FIRST DIVISION
HEIRS OF DICMAN, namely: G.R. No. 146459
ERNESTO DICMAN, PAUL
DICMAN,
FELICIANO TORRES, EMILY
TORRES, TOMASITO TORRES PANGANIBAN,
C.J.
and HEIRS OF CRISTINA (Chairperson)
ALAWAS and BABING COSIL, *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
- versus -
JOSE CARIÑO and COURT OF
APPEALS, Promulgated:
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
This refers to the
petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision[1]
dated June 30, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 33731,
which affirmed in toto the Decision
dated November 28, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 7 (Baguio
City), La Trinidad, Benguet; and the CA Resolution dated December 15, 2000
which denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The petition originated from an action
for recovery of possession of the eastern half of a parcel of land situated in
Residence Section “J”, Camp Seven,
The antecedent
facts are clear:
The subject land,
at the turn of the 20th century, had been part of the land claim of Mateo
Cariño. Within this site, a sawmill and
other buildings had been constructed by H.C. Heald in connection with his
lumber business. On
Ting-el Dicman,[3]
predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners, namely, Ernesto Dicman, Paul
Dicman, Florence Dicman, Babing Cosil, Feliciano Torres, Cristina Alawas, Emily
Torres and Tomasito Torres, and resident of Atab, a sitio within the City of
Baguio but located at some distance from the land in controversy, had been
employed by Sioco Cariño as his cattle herder.
On the advice of his lawyers, and because there were already many
parcels of land recorded in his name,[4]
Sioco Cariño caused the survey of the land in controversy in the name of
Ting-el Dicman.
On
DEED OF CONVEYANCE OF PART
RIGHTS AND
INTERESTS IN AGRICULTURAL LAND.
KNOW ALL
PERSONS BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, Ting-el Diac-man, of legal age, widower, and
resident of the sitio known as “Atab”, near Camp Seven, City of Baguio,
Philippine Islands, DO HEREBY STATE, viz: —
That I am the applicant for a free-patent of a parcel of
land (public), having a surface of over ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the
District Land Office of Baguio for me, and located in the place known as Camp
Seven, Baguio;
That to-date I have not as
yet received the plan for said survey;
That Mr. Sioco Cariño has advanced all expenses for said
survey for me and in my name, and also all other expenses for the improvement
of said land, to date;
That for and in consideration of said advance expenses,
to me made and delivered by said Mr. Sioco Cariño, I hereby pledge and promise
to convey, deliver and transfer unto said Sioco Cariño, of legal age, married
to Guilata Acop, and resident of Baguio, P.I., his heirs and assigns, one half
(1/2) of my title, rights, and interest to and in the aforesaid parcel of land;
same to be delivered, conveyed and transferred in a final form, according to
law, to him, his heirs and assigns, by me, my heirs, and assigns, as soon as
title for the same is issued to me by proper authorities.
That this conveyance,
transfer, or assignment, notwithstanding its temporary nature, shall have legal
force and effect; once it is approved by the approving authorities all the
final papers and documents, this instrument shall be considered superseded.
After I have received my
title to said parcel of land I bind myself, my heirs and assigns, to execute
the final papers and forward same for approval of the competent authorities at
Mr. Sioco Cariño’s expense.
WITNESS MY HAND in the
City of
his right
TING-EL DIAC-MAN
thumbmark[5]
After the execution of the foregoing
deed, Sioco Cariño, who had been in possession of the land in controversy since
1916, continued to stay thereon.
On
x x x for and in
consideration of the sum of ONE PESO (P 1.00) Philippine Currency and other
valuable considerations which I had received from my son, Guzman A. Cariño x x
x have ceded, transferred and conveyed as by these presents do hereby cede,
convey and transfer unto the [sic] said Guzman A. Cariño, his heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns, all my rights, title, interests in and
participation to that parcel of land (public) covered by an application for
free patent with a surface area of Ten (10) hectares, surveyed by the District
Land Office of Baguio in the name of Pingel Dicman, and who ceded, conveyed and
transferred one half of his title, rights and interests to me under an
instrument executed by the said owner in the city of Baguio, Philippines, on
the 22nd day of October, 1928 A.D. and duly ratified before Notary
Public x x x together with all improvements therein, consisting of oranges,
mangoes, and other fruit trees and a building of strong materials (half
finished) x x x, which building was purchased by me from H.C. Heald on March
14, 1916, free from all liens and encumbrances, with full rights and authority
to the said Guzman A. Cariño to perfect his claim with any government agency
the proper issuance of such patent or title as may be permitted to him under
existing laws.
