Republic of the
Supreme Court
FIRST DIVISION
RONALDO GESMUNDO, G.R.
No. 147881
REYNALDO
GESMUNDO,
HEIRS
OF RODOLFO Present:
GESMUNDO
(deceased)
NAMELY: ZENAIDA
ROSARIO
GESMUNDO (wife), (Chairperson)
HERMINIGILDA,
BELINDA, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
JAYSON,
ARNULFO AND
all
surnamed GESMUNDO, represented CALLEJO,
SR., and
by
BELINDA GESMUNDO, as CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
Attorney-In-Fact, and HEIRS OF
MANUEL
GESMUNDO SR.
(deceased) NAMELY:
RESURRECION
EVANGELISTA
GESMUNDO (wife),
MELANIE, MARIO and MANUEL, JR.,
all
surnamed GESMUNDO, represented
by the
latter as Attorney-In-Fact of his
Co-Heirs,
Petitioners,
- versus
-
SALOME
SAHAGUN VDA. DE
GESMUNDO,
SANORA GESMUNDO,
FELIX
GESMUNDO, JR., LILIA
GESMUNDO,
RODORA GESMUNDO,
and RAUL
GESMUNDO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x-
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- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the petition for review
on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated
This case
was commenced in the
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered adjudging the validity of the following:
a)
the deeds of sale dated
b)
the two (2) Deeds of Partition with sale dated
Declaring
that plaintiffs [herein petitioners] have no cause of action whatsoever against
herein defendants [herein respondents] as to the properties of the deceased
Felix Gesmundo, Sr. as their forbears Federico Gesmundo and Manuel Gesmundo
during their lifetime had ceded, transferred and conveyed all their rights,
ownership and participation in the properties of Felix Gesmundo,
Sr., subjects of this suit.
Ordering defendants to deliver two-sixths (2/6) or one-third (1/3) portion of the parcel of land situated at Barangay Sta. Catalina under Tax Declaration No. 40-609 to the heirs of Federico Gesmundo namely Ronaldo Gesmundo, Reynaldo Gesmundo and the heirs of Rodolfo Gesmundo, namely, his wife Zenaida del Rosario Gesmundo and children Herminigilda, Belinda, Jayson, Arnulfo and Joan all surnamed Gesmundo and represented by Belinda Gesmundo as attorney-in-fact; and to the heirs of Manuel Gesmundo now Manuel Gesmundo, Sr. namely his wife Resurreccion Evangelista Gesmundo and children Melanie, Mario and Manuel, Jr., all surnamed Gesmundo represented by Manuel, Jr. as attorney-in-fact.
Ordering the parties named above to conduct a subdivision of said lot covered by Tax Declaration No. 40-609 in order to determine the metes and bounds of the portions respectively belonging to them.
All expenses to be incurred in the accomplishment of this division shall be borne proportionately by the parties.
For insufficiency of evidence, claims and counterclaims of damages are ordered dismissed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[3]
(Emphasis ours)
On
However,
for failure of petitioners to file their appellants’ brief, the CA issued a
Resolution on
True,
appellants have dispatched their motion for reconsideration as well as their appellants’
brief on
Section 4 of Rule 3 of the Revised Internal Rules of this Court provides:
“Section 4. Other Modes of Filing. – Pleadings, motions and other papers sent by ordinary mail, by private messengerial services, or by any mode other than personal delivery or registered mail, shall be deemed filed only on the date and time they are actually received by the Court. The date and time of actual receipt shall be stamped and signed by the receiving clerk.” (Underline Ours).
The
subject omnibus motion for reconsideration was received by this Court on
WHEREFORE,
for having been filed out of time, the omnibus motion for reconsideration is DENIED
and the appellants’ brief thereto attached is DENIED ADMISSION. Our dismissal resolution of
SO ORDERED.[4]
Hence, this
petition for review on certiorari on the ground that the CA erred in
dismissing the appeal and denying petitioners’ omnibus motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioners’
first argument is that the CA failed to consider the reason advanced by the
petitioners for the delay in filing the appellants’ brief, i.e., that the law
firm’s regular secretary suffered a stroke and a new one had to be hired to
take over the tasks of the regular secretary, hence, there was some delay in
submitting the appellants’ brief.
