FIRST
DIVISION
|
ADVANCED
FOUNDATION CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Petitioner, - versus - NEW WORLD
PROPERTIES AND VENTURES, INC., Respondent. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
x NEW WORLD
PROPERTIES AND VENTURES, INC., Petitioner. - versus - ADVANCED
FOUNDATION CONSTRUCTION SYSTEMS CORPORATION, Respondent. |
|
G.R.
No. 143154 G.R.
No. 143177 Present: PANGANIBAN, CJ Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June
21, 2006 |
x-
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us are two consolidated
Petitions for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals which affirmed with modification the Decision[2] of
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) awarding Advanced
Foundation Construction Systems Corporation’s (AFCSC) claim against New World
Properties and Ventures, Inc. (New World) in the total amount of P10,700,384.00
with interest, as well as the Resolution dated 3 May 2000 denying both parties’
Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Sometime in November 1996,
After inspecting the site and
conducting soil investigation, the bidding participants submitted their
respective bids. On P36,000,000.00).
On P36,000.00 per calendar day of delay.
After the issuance of the Notice to
Proceed, but before the signing of the contract, AFCSC, on
1.6
Excluded in the contractor scope of work shall be as follows:
1.6.2. Removal of
Underground Obstruction: - The contractor shall execute probing of underground
obstruction on each pile position.
Should the bored piling contractor encounter underground obstruction
during drilling such as footings, tie beams, piles, and any other incidental
impenetrable obstruction, the contractor shall be paid on the actual daywork expenses for equipment and manpower plus 25%
overhead (sic).
1.6.3. Should the underground obstruction cannot be recover the
contractor shall notify the owner in writing which in turn refer to the
structural engineer for further instructions provided however that the
contractor will not entail delay and stand by in the faithful execution of the
work. Idle time shall be charge as per actual
operating expenses of manpower and equipment subject to the evaluation of the
owner’s engineer representative (sic).
During the subsistence of the
contract, P36,000,000.00 would increase to P48,400,000.00.
Thereafter, sometime in August 1997,
AFCSC billed
After removing the underground
obstructions and incorporating the change in the scope of work, the
construction of the bored piles were completed only on
Subsequently, during the early part
of 1998,
When it came time to settle the
accounts, the parties found that their respective records of accounts were at
variance with each other. Thus, on P6,326,318.72
as the unpaid balance of the original contract price and P2,133,658.46
as the cost of the change orders after deducting the liquidated damages due to
New World for the delay incurred by AFCSC.
P23,478,251.29
consisting of the reconciled amount of P8,515,396.63, and the cost of
removing the underground obstructions, sonic pipe installation, build up of pile
test cap, soil investigation and crane rental.
Upon
In the Decision dated
The bone of contention is whether or not the removal
of underground obstruction is part of the scope of the work of the contractor
as claimed by the respondents or is extra work as claimed by the contractor.
x x x
x
It is clear to us that this controversy could have
been avoided if the owner’s designers had clearly stated the contractor’s scope
of work. The bid documents failed to
give bidders of the lump-sum bids details of the underground obstruction or at
least made provisions for the treatment of the parties’ reciprocal obligations
in the event such obstruction is encountered.
Upon the other hand, the contractor, one which is experienced in
foundation work, had been remiss in its obligation to obtain as much
information as possible on the contingency that the unknown obstruction would
impede its work and make it more costly, or at least provided a qualification
in its bid so as to make clear its right to claim contract price and time
adjustment caused by such obstruction.
Assuming, therefore, that these omissions of both parties may be treated
as acts in bad faith, we shall have to apply the rule that in such case, their
rights and obligations shall be resolved as if both had acted in good faith up
to the time of the bid.
x x x
x
x x x We also reviewed the bid of
the claimant as well as the bids of the other bidders made on a form supplied
by
The removal of underground obstruction, in our view,
is covered by the General Conditions of Contract which provide as follows:
“Should
the Contractor encounter subsurface or latent physical conditions differing
materially from those indicated, or unknown physical conditions at the site of
an unusual nature differing materially from those ordinarily encountered… the
Owner’s Representative shall be promptly notified of such conditions before
they are disturbed. The Owner’s
Representative shall thereupon promptly investigate the conditions at the site
and if he finds that they do so materially differ and cause an increase or
decrease in the cost, or the time required for performance of the Contract, an
equitable adjustment will be made and the Contract modified in accordance with
existing laws on the matter or as agreed upon the provided for [sic] under the
Contract.”
x x x
x
We have no
hesitation, therefore, in holding that the removal of underground obstructions
by the claimant falls under Clause
56.2 of the General Conditions which should
therefore be treated as extra work.
