Republic of the
Supreme Court
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Purificacion Perez-Rosario, |
G.R. No. 140796 |
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Federico Rosario, Ricardo |
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Perez, Maria Paz Perez-Pasion, |
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Gualberto Perez, Ladislao |
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Perez, Marcelo Perez and Teodora Perez, |
Present: |
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Petitioners, |
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*PANGANIBAN, C.J., (Chairperson) |
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- versus - |
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AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, |
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Hon. Court of Appeals, |
CALLEJO,
SR. and |
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Adjudication Board of the |
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. |
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Department of Agrarian Reform, Mercedes Resultay, Basilio Cayabyab, Federico Baniqued, And Miguel Resultay (deceased) Substituted by his heir, Arturo Resultay, |
Promulgated: |
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Respondents. |
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D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioning the Decision[1]
dated January 14, 1999 promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43905 which affirmed in toto the Decision dated June 10, 1994 of the
Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DARAB); and the CA
Resolution[2]
dated November 8, 1999 which denied the petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The
petition originated from an action for ejectment filed with the DARAB
principally on the grounds of non-payment of lease rentals and sub-leasing
without the knowledge and consent of the owners of a parcel of agricultural
land, consisting of 2.2277 hectares, more or less, devoted to rice and mango
production, located at Barangay Obong, Basista, Pangasinan and registered in
the name of Nicolasa Tamondong Vda. de Perez, predecessor-in-interest of the
petitioners, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-31822.
The facts declared by the DARAB, as
supported by the evidence on record, are clear:
On
On
On November 29, 1983, [petitioners]
Purificacion and Federico Rosario repurchased the subject property from
[respondent] Miguel Resultay in the total amount of P16,000.00 as
evidenced by a document denominated as DEED OF RESALE OF LAND UNDER PACTO DE
RETRO. Thereafter, defendant Miguel
Resultay resumed his delivery of 50% share of the rice harvest to the plaintiffs-heirs
[petitioners] through [petitioners] Purificacion and Federico Rosario on the
portion of 1.6 hectares of the land planted to rice [sic] while the other
one-half hectare portion of this 2.2277 of hectares land [sic] continued to be
cultivated by defendant Basilio Cayabyab who then dealt directly with
[petitioners] Purificacion and Federico Rosario. On
On December 20, 1986, [petitioner] Federico
Rosario received from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab seven (7) cavans at
forty-five (45) kilos per cavan of clean and dry palay representing lease
rental for 1984 and also seven (7) cavans at forty-five (45) kilos per cavan of
clean and dry palay representing lease rental for 1985, or a total of fourteen
(14) cavans of clean and dry palay.
On
On P1,228.50 representing the lease rental for 1988.
On
On
Sometime in 1988, [respondent] Miguel
Resultay who is already old and senile was paralyzed. However, [the] shares of [petitioner]
Purificacion Rosario from the rice harvest were being delivered.
On November 24, 1988, [petitioners] filed the
instant complaint for ejectment of defendants from the land on the grounds
that: a) [respondent] Miguel Resultay delivered only 33.30 cavans of palay to
them (plaintiffs); b) [respondents] Miguel Resultay and Federico Baniqued
constructed their own residential houses on the subject landholding without
their knowledge and consent; c) [respondent] Miguel Resultay is now old and
senile and is no longer capable of doing the necessary manual work; and, d) due
to old age, [respondent] Miguel Resultay sub-leased the land to [respondents]
Federico Baniqued and Basilio Cayabyab without [petitioners’] knowledge and
consent.