x x x x[6]
In a letter dated
On
On
On
Meanwhile, on
January 8, 1960, while the foregoing petition was pending in the trial court,
President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 628 “excluding from the
operation of the Baguio Townsite Reservation certain parcels of public land
known as ‘Igorot Claims’ situated in the City of Baguio and declaring the same
open to disposition under the provisions of Chapter VII of the Public Land
Act.” The Proclamation further provided
that the “Igorot Claims” enumerated therein shall be “subject to the condition
that except in favor of the government or any of its branches, units, or
institutions, lands acquired by virtue of this proclamation shall not be
encumbered or alienated within a period of fifteen years from and after the
date of issuance of patent.” One such
claim pertained to the “Heirs of Dicman,” to wit:
Name
Heirs of 46 Swo-37115 “J” 101,006
Dicman
Before the trial
court could dispose of the case, the Supreme Court promulgated Republic v. Marcos[9]
which held that Courts of First Instance of Baguio have no jurisdiction to
reopen judicial proceedings on the basis of Republic Act No. 931. As a consequence, on July 28, 1978, the trial
court dismissed the petition to reopen Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O.
211 insofar as Lot 76-B was concerned, and the certificate of title issued
pursuant to the partial decision involving Lot 76-A was invalidated. The trial court stated that the remedy for
those who were issued titles was to file a petition for revalidation under
Presidential Decree No. 1271, as amended by Presidential Decrees No. 1311 and
2034.
After the
dismissal of the case, Guzman Cariño was left undisturbed in his possession of
the subject property until his death on
On April 20, 1983,
petitioners, suing as compulsory heirs of Ting-el Dicman, revived the foregoing
case by filing a complaint for recovery of possession with damages involving
the subject property with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 59-R. As earlier stated, petitioners, then
complainants, originally sought to recover possession of the eastern half of
the parcel of land situated in Residence Section “J”, Camp Seven,
Petitioners, then
plaintiffs, averred in their complaint:
10. That however, this
Honorable Court was not able to decide the [
] petition for reopening as far as the remaining eastern half portion of
the above-described property is concerned due to the fact that the said
petition was dismissed for alleged lack of jurisdiction; x x x
11. That because of the above-mentioned
dismissal, the conflict between herein plaintiffs and defendant over the half
eastern portion of the above-described property which was one of the issues
supposed to be decided in the said judicial reopening case remains undecided;
12. That after the dismissal of the
abovementioned petition and before the dispute between herein plaintiffs and
defendant over the eastern half portion of the above-described property,
defendant unlawfully and illegally continue to occupy portion [sic] of the
above-described property to the clear damage and prejudice of herein
plaintiffs;
13. That the defendant has no valid claim of
ownership and possession over any of the portions of the above-described
property;
14. That plaintiffs and their
predecessors-in-interest have been religiously paying the realty taxes covering
the above-described property x x x[11]
Private respondent
Jose Cariño filed his answer and prayed for dismissal. He alleged that his predecessors-in-interest
had acquired the land by onerous title through the “Deed of Absolute Sale”
dated January 10, 1938 executed by his grandfather, Sioco Cariño, as seller,
and his father, Guzman Cariño, as buyer; that the property was earlier acquired
by Sioco Cariño by virtue of the “Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land” dated October 22, 1928 executed between Sioco
Cariño and Ting-el Dicman; and that he has been in possession of the subject
property for 55 years peacefully, in good faith, and in concept of owner and
therefore perfected title over the same through acquisitive prescription.
On
The RTC, through
an ocular inspection on
On
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Plaintiffs’ complaint is hereby DISMISSED;
2.
Plaintiffs’-Intervenors complaint-in-intervention is hereby
dismissed;
3.
Defendant is hereby declared the lawful possessor and as
the party who has the better right over the land subject matter [sic] of this
action and as such he may apply for the confirmation of his title thereto in
accordance with law (R.A. No. 8940[12])[.] Defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed;
4.
Costs is [sic] adjudged against the plaintiff and
plaintiff-intervenor.
SO ORDERED.