On the additional sub-issues:
x x x
x
In its Reply, claimant alleged in its paragraph 9
that:
9. Claimant did not ‘cover up several bored
piles before the same were tested’ [par.4.14, Answer]. This is yet another of many reckless
allegations that discredit the whole Answer.
Claimant was not the contractor for the mat foundation (the flooring of
the basement which is constructed on top of the bored piles) and accordingly,
had nothing to do with ‘cover[ing] up’ the bored
piles.
9.1. On the contrary,
after completing the bored piles, claimant left their tops, sticking overground, together with extra rebars
and extra lengths as allowance for dirty concrete, which were later cut off and
discarded.
10. It was only after the bored piles were
covered up by the mat foundation contractor that respondents informed claimant
of the results of the pile testing – rendering it impossible for claimant to
challenge definitively the results and, more importantly, to undertake remedial
work on the five [5] piles alleged found defective.”
We accept the foregoing assertions in pars. 9 and 9.1 of the claimant as being in accord with industry
practice, and as being consistent with the facts.
The issue, therefore, boils down to whether or not the
cost of testing shall be for the account of claimant or of
At the outset, it must be stressed that Clause 38.4 of
the General Conditions cover tests of contractor-supplied materials such as
concrete, cement, or rebars, not finished
products. In accordance with accepted
industry practice, this provision, which is also a standard provision in
construction contracts, is not interpreted to include tests on finished
structural members. It does not cover,
for example, tests on the reinforced concrete column of a building to see if it
can carry 35 floors above or test a girder to check if it carry
the designed seismic load.
The claim of
the claimant is for the installation of sonic pipes amounting to P320,000.00; for built-up of pile test cap, to P104,002.33; for
crane rental, P75,000.00 and for soil investigation, P60,000.00 should be for
the account of
We also find that claimant should be liable for part
of the cost of the sonic pipes defectively installed by it. x x x
Issue No. 2 concerns liquidated damages. As formulated, the issue submitted for
resolution is this: Whether or not claimant was in delay and, as such, whether
it is liable to pay respondent liquidated damages. If it is found to be liable, how much
liquidated damaged should be awarded to the respondent?
x x x
x
Article 7.1 of the contract provides that: “7.1 The
OWNER may, at any time, by a written order, make changes in the schedule and
work required under this Agreement. If
any such changes causes an increase or decrease in the
work or the time required for performing the work, an equitable adjustment shall be made of the contract price and
completion date upon mutual agreement of the parties reflecting such
adjustments by way of a written variation order subject to the negotiation by
both parties. [Underscoring supplied]
Clause 49.2.4 of the General Conditions provide that
“The Contractor shall be entitled to claim an adjustment of his Contract Time
where: [i] the amount of additional work under a
Change Order, or [ii] special circumstances had occurred, so as to fairly
entitle the Contractor to an extension of Contract Time.”
In light of
the facts, and in our discussion above of the changes made, it is clear that we
have found that indeed there were circumstances fairly entitling the claimant
to an extension of its contract period.
x x x
x
We examined the numerous exhibits submitted by the
claimant all mentioning directly or indirectly compensation to it for extra
work performed. x x x
In none of these exhibits did claimant request
an extension of the contract period.