[Respondents] controverted the allegations of
[petitioners] by averring that: 1) [respondent] Federico Baniqued is only a
hired farm worker who constructed a shanty inside the disputed landholding for
the purpose of guarding the plants inside the land; 2) [respondent] Miguel
Resultay has been cultivating the land since 1973 and he had constructed his
house on the land itself; 3) the net harvest during the agricultural year of
1987 was twenty-one (21) cavans and one (1) can, and it was divided into 50-50
basis; 4) [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab is an agricultural lessee on a portion
of one-half hectare of the land paying a lease rental of seven (7) cavans of
palay; and 5) the lease rental of seven (7) cavans which is being paid by
Basilio Cayabyab is excessive and unjustifiable considering that he can produce
14 to 18 cavans of palay.[4]
The
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator identified the issues as
follows: first, whether respondent
Miguel Resultay or his wife, respondent Mercedes Resultay, is entitled to
remain as agricultural lessee of the land in question with respondent Federico
Baniqued as their hired farm worker; and, second,
whether respondent Basilio Cayabyab is entitled to remain as an
agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare riceland portion of the landholding
in question.[5]
On
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring
[respondent] Mercedes Resultay as having succeeded [respondent] Miguel Resultay
as agricultural lessee of the land in question as of the time the former
suffered a stroke which paralyzed him;
2. Dispossessing
the [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab for deliberate non-payment of the 1986, 1987,
1988 and 1989 lease rental of the one-half (1/2) hectare riceland portion until
the filing of this complaint against him;
3. Ordering
[respondent] Federico Baniqued to refrain from further performing farmworks on
the riceland in question;
4. Dispossessing
[respondent] Mercedes Resultay from the riceland portion of the land in
question which she retained after giving the one-half (1/2) hectare portion to
[respondent] Basilio Cayabyab;
5. Maintaining
[respondent] Mercedes Resultay as agricultural lessee on the non-riceland
portion of the land in question.[6]
In support of the foregoing, the
Office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator held that although
respondent Mercedes Resultay succeeded respondent Miguel Resultay after a
stroke which caused his paralysis, she did not perform the farm work on the
land in question; that, for this reason, she hired respondent Federico Baniqued
to work for her; that the hiring of respondent Baniqued amounted to a
“substantial non-compliance of her obligation”
as an agricultural
tenant and a ground for dispossession under Section 36,
paragraph 2,[7] of
Republic Act No. 3844, as amended; that although the receipt of the lease rentals
by petitioner Federico Rosario is indicative of respondent Cayabyab’s status as
an agricultural lessee on the one-half hectare riceland portion, he should be evicted on the ground of deliberate refusal to pay rental; that
respondent Baniqued is merely a hired farm laborer and, thus, he “has no better
right than (respondent) spouses Miguel Resultay and Mercedes Resultay who hired
him;” and that the non-riceland portion where respondent spouses Resultay
reside does not appear to have been subleased or given to any third party for
farm work and, hence, they should remain in possession of the same.[8]
Respondents
appealed to the DARAB. On
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment dated
IT
IS SO ORDERED.[9]
The
DARAB declared that respondent Cayabyab is a bona fide agricultural
lessee; that he substantially complied with his obligation to deliver the
landholders’ share and was not remiss in paying the rentals whenever they fell
due; that he could not be faulted for seemingly delayed payment of lease
rentals after the institution of the complaint on November 24, 1988, nor could
he be blamed for the confusion in the accounting and liquidation of harvests
since the petitioners gave rise to it by refusing to receive promptly his
tender of lease rentals; that petitioner Purificacion Rosario herself admitted
in her testimony that she received the rental payments; that the conclusion
that respondent Mercedes Resultay, as successor of her old and paralyzed
husband Miguel Resultay, did not herself perform the farm work on the land had
no factual basis; that the burden to prove the averment that she did not actually
perform her obligations as an agricultural tenant rested with the petitioners
and they failed to discharge that burden; that the hiring of the services of a
farm laborer to do certain piece work or on an occasional basis is not
prohibited by law, as long as the agricultural tenant herself cultivates the
farm and manages it with due diligence; that the hiring of a farm laborer to do
a certain phase of farming is, in itself, a generally accepted practice in a
farming community; that respondent Mercedes Resultay had faithfully and
religiously shared the rice produce with the petitioners; that there is no
legal impediment for respondent Miguel Resultay to build his house within the
landholding, and neither did petitioners adduce any concrete evidence to show
that respondent Baniqued had constructed a house thereon, since Baniqued, who
is only a farm helper, merely built a shanty which is not a dwelling
contemplated by law; that petitioners failed to prove the existence of any
other lawful cause for the ejectment of the respondents; and that since the
juridical relationship between the parties appears to be a share tenancy which
is contrary to law and public policy, it should be converted to a leasehold
pursuant to law and existing rules and regulations.