To support its ruling, the RTC found
that the tax declarations and their revisions submitted as evidence by the
petitioners made no reference to the land in question;[13]
that no tax declaration over the land declared in the name of the Estate of
Sioco Cariño had been submitted as evidence, and that the intervenor-estate
presented tax declarations over the building only; that it was Guzman Cariño
alone who declared for taxation purposes both the land and the improvements
thereon in his name;[14]
that there is no evidence to the
effect that
petitioners ever filed any action to challenge the validity of the “Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land” dated October 22,
1928; that even assuming that this instrument may be invalid for whatever
reason, the fact remains that Sioco Cariño and his successors-in-interest had
been in possession of the subject property publicly, adversely, continuously
and in concept of owner for at least 55 years before the filing of the action;[15]
that Sioco’s successor, Guzman Cariño, had been in open and continuous
possession of the property in good faith and in the concept of owner from 1938
until his death in 1982 and, hence, the Estate of Sioco Cariño has lost all
rights to recover possession from Guzman Cariño or his heirs and assigns; and
that although the Estate of Sioco Cariño attempted to assail the genuineness
and due execution of the “Deed of Absolute Sale” dated January 10, 1938
executed by Sioco Cariño in favor of his son, Guzman Cariño, the challenge
failed since no evidence had been adduced to support the allegation of forgery.[16]
On
Petitioners
raised the following issues before the Court of Appeals:
1. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT CONSIDERING THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE OF THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS AND THE
STRAIGHTFORWARD DECLARATIONS OF THEIR WITNESS.
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN
AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS
NULLITY.
3. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE TO HAVE A BETTER RIGHT TO THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE.
4. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE COMPLAINT AND NOT GRANTING THE RELIEFS PRAYED FOR THEREIN.
On
The CA based its
ruling on the following reasons: that the petitioners raised for the first time
on appeal the issue on whether the “Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and
Interests in Agricultural Land” is void ab
initio under Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu[17]
(which was made applicable later to the Mountain Province and Nueva Viscaya by
Act 2798, as amended by Act 2913, and then to all other cultural minorities
found within the national territory by virtue of Section 120 of the Public Land
Act[18])
and, hence, cannot be considered by the reviewing court;[19]
that, even if this issue were considered, the records fail to show that Ting-el
Dicman, though an Igorot, is a non-Christian and, hence, the foregoing laws are
not applicable;[20]
that there was sufficient proof of consideration for the said deed;[21]
and that even if the deed were a mere contract to sell and not an absolute
sale, under Borromeo v. Franco[22]
the obligation on the part of the purchaser to perfect the title papers
within a certain time is not a condition subsequent nor essential to the
obligation to sell, but rather the same is an incidental undertaking the
failure to comply therewith not being a bar to the sale agreed upon.[23]
On
Petitioners raise
the following grounds for the petition:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE PROVISIONS OF ACT NO. 2798 ARE NOT APPLICABLE TO THE “DEED
OF CONVEYANCE” EXECUTED BY PING-EL DICMAN ON THE GROUNDS THAT THERE IS NO PROOF
THAT HE WAS A NON-CHRISTIAN AND THAT
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN THE APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN BORROMEO
V. FRANCO (5 PHIL 49 [1905]) THAT AN AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF THE PARTY TO A
CONTRACT TO PERFECT THE TITLE PAPERS TO A CERTAIN PROPERTY WITHIN A CERTAIN
TIME IS NOT A CONDITION SUBSEQUENT OR ESSENTIAL OF THE OBLIGATION TO SELL
[sic].
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SUBJECT OF LITIGATION AND OVER WHICH RESPONDENT’S
IMPROVEMENTS ARE BUILT BELONGS TO RESPONDENT NOTWITHSTANDING UNCONTROVERTED
EVIDENCE THAT PETITIONERS’ PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST PING-EL DICMAN HAD APPLIED
FOR FREE PATENT OVER THE SUBJECT AREA AND HAD BEEN ISSUED PLAN SWO-37115 IN HIS
NAME BY THE BUREAU OF LANDS IN 1954 AND HAD BEEN IN ACTUAL, OPEN, PEACEFUL,
ADVERSE AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE PROPERTY SINCE THE EARLY 1900s UNTIL
HIS DEATH WHEN HIS GRANCHILDREN AND SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, THE PETITIONERS,
TOOK OVER AND CONTINUED THE POSSESSION OF THEIR GRANDFATHER, PING-EL DICMAN.
On March 2, 2001,
petitioners filed their Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and
Cristina Alawas With Their Respective Heirs stating, among others, that Julio
F. Dicman, son of petitioner Ernesto Dicman, had been appointed by the
petitioners to sign the petition for and in their behalf, but due to distance
and time constraints between Makati City and Baguio, he was not able to submit
the same in time for the deadline for the petition on February 12, 2001. Petitioners attached the Special Power of
Attorney seeking to formalize the appointment of Julio F. Dicman as their
attorney-in-fact and to ratify his execution of the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping for and on behalf of the petitioners.