Engr. Joel
Claimant, in its memorandum, dismisses the request for
time extension as a mere formality. [See claimant’s Memorandum, p.12] We do not
agree. The contract provides that the contractor shall pay liquidated damages
for delay unless the period for completion of the work is extended by the
owner. The procedure for requesting
extension of time and for the approval of the request by the owner is laid
out. We have not been shown why these
important provisions of the contract between the parties should be treated by
us as a mere formality. [See Clauses 49.3.1 and 49.3.2 of the General
Conditions] We accordingly hold that
claimant is not entitled to extension of time for the extra works performed and
is accordingly liable to the respondent for liquidated damages in accordance
with the contract.
x x x
x
We note, however, that the purpose of giving punctual
notice of claim for time extension is to enable the owner immediately to
“investigate the actual basis of the claim, decide whether or not to grant the
request, and in case the request is granted, to fix the period of extension of
Contract Time.” In this case, the
claimant submitted Exhs. “R” to “R-138” to show on a
daily basis the removal of obstruction and each report is acknowledged received
by the owner’s representative. Thus,
In view of the circumstances of the case, taking into
account the fact that there was no material prejudice caused to P1,000,000.00.
The most difficult issue submitted for resolution is a
highly technical one, namely: “Did the result of the test piles accurately
determine the capacity of the piles?”
x x x
x
The test results were evaluated by Dr. Benjamin R. Buencuseso, Jr. who submitted his own report on
x x x
x
We
find that only one pile test was done to assess both integrity and
capacity. The other tests simply
evaluated qualitatively pile integrity. [Exh. “K”] A pile capacity in this context is
meant to carry vertical loads and is dependent on any of three factors, namely:
integrity, skin friction and end-bearing.
A
total of 34 piles were tested. A total
of 35 tests were conducted. Pile No. 25
was tested twice, one by sonic logging and the second, for pile integrity. The pile integrity tests resulted in a
finding that all piles, except Pile No. 9, were of acceptable integrity. Pile No. 9 was found to have defects in the
lower portion of the pile shift. Pile
No. 25 which was subjected to sonic logging and pile integrity tests, passed the
integrity test but the result of the sonic test was inconclusive.
Engr. Rogelio Menguito gave his
formula for computing the capacity of each pile. The formula he gave is the standard formula
meant to determine the capacity of a reinforced concrete column with loads and
reaction at each end and is not generally applicable to piles which are
laterally supported throughout its length and with skin friction
capabilities. The capacity of a pile,
with length of 70 meters, and at the project site, the soil quality of which is
described in three soil investigation reports, is normally determined by skin
friction and point bearing which Engr. Menguito merely considered as factors of safety. As admitted by him during the hearing, he had
no mathematical or technical basis for his conclusion, and that the bored poles
could actually carry a load much heavier than 800 tons.
x x x x
We
found support for this view from two recognized authorities. The first is Peck, Hanson and Thorburn’s “Foundation Engineering”, in which it was stated
that “a point bearing pile is sometimes erroneously regarded as a structural
member that transfers its load like a column from the top of the pile to the
bottom where it is delivered to the underlying rock or soil.” [At p. 182, a photocopy of this page is
hereto attached as Annex “A”] The second
are H.G. Poulos and E.H. Davis, who in their book,
“Pile Foundation, Analysis and Design”, set the general equation for the
ultimate capacity of a pile. A photocopy
of the page where the equation appeared is hereto attached as Annex “B”] It is clear from
this equation that the ultimate capacity of a pile is dependent on skin
friction and end-bearing and not a pile acting as a column. Other that a pile driven in
water or on very soft soil, a pile is laterally supported on its entire length. Hence, it does not act as a reinforced
concrete column subjects to buckling.
Because of the above discussion, the Arbitral Panel is of the opinion
that the test results were inconclusive and did not truly measure the capacity
of the piles. Engr. Menguito’s
use of the result and his admission that all the values for pile capacities
were simply based on assumptions without any or technical basis [t.s.n., pp. 113-116] seriously undermines the value of his
recommendation to reduce the capacity of the piles and tends to give the
impression that this was an accommodation to a client.
x x x x
AWARD
We
find that:
[a] As admitted by New World, claimant is
entitled to the balance of the contract price amounting to P6,326,318.72
and the cost of approved change orders amounting to P2,133,658.46 or the
total amount of P8,459,977.17.