On
On
1. That public respondent Adjudication Board grossly misappreciated the
established facts and evidence adduced in the above-entitled case;
2. That
the Decision dated June 10, 1994 and Resolution dated February 11, 1997
rendered by public respondent Adjudication Board in the instant case, were
contrary to existing agrarian laws and jurisprudence applicable on the matter
at issue; and
3. That
due to public respondent Adjudication Board’s patent and gross errors committed
in the issuances of the assailed Decision and Resolution, petitioners suffered
not only irreparable damage and prejudice but also caused grave injustice to
petitioners.[10]
On
Petitioners moved to reconsider, but
the CA denied the motion through its Resolution dated November 8, 1999, a copy
of which was received by the petitioners on
Twenty-two
days later, or on
Petitioners raise the following issues
before this Court:
1. Whether or not public respondents Honorable
Court of Appeals and Honorable Adjudication Board (DARAB) grossly erred in
declaring private respondents Mercedes Resultay and Basilio Cayabyab as
agricultural lessees over the landholding co-owned by the petitioners;
2. Whether or not the declarations of private
respondents as agricultural lessees by the public respondents are contrary to
the established facts, adduced evidences [sic], law and jurisprudence
applicable on the matter; and
3. Whether or not honorable public respondents
committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring private respondents as
agricultural lessees over the landholding co-owned by the petitioners.[12]
Meanwhile, on
The
instant Petition for Certiorari “based on Rule 65” must fail.
Under Rule 65, the petitioners must
show that they have no plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the error that they
seek to correct. A remedy is considered
“plain, speedy, and adequate” if it will promptly relieve the petitioners from
the injurious effects of the judgment and the acts of the lower court or
agency.[13] In this case, an appeal under Rule 45 by way
of petition for review on certiorari
was not only available but also a
speedy and adequate remedy.[14] When the petitioners received on November 15,
1999 a copy of the CA Resolution dated November 8, 1999 denying their Motion
for Reconsideration, and absent any motion for extension, they had until
November 30, 1999, or 15 days later, within which to perfect their appeal. They did not.
What they chose to do was to file a “Petition for Certiorari” “based on Section 1, Rule 65” on
Under Rule
45, the reglementary period to appeal is 15 days from notice of judgment or
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Rule 45 is clear that decisions, final orders or resolutions of the CA in
any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of the
action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to this Court by filing a
petition for review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process
over the original case.[15] A special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court will not cure the failure to timely file a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.[16] The remedies of appeal in the ordinary course of law and that
of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.[17] A petition under Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule
45, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by one’s own
neglect or
error in the choice of remedies.[18] And under Section 5(f) of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, an error
in the choice or mode of appeal, as in
this case, merits an outright dismissal.
But even if this Court should excuse
the procedural lapse in the interest of substantial justice, the same result
obtains, because the decisions and resolutions of the DARAB and CA, as
well as their findings of fact, are in accord with law and jurisprudence.
The determination of personal cultivation
is a factual issue and requires the exercise of a function not within the
province of this Court. Well established
is the rule that in an appeal via certiorari, only questions of law may
be reviewed.[19] And so, too, is the rule that in agrarian cases,
the only function of the appellate courts is to determine whether the findings
of fact of the agrarian courts, such as the DARAB or, its predecessor, the
Court of Agrarian Relations, are supported by substantial evidence, and where
they are so supported, such findings are conclusive and binding upon the
appellate courts.[20]
Petitioners insist that respondent
spouses Miguel and Mercedes Resultay did not perform in their personal capacity
the major phases of the farm work over the land in question, but through hired
hands. Both the CA and the DARAB are of
the same opinion that this negative averment has no factual basis. While it is conceded in all quarters that
respondent Baniqued is a hired farm worker, from this fact alone, it cannot be
inferred that respondent Mercedes Resultay is not actually performing her
obligations as an agricultural tenant or, stated otherwise, that she did not
cultivate the land in person or through other members of the immediate
household. Under Section 37 of Republic Act
No. 3844, as amended, and coupled with the fact that the petitioners are the
complainants themselves, the burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful
cause for the ejectment of an agricultural lessee rests upon them, since they
are the agricultural lessors.[21] This proceeds from the principle that a
tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of
tenure. She can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law.[22]
Section 36 of the same law enumerates
the grounds for dispossession of the tenant’s landholding.