On
VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION
I, JULIO F. DICMAN,
of legal age, Filipino, with residence address at Camp 7, Montecillo Road,
Baguio City, after being first duly sworn in accordance with law, do hereby
depose and state:
1. I am one of the petitioners in the
above-entitled case;
x x x (emphasis supplied)
To private
respondent, since Ernesto Dicman, one of the petitioners, appears to be alive,
he excludes his son as the successor-in-interest of Ting-el Dicman. The verification, therefore, is false in view
of the statement under oath that Julio F. Dicman is a petitioner when in fact
he is not, and should be cause for the dismissal of the case and indirect
contempt of court, without prejudice to administrative and criminal action.
On May 2, 2001, in
their Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File the Attached Reply and Reply,
petitioners argued that while it may be true that the verification and
certification to the petition were signed by Julio F. Dicman, the son of one of
the petitioners, they subsequently confirmed his authority to sign on behalf of
all the petitioners through the Special Power of Attorney submitted to the
Court in a Manifestation and Motion to Substitute Babing Cosil and Cristina
Alawas With Their Respective Heirs filed on March 2, 2001. Petitioners invoked substantial compliance
and prayed that the Court overlook the procedural lapse in the interest of
substantial justice. The parties
thereafter submitted their respective memoranda.
The petition must
be dismissed on the following grounds:
1. Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires the pleader to submit a certificate of non-forum
shopping to be executed by the plaintiff or principal party, is mandatory, and
non-compliance therewith is a sufficient ground for the dismissal of the
petition.[24]
The forum shopping certification must be
signed by the party himself as he has personal knowledge of the facts therein
stated.[25] Obviously, it is the plaintiff or principal
party who is in the best position to know whether he actually filed or caused
the filing of a petition in the case.[26] Where there are two or more plaintiffs or
petitioners, all of them must sign the verification and non-forum
certification, and the signature of only one of them is insufficient,[27]
unless the one who signs the verification and certification has been authorized
to execute the same by, and on behalf of, the co-plaintiff or co-petitioner.[28] But it must be stressed that the requirement
the principal party himself should sign the certification applies only to a
natural person and not to a juridical person which can only act through its
officer or duly authorized agent.[29]
However, the Court
has also held that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and
facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be
interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with
respect to the contents of the certification.
This is because the requirement of strict compliance with the provisions
regarding the certification of non-forum shopping merely underscores its
mandatory nature in that the certification cannot be altogether dispensed with
or its requirements completely disregarded.[30]
Thus, under justifiable circumstances,
the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification
considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional.[31]
But a perusal of
the relevant decisions handed down by this Court consistently shows that
substantial compliance may be invoked and the procedural lapse overlooked
provided that, where the petitioner is a natural person as in the case at bar,
the authorized signatory must also be a principal party or co-petitioner.[32]
Petitioners, as natural persons, cannot therefore appoint a non-party to sign
for them, especially since only the petitioners occupy the best position to
know whether they actually filed or caused the filing of a petition in this
case and who personally know the facts stated in the petition. On this point alone the petition should be
dismissed.
2. It is a settled rule that in the exercise of
the Supreme Court’s power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the
contending parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings
of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. While
jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be
resolved by this Court, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the
findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence
on record; and (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, could justify a
different conclusion,[33]
none of these exceptions has been shown to apply in the present case and,
hence, this Court may not review the findings of fact made by the lower courts.
3. Petitioners argue on appeal that the “Deed of
Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land” dated October 22,
1928 executed between Sioco Cariño and Ting-el Dicman is void ab initio
for lack of approval of competent authorities as required under Section 145 in
relation to Section 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, the
application of which was later extended to the Mountain Province and Nueva
Viscaya and, thereafter, throughout the entire national territory;[34]
that the sale was without valid consideration; and that the said deed is not an
absolute sale but merely a contract to sell subject to the suspensive condition
that the papers evidencing the title must first be perfected. These arguments were lumped under the
following issue in their appeal to the CA:
2. THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONSIDERING THE DEED OF CONVEYANCE [OF] PART RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN
AGRICULTURAL LAND EXECUTED BY DICMAN IN FAVOR OF SIOCO CARIÑO DESPITE ITS
NULLITY.
The foregoing
issue and the incidents thereunder were never raised by the petitioners during
the proceedings before the RTC. Suffice
it to say that issues raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely
in the proceedings in the lower court are barred by estoppel.[35] Matters, theories or arguments not brought
out in the original proceedings cannot be considered on review or appeal where
they are raised for the first time. To
consider the alleged facts and arguments raised belatedly would amount to
trampling on the basic principles of fair play, justice and due process.[36]
4.
