Republic
of the
Supreme
Court
SECOND
DIVISION
|
NIEVES A. SAGUIGUIT,
Petitioner, - versus - PEOPLE OF THE Respondent. |
|
G.R. No. 144054 Present: PUNO, J.,
Chairperson, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AZCUNA, and GARCIA, JJ. Promulgated: June 30, 2006 |
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
GARCIA,
J.:
Assailed
and sought to be set aside in this petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is the Decision[1] dated
June 28, 2000 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 22180, affirming the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City convicting herein petitioner Nieves Saguiguit of violation
(eight [8] counts) of Batas Pambansa (B.P.)
Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.
The
facts:
In
eight (8) separate informations filed with the RTC of Angeles City, thereat
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233, petitioner was charged with
violations of the Bouncing Checks Law. All containing identical allegations as
to the elements of the offense charged and differing only as regards the
respective amounts and due dates of the check involved in each case, the eight
(8) informations uniformly alleged:
“That on or about the 1st week of April, 1991, in the
City of Angeles, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously draw and issue to the complainant MR. ELMER EVANGELISTA a Traders
Royal Bank Check No._________________, in the amount of _________________,
dated _________________, 1991, well knowing and without informing the
complainant that she has no sufficient funds with the drawee bank, which check
when deposited for payment was dishonored for reason "ACCOUNT CLOSED" and demand notwithstanding
for more than five (5) days from notice of dishonor, the accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to redeem the said check to the damage and
prejudice of the complainant ELMER EVANGELISTA in the afore-mentioned amount of
________________, Philippine Currency”.
After trial,
the RTC, in a decision dated
1. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-226, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P26,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P26,500.00 and to pay the cost;
2. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-227, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P28,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P28,000.00 and to pay the cost;
3. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-228, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;
4. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-229, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P20,000.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P20,000.00 and to pay the cost;
5. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-230, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;
6. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-231, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost;
7. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-232, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P21,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P21,500.00 and to pay the cost; and
8. In Crim.
Case No. 94-03-233, one (1) year imprisonment and to pay a fine of P22,500.00
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to indemnify the
complainant the amount of P22,500.00 and to pay the cost.[2]
Unable to
accept the verdict of guilt, petitioner went on appeal to the CA whereat her
appellate recourse was docketed as CA-G.R.
CR NO. 22180. In the herein assailed
Decision dated
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated
SO ORDERED.[3]
Undaunted,
petitioner interposed the instant recourse urging the Court not only to review
the factual determinations of the CA, but also to reexamine extant
jurisprudence on the Bouncing Checks Law. As the petitioner would put it:
The instant case calls for a reexamination and
modification, if not abandonment, of rulings to the effect that the mere
issuance of a check which is subsequently dishonored makes the issuer liable
for violation of BP Blg. 22 regardless of the intent of the parties ….
Petitioner respectfully submits that it was not the intention of the lawmaking
body, … to make the issuance of a bum check ipso facto a criminal
offense already; there must be an intent to commit the prohibited act, and
subject check should be issued to apply on account or for value.
This case also calls for a review of the findings of the
facts of the CA, as and by way of
exception to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review under Rule 45 …. Petitioner
humbly submits that the CA's findings of fact are not supported by evidence and
differ from those of the [RTC]. xxx [4] (Underscoring in the original;
citation omitted.)
The petition is
devoid of merit.
At
its most basic, what the petitioner asks is for the Court to delve into the
policy behind or wisdom of a statute, i.e.,
B.P. Blg. 22, which, under the doctrine of separation
of powers, it cannot do, matters of legislative wisdom being within
the domain of Congress.[5]
Even with the best of motives, the Court can only interpret and apply the law
and cannot, despite doubts about its wisdom, amend or repeal it. Courts of justice have no right to encroach on
the prerogatives of lawmakers, as long as it has not been shown that they have
acted with grave abuse of discretion. And while the judiciary may interpret
laws and evaluate them for constitutional soundness and to strike them down if
they are proven to be infirm, this solemn power and duty do not include the discretion
to correct by reading into the law what is not written therein.[6]
Here,
petitioner makes no attempt to challenge the constitutionality of the Bouncing Checks Law. At bottom,
then, petitioner's last and only remaining remedy is to seek an amendment of
the law in question, a matter which should be addressed to Congress no less. For at the end of the day, the legislature is
the primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law.[7]
xxx
Under our system of government where
powers are allocated to the three (3) great branches, only the Legislature can
remedy such deficiency [in the law], if any, by proper amendment…. [8] (Words in bracket added).