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding;
Exceptions. - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future
surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment
and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has been
authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:
(1) The
agricultural lessor-owner or a member of his immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will convert the landholding, if suitably located,
into residential, factory, hospital or school site or other useful
non-agricultural purposes: Provided; That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five years rental on his
landholding in addition to his rights under Sections twenty-five and
thirty-four, except when the land owned and leased by the agricultural lessor,
is not more than five hectares, in which case instead of disturbance
compensation the lessee may be entitled to an advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment proceedings are filed against him: Provided,
further, That should the landholder not cultivate the land himself for three
years or fail to substantially carry out such conversion within one year after
the dispossession of the tenant, it shall be presumed that he acted in bad
faith and the tenant shall have the right to demand possession of the land and
recover damages for any loss incurred by him because of said dispossessions.
(2) The
agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his
failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
(3) The
agricultural lessee planted crops or used the landholding for a purpose other
than what had been previously agreed upon;
(4) The
agricultural lessee failed to adopt proven farm practices as determined under
paragraph 3 of Section twenty-nine;
(5) The
land or other substantial permanent improvement thereon is substantially
damaged or destroyed or has unreasonably deteriorated through the fault or
negligence of the agricultural lessee;
(6) The
agricultural lessee does not pay the lease rental when it falls due: Provided,
That if the non-payment of the rental shall be due to crop failure to the
extent of seventy-five per centum as a result of a fortuitous event, the
non-payment shall not be a ground for dispossession, although the obligation to
pay the rental due that particular crop is not thereby extinguished; or
(7) The
lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
The petitioners failed to discharge
that burden. They invoke Gabriel v.
Pangilinan[23] where the Court
held:[24]
A person, in order to be considered a tenant,
must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household
cultivate the land. Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land
cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he pays for doing
the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having
abandoned the land as tenant within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic
Act No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of one.
But
precisely, as discussed above, it falls
upon the
petitioners to demonstrate through
substantial evidence that the respondents did not actually cultivate the land
in order to consider the latter as having abandoned the same. It does not
follow that, if the tenant hires a farm worker to do certain phases of the farm
work, then the tenant entirely ceases all cultivation.
Respondent Baniqued himself testified that he was being paid
for a certain phase of work.[25]
In the recent past, the Court has held
that the employment of farm laborers to perform some aspects of farm work does not preclude the existence of an
agricultural leasehold relationship, provided that an agricultural lessee does
not leave the entire process of cultivation in the hands of hired
helpers. Indeed, while the law
explicitly requires the agricultural lessee and his immediate family to work on
the land, this Court nevertheless has declared that the hiring of farm laborers
by the tenant on a temporary, occasional, or emergency basis does not negate
the existence of the element of “personal cultivation” essential in a tenancy
or agricultural leasehold relationship.[26]
The
foregoing pronouncements are nothing new; the Court, quoting established
authority, has recognized as far back in 1962
that the mere fact that the
agricultural lessee did not do all the work himself but temporarily
utilized the services of others to help him, does not mean that he violated the
requirements provided by law and jurisprudence; it would have been otherwise
had the lessee entirely entrusted the work to other persons and
employed laborers on a permanent
basis. The law does not prohibit the tenant or the landowner who works the land
himself to avail occasionally of the help of others.[27]
Petitioners maintain that respondent
spouses Resultay sub-leased a portion of the land in question to respondent
Cayabyab, and that the employment of a sub-lessee who is not a member of the
tenant’s immediate household, and without the knowledge and consent of the landowner, is prohibited
by law.[28] To support this contention, petitioners refer
to a decision rendered by the CA.[29]
Further, petitioners aver that
respondent Cayabyab deliberately refused to pay the lease rentals for the
period covering 1986 to 1989. Even if
Cayabyab attempted to pay the rentals by depositing them during the pendency of
the case, petitioners argue, their withdrawal, however, was made with leave of
court, prompted by extreme human needs, and on the condition that the receipts
shall not be used as evidence of any tenancy relationship.
