FIRST DIVISION
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LYDIO ALVERO, Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 145209 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO,* AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,** CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before
trial, an accused has the right to remain silent. During trial, an accused has the right not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself.
An accused who waives these rights by speaking to the police or
testifying in court cannot complain that his statements were used to convict him.
This
is an appeal by certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court from the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals dated
The
factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
An information
was filed with the RTC of Surallah,
That
on or about the 9th day of September, 1991 in the afternoon thereof,
along the
On
As
summarized by the RTC, the prosecution’s evidence tends to establish the
following:
1. Luvimin Servañez is a PNP member detailed at Banga,
He
identified a picture of the front portion of the jeep (Exh.
A) with Plate No. LVK 365. He learned at the police station that said
jeep bumped a motorcycle. The jeep
driver is the accused Lydio Alvero. The accused voluntarily surrendered to the
police at the police station.
He
proceeded to the scene of the incident at Liwanay, Banga. While there
were people at the scene nobody answered [the] questions he asked. He made a sketch of the scene and took pictures
of the motorcycle (Exh. B).
He pointed
to an alleged tire mark of the motorcycle in a picture on the left lane going
to Banga (Exh. C). And he found the
motorcycle which figured in the incident away from the cemented road on the
left lane of it going to Koronadal (Exh. B).
It was lying four meters away from the edge of the road.
He learned
that the motorcycle driver was brought to Landero’s
Clinic where he could not interview said driver who was unconscious. So he brought the motorcycle to the Banga police station (Exh. D and E).
The part of
the jeep which allegedly bumped the motorcycle is the left front bumper (Exh. A, A-1).
A
sketch drawn by this witness (Exh. G) was identified by him.
Said sketch was on his own perception of the incident as according to
him no person in the scene did answer his questions. It appears the said sketch was shown without
basis.
The accused
adopted the exhibits of the prosecution as his own exhibits: Exh. A as Exh.
1; Exh. B
as Exh. 2; C as 3; D as 4; E
as 5; F as 6; and G as 7.
The
motorcycle was bumped on its rear portion.
On
cross-examination this witness identified his sworn statements (Exh. 8 or H). The
road where the incident happened is straight and plain.
2. Alex Bacolor was
riding on a truck in the afternoon of
The jeep
was following the motorcycle. It was the
rear portion of the motorcycle which was bumped. The truck returned to where the incident happened
and took the victims to Landero’s clinic. Actually the bumping he saw took place when
the truck he was riding had already passed by the motorcycle followed by the
jeep.
The jeep
which bumped left the motorcycle and the victims.
3. Nestor Villa is a civilian agent of the
NARCOM. Between
At Liwanay, Banga the motorcycle
where he rode was bumped on its rear. It
was bumped on the right lane of the highway going to Marbel
or Koronadal (p. 30, tsn –
9/15/92). At the back of the driver he
was seated and at his back was Sgt. Rondina.
Coming from
the opposite direction he saw an Isuzu Elf truck.
After the
bumping sound he lost consciousness and recovered it only at the provincial
hospital. He does not know how much he
spent for his hospitalization for two weeks.
The vehicle
was following very near the motorcycle (p. 34, ibid).[4]
The
defense presented the testimonies of Armado Fanela and the accused Lydio Alvero. Their
testimonies, as summarized by the trial court, are as follows:
1.
Lydio Alvero the
driver of the passenger jeep of the Yellow Bus Line, Inc. which bumped the
motorcycle was already 57 years old.
While he had already 25 years behind him as a driver he only had 8 years
driving experience with the Yellow Bus Line.
Here is how the accident happened as
told by the accused. He was following a motorcycle
from Surallah.
He was about to overtake it. But
the motorcycle swerved to the left.
He first saw the motorcycle near the
cockpit at Surallah.
He followed it for about 25 or 30 meters distance at the speed of 40
kilometers per hour while the motorcycle was at the speed of 45 kilometers per
hour.
