SECOND DIVISION
|
GERMELINA TORRES RACAZA and BERNALDITA
TORRES PARAS, |
G.R. No. 148759 |
|
Petitioners, |
|
|
-
versus - |
Present: PUNO, J., Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. |
|
ERNESTO GOZUM,[1] Respondent. |
Promulgated: June 8, 2006 |
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
AZCUNA,
J.:
In
this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, petitioners Germelina
Torres Racaza and Bernaldita
Torres Paras seek the nullification of the decision[2]
dated July 12, 2000 as well as the resolution[3]
dated June 28, 2001 rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
61227 which reversed and set aside the decision[4]
dated September 30, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 158 of Pasig City, consequently dismissing the complaint for accion
publiciana filed by petitioners against respondent Ernesto Gozum.
The
antecedents of this case are as follows:
The plaintiffs are the
registered co-owners of a parcel of land under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. PT-92411 situated at
In 1981, defendant
Ernesto Gozum occupied the back portion of the
property on a P3,500.00 monthly rental and
continued to occupy the same even after the death of Carlos Torres on
On
Almost two (2) years
thereafter, on May 27, 1997, plaintiffs sent anew a formal demand letter to
vacate on the ground that the verbal contract of lease over the property had
already expired sometime in July 1995, and the same has not been renewed and
since then, defendant had discontinued paying the monthly rentals of P3,500.00.
When this latter demand was not heeded, on
The initial reaction of
the defendant was to file a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
claiming that the cause of action should have been for unlawful detainer
falling within the jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts and that the
provision of P.D. No. 1508 was not complied with.
In the Order dated
September 30, 1997, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss on the
ground that an unlawful detainer must be filed within one (1) year from the
notice to vacate [given] as early as July 1, 1995 and since over two (2) years
had passed when the case was filed, the proper action is accion publiciana and
no longer unlawful detainer.
Defendant thereafter
filed his answer asseverating that he has a 10-year contract of lease (Annex
1, Complaint) over the premises executed between him and plaintiffs’ late
father on
After due proceedings on
“WHEREFORE,
in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant, ordering the latter and all persons claiming rights
under him to vacate the premises covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
PT-92411 of the Register of Deeds of Pasig City and
turn it over to the plaintiffs. Defendant is also ordered to pay plaintiffs the
amount of P3,500.00 effective P30,000.00
plus P1,500.00 per court appearance and the cost of suit.
SO
ORDERED.
Aggrieved, respondent
seasonably appealed the decision to the CA, ascribing to the lower court the
following errors:
I.
THE
COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAVE A LEGAL RIGHT TO
RECOVER POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FROM THE DEFENDANT.
II.
THE
III.
THE
COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE ABOVEMENTIONED CONTRACT IS
FRAUDULENT, FABRICATED AND FICTITIOUS AND THAT THE SIGNATURE OF ATTY. TORRES
AFFIXED THEREON IS NOT GENUINE.
IV.
THE
TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN AWARDING DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY’S FEES IN FAVOR OF
PLAINTIFFS.[6]
After
the submission by the parties of their respective briefs but prior to the
resolution of the appeal, petitioners filed with the CA a Motion to Dismiss or
for Execution Pending Appeal[7]
dated December 6, 1999 on the ground that the lease contract relied upon by
respondent to justify his continued possession of the subject property had, by
its own terms and respondent’s own admission, expired on September 30, 1999.
Thereafter,
without acting upon petitioners’ motion to dismiss, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and dismissed the case, holding that the lower court had no
jurisdiction over the complaint for accion publiciana considering that
it had been filed before the lapse of one (1) year from the date the last
letter of demand to respondent had been made. The CA ruled that the proper
remedy of petitioners should have been an action for unlawful detainer filed
with the first level court, or the municipal or metropolitan trial court.
Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this present petition arguing that:
1) The Court of Appeals decided a question
of substance not in accord with jurisprudence and remedial law authorities when
it declared as null and void the entire proceedings in the trial court despite
the fact that:
(i)
petitioners
correctly filed the accion publiciana with the trial court below;
(ii)
respondent
actively participated in the trial proceeding, testified in person, and
submitted to the trial court’s authority to decide the case; and
(iii)
respondent did not raise any jurisdictional issue
in his appeal where he raised only the substantive portions of the trial
court’s decision.