[b] Since the foregoing is a liquidated
amount as due from P8,459,977.17 plus interest at 6% per annum from P253,799.32.
[c] Claimant is entitled to payment for and
hereby order P8,366,336.55.
[d] Claimant is entitled to payment for the
installation of 34 sonic pipes in the amount of P157,681.16.
The
foregoing amount to a total of P17,237,794.20.
On
the counterclaims, we find for
[a] P190,141.30
representing the value of sonic pipes which were defectively installed by
claimant;
[b] P1,000,000
as liquidated damages for delay; and
[c] P5,347,268.90
as the cost of the five [5] bored piles which were found defective, or the
total amount of P6,537,410.20.
All
other claims and counterclaims are dismissed.
After offsetting the amount due claimant from
respondent and the amount due respondent from claimant, there is a balance of P10,700,384. which
The
arbitration fees and expenses have been paid initially on a pro rata
basis. In light of the findings above,
no change in the above sharing of expenses is warranted.[4] [Emphases
ours]
Aggrieved by the Decision of the
CIAC,
But for one point, the appeal lacks merit.
One. The
pronouncements of CIAC on the question of whether the removal of underground
obstructions was covered by the contract between the parties are evidently
conclusions of law. This is so because
the conclusions drawn by an adjudicatory body from a set of facts is a question
of law. (Pilar
Development Corporation v. IAC, 146 SCRA 215; Cunanan
v. de Lazatin, 74 Phil. 719) Consequently, the window for review is fully
open for this Court to examine the correctness of said conclusions.
Try
as it might, this Court cannot share the view of CIAC that respondent’s
Neither
can this Court go along with CIAC in its determination that said proposals
modified respondent’s bid offer so that when the contract was signed without
petitioner expressly rejecting the proposals, the same were deemed impliedly
accepted. The reasoning is quite
strained. The proposals were made on
But
this Court fully agrees with CIAC that the removal of the underground
obstructions was covered by Clause 56.2 of the General Conditions of the
Contract.
x x x x
It is
clear to this Court that petitioner did not agree with respondent’s proposals
but in order to address the latter’s concern about underground obstructions,
the parties adopted Clause 56.2.
Therefore, the contractual rule governing underground obstructions was
the above-quoted Clause 56.2.
But
alas, respondent did not comply with said stipulation. Respondent did not formally notify the
petitioner about the underground obstruction that it encountered, hence, the
petitioner did not conduct its investigation to verify the existence and nature
of the obstructions. The mechanism for a
modification of the contract and an equitable adjustment of the contract price
was not set in motion through the fault of respondent.
The
vital question then is: For its fault in not complying with the steps provided
for in the above-quoted stipulation, should respondent be left alone to
shoulder the heavy cost of he removal of the obstruction?
x x x x
It is
not disputed that the removal of the underground obstructions was a major work
entailing additional expense and extra working time. The experts and CIAC agreed that such work
was not covered by the scope of work in the contract. That determination is logical and
correct. Petitioner’s rejection of this
holding and its insistence post factum that such
major work was embraced in the scope of work in the contract puts to doubt its
good faith and fairness. This stance may
be perceived as taking advantage of the imprudence of respondent in not
faithfully observing the requirements of Clause 56.2 above quoted.
To
deny respondent any relief for the expenses it incurred and the extra time that
it spent in removing the underground obstructions is to allow the petitioner to
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the respondent. That is anathema to the great principle of
equity. When it becomes clear – as in this case –
that the application to the law in sensu strictione would result in patently unjust juridical
situation, a court of justice which is also a court of equity is called upon to
exercise its equitas juridictio
in order to refine the rough edges of the rules and avoid injustice. The Code Commission which drafted the Civil
Code justifies a resort to equity stating beautifully that every good law draws
its breath of life from morals, from those principles written with the words of
fire in the conscience of man.
Appropriately, these guides for human conduct should run as golden
threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice.
(Report of the Code Commission, pp. 4041).
