CARGOLIFT
SHIPPING, INC. G.R. No. 146426
Petitioner,
Present:
Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairperson),
-
versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
L. ACUARIO MARKETING CORP.
and SKYLAND BROKERAGE, INC.,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 27, 2006
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YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the July
6, 2000 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 55664, which affirmed the judgment[2] of
the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 121, in Civil Case No. C-16120
in so far as it found petitioner Cargolift Shipping, Inc. (“Cargolift”) liable,
as third-party defendant, for actual damages in the sum of P97,021.20, as well
as the November 28, 2000 Resolution[3]
denying the motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts of the case are
as follows:
Sometime in March 1993, respondent L. Acuario Marketing Corp., (“Acuario”)
and respondent Skyland Brokerage, Inc., (“Skyland”) entered into a time charter
agreement[4]
whereby Acuario leased to Skyland its L. Acuario II barge for use by the latter
in transporting electrical posts from Manila to Limay, Bataan. At the same time, Skyland also entered into a
separate contract[5] with petitioner Cargolift,
for the latter’s tugboats to tow the aforesaid barge.
In accordance with the foregoing contracts, petitioner’s tugboat M/T
Beejay left the
Off-loading operations went underway until
On the same day, the barge was brought to Acuario’s shipyard where it was
allegedly discovered by Acuario’s dry-docking officer, Guillermo Nacu, Jr., that
the barge was listing due to a leak in its hull. According to Nacu, he was informed by the
skipper of the tugboat that the damage was sustained in
The barge was consequently dry-docked for repairs at the Western Shipyard
from April 16 to
Pursuant to its contract with Skyland which provided that “(a)ny damage
or loss on the barge due to the fault or negligence of charterers shall be the
responsibility of the (c)harterer or his representative,”[7] Acuario
wrote Skyland seeking reimbursement of its repair costs, failing which, it
filed a complaint for damages against Skyland before the Regional Trial Court
of Caloocan City, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. C-16120 and
raffled to Branch 121.
Skyland, in turn, filed a
third-party complaint[8]
against petitioner alleging that it was responsible for the damage sustained by
the barge.
According to Acuario and its witnesses, the weather in
On the other hand, petitioner and
Skyland denied that the barge had been damaged. One of its witnesses, Salvador D. Ocampo,
claimed that he was involved in all aspects of the operation and that no
accident of any sort was brought to his knowledge. He alleged that the barge patron and tug
master made no mention of any maritime casualty during the clearing of the
vessels at the Philippine Ports Authority in Limay,
In due course, the trial court
promulgated its decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered,
judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the
defendant Skyland Brokerage to pay to the plaintiff L. Acuario Marketing
Corporation the cost of repairs of the barge L. Acuario II in the amount of
P97,021.20 and to seek reimbursement from the third-party defendant Cargolift
Shipping;
2. Ordering the
defendant to pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P24,255.30 and to seek
reimbursement thereof from the third-party defendant; and
3. Ordering the
defendant to pay the costs of suit subject to reimbursement from the
third-party defendant.
SO ORDERED.[11]
The trial court gave credence to the testimonies of Acuario’s witnesses
that the barge sustained damage while it was being chartered by Skyland. It held that the positive testimonies of
Acuario’s witnesses, coupled with documentary evidence detailing the nature and
extent of the damage as well as the repairs done on the barge, should prevail
over the bare denials of Skyland and petitioner. It also noted that two of the latter’s three
witnesses were not in Limay,
The trial court further held that Skyland was liable under its time
charter agreement with Acuario pursuant to Article 1159 of the Civil Code which
states that “contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties.” Skyland must bear the consequences of the
tugboat’s incapacity to respond to the barge’s request for assistance because
Acuario had no control in the selection of the tugboats used by Skyland. But since the ultimate fault lies with
petitioner, justice demands that the latter reimburse Skyland for whatever it
may be adjudged to pay Acuario.[12]
Both Skyland and petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals
which, on
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING OF
THE TRIAL COURT THAT L. ACUARIO II SUSTAINED DAMAGE AND THAT IT WAS SUSTAINED
DURING ITS CHARTER TO RESPONDENT SKYLAND.
