |
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G.R. No. 149489 |
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Corporation, |
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Petitioner, |
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Present: |
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*PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson, |
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**YNARES-SANTIAGO, |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Promulgated: |
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Reynaldo Magada, |
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Respondent. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before the Court is a petition for
review on certiorari filed by Private Enterprise Corporation
(petitioner) assailing the Decision[1] dated
November 29, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 56897, which
affirmed the Order[2] dated
December 9, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan
de Oro City, Branch 19, in Civil Case No. 92-099, dismissing
the complaint for damages which petitioner filed against Reynaldo Magada (respondent) on ground of res
judicata. Also assailed is the CA Resolution[3]
dated
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner represented by its Manager,
Dominador A. Rañises and Valentina Magada (Valentina), represented by her attorney-in-fact, herein respondent,
entered into a contract of lease[4] dated
P3,000.00; that lessor Valentina allowed petitioner
to introduce and/or construct any structure of light materials on the leased premises
provided the lessee shall remove the same not later than 30 days after the expiration
of the contract; that in the event that the lessee failed to remove the
structure within the stipulated period,
the removal may be done by the lessor at the expense of the lessee with the former not
being answerable for the material damages that may be caused to the structure
in the course of demolition.
Petitioner utilized the leased
premises as a parking area for its hotel and restaurant and established a
bunkhouse as sleeping quarters of some of its employees and also as storage.
On
On
On the same day, petitioner filed
with the RTC of Cagayan de Oro
City, a complaint[6] for
injunction with damages against its lessor, Valentina, docketed as Civil Case No. 91-340, and raffled
off to Branch 24. Petitioner prayed that
defendant Valentina be (1) enjoined from committing
any act to dispossess petitioner of the subject property or any act in
violation of petitioner’s rights; and (2) ordered to indemnify petitioner the
amount of P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, litigation expenses as may be
proved during trial and to pay the cost of the suit. Valentina filed her
Answer with counterclaim.
In
an Order[7]
dated
The RTC issued another Order dated October
11, 1991 stating that in addition to its September 11, 1991 Order, there was another
ground to deny the injunction, i.e., petitioner had no more right on the
subject premises since their lease contract had already expired.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a
petition for review on certiorari with the Court assailing the RTC
Orders denying the injunction prayed for by petitioner. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 102269.
In
the meantime, on
In a Resolution[10]
dated
Subsequently, the RTC in Civil Case
No. 91-340 rendered its Decision[11]
dated October 9, 1992 on Valentina’s counterclaim and
ordered petitioner to pay Valentina P30,000.00
for demolishing the bunkhouse as petitioner failed to remove the same per their
contract of lease; P50,000.00 for her car hire and food from Butuan City to Cagayan de Oro City; P50,000.00 for loss of income of Valentina’s son, herein respondent, while attending the
court hearing as well as exemplary and moral damages and attorney’s fees. Petitioner appealed the decision to the CA,
docketed as CA- G.R. CV No. 43003.
Petitioner had also filed on
On P209,440.60 for actual damages, P50,000.00 attorney’s
fees and P50,000.00 exemplary damages and cost of suit.
Respondent
filed a motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 92-099 with reservation to substantiate
his counterclaim for damages[14] on
the ground that the complaint states no cause of action and if there is any cause
of action, the same was barred by prior judgment as decided in G.R. No. 102269.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss in
an Order[15] dated
Respondent then filed with the CA a
petition[17] for certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and prohibitory
injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35751, praying for the annulment of the
abovementioned Orders.
While
CA-G.R. SP No. 35751 assailing the trial court’s denial of his motion to
dismiss on ground of res judicata
was pending in the CA, the RTC in Civil Case No. 92-099 issued its Order
dated
Petitioner filed its appeal with the
CA, docketed as CA-G. R. CV No. 56897.