Inspired
by such profound pronouncements, this Court, invoking its equity jurisdiction
and in order to prevent unjust enrichment and manifest injustice, holds that
respondent should be accorded a relief.
But then respondent should not expect for a full recovery of its claim
for it should realize that it had been contractually negligent not just once but
several times. The cost of the removal
of the underground obstructions was P8,025,836.37. This Court allows respondent a concessional award of one-half (1/2) of said amount which
is P4,012,918.18.
x x x
x
Petitioner protests CIAC’s
lowering of the amount of liquidated damages due it from P7.2 million to P1
million on the justification that petitioner did not suffer any material
prejudice. This Court,
rejects petitioner’s protest. The
reasons – not just CIAC’s finding that petitioner did
not suffer material damage – given by the
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, this Court renders judgment MODIFYING the appealed
Decision in this wise:
The
respondent Advanced Foundation Construction Systems Corporation is hereby
ordered to pay the petitioner New World Properties and Ventures, Inc. the
following:
1. Php190,141.30 representing the value of sonic pipes
which were defectively installed by respondent;
2. Php1,000,000.00 as liquidated damages for delay; and
3. Php5,347,268.90 as cost of
the five (5) bored piles which were found defective, or a total amount of
P6,537,410.20.
II. FOR RESPONDENT:
The petitioner is hereby ordered to pay the respondent
the following:
1. Php8,459,977.17 as the sum of the balance on the
contract price amounting to Php6,326,318.72 and cost of approved change orders
amounting to Php2,133,658.46 plus six (6) percent interest per annum on said
total amount (Php8,459,977.17) from June 2, 1998 until fully paid;
2. Php4,353,418.37 as cost of additional works consisting
of the removal of the underground obstructions and the cost of various tests;
and
3. Php157,681.16 as payment for
the installation of 34 sonic pipes.
After compensating the obligations of the parties to
each other, the balance shall earn six (6%) percent interest per annum from the
date of this decision.[5]
The
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of both parties having been denied, both
The resolution of the instant case
lies in the determination of two pivotal issues, namely: (1) Which between New
World and AFCSC should shoulder the expenses incurred for the removal of the
underground obstructions and the conduct of the pile tests; and (2) Whether or
not AFCSC is liable for liquidated damages for its failure to complete the
construction work by 24 February 1997.
At this point, We
find it necessary to reiterate that our jurisprudence is replete with the rule
that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies which have acquired expertise
because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are accorded not
only with respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial
evidence.[6] This is because there are certain cases which
require the expertise, specialized skills, and knowledge of the proper administrative
bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved.[7]
In the case at bar, it would seem
that the CIAC, in interpreting the contract covering the construction work in
the light of the facts present in the case, was guided by the prevailing
practices in the construction industry.
The members of the three-man panel, all equipped with considerable
knowledge and training in the field of engineering and significant experience
in construction industry arbitration, reconciled the conflicting claims of both
parties by applying industry accepted practice with respect to the treatment of
removal of underground obstructions and the conduct of pile tests. According to the panel, the removal of
underground obstruction is a ‘major item of work and it cannot be understood as
being subsumed under the general heading miscellaneous’ and should therefore be
treated as extra work. With respect to
the pile tests, the CIAC stated that in accordance with accepted industry
practice, the provisions in the contract only cover tests of
contractor-supplied materials and not tests on finished products to see whether
it can carry a certain load.
In light of the ratiocination of the
CIAC that the removal of underground obstruction is a major item of work and
cannot merely be contemplated as a miscellaneous item in a construction bid and
must therefore be considered as extra work, We conclude that there was nothing
in the bid nor in the contract explicitly discussing the obligations of both
parties in the event that the contractor will encounter underground
obstructions in the project site and may be constrained to remove the same.