These
mixed questions of fact and law are interrelated, and have been correctly
resolved by the CA and the DARAB whose decisions are supported by substantial
evidence as it appears on the record.
This Court affirms the CA decision which, in turn, upheld in toto the
DARAB’s finding that respondent Cayabyab is a bona fide agricultural
lessee,[30]
as well as the finding that he duly paid the rentals, to wit:
There is no factual basis which shall lead to
a conclusion that [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab deliberately refused to pay the
lease rentals on the land for the cropping years of 1986, 1987, 1988 and
1989. Evidence on records clearly
show[s] that Basilio Cayabyab was not remiss of his obligation to pay lease
rentals when they fall due. For the
cropping years of 1984 and 1985, he paid to [petitioner] Federico Rosario a
total amount of fourteen (14) cavans as evidenced by a receipt dated December
20, 1986 (Exhibit “3”, Defendants). The
lease rentals due for the cropping years of 1986 and 1987 in the total amount
of fourteen (14) cavans were deposited by [respondent Cayabyab] with Gangano’s
Family Rice Mill at Malimpec, Bayambang, Pangasinan on November 28, 1986. These rentals which were converted into its
money equivalent of Php 2,511.60 were received by [petitioner] Purificacion
Rosario on
The lease rentals due for 1988 harvest season
amounting to seven (7) cavans was deposited by [respondent] Cayabyab with the
Rural Bank of
x x x Finally, the issue on payment of lease
rentals is undoubtedly resolved by the admission of [petitioner] Purificacion
Rosario herself when she testified in the following manner –
Q — So, in
1986, 1987, 1988 and 1989 nagdedeliver sa inyo si Cayabyab ng renta sa lupa.
A — Opo.
Q — Sigurado kayo?
A — Until 1991 pala.” (T.S.N., September 29, 1992, p.
7).
We find no cogent reason to find otherwise
than the above quoted findings of public respondent Adjudication Board.[31] (emphasis supplied)
With
respect to the question of whether the withdrawals made with leave of court may
prejudice the petitioners, the CA aptly held:[32]
Furthermore, while it is true that the
approved withdrawal of the deposited rentals thereon by the [petitioners]
should not be construed as recognition of tenancy relationship, it is likewise
true that the act of [petitioner] Federico Rosario in receiving from
[respondent] Basilio Cayabyab on December 20, 1986 the lease rental of seven
(7) cavans of palay for 1984 and another seven (7) cavans of palay for 1986 is
indicative of his being [an] agricultural lessee of the one-half (1/2) hectare
riceland portion of the land in question.
Besides, it should be noted, that in cases for ejectment of a tenant for
failure to pay lease rentals, there must be a conscious intent to unlawfully
deprive the landholder of his share, which is not so in the case at bar
especially considering that, on February 1, 1989, [petitioner] Purificacion
Rosario received from [respondent] Basilio Cayabyab the total amount of Php
2,511.60 representing the lease rentals for 1985 and 1986, and on February 16,
1989, the amount of Php 1,228.50 representing the lease rental for 1988; on May
25, 1989, [petitioner] Federico Rosario received from [respondent] Cayabyab
seven (7) cavans of palay at 45 kilos per cavan; and on December 11, 1990,
[petitioner] Federico Rosario received from [respondent] Cayabyab seven (7)
cavans of palay.