Even if this Court should declare the sale null and void or the
agreement merely a contract to sell subject to a suspensive condition that has
yet to occur, private respondent nonetheless acquired ownership over the land
in question through acquisitive prescription.[37]
The
records show that as early as 1938, the land in controversy had been in the
possession of Guzman Cariño, predecessor-in-interest of private respondent,
continuously, publicly, peacefully, in concept of owner, and in good faith with
just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest, well beyond the period required under law to acquire
title by acquisitive prescription which, in this case, is 10 years.[38]
The findings of fact of the lower
courts, and which this Court has no reason to disturb, inescapably point to
this conclusion: immediately after the “Deed of Absolute Sale,” a public
instrument dated January 10, 1938, had been executed by Sioco Cariño in favor
of his son, Guzman Cariño (the father of private respondent), the latter
immediately occupied the property; the 1940 directory of Baguio Telephones
lists his residence at Camp 7, Baguio City along with his telephone number; his
permitting the use of portions of the property to various third parties; his
introduction of improvements over the land in controversy; the testimonial
accounts of his neighbors; and that it was Guzman Cariño alone who declared for
tax purposes both the land and the improvements thereon in his name, while the
tax declarations of the other claimants made no reference to the subject
property.[39] Although arguably Sioco Cariño may not have
been the owner of the subject property when he executed the “Deed of Absolute
Sale” in 1938 in favor of his son, the requirement of just title is nonetheless
satisfied, which means that the mode of transferring ownership should
ordinarily have been valid and true, had the grantor been the owner.[40] By the time the successors-in-interest of
Ting-el Dicman sought to establish ownership over the land in controversy by
filing their “Petition of the Heirs of Dicman to Reopen Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. 211” on April 24, 1959 with the trial court, and which Guzman
timely opposed, more than 20 years had already elapsed. Thus, the 10-year period for acquisitive
prescription is deemed satisfied well before Guzman’s possession can be said to
be civilly interrupted by the filing of the foregoing petition to reopen.[41] After the dismissal of that case on
5.
Prescinding from the issue on prescription, the petitioners and their
predecessors-in-interest are nonetheless guilty of laches.
Laches has been defined as such neglect or
omission to assert a right, taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and
other circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse party, as will operate as a
bar in equity.[42] It is a delay in the assertion of a right
which works disadvantage to another[43]
because of the inequity founded on some change in the condition or relations of
the property or parties.[44] It is based on public policy which, for the
peace of society,[45]
ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a
valid claim.[46] It is different from and applies
independently of prescription. While
prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is concerned with the effect of delay. Prescription is a matter of time; laches is principally a question of
inequity of permitting a claim to be enforced, this inequity being founded on
some change in the condition of the property or the relation of the
parties. Prescription is statutory; laches is not. Laches
applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Prescription is based on a fixed time, laches is not.[47]
Laches means the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which,
by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting
the presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined
to assert it.[48] It has been held that even a registered owner
of property under the Torrens Title system may be barred from recovering
possession of property by virtue of laches.[49]
Given the
foregoing findings of fact, all the four (4) elements of laches, as prescribed by the decisions of this Court, are present
in the case, to wit:
1.a. Conduct on the part of the
defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of
which complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
2.b. Delay in asserting the
complainant’s rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice, of the
defendant’s conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a
suit;
3.c. Lack of knowledge or notice on
the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which
he bases his suit; and
d.
Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.[50]
As correctly held
by the RTC, there is no evidence to the effect that Ting-el Dicman or his
successors-in-interest ever filed any action to question the validity of the
“Deed of Conveyance of Part Rights and Interests in Agricultural Land” after
its execution on
6. Petitioners argue that Proclamation No. 628
issued by then President Carlos P. Garcia on January 8, 1960 had the effect of
“segregating” and “reserving” certain Igorot claims identified therein,
including one purportedly belonging to the “Heirs of Dicman,” and prohibiting
any encumbrance or alienation of these claims for a period of 15 years from
acquisition of patent. But by the time
the Proclamation had been issued, all rights over the property in question had
already been vested in private respondent.
The executive issuance can only go so far as to classify public land,
but it cannot be construed as to prejudice vested rights. Moreover, property rights may not be altered
or deprived by executive fiat alone without contravening the due process
guarantees[54]
of the Constitution and may amount to unlawful taking of private property to be
redistributed for public use without just compensation.[55]
The recognition, respect, and protection of the rights
of indigenous peoples to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and
institutions are vital concerns of the State and constitute important public
policies which bear upon this case. To give
life and meaning unto these policies the legislature saw it fit to enact
Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997, as a culminating measure to affirm the views and opinions of indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities
on matters that affect their life and culture.[56] The provisions of that law unify an otherwise
fragmented account of constitutional, jurisprudential and statutory doctrine
which enjoins the organs of government to be vigilant for the protection of
indigenous cultural communities as a marginalized sector,[57]
to protect their ancestral domain and ancestral lands and ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being,[58]
and to guard their patrimony from those inclined to prey upon their ignorance
or ductility.[59] As the final arbiter of disputes and the last
bulwark of the Rule of Law this Court has always been mindful of the highest
edicts of social justice especially where doubts arise in the interpretation
and application of the law. But when in
the pursuit of the loftiest ends ordained by the Constitution this Court finds
that the law is clear and leaves no room for doubt, it shall decide according
to the principles of right and justice as all people conceive them to be, and
with due appreciation of the rights of all persons concerned.
WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
(On
leave)
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned
by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali (now retired), with Associate Justices
Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Eriberto U. Rosario, Jr. (now retired), concurring.
[2] The
eastern portion was denominated as Lot 76-B of Plan RS-463-D.
[3] Also
known as “Ping-el” or “Diac-man” in the records.
[4] The
RTC took judicial notice of the historical fact “that much of Baguio City,
including the Camp John Hay reservation which adjoins the property in question,
used to belong to the Cariño family, particularly their patriarch Mateo
Cariño. In fact, a whole district of the
city, Campo Sioco, is named after Sioco Cariño himself.” RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 103.
[5] Exhibit
“6”; Exhibit “H” of Estate of Sioco Cariño.
[6] Exhibit
“8”; Exhibit “O” of Estate of Sioco Cariño.
[7] Sioco
Cariño’s letter asked Guzman Cariño“ to come up here at Camp 7 because I am
here waiting for you inasumuch as I like to hand over to you this building here
in Camp 7 and also the land which came from Isis, in order that you and your
wife have a gift which will serve as the remembrance of your children from me,
your father.” RTC Decision, pp. 2-3; Rollo,
pp. 103-4.
[8] CA
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 63 ; RTC Decision, at 3; Rollo, p. 104.
[9] 140
Phil. 241 (1969), reiterated in Republic
v. Marcos, 152 Phil. 204 (1973).
[10] RTC
Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.
[11] Rollo,
p. 83.
[12] This
should read “R.A. 6940” which is entitled “AN ACT GRANTING A PERIOD ENDING ON
DECEMBER 31, 2000 FOR FILING APPLICATIONS FOR FREE PATENT AND JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE TO ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LANDS OF THE PUBLIC
DOMAIN UNDER CHAPTERS VII AND VIII OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT (CA 141, AS
AMENDED).”
[13] RTC
Decision, pp. 4-5;
[14]
[15] RTC
Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.
[16] RTC
Decision, p. 7; Rollo, p. 108.
[17] Sections
145 and 146 provide as follows:
SEC. 145. Contracts with non-Christians: requisites.
- Save and except contracts of sale or barter of personal property and
contracts of personal service comprehended in chapter seventeen hereof no
contract or agreement shall be made in the Department by any person with any
Moro or other non-Christian tribe or portion thereof the Department or with any
individual Moro or other non-Christian inhabitant of the same for the payment
or delivery of money or other thing of value in present or in prospective, or
in any manner affecting or relating to any real property, unless such contract
or agreement be executed and approved as follows:
x x x
(b) It shall be executed before a judge of a
court of record, justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public,
and shall bear the approval of the provincial governor wherein the same was
executed or his representative duly authorized in writing for such purpose,
indorsed upon it.
x
x x
(f) The judge,
justice or auxiliary justice of the peace, or notary public before whom such
contract or agreement is executed shall certify officially thereon the time
when and the place where such contract or agreement was executed, and that it
was in his presence, and who are the interested parties thereto, as stated to
him at the time; the parties making the same; the source and extent of
authority claimed at the time by the contracting parties to make the contract
or agreement, and whether made in person or by agent or attorney of any party
or parties thereto.
SEC. 146. Void contracts. - Every contract or
agreement made in violation of the next preceding section shall be null and
void; and all money or other thing of value paid to any person by any aforesaid
Moro or non-Christian inhabitant or tribe or portion thereof, or any other
person, for or on his or their behalf, thereunder or pursuant thereto may be
recovered by suit in the name of the province wherein the contract was executed
in any court of competent jurisdiction; and one-half thereof shall be paid to
the person suing for the same, and the other half shall be paid into the
treasury of the province wherein the contract was executed for the use of the
aforesaid Moro or non-Christian inhabitant or tribe or portion thereof by or
for whom it was so paid.
[18] Amarante
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Lacamen
v. Laruan, G.R. No. L-27088,
[19] CA
Decision, p. 10; Rollo, p. 70.
[20] CA
Decision, pp. 11-13; Rollo, pp. 71-3.
[21] CA
Decision, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 73-4.