2) The Court of Appeals likewise departed
from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings amounting to serious
abuse of discretion when it chose to ignore the glaring fact that respondent’s
appeal had become moot and academic with the expiration of the lease contract
upon which his appeal rested.[8]
In due course, respondent filed his Comment[9]
dated
In their Reply[13]
dated October 20, 2001, petitioners countered that respondent is estopped from
raising any jurisdictional issue in connection with the demand letter dated May
27, 1997 considering that respondent never argued during the trial or even in
his appeal to the CA that the existence of the second letter divested the trial
court of jurisdiction over the complaint.
The petition has
merit.
The
allegations of a complaint determine the nature of the action as well as which
court will have jurisdiction over the case.[14]
The complaint would be deemed sufficient if, on its face, it shows that the
court has jurisdiction without resorting to parol
testimony.[15]
Precisely because ejectment proceedings are summary in nature, the complaint
should contain a statement of facts which would bring the party clearly within
the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy.
In the present case, petitioners made the following allegations in their complaint:
x x
x
2. [Petitioners] are the duly registered
co-owners of a parcel of land and its improvements, more particularly
identified as a 3-door apartment, specifically located between Fumakilla Laboratories, Inc. and the Shell Gasoline Station
along Amang Rodriguez, Sr. Avenue, Santolan, Pasig City, Metro
Manila x x x.
3. Sometime in 1981, [respondent] entered
into a verbal lease contract with the parents of herein [petitioners], who
agreed to lease to the [respondent], on a month-to-month basis, the aforementioned
property at the rental rate of Php3,500.00 per month.
4. On July 1, 1995, [petitioners] sent
[respondent] a Notice to Vacate x x x informing the latter of the termination of the said
verbal lease contract and demanding from him to vacate and peacefully surrender
to the [petitioners] the aforesaid premises, the possession of which
[respondent] has unlawfully withheld from the latter. Notwithstanding these
written and oral demands, [respondent] has repeatedly failed and up to now
still refuses to turn over the said premises peacefully to the [petitioners].
Since that
time, [respondent] has failed to remit his monthly rentals of Php3,500.00 so that as of
To
summarize, petitioners claim that (1) they are the owners of the property,
being the successors-in-interest of the original owners; (2) their
predecessors-in-interest entered into a verbal lease agreement with respondent
on a month-to-month basis; (3) they decided to terminate the verbal lease
contract upon the expiration of the last monthly term sometime in 1995; and (4)
on July 1, 1995, they demanded that respondent leave the property, but
respondent refused to do so.
Undeniably,
the foregoing averments constitute a cause of action that is based
primarily on unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession. Petitioners
seek the recovery of the possession of the leased premises following the lapse
of the term of the verbal lease contract entered into by petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest with respondent. The allegation that the contract is
on a month-to-month basis becomes material in this sense because it signifies
that the lease contract is terminable at the end of every month.[17]
Thus, petitioners may exercise their right to terminate the contract at the end
of any month even if none of the conditions of the contract had been violated,
and such right cannot be defeated by the lessee's timely payment of the rent or
by his willingness to continue doing so. The lease contract expires at the end
of every month unless there is an implied or tacit renewal thereof as when the
lessee is allowed to continue enjoying the leased premises for fifteen (15)
days after the end of every month with the acquiescence of the lessor. Such exception, however, cannot be invoked when
notice to vacate is given to the lessee in which case the contract of lease
expires at the end of the month.[18]
Moreover,
even if the month-to-month agreement is only on a verbal basis, if it is shown
that the property is needed for the lessor’s own use
or for the use of an immediate member of the family or for any of the other
statutory grounds to eject, then the lease is considered terminated as of the
end of the month, after proper notice or demand to vacate has been given.[19]
At this juncture, it must be pointed out that notice or demand to vacate had
been properly served upon respondent through the letter[20]dated
July
1/95
Dear
Ernesto Gozom,
I
would like to reiterate my verbal demand upon you to vacate the premises you
are presently occupying made sixty (60) days ago.