While he was about to overtake the
motorcycle at a crossing, the motorcycle slowed down until he was about seven
meters away from the motorcycle. He also
slowed down and applied his brake and turned to the right but still he hit or
bumped the motorcycle. He was not able
to evade hitting the motorcycle.
The distance from the front of his
jeep to the back of the motorcycle was only three to two and one-half
meters. He bumped the motorcycle on the left
of the road going to Marbel. The jeep was then about two feet from the
center line of the road. And he did not
see the signal light of the motorcycle then.
The swerving of the motorcycle to
the left was sudden so he returned to the right as he was already driving his
jeep on the left side of the road in the process of overtaking the motorcycle.
After bumping the motorcycle, the
motorcycle was thrown out of the road about six meters away. Then he drove backward to load the victim but the
passengers shouted: “
He walked to the municipal hall of Banga and reported the incident.
The gross width of the motorcycle
was about one-half foot, yet he was not able to evade it as the swerving to the
left was too sudden. Before attempting
to overtake the motorcycle he blew the jeep’s horn.
On cross-examination he revealed
that at the poblacion the speed of his jeep was 40
kilometers per hour. From the cockpit to
the scene of the accident his speed was 30 kilometers per hour. He drove at this slow speed so he would not
hit the motorcycle.
The passengers of the motorcycle
were not unconscious after the bumping.
The driver of the motorcycle and Villa stood up. He did not see anyone holding a gun then.
2. Armando Fanela is
the conductor of the jeep driven by the accused when it bumped the
motorcycle. The accident took place at
A lady
passenger of the jeep said “Ay” and then he saw the motorcycle in front of the
jeep about to be bumped by the jeep.
Then the motorcycle was only one meter away from the jeep.
The jeep
was going to Marbel, and so with the motorcycle going
in the same direction. The motorcycle
when hit was thrown to the side of the road.
On
cross-examination he revealed that he did not see the motorcycle before the
lady shouted: “Ay”. And when he saw the
motorcycle the bumping happened in a second.
After hearing “Ay” he did not hear [the] sound of screeching of the
tire. He did not remember if a horn was
blown then.[5]
On
In view of
the foregoing, the court finds the accused Lydio Alvero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless
imprudence resulting to the death of Paulino Rondina, the injury of Nestor Villa and the loss of the
handcuff and sun glasses of the latter, and hereby sentences said accused the
penalty of an imprisonment of two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional in its medium period as its minimum to four years, two months and
one day of prision correccional in its maximum period as its maximum, and to
indemnify the surviving heirs of the victim Paulino Rondina, except his widow, in the sum of P20,000.00 and to Nestor
Villa the sum of P700.00 for
actual damages representing the value of his losses duly proved.[6]
Petitioner
appealed the guilty verdict to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial
court in the assailed decision and resolution.
The assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error
in the decision appealed from, We hereby AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
No costs.[7]
Hence,
this petition, where petitioner raises the following issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals,
in its Decision affirming the trial court’s judgment of conviction, erred by
failing to discuss and reason out on the basis of the prosecution evidence, and
by assailing instead what it perceived to be weaknesses in the defense
evidence.
2. Whether or not the prosecution has in
fact proved the petitioner guilty of gross negligence beyond reasonable doubt.
3. Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in assessing and rejecting the petitioner’s defense as weak, assuming for
the sake of argument that there was any need for petitioner to put up any
defense.
We
uphold the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. All that are assailed in this petition are
factual findings which this Court, as a general rule, is bereft of authority to
pass upon. Findings of fact of the trial
court, especially when upheld by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the
Supreme Court[8] except
in certain instances.[9]
The
prosecution was able to prove the negligence of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt.
Petitioner
posits, thus, that the judgment of conviction rendered against him by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was not sufficiently supported or
established by the prosecution evidence.