In the meantime, the Former Second Division
of the CA rendered its Decision[18] dated
Subsequently, on
The
CA found that while Civil Case No. 91-340 was for injunction, the prayer for
preliminary injunction therein was a preservative remedy for the protection of
some substantive right or interest and was but an adjunct to the main suit
which was whether or not petitioner was entitled to damages; that the Supreme
Court’s conclusion in G.R. No. 102269 that no legal right was violated when
respondent demolished petitioner’s bunkhouse formed the basis for the RTC’s decision in Civil Case No. 91-340 denying
petitioner’s claim for damages and, at the same time, awarding damages in defendant
Valentina’s favor.
The
CA further held that were this appeal be given due course, the same evidence or
set of facts which were considered by the RTC in Civil Case No. 91-340 (first
case) will also be considered in Civil Case No. 92-099 (second case), thus the
causes of action in the subject two cases are the same as to warrant the
application of the doctrine of res judicata.
Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated
Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari. Petitioner
raises the following arguments:
1.
The principle of res judicata cannot apply when the complaint in the
civil case (which was filed ahead) had been dismissed at the instance of
petitioner, although respondent’s compulsory counterclaim therein proceeded.
2.
The principle of res judicata cannot also apply when the second case was
filed as a result of the reservation to file a separate civil action in the
criminal case against the accused therein (who is not a defendant in the first
case), considering also that the first case had been dismissed at the instance
of petitioner.
3.
The principle of res judicata is not also applicable when the judgment on
the counterclaim in the first case had been appealed to the Court of Appeals,
as the same has not attained finality.
4.
The rule against splitting a single cause of action is
not violated when the first case was filed for injunction and the second case
was filed principally for damages, considering also that the first case had
been dismissed at the instance of petitioner.
5.
The respondent had no right to demolish petitioner’s
bunkhouse on the leased premises without a special court order.[19]
Petitioner argues that when the
second case was filed solely against
respondent, the complaint in the first case had already been dismissed
on November 30, 1991 at the instance of petitioner, although the compulsory
counterclaim of Valentina proceeded; that the first
case could not be made the basis for the application of the principle of res judicata as to
bar the filing of the second case since
the latter was filed by petitioner as a civil action arising from Criminal Case
No. 61127 for malicious mischief and allowed under Section 1, Rule 11 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioner insists that there is no
identity of parties and reliefs sought since the defendant
in the first case was Valentina while in the second case,
it was respondent, being the sole accused in the criminal case and the one who
ordered the demolition of petitioner’s bunkhouse without a court order; that the
reliefs sought were not the same, i.e., the
first case was for injunction while the second case was filed principally for
damages; that the judgment on respondent’s counterclaim in the first case had
been appealed to the CA, docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 43003, and is still pending
decision thereat; that the said judgment had not attained finality and cannot
be made the basis for the application of res judicata.
Petitioner
also claims that it did not violate the rule against splitting a cause of
action as the instant case arose from a criminal offense; that respondent in
taking back possession of the leased property took the law into his hands.
The principal issue for resolution is
whether or not petitioner’s filing of Civil Case No. 92-099 for damages is
barred by the rule on res judicata.
We answer in the positive.
We find that the issue of res judicata had been
squarely raised by respondent when he earlier filed his petition for certiorari
with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35751, principally ascribing grave
abuse of discretion committed by Judge Anthony R. Santos when he denied
respondent’s motion to dismiss the second case on ground of res
judicata.
The CA Former Second Division granted the petition in its Decision dated
The
questions to be resolved in this petition are:
1.
whether or not the resolution of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. 102269 bars the filing by private respondent (herein petitioner) of
Civil Case No. 92-099 for damages and
2.
whether or not Rule 2 Section 4, - effect of splitting
a single cause of action - is applicable in this case.
The
Court finds for the petitioner (herein respondent) and rules that the
Resolution of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 102269 bars the filing by private
respondent (herein petitioner) of Civil Case No. 92-099 against petitioner
(herein respondent) and that the effect of splitting a single cause of action
is applicable in this case.