Petitioner
likewise calls for “modification, if not abandonment” of the rulings that
hold issuers of bad checks liable under the Bouncing Checks Law regardless of intent. [9]
The call must fall.
Judicial decisions
applying or interpreting laws shall form a part of the legal system of the
Specifically,
the principle underlying the concept of mala
prohibita is the stare decisis
governing a long history of cases involving violations of the Bouncing Checks
Law.
xxx
[T]he gravamen of the offense is the act
of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon
its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. …. The law was designed to prohibit and
altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks
with insufficient or no credit or funds therefor. Such practice is deemed a public nuisance, a
crime against public order to be abated.
The mere act of issuing a worthless check, is covered by B.P. 22. It is a crime classified as malum prohibitum.
xxx.
The
effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests
of the parties …. The mischief it
creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the
public. The harmful practice of putting
valueless commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very
well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and
eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. xxx. –
xxx xxx xxx
It
bears stressing that, whether a person is an accommodation party is a question
of intent. When the intent of the
parties does not appear on the face of the check, it must be ascertained in the
light of the surrounding facts and circumstances. Invariably, the tests applied are the purpose
test and the proceeds test. xxx.
What the law punishes is the issuance
itself of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued
or of the terms and conditions relating to its issuance. The mere act of issuing a worthless check, whether merely as an accommodation, is
covered by B.P. 22. Hence, the agreement surrounding the
issuance of a check is irrelevant to the prosecution and conviction of the
petitioner. xxx.[12]
Neither can the
Court grant petitioner's “call
for review of the findings of the
facts of the CA.” [13] We need not belabor the basic rule that the Court is not a trier of facts.
Moreover,
granting arguendo that petitioner's
version of the facts is true – that her transaction was only with a certain Bernadette
Montes and not with private complainant Elmer Evangelista – the hard fact
remains that she issued eight (8) bouncing checks that went into circulation.
In net effect, what she did was to borrow from Ruiz, to pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injuring the
banking system, and eventually hurting the welfare of society and the public
interest.
Finally, while we affirm petitioner's conviction, we deem it
proper to modify the penalty imposed by the trial court and effectively
sustained by the CA, pursuant to the policy established under Supreme Court
(SC) Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 dated
SC Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
Section
1 of B.P. Blg. 22 … imposes the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty
(30) days but not more than one (1) year OR a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in no case exceed
P200,000, OR both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
In
its decision in Eduardo Vaca v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 131714, 16
November 1998, 298 SCRA 656, 664) the Supreme Court … modified the sentence
imposed for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 by deleting the penalty of imprisonment
and imposing only the penalty of fine in an amount double the amount of the
check. In justification thereof, the Court said:
Petitioner
are first-time offenders. They are
Filipino entrepreneurs who presumably contribute to the national economy. Apparently, they brought this appeal,
believing in all good faith, although mistakenly that they had not committed a
violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Otherwise
they could simply have accepted the judgment of the trial court and applied for
probation to evade a prison term. It
would best serve the ends of criminal justice if in fixing the penalty within
the range of discretion allowed by §1, par. 1, the same philosophy underlying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable
human material and preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and
economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order. In this case we believe that a fine in an
amount equal to double the amount of the check involved is an appropriate
penalty to impose on each of the petitioners.