The
said premises should be vacated within THIRTY (30)[21]
DAYS upon receipt hereof for I badly needed it and please take this notice as
my final demand after I have verbally given you sixty (60) days already.
Hoping
you will give this matter your preferential and utmost attention in order to
avoid a costly litigation.
Very
truly yours,
(sgd.)
GERMELINA
T. RACAZA and
(sgd.)
BERNALDITA
T. PARAS
Verily,
respondent’s right to remain in possession of the property subject of the lease
was extinguished upon the expiration of the grace period mentioned in the
An
action for unlawful detainer exists when a person unlawfully withholds possession of any land or building
against or from a lessor, vendor, vendee or other
persons, after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession,
by virtue of any contract, express or implied.[23]
This summary action should be filed with the municipal trial courts within one
year after the occurrence of the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession.[24] Beyond
the one-year period, the real right of possession may be recovered through the
filing of an accion publiciana
with the regional trial
courts. [25]
In upholding the propriety of the mode adopted by petitioners to recover possession of their real property, the trial court found that more than one (1) year had lapsed from the time of petitioners’ dispossession, to wit:
x
x x
As to the first issue, the
[petitioners] have the legal right to recover the property from the
[respondent]. [Petitioners] are the absolute owners of the property and the
portion of the property which is occupied by the [respondent]. The possession
by the [respondent] of the back portion of the property is unlawful and
[petitioners] have been unlawfully deprived of the property since
Respondent nevertheless
insists, for the first time, that the one-year period must be reckoned from the
date of the second demand letter to vacate, that is, on
The records of the case,
however, do not support this view. Demand or notice to vacate is not a
jurisdictional requirement when the action is based on the expiration of the
lease. Any notice given would only negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to extend the period of the lease. The
law requires notice to be served only when the action is due to the lessee’s
failure to pay or the failure to comply with the conditions of the lease.[27] The one-year period is thus counted from the
date of first dispossession. To reiterate, the allegation that the lease was on
a month-to-month basis is tantamount to saying that the lease expired every
month. Since the lease already expired mid-year in 1995 as communicated in petitioners’
letter dated
Even assuming, for the sake of argument,
that a demand or notice to vacate was necessary, a reading of the second letter
shows that petitioners were merely reiterating their original demand for
respondent to vacate on the basis of the expiration of the verbal lease
contract mentioned in the first letter. For clarity, the full
text of the second letter[28]
sent by petitioners’ counsel is reproduced below:
Dear Mr. Gozom:
My principals, Germelina Torres Racaza and Bernaldita Torres Paras, have
brought to me for legal action the fact of your unjustified and unlawful
possession and occupation of the entire back portion of their apartment
building, located between Fumakilla Laboratories Inc.
and the Shell Gasoline Station along
According to my
principals, your verbal contract of lease covering the said premises already
expired sometime in July 1995 and the same has never been renewed, for which reason you
discontinued paying your monthly rentals of Php3,500.00.
Notwithstanding their
constant reminders and requests to you, for you to immediately vacate the
aforesaid leased premises in view of the expiration of the lease contract, you
have up to this time failed and still refuse to vacate the said premises to the
prejudice of my clients.
In this regard, please
consider this letter our formal demand and notice for you to vacate the said
leased premises on or before the 2nd day of June 1997. Should you
fail to so vacate and leave the premises and to pay your total monthly rental
arrearages, amounting to Php 80,500.00, on or before
the said date, we shall be constrained to pursue all available remedies under
the law to protect the interests of my clients.
Very truly yours,
(sgd.)
ATTY. CELSO P. YLADAN II
Counsel for Germelina Torres Racaza
and Bernaldita
Torres Paras
(Emphases supplied.)