A
cause of action is defined as an act or omission of one party in violation of
the legal right of the other and its essential elements are a legal right of
the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant and an act or omission
of the defendant in violation of said legal right. While
Civil Case No. 91-340 was for injunction and damages specified as
attorney fees of P20,000.00 and litigation expenses, and the second
case, i.e., Civil Case No. 92-099 was for damages specified as 1.) P209,440.60
for actual damages, 2.) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and 3.) P50,000.00
for exemplary damages, the act or omission complained of in both cases refers
to the demolition of private respondent’s (herein petitioner) bunkhouse.
Private
respondent (herein petitioner) contends that it filed the first civil case only
for the purpose of enjoining petitioner (herein respondent) from demolishing
the improvements and dispossessing the former of the premises.
It
would appear, however, that the demolition started at 5:30 early in the morning
of August 22, 1991 and when the case for injunction was filed at 9:30 in the
morning of the same day, private respondent (herein petitioner) was already
aware that it suffered damages by the destruction of its bunkhouse. It could have included in its prayer such
damages albeit the value thereof could not yet be ascertained.
For
a single cause of action or violation of a right, the plaintiff may be entitled
to several reliefs. It is the filing of the separate complaints
for these several reliefs that constitutes splitting
of the cause of action. This is what is
prohibited by the rule.
The rule is that the prior “judgment
or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successor in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under
the same title and in the same capacity.
Thus, when the Supreme Court ruled
in G.R. No. 102269 on
It
is evident from the records that at the time the complaint was filed, the
contract of lease had long expired. Even
the grace period of thirty (30) days within which to remove the improvements
had also expired. The second contract of
lease entered into between petitioner and the Heirs of Maria Bacud cannot confer on the former the right to extend its
lease xxx It is clear, therefore, that petitioner had no right to occupy the
premises. Thus, when respondent demolished the improvements and dispossessed
petitioner, no legal right was violated.
the actual damages
allegedly sustained by herein private respondents (herein petitioner) is a
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, and the Supreme Court
Resolution, insofar as the demolition is concerned, is conclusive between the
parties.
As
far as the contract of lease which includes, among others, the stipulation as
to the expiration thereof, the grace period of thirty (30) days within which to
remove the improvements thereon, is concerned, the Supreme Court has ruled that
when herein petitioner (respondent) demolished the improvements and
dispossessed the private respondent (herein petitioner), no legal right was
violated. To allow the respondent court
in Civil Case No. 92-099 to make another ruling on whether there was a legal
right of private respondent (petitioner) violated by virtue of the demolition
of the improvement would be to allow it to rule again on a controversy already
decided by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 102269 which refers to the same parties,
and the same cause of action or subject of controversy. In the recent case of Peltan
Development, Inc., Margolles, et al, vs. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court said that “The Supreme Court promulgated Margolles ahead of the assailed Court of Appeals decision. It was incumbent upon Respondent Court of
Appeals to take judicial notice thereof and apply it in resolving this case. That the Court of Appeals did not is clearly a
reversible error.”
When
there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single
cause of action regardless of the number of rights violated belonging to one
person, All such rights should be alleged in a single complaint, otherwise they
are barred forever.
x x x x
We
find, therefore, that the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in denying petitioner’s motion
to dismiss Civil Case No. 92-099. (Parentheses
supplied).
Petitioner filed with the Court a
petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 132276, assailing
the foregoing CA decision. The petition
was dismissed in a Resolution dated
Notably, the decision in CA-G.R. SP
No. 35751 as well as the Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 132276 came ahead of
the assailed CA decision, however, not one of the parties invoked the same nor did
the CA take judicial notice of it. And
since it had been finally decided in the previous petition that Civil Case No.
92-099 (second case) is already barred by res judicata, the issue of res
judicata raised in the instant petition is utterly
foreclosed. It has become the law of the
case between petitioner and respondent and may no longer be disturbed or
modified.
Law of the case has
been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal.[23] More specifically, it means that whatever is
once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between
the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of
the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the
facts of the case before the court.[24]
Indeed, courts must adhere thereto,
because public policy, judicial orderliness and economy require such stability
in the final judgments of courts or tribunals of competent jurisdiction.[25]
Petitioner claims that respondent, in
taking back possession of the leased premises, took the law into his own hands
by demolishing petitioner’s bunkhouse without a court order as required by law.