In
the recent case of Rosa Lim v. People of the Philippines … the Supreme
Court En Banc, applying Vaca also deleted the penalty of
imprisonment and sentenced the drawer of the bounced check to the maximum of
the fine allowed by B.P. Blg. 22, xxx.. [14]
SC Administrative Circular No. 13-2001
The pursuit of this purpose clearly does not foreclose
the possibility of imprisonment for violations of B.P. Blg. 22. Neither does it defeat the legislative intent
behind the law.
Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000
establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P.
Blg. 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the
offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint
of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more
appropriate penalty. Needless to say,
the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine
alone rests solely upon the Judge. [15] Should the Judge decide that imprisonment is
the more appropriate penalty, Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 ought
not be deemed a hindrance. [16]
It is, therefore,
understood that:
1. Administrative Circular 12-2000
does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for violations of B.P.
Blg. 22;
2. The Judges concerned may, in the
exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone
would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose
imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on
the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice; [17]
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the
accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the
application of the Revised Penal Code provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment.
While the decisions of the trial court and that of the CA
dated March 16, 1998 and June 28, 2000, respectively, were promulgated before SC
Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 and its subsequent clarificatory circular took
effect, there is no legal impediment to their application under the premises,
favorable as they are to the accused. What is more, the pleadings before us contain
no indication that petitioner was a habitual delinquent or recidivist, a
circumstance strongly arguing for the application, as we did in Young v. Court of Appeals,[18] of the
latest stare decisis towards modifying
the penalties imposable herein. In an
earlier case likewise on all fours with this case, the Court held:
However,
in view of [SC] Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, as clarified by
Administrative Circular No. 13-2001, establishing a rule of preference in the
application of the penalties provided for in B.P. Blg. 22;
and the recommendation of the Solicitor General in its Comment that the policy
laid down in Vaca vs. Court of Appeals,[19] and Lim vs. People,[20] of redeeming valuable human material and
preventing unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness,
be considered in favor of petitioner who is not shown to be a habitual
delinquent or a recidivist, we find that the penalty imposed by the Court of
Appeals should be modified by deleting the penalty of imprisonment and imposing
only a fine of xxx.[21]
WHEREFORE,
the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION that petitioner
Nieves Saguiguit is hereby –
1) Sentenced to pay a FINE equivalent to double the amount of the check involved in each of Criminal Cases Nos. 94-03-226 to 94-03-233 with
subsidiary imprisonment not to exceed six (6) months in each of said cases in the
event of insolvency, pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 39 of the Revised Penal
Code; and
2) Indemnify
the private complainant with the total amount of the subject checks plus six percent
(6%) interest from date of filing of the informations until finality
of this Decision, the amount of which, inclusive the interest, is subject to
twelve percent (12%) interest per annum until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
Chairperson
|
(on official leave) |
|
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant
to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
[1] Penned
by former Associate Justice Demetrio G. Demetria with Associate Justices Ramon
Mabutas, Jr. (ret), and Jose L. Sabio, Jr., concurring; Rollo, pp. 22-25.
[2] RTC
Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 78-85.
[3]
[4] Petition,
p. 2.
[5] Paloma v. Mora, G.R. No. 157783,
[6] Agote v. Lorenzo, G.R. No. 142675,
[7] Province of Rizal v. Executive Secretary,
G.R. No. 129546, December 13, 2005, 477 SCRA 436, 468.
[8] Agote v. Lorenzo, supra.
[9] Petition,
p. 2; Rollo, p. 9.
[10] Civil
Code, Article 8.
[11] Ladanga v. Aseneta, G.R. No. 145874,
[12] Ruiz v. People, G.R. No. 160893,
[13] Petition,
p. 2; Rollo, p. 9.
[14] Josef v. People, G.R. No. 146424,
[15] Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876,
[16] Josef v. People, G.R. No. 146424,
[17] Go v. Dimagiba, G.R. No. 151876,
[18]
G.R. No. 140425,
[19] G.R.
No. 131714,
[20] G.R.
No. 130038,
[21] Lee v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
145498, January 17, 2005, 448 SCRA 455, 476-477.