II
ASSUMING THAT L. ACUARIO II SUFFERED DAMAGE, WHETHER THE COURT
OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE TRIAL COURT DECISION HOLDING PETITIONER
LIABLE THEREFOR.[14]
The petition lacks merit.
On the first assigned error,
petitioner is asking this Court to resolve factual issues that have already
been settled by the courts below. The
question of whether the barge had been damaged during its charter to Skyland is
a factual matter, the determination of which may not be generally disturbed on
appeal. Questions of fact are not
reviewable by this Court except under certain exceptional circumstances.[15] No such exceptional circumstance exists in the
case at bar.
On the contrary, the factual
conclusions reached by the courts below are consistent with the evidence on
record. Acuario’s witnesses testified
that strong winds and waves caused the barge to bump into the walls of the pier
where it was berthed for unloading. Petitioner’s
tugboat failed to tow it farther away due to engine breakdown, thus causing the
barge to sustain a hole in its hull. These
testimonies were duly supported and corroborated by documentary evidence
detailing the damage and repairs done on the barge.[16]
On the other hand, petitioner and
Skyland’s denial that there was inclement weather in the early hours of April
7, 1993 and that the barge sustained no damage on this occasion were not supported
by evidence to overcome the positive allegations of Acuario’s witnesses who
were present at the place and time of the incident. The categorical declaration of Acuario’s
witnesses regarding the events which led to the damage on the barge shifted the
burden of evidence on petitioner and Skyland. They could have easily disproved Acuario’s
claims by presenting competent proof that there was no weather disturbance on
that day or, by presenting the testimony of individuals who have personal
knowledge of the events which transpired.
Moreover, the inability of
petitioner’s and Skyland’s witnesses to unequivocally declare that it was still
the M/T Count that secured the barge during the resumption of off-loading
operations casts suspicion on their credibility. As aptly observed by the trial court, such
hesitation on the part of its witnesses is indicative of uncertainty, if not a
propensity to withhold information that could be unfavorable to their cause.[17] To our mind, therefore, the trial court rightly
concluded that petitioner’s M/T Count indeed encountered mechanical trouble, as
asserted by Acuario. The fact that petitioner
did not categorically deny the allegation of mechanical trouble only serves to
strengthen the trial court’s conclusion.
Petitioner’s assertion that it is
contrary to human experience for the barge to have made the return trip to
Consequently, we find no cogent reason to disturb the lower courts’
finding that the barge sustained a hole in its hull when petitioner’s tugboat
failed to tow it to a safer distance as the weather changed in the
As for the second assigned error,
petitioner asserts that it could not be held liable for the damage sustained by
Acuario’s barge because the latter sought to recover upon its contract with
Skyland, to which petitioner was not a party. Since it had no contractual relation with
Acuario, only Skyland should be held liable under the contract. Besides, Skyland contractually assumed the
risk that the tugboat might encounter engine trouble when it acknowledged in
its contract with petitioner that the latter’s vessels were in good order and
in seaworthy condition. At any rate, it
was neither negligent in the performance of its obligation nor the proximate
cause of the damage.
We do not agree.
It was not Acuario that seeks to hold
petitioner liable for the damage to the barge, as the former in fact sued only
Skyland pursuant to their charter agreement. It was Skyland that impleaded petitioner as
third-party defendant considering that Skyland was being held accountable for
the damage attributable to petitioner. In other words, petitioner was not sued
under Skyland’s charter agreement with Acuario, but pursuant to its separate
undertaking with Skyland. Strictly
speaking, therefore, petitioner is not being held liable under any charter
agreement with Acuario.