We are not persuaded. In G. R. No.
102269, the Court, in its Resolution dated
It is evident from
the records that at the time the complaint was filed, the contract of lease had
long expired. Even the grace period of
thirty (30) days within which to remove the improvements had also expired. The second contract of lease entered into
between petitioner and the Heirs of Maria Bacud (when
the latter showed their title as opposed to respondent’s mere tax declaration)
cannot confer on the former the right to extend its lease since the respondent
was not a party to this agreement and the Heirs of Maria Bacud
were not parties to the action. Petitioner itself impliedly admitted that it
had no legal basis when it filed a motion to dismiss before the lower court stating that “although
plaintiff wants to manifest that it was not in bad faith in entering into a
contract of lease with the Heirs of Maria Bacud (who
claim to be the owner of the northern portion, fronting Philtown
Hotel) because the Heirs of Maria Bacud did not
inform plaintiff or its representative about the previous judgment by
compromise where the share of the Heirs of Maria Bacud
was reduced from 725 square meters to 241 square meters… plaintiff has no more
reason to pursue its complaint.” It is
clear, therefore, that petitioner had no right to occupy the premises. Thus, when respondent demolished the
improvements and dispossessed petitioner, no legal right was violated.[26]
Petitioner’s contention that the
first case (Civil Case No. 91-340) cannot be the basis for the application of res judicata since
the decision in the counterclaim has been appealed to the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 43003, and is still
pending therein deserves scant consideration.
As mentioned earlier, G.R. No. 102269,
which was a petition for review on certiorari of the RTC Order in Civil
Case No. 91-340 denying the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, sustained
the RTC and upheld the legality of the demolition of petitioner’s bunkhouse. Thus, insofar as the demolition is concerned,
it is already a settled matter in Civil Case No. 91-340. It bears stressing that the only issue which
proceeded in Civil Case No. 91-340 was Valentina’s compulsory
counterclaim for actual damages incurred in demolishing the bunkhouse as well
as exemplary and moral damages. The RTC decision
dated
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari
is DENIED for utter lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On
Official Leave)
Chief Justice
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CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Acting Chairperson |
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson
[1] Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez , Jr. concurred in by Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now member of this Court) and Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr.; rollo, pp. 19-28.
[2] Penned by Judge Anthony E. Santos; rollo, pp. 49-51.
[3] Rollo, p. 33.
[4] Records, p. 5.
[5] Rollo, p. 58.
[6] Rollo, pp. 71-74.
[7] Records, p. 69.
[8] Complaint for quieting of title and removal of cloud therefrom and partition with damages, entitled, “Pedro Naca, Josefina Naca de Madriaga and Adelaida Naca, (children of Maria Bacud) v. Marlene Echeverria, Valentina C. Magada and Fortunata C. Aves”, rollo, pp. 57-59.
[9] Stated in the decision dated
[10]
[11] Penned by Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo; Records, pp. 337-346.
[12] Per Judge Antonio A. Orcullo, Records, pp. 46-51.
[13] Records, pp. 14-17.
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18] Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena (now retired Justice of this Court) and concurred in by Justices Buenaventura J. Guerrero (now retired) and Portia Alino-Hormachuelos.
[19] Rollo, pp. 8-9.
[20] Sec. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. - Whenever practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
[21] Sec. 3. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. – Unless he has theretofore done so, the petitioner shall pay the corresponding docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.
[22] Sec. 5. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. – The appeal may be dismissed motu proprio or on motion of the respondent on the following grounds:
x x x x
(d) Failure to comply with the requirements regarding proof of service and contents of and the documents which should accompany the petition.
[23] Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 475, 484 citing Cucueco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139278, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 290.
[24] Ducat v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 753, 769 (2000); Zebra Security Agency and Allied Services v. National Labor Relations Commission, 337 Phil. 200, 207 (1997); People v. Pinuila, et al., 103 Phil 992, 999 (1958); 21 C.J.S. 330.
[25]
[26] Records, pp. 43-44