However, there is a provision in the
contract that can be made applicable in the case of underground obstructions,
which the CIAC and the Court of Appeals have correctly pointed out, to
wit:
56.2. Should the Contractor encounter
subsurface or latent physical conditions differing materially from those
indicated, or unknown physical conditions at the site of an unusual nature
differing materially from those ordinarily encountered and generally recognized
as inherent in the work of character provided for in the Contract, the Owner’s
Representative shall be promptly notified of such conditions before they are
disturbed. The Owner’s Representative
shall thereupon promptly investigate the conditions at the site and if he finds
that they do so materially differ and cause an increase or decrease in the
cost, or the time required for performance of the Contract, an equitable adjustment
will be made and the Contract modified in accordance with existing laws on the
matter or as agreed upon the provided for [sic] under the Contract.
The appellate court
laid stress the fact that AFCSC failed to comply with the stipulations
of the abovequoted provision. According to the Court of Appeals, in failing
to formally notify
We do not agree. As explained by the appellate court itself,
the experts and CIAC have agreed that the removal of the underground
obstructions was not covered by the scope of work in the contract. It is not disputed
though that the same was a major work entailing additional expenses and extra
working time. Neither was it denied that
such major work was indeed necessary for the successful completion of the
project. Indeed, to deny AFCSC relief
for the expenses it incurred in removing said obstructions would result in
allowing
Article 22 of the Civil Code which
embodies the maxim, Nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man ought to be made rich out of
another’s injury) states:
Art. 22. Every
person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.[8]
The above-quoted article is part of
the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as “basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x
x guides human conduct [that] should run as golden
threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal
which is the sway and dominance of justice.[9] Hence, to allow
AFCSC submitted proof before the CIAC
of the additional cost of manpower and equipment usage for the removal of the
underground obstructions and other supporting documents, the veracity of which
was never questioned by P8,025,836.37. Beyond
cavil, AFCSC is entitled to full payment of the expenses incurred for the
removal of the underground obstructions.
As to the question of which between
AFCSC and New World should shoulder the expenses for the pile tests, We uphold
the ruling of the CIAC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the pile tests
conducted should be for the account of New World in accordance with the
accepted practice in the construction industry.
We see no reason to disregard the determination of the CIAC on this
matter. This being in accordance with
the established principle that determination of certain questions of fact
falling within the peculiar technical expertise of an administrative agency,
must be accorded great respect, if not finality by this Court. A long line of cases establish the basis rule
that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.[11] Therefore, AFCSC is entitled to the payment
of the total amount of P336,683.48 consisting
of P157,681.15 for sonic pipe installation; P104,002.33 for build
up of pile test cap; and P75,000.00 for crane rental.
Finally, with respect to the issue of
whether or not AFCSC is liable for liquidated damages for its failure to
complete the construction work by the contract date of 24 February 1997, We
agree with the findings of the CIAC that AFCSC never sent notice to New World
regarding a request for extension of time to finish the work despite the
existence of circumstances fairly entitling it to an extension of the contract
period. Thus, AFCSC,
must bear some consequences for the delay in the completion of the project and
for disregarding the owner’s right to determine the length of extension to be
given to the contractor and to consequently adjust the period to finish the
extra work.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
1.
P8,025,836.37 as
cost of additional work consisting of the removal of the underground
obstructions;
2.
P336,683.48 as costs for the various test conducted consisting
of P157,681.15 for sonic pipe installation; P104,002.33 for build
up of pile test cap; and P75,000.00 for crane rental.
The remainder of
the same Decision of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] CA-G.R. SP No. 50045, dated
[2] CIAC Case No. 17-98 dated
[3] The Construction Industry
Arbitration Commission (CIAC) was created under Executive Order No. 1008, which
vested it with original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising from,
or connected with contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in
the
[4] CIAC Decision pp. 9-28; Rollo of G.R. No. 143154, pp. 88-107; Rollo of G.R. No. 143177, pp. 66-86.
[5] CA Decision, Rollo of G.R. No. 143154, pp. 19-28; Rollo of G.R. No. 143177, pp. 97-106.
[6] International Container Terminal Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 134, 146 (1996).
[7] Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, 18 April 1999, 184 SCRA 426, 431-432.
[8] Security Bank & Trust Company and Manahit v. Court of Appeals and Ferrer, 319 Phil. 312, 317 (1995).
[9]
[10]
[11] First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Apepals, 323 Phil. 657, 664 (1996).