The Court has, in the past, ruled that
subsequent demands which are merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations
of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which
to commence the ejectment suit considering that the
period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.[29]
Besides,
the allegations in the complaint and the answer put in issue the existence and
validity of the verbal lease contract itself. Respondent contends that the
lease term over the property is ten (10) years based on a written lease
contract purportedly executed by him and petitioners’ predecessors-in interest.
In this situation, it is the RTC which would be in the best position to
determine the true nature of the agreement between the parties and to decide
which of the two agreements is valid. In fact, it found that the written lease
contract was spurious and not binding upon the petitioners.
Moreover,
it is too late for respondent to invoke the defense of lack of jurisdiction on
the ground that the action was filed before the lapse of one year from the date
of last demand. Based on the records,
respondent never pursued this line of argument in the proceedings before the
trial court and even in his appeal to the CA. While it is true that prior to
the filing of his answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the
theory that the allegations therein merely constituted an action for unlawful detainer, the motion did not raise any jurisdictional issue
relative to the second demand letter. When his motion to dismiss was denied,
respondent no longer challenged the jurisdiction of the trial court in his
subsequent pleadings and instead actively participated in the proceedings held
before the RTC by relying principally on the strength of the written lease
contract allegedly executed between him and petitioners’
predecessors-in-interest. It was only when the CA motu
proprio dismissed the complaint that respondent
conveniently thought of adopting the novel theory embodied in the assailed
decision of the appellate court. Under these circumstances, estoppel
has already set in.
In
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy,[30]
this Court held that a party’s active participation in all stages of the case
before the trial court, which includes invoking the court’s authority to grant
affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from
later challenging that same court’s jurisdiction. The CA’s conclusion that the
doctrine enunciated in Tijam has been
abandoned is erroneous as, in fact, the same has been upheld and reiterated in
many succeeding cases.[31]
Thus, while an order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be assailed at any stage, a party’s active participation in the
proceedings in the tribunal which rendered the order or decision will bar such
party from attacking its jurisdiction.
In any
event, this Court notes that by respondent’s own claim,[32]
the term of the alleged written lease contract expired on
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the
assailed Decision dated July 12, 2000 as well as the
Resolution dated June 28, 2001 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 61227 are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Decision dated
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ADOLFO
S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chairperson
Associate Justice
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate
Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Acting
Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Respondent is sometimes referred to as Ernesto Gozom in the records.
[2] Rollo, pp. 31-36.
[3]
[4] Records, pp. 133-137.
[5] Rollo, pp. 31-33.
[6]
[7]
Rollo,
pp. 117-125.
[8]
[9] Rollo, pp. 139-143.
[10]
[11] Who may institute proceedings, and when. – Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and costs.
[12]
Records, pp. 1-10.
[13]
Rollo,
pp. 160-164.
[14]
Sumulong
v. CA, G.R. No. 108817,
[15] Sarmiento v. CA, 320 Phil. 146 (1995).
[16] Records, pp. 1-2.
[17] This is based on Article 1687 of the Civil Code which provides as follows:
“If the period for the lease has not been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent is to be paid daily. x x x.”
[18]
Cruz v.
IAC, G.R. No. 72313,
[19]
Guiang
v. Samano, G.R. No. 50501,
[20] Records, p. 8.
[21] The letter contained a handwritten inscription changing the grace period from 30 days to
60 days which appears to have been countersigned by petitioners.
[22]
Lopez v. David, G.R.
No. 152145,
[23] RULES OF COURT, Rule 70, Section 1.
[24]
De La Paz v. Panis, G.R. No. 57023,
[25]
Cruz v. Torres, G.R. No.
121939,
[26] Records, p. 135.
[27]
Lanuza
v. Muñoz,
G.R. No. 147372,
[28] Records, p. 10.
[29]
Desbarats v. Laureano, G.R. No. L-21875,
[30]
G.R. No.
L-21450,
[31] Soliven v. Fastforms Philippines, Inc ., G.R. No. 139031, October 18, 2004, 440 SCRA 389; Philippine Banking Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487; Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, G.R. No. 134895, June 19, 2001, 358 SCRA 715; PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998, 297 SCRA 402; Caltex (Philippines) Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448.
[32] Records, pp. 31, 33.