[22] 5 Phil
49 (1905).
[23] CA
Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 74
[24] Rules of Court, Rule 46, Sec. 3, par. 5.
(1997); Great Southern Maritime Services Co. v. Acuña, G.R. No. 140189,
February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435; Philippine Phosphate Fetilizer Co. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 141973, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA
369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog
City, Br. 9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806.
[25] Loquias v. Ombudsman, 392 Phil. 596 (2000).
[26] Philippine
Phosphate Fetilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
141973, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 382; Chan v. Regional Trial Court of
Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br. 9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15,
2004, 427 SCRA 796, 806; Mendigorin v. Cabantog, 436 Phil. 483 (2002); Digital
Microwave Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128550, March 16, 2000,
328 SCRA 286, 290.
[27] Estares
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June 8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604, 616-17; Gonzales
v. Balikatan Kilusang Bayan sa Pananalapi, Inc., G.R. No. 150859, March 28,
2005, 454 SCRA 111, 115-16.
[28] Loquias
v. Ombudsman, supra note 25, at 67-8.
[29] BA
Savings Bank v. Sia, 391 Phil. 370 (2000).
[30] Philippine
Phosphate Fetilizer Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No.
141973, June 28, 2005, 461 SCRA 369, 383-84; Vicar International
Construction, Inc. v. FEB Leasing and Finance Co., G.R. No. 157195, April
22, 2005, 456 SCRA 588, 596-99; Great Southern Maritime Services Co. v.
Acuña, G.R. No. 140189, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 422, 435-37; Cavile
v. Heirs of Cavile, 448 Phil. 302 (2003); Chan v. Regional Trial Court
of Zamboanga del Norte in Dipolog City, Br. 9, G.R. No. 149253, April 15,
2004, 427 SCRA 796, 808; General Milling Corporation v. NLRC, 442 Phil.
424 (2002); Active Realty & Development Corporation v. Daroya, 431
Phil. 753, 758-59 (2002); Shipside Incorporated v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 143377, February 20, 2001, 352 SCRA 334, 345-47; Uy v. LandBank,
G.R. No. 136100, July 24, 2000, 336 SCRA 419, 427-29; Roadway Express, Inc.
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121488, November 21, 1996, 264 SCRA 696,
700-01; Bernardo v. NLRC, G.R. No. 105819, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 108,
117; Loyola v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117186, June 29, 1995, 245
SCRA 477, 482-84.
[31] See, e.g., Ateneo de Naga University v. Manalo, G.R. No. 160455, May
9, 2005, 458 SCRA 325, 336-37; Torres v. Specialized Packaging Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 149634, July 6 2004, 433 SCRA 455, 465.
[32]
See San Miguel Co. v. Aballa, G.R. No. 149011, June 28,
2005, 461 SCRA 392; Heirs of Olarte v. NHA, G.R. No. 165821, June 21,
2005, 460 SCRA 561; Estares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144755, June
8, 2005, 459 SCRA 604; Cavile v. Heirs of Cavile, G.R. No. 148635, 1
April 2003, 400 SCRA 255, 261-262; Docena v. Lapesura, G.R. No. 140153,
March 28, 2001, 355 SCRA 658; Dar v. Alonzo-Legasto, 393 Phil. 734
(2000).
[33] Rivera
v. Roman, G.R. No. 142402, September 20, 2005, 470 SCRA 276; The Insular
Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, April
28, 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 86; Aguirre v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122249,
January 29, 2004, 421 SCRA 310, 319; C & S Fishfarm Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 442 Phil. 279 (2002).
[34] Amarante
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Lacamen
v. Laruan, G.R. No. L-27088,
[35] Cruz v. Fernando, G.R. No. 145470, December
9, 2005, 477 SCRA 173, 182; Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127469, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 487, 503-04; Caltex
(Phils), Inc. v. CA, G.R. No. 97753, August 10, 1992, 212 SCRA 448, 461.
[36] Cruz
v. Fernando, supra; Department of Agrarian Reform v. Franco, G.R.
No. 147479, September 26, 2005, 471 SCRA 74, 92-93; Gualberto v. Go,
G.R. No. 139843, July 21, 2005, 463 SCRA 671, 678; De Rama v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 131136, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 94.
[37] Section
41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure) provides:
Sec. 41. Title
to land by prescription. – Ten years actual adverse possession by any
person claiming to be the owner for that time of any land or interest in land,
uninterruptedly continued for ten years by occupancy, descent, grants, or
otherwise, in whatever way such occupancy may have commenced or continued,
shall vest in every actual occupant or possessor of such land a full and
complete title, saving to the person under disabilities the rights secured by
the next section. In order to constitute
such title by prescription or adverse possession, the possession by the
claimant or by the person under or through whom he claims must be actual, open,
public, continuous, under a claim of title exclusive of any other right and
adverse to all claimants x x x
The
relevant provisions under the present Civil Code provide:
Art.