Secondly, petitioners contend that the CA should have considered the
fact that December 29, 2000 was a Friday and the last working day of the month,
December 30, 2000, Saturday was Rizal Day, a holiday,
December 31, 2000 was a Sunday, January 1, 2001 was New Year’s Day, and January
2, 2001 was also declared a holiday.
Considering the long holiday season, petitioners argue that the CA
should not have considered the filing of the motion for reconsideration as five
(5) days late and should have liberally applied the rules in the interest of
substantial justice.
On the other hand, respondents point out that the CA had been magnanimous to petitioners by granting the latter two extensions of time totaling 75 days[5] in addition to the original 45 days given within which to file their appellants’ brief. Despite such liberality, petitioners still failed to file said brief. Thus, respondents emphasize that petitioners’ appeal was dismissed not on purely technical grounds but for blatant violation of procedural laws.
The Court finds the petition absolutely devoid of merit.
Petitioners
do not deny that they dispatched their motion for reconsideration through a
private messengerial service on
Petitioners’ asseveration deserves scant consideration. Pelayo v. Perez[6] is closely analogous to the present case. Petitioners in Pelayo also sent their motion for reconsideration of the decision of the CA through a private messengerial service, hence, said motion was deemed filed on the date of actual receipt thereof. The CA ruled that the motion was filed beyond the reglementary period. In said case, this Court ruled thus:
Petitioners never denied the CA finding that their motion for reconsideration was filed beyond the fifteen-day reglementary period. On that point alone, the CA is correct in denying due course to said motion. The motion having been belatedly filed, the CA Decision had then attained finality. Thus, in Abalos vs. Philex Mining Corporation, we held that:
x x x Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. It may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land.[7] (Emphasis ours)
The foregoing ruling finds exact
application in the present case.
First of
all, petitioners were given a total of one hundred twenty (120) days within
which to file their appellants’ brief.
Despite the lapse of that period of time, petitioners were not able to
file said brief, hence, the CA rightly dismissed their appeal in a Resolution
dated
There is
likewise no cogent reason for the CA to relax the application of the rules
regarding the timely filing of a motion for reconsideration. Nothing in the petition shows that, indeed,
substantial justice would be served thereby.
The
hornbook principle is stated in Paramount Vinyl Products Corp. v. NLRC,[8]
thus:
x x x Failure to interpose a timely appeal (or motion for reconsideration) renders the assailed decision, order or award final and executory that deprives the appellate body of any jurisdiction to alter the final judgment. x x x This rule “is applicable indiscriminately to one and all since the rule is grounded on fundamental consideration of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date fixed by law.” x x x Although, in a few instances, the Court has disregarded procedural lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the reglementary period, x x x the Court did so on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.
In the
present petition, no convincing argument was presented to show that the trial
court erred in finding that petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest had validly
disposed of their shares in the estate of Felix Gesmundo,
Sr. by executing a Deed of Sale dated August 11, 1947 and two deeds of
partition dated February 1, 1952 and January 9, 1957, respectively, hence, petitioners
only have inheritance rights over the conjugal share of the deceased first wife
of Felix Gesmundo, Sr.. Verily, the instant case is
not meritorious enough to deserve relaxation of the rules regarding timeliness
of the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
To rule
otherwise would be an injustice against respondents because as held in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue,[9] “just as a losing party has the
privilege to file an appeal within the prescribed period, so also does the
prevailing party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of a decision
in his favor.”[10]
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate
Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA
V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia (now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court) and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner (now retired) and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
[2] CA rollo, pp. 84-100.
[3]
[4] Rollo, pp. 26-27.
[5] See Resolutions dated
[6] G.R. No. 141323,
[7]
[8] G.R. No. 81200,
[9] G.R.
No. 122472,
[10]