According
to petitioner, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals assessed the
prosecution evidence, and instead, directly assailed the supposed weaknesses of
the defense evidence.[10] Petitioner alleged that the findings
concerning his negligence were based entirely on the evidence of the defense and
not on the prosecution evidence.[11]
The
allegation that the finding of negligence was based entirely on the evidence of
the defense is belied by the records of the case. The prosecution had presented the Investigation
Report on Vehicular Accident[12]
and the sketch plan[13]
prepared by SPO3 Luvimin Servañez
as evidence of the relative distances of the point of impact and the position
of the vehicles after the incident. The
prosecution also presented the testimony of Nestor Villa to show that the jeepney was following the motorcycle very closely. Whether the testimonies of these witnesses
are credible and to be accorded great weight in establishing the negligence of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt is for the trial court to determine, as it
is the trial court which had the opportunity to observe Luvimin
Servañez and Nestor Villa as they testified.[14]
The
mere fact that a vehicle is trying to overtake another imposes upon the driver
of the overtaking vehicle a far greater amount of responsibility than is usual,
and gives rise to a reasonable presumption of negligence on the part of such
person in case of an accident. The
definition of negligence in the Civil Code is instructive:
Art. 1173. The fault or negligence of the obligor
consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of
the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the
time and of the place. x x x
The circumstances in a situation wherein a person is
driving a vehicle overtaking another require of that person a greater amount of
diligence for the following reasons: (1) it was the overtaker’s
decision to assume the risks involved in overtaking another; and (2) the overtaker, being behind the vehicle sought to be overtaken,
is in a better position to ensure the safety of the vehicles concerned. It is therefore the responsibility of the
person driving a vehicle overtaking another to ensure the safety of all the
vehicles, passengers, and pedestrians in the immediate vicinity.
Petitioner
claims that the prosecution “failed to present evidence of what speed the jeep
(or jeepney) was running at except, the vague
testimony of Nestor Villa, to the effect that, as they were nearing the place
of the incident, it was ‘as if’ the vehicle that was following the motorcycle
was ‘very near because (its) sound was becoming louder.’”[15] This Court does not find Nestor Villa’s
testimony vague. The witness was
testifying on the proximity of the jeep based on his sense of hearing, instead
of his sense of sight. He clearly used
the words “as if” because he did not see the jeep getting close to them, but
instead heard it.
Petitioner
claims that the trial court misunderstood the accused’s
vague, irrelevant and non-responsive answer to the following question:
Q: At
the time when the motorcycle suddenly turned to the left(,)
on which part of the road you were then driving the jeepney?
A: At
Crossing Andam.[16]
Petitioner claims the responsive answer should have been a
part of the road, and yet the answer “Crossing Andam”
can be construed as a proper noun, as referring to a particular place, and not
to a part of the road. This attempt of
petitioner to give an appearance of vagueness to his own testimony fails
miserably. Firstly, as discussed above,
negligence is presumed even in the absence of a crossing, because the fact that
the accident occurred during an attempt to overtake another vehicle (and a much
smaller vehicle at that) puts upon the overtaker a
great amount of responsibility, thus shifting the burden of evidence to the overtaker to prove his exercise of the diligence required
by the circumstances. Secondly, if a
witness answers a question, it should be presumed that he understood the
question, especially in this case wherein his own counsel did not raise any
objection to the question for vagueness, nor moved to strike out the
answer. Assuming that the witness
misunderstood the question is a great leap in reasoning that should not be
countenanced.
Petitioner
further claims that the six-meter distance within which the motorcycle was
thrown from the point of impact should not have given rise to a conclusion
concerning the relative speeds of the vehicles.
According to petitioner:
[I]f it were a head on collision,
that [six-meter] distance would probably be sufficiently indicative of a strong
impact resulting from high speeds. In
this case, it is different because the impact was practically pushing the
motorcycle towards the same or about the same direction it was headed to,
probably with its engine still running.
The law of inertia aided its tendency to move on and in a straight line.[17]
It is important to note that the sketch plan presented by
the prosecution actually showed a distance of eight meters from the point of
impact, contrary to the six meters that was claimed by the accused.[18] The sketch plan further showed that such
eight-meter distance from the point of impact was not toward the same direction
to which the vehicles were headed, but was instead around 45 degrees to the
left from the direction of the vehicles. Inertia in the motorcycle could have indeed accounted
for the component of the force that carried it forward. The component of such force, however, that
threw the motorcycle to the left was solely from the impact, as the motorcycle (and
the force of inertia) was headed forward before the impact.