Consequently, it is not correct for
petitioner to assert that Acuario could not recover damages from it due to lack
of privity of contract between them. It
is not Acuario that is seeking damages from petitioner but Skyland, with whom it
undoubtedly had a juridical tie. While
Acuario could hold Skyland liable under its charter agreement, Skyland in turn
could enforce liability on petitioner based on the latter’s obligation to
Skyland. In other words, petitioner is
being held liable by Skyland and not by Acuario.
Thus, in the performance of its
contractual obligation to Skyland, petitioner was required to observe the due
diligence of a good father of the family. This much was held in the old but still
relevant case of Baer Senior & Co.’s Successors v. La Compania Maritima[21]
where the Court explained that a tug and its owners must observe ordinary
diligence in the performance of its obligation under a contract of towage. The negligence of the obligor in the
performance of the obligation renders him liable for damages for the resulting
loss suffered by the obligee. Fault or
negligence of the obligor consists in his failure to exercise due care and
prudence in the performance of the obligation as the nature of the obligation
so demands.[22]
In the case at bar, the exercise of
ordinary prudence by petitioner means ensuring that its tugboat is free of
mechanical problems. While adverse
weather has always been a real threat to maritime commerce, the least that
petitioner could have done was to ensure that the M/T Count or any of its other
tugboats would be able to secure the barge at all times during the engagement. This is especially true when considered with
the fact that Acuario’s barge was wholly dependent upon petitioner’s tugboat
for propulsion. The barge was not
equipped with any engine and needed a tugboat for maneuvering.[23]
Needless to say, if petitioner only
subjected the M/T Count to a more rigid check-up or inspection, the engine
malfunction could have been discovered or avoided. The M/T Count was exclusively controlled by
petitioner and the latter had the duty to see to it that the tugboat was in
good running condition. There is simply
no basis for petitioner’s assertion that Skyland contractually assumed the risk
of any engine trouble that the tugboat may encounter. Skyland merely procured petitioner’s towing
service but in no way assumed any such risk.
That petitioner’s negligence was the
proximate cause of the damage to the barge cannot be doubted. Had its tugboat been serviceable, the barge
could have been moved away from the stone wall with facility. It is too late in the day for petitioner to
insist that the proximate cause of the damage was the barge patron’s negligence
in not objecting to the position of the barge by the stone wall. Aside from the fact that the position of the
barge is quite understandable since off-loading operations were then still
underway,[24] the alleged negligence of
the barge patron is a matter that is also being raised for the first time
before this Court.
Thus, the damage to the barge could
have been avoided had it not been for the tugboat’s inability to tow it away
from the stone wall. Considering that a barge has no power of its own and is
totally defenseless against the ravages of the sea, it was incumbent upon
petitioner to see to it that it could secure the barge by providing a seaworthy
tugboat. Petitioner’s failure to do so
did not only increase the risk that might have been reasonably anticipated
during the shipside operation but was the proximate cause of the damage.[25] Hence, as correctly found by the courts below,
it should ultimately be held liable therefor.
WHEREFORE,
the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 55664 dated July 6, 2000 and the Resolution dated
November 28, 2000, finding petitioner Cargolift Shipping, Inc. liable, as
third-party defendant, for actual damages in the sum of P97,021.20, are AFFIRMED.
SO
ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that
the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico
and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Remedios
Salazar-Fernando.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15] Central Shipping Company, Inc. v. Insurance
Company of North America, G.R. No. 150751, September 20, 2004, 438 SCRA
511, 518.
[16] Rollo, p. 64.
[17]
[18]
[19] Smith Bell Dodwell Shipping Agency
Corporation v. Borja, 432 Phil. 913, 922 (2002).
[20] Central Shipping Company, Inc. v. Insurance
Company of North America, supra
note 15 at 518.
[21] 6
Phil. 215, 217-218 (1906).
[22] Bayne Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 380 Phil. 196, 201 (2000).
[23] Rollo, p. 32.
[24]
[25] Schmitz Transport & Brokerage
Corporation v. Transport Venture, Inc., G.R. No. 150255, April 22, 2005,
456 SCRA 557, 572.