1117. Acquisitive prescription of
dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law.
Art. 1118. Possession has to be in the concept of an
owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted.
Art.
1127. The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.
Art. 1128. The conditions of good faith required for
possession in articles 526, 527, 528, and 529 of this Code are likewise
necessary for the determination of good faith in the prescription of ownership
and other real rights.
Art. 1129. For the purposes of prescription, there is
just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over
immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of
ten years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real
rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
[38] Code of Civil Procedure, Act 190,
Section 41. Article 1116 of the 1950
Civil Code states:
Prescription already running before the effectivity
of this Code shall be governed by laws previously in force; but if since the
time this Code took effect the entire period herein required for prescription
should lapse, the present Code shall be applicable, even though by the former
laws a longer period might be required.
This is a case where Article 1116 may be said to
apply, such that if the period began and ended under the old law, then the
period under the old law applies which, in this case, is only 10 years
regardless of good faith or bad faith.
Section 41 of Act 190, otherwise known as the Code of Civil Procedure,
allows adverse possession in any character, whether good faith or bad faith, to
ripen into ownership after the lapse of ten years. See Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No.
159571, July 15, 2005, 463 SCRA 627, 643-44; Ramos v. CA, 198 Phil. 263; Alvero
v. Reas, 146 Phil. 221 (1970); Ongsiaco v. Dallo, 136 Phil. 596
(1969); Arboso v. Andrade, 87 Phil. 782, 785-786 (1950); Santos v.
Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 342 (1921); Locsin Rama v. Montelibano
Ramos, 36 Phil. 136 (1917); Altman v. Commanding Officer, 11 Phil.
516 (1908). Prescription lies under the
said section even in the absence of good faith and just title. Rigonan v. Derecho, G.R. No. 159571,
[39] CA
Decision, pp. 5-7; Rollo, pp. 65-7; RTC Decision, pp. 3, 5; Rollo,
pp. 104, 106.
[40] See
Code of Civil Procedure, Act
190, Section 41. See also Civil Code of the
[41] See
Civil
Code of the
[42] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, G.R. No. 144103,
[43] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra, citing Hall
v. Mortgage Secur.
[44] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra, citing 2
Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence
171-72 (5th ed.).
[45] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra, citing Tijam
v. Sibonghanoy, L-21450,
[46] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra, citing Vda.
de Lima v. Tio, 143 Phil. 401 (1970).
[47] De
Vera-Cruz v. Miguel, supra; Lacamen v. Laruan, supra, citing Nielson
& Company, Inc. v. Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., 125 Phil. 204
(1966).
[48]
[49] Panganiban
v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 151235,
[50] Panganiban
v. Dayrit, supra, note 49, at 382; Claverias v. Quingco, G.R. No.
77744, March 6, 1992, 207 SCRA 66, 83; Miguel v. Catalino, 135 Phil.
229, 235 (1968); Mejia de Lucas v. Gamponia, 100 Phil. 277, 280 (1956); Go
Chi Gun v. Co Cho, 96 Phil. 622, 637 (1954), citing 19 Am. Jur., 343-344.
[51] RTC
Decision, p. 6; Rollo, p. 107.
[52] RTC
Decision, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 107-08.
[53] See Lucenta v. CFI, G.R. No. L-39789,
[54] See
Ayog v. Cusi, 204 Phil. 126 (1982).
[55] See
Manotok v. NHA, G.R. No. L-55166-7,
[56] See
Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Introducing the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, 47
Ateneo L.J. 571 (2002)
(introducing the Colloquium on Indigenous Peoples and discussing the framework
of IPRA); Werner Blenk, ILO Partnership with Indigenous Peoples, 47 Ateneo L.J. 556 (2002) (defining the
historical involvement of the International Labor Organization in the situation
of indigenous and tribal peoples); Terence D. Jones, The United Nations
Development Programme and the Indigenous Peoples, 47 Ateneo L.J 562 (2002) (discussing the
situation of indigenous peoples in light of internal conflict and sustainable
development).
[57] Civil Code of the
[58] See
Philippine Const. Art. XII,
Sec. 5.
[59] Amarante
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 76386, October 26, 1987, 155 SCRA 46, 58; Madale
v. Sa Raya, 92 Phil. 558 (1953); Porkan v. Navarro, 73 Phil. 698
(1942); De Porkan v. Yatco, 70 Phil. 161 (1940).