All
of the foregoing show that there is no truth to the
allegation that the findings concerning the negligence of the accused were
based entirely on the evidence of the defense.
Again, these are all academic as the findings of fact of the trial court
which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals have already attained
finality. On examination of the evidence
on record, we fail to find any reversible error in the factual findings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals.
Using
pieces of information derived from the evidence of the defense is not assailing
the weaknesses of the defense.
As
discussed above, petitioner’s allegation that the Court of Appeals relied
solely on the evidence of the accused in finding his guilt is belied by the
records of the case. To prevent future
use of such contention, however, we still find it significant to point out that
petitioner’s line of reasoning is misguided.
Even assuming that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals relied on the evidence presented by the defense in its determination of
the negligence of the accused, petitioner’s argument that this is an attack on
the weakness of the defense remains to have no merit. Using pieces
of information derived from the evidence of the defense is not equivalent to
assailing the weaknesses of the defense.
Incriminating evidence coming from the lips of the accused and his
witnesses are naturally more damaging to the accused. Such evidence may and should be used by the
court, having as it does great weight brought about by the undisputed character
of such evidence.
The
courts, when they find the accused guilty, are more inclined to cite defense
evidence instead of prosecution evidence tending to prove the same thing, as
the former are judicial admissions that the accused cannot possibly contest. The accused has been warned that whatever he
says may and shall be used against him. Before
trial, an accused has the right to remain silent. During trial, an accused has the right not to
be compelled to be a witness against himself.[19] An accused who waives these rights by speaking
to the police or testifying in court cannot complain that his statements were
used to convict him.
The
compensation to the heirs of Paolino Riondina should be P50,0000.00.
Finally,
pursuant to recent decisions[20]
of this Court regarding the indemnification to the heirs of victims in case of
death (which comes in the nature of moral damages), we likewise resolve to
raise the compensation to the heirs of Paulino Rondina to P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE,
the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the moral damages to the surviving heirs of the victim Paulino Rondina, except his
widow, shall be in the sum of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
On Leave
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
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Acting Chairman |
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ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
* On leave.
** Acting Chairman.
[1] CA-G.R. CR No. 21118, penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Cancio C. Garcia with Associate Justices Martin S. Villarama, Jr. and Andres B. Reyes, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 44-54.
[2]
[3] Records, pp. 1-2.
[4]
[5] Rollo, pp. 193-194.
[6] Records, p. 198.
[7] Rollo, p. 54.
[8] Sps. Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 352 Phil. 928, 941 (1998); Fuentes v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1163, 1168 (1997).
[9] “It is
a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, the
Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of
the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However, the Court had recognized several
exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the
findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.” (The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126850, 28 April 2004, 428 SCRA 79, 85-86.)
[10] Rollo, p. 225.
[11]
[12] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit F, p. 2.
[13]
[14] See People v. Mijano, 370 Phil. 84, 92-93 (1999); People v. Lomboy, 368 Phil. 755, 765-766 (1999); Jacobo v. Court of Appeals, 337 Phil. 7, 18-19 (1997).
[15] Rollo, p. 223.
[16]
[17]
[18] Folder of Exhibits, Exhibit G, p. 3. As to be discussed in the succeeding pages, the trial court is merely more inclined to quote evidence coming from the defense which tend to prove the guilt of the accused, simply because they are judicial admissions which the accused cannot contest.
[19] RULES OF COURT, Rule 115, Section 1(e); Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 17.
[20] Victory Liner, Inc. v. Gammad, G.R. No. 159636, 25 November 2004, 444 SCRA 355, 370; People v. Ventura, G.R. Nos. 148145-46, 5 July 2004, 433 SCRA 389, 421; People v. Malinao, G.R. No. 128148, 16 February 2004, 423 SCRA 34, 53; People v. Panado, 401 Phil. 906, 919 (2000).