This
Court has held that rental payments are factual issues beyond the reach of an
appeal via certiorari, as only questions of law may be reviewed.[33] Likewise, the question of whether a person is
an agricultural tenant or not is basically a question of fact.[34]
Apart from the foregoing findings of
the courts a quo, there is evidence on the record, unrebutted by
petitioners and confirmed by the DARAB, showing that respondent Miguel Resultay
constituted respondent Cayabyab as an agricultural lessee by virtue of a
contract of lease entered into by them at the time the former owned the land as
vendee a retro before its redemption by the petitioners in 1983.[35] Hence, when the petitioners repurchased the
land, they are deemed to have assumed this lease by virtue of subrogation. Respondent Cayabyab himself testified that at
the time of the redemption and reversion of ownership, he was made to sign a
receipt describing the parcel he cultivated in order to acknowledge that he had
received the land from the petitioners and their predecessor-in-interest.[36]
As stated above, in agrarian cases,
when the appellate courts confirm that the findings of fact of the agrarian
courts are borne out by the record or based on substantial evidence, such
findings are conclusive and binding on the appellate courts.[37] Accordingly, this Court will not disturb the
factual findings of the DARAB, as affirmed by the CA, that respondent Cayabyab
was an agricultural lessee of the subject land, considering that this
conclusion was supported by substantial evidence.[38]
As
correctly noted by the DARAB, it appears that the juridical relationship of the
parties is still governed by agricultural share tenancy. The relationship should be converted into a
leasehold. On
Sections 4 and 5[41]
of R.A. No. 3844 provide for the automatic conversion of share tenancy to
agricultural leasehold. The lease rental
should be determined in accordance with Section 12[42]
of R.A. No. 6657 in relation to Section 34[43]
of R.A. No. 3844, as amended, and existing rules and regulations.
It is an established social and
economic fact that the escalation of poverty is the driving force behind the political
disturbances that have in the past compromised the peace and security of the
people as well as the continuity of the national order. To subdue these acute disturbances, the
legislature over the course of the history of the nation passed a series of
laws calculated to accelerate agrarian reform, ultimately to raise the material
standards of living and eliminate discontent.[44] Agrarian reform is a perceived solution to
social instability. The edicts of social
justice found in the Constitution and the public policies that underwrite them,
the extraordinary national experience, and the prevailing national consciousness,
all command the great departments of government to tilt the balance in favor of
the poor and underprivileged whenever reasonable doubt arises in the
interpretation of the law. But annexed
to the great and sacred charge of protecting the weak is the diametric function
to put every effort to arrive at an equitable solution for all parties
concerned: the jural postulates of social justice cannot shield illegal acts,
nor do they sanction false sympathy towards a certain class, nor yet should
they deny justice to the landowner whenever truth and justice happen to be on
her side.[45] In the occupation of the legal questions in
all agrarian disputes whose outcomes can significantly affect societal harmony,
the considerations of social advantage must be weighed,[46]
an inquiry into the prevailing social interests is necessary in the adjustment
of conflicting demands and expectations of the people,[47]
and the social interdependence of these interests, recognized.[48]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED
and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
(On Official Leave)
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO ROMEO J. CALLEJO,
SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Acting chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
CONSUELO
YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, First Division
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairman’s attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Acting Chief Justice
* On Official Leave.
** Acting Chairperson.
[1] Penned by then Acting Presiding Justice Jorge S. Imperial (retired), with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (now deceased) and Artemio G. Tuquero (retired), concurring.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Artemio G. Tuquero (retired), with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola (now deceased) and Teodoro P. Regino (retired), concurring.
[3]
It must be noted that these
rentals and those that came after, but not those before, were deposited and
withdrawn pending litigation through petitioners’ motions and with leave of
court. The instant complaint for
ejectment was filed by the petitioners on
[4] CA rollo, pp. 43-46.
[5]
[6]
[7] Republic
Act No. 3844, Sec. 36, as amended, provides:
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions.
- Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or future surrender, of the
land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the enjoyment and possession of
his landholding except when his dispossession has been authorized by the Court
in a judgment that is final and executory if after due hearing it is shown
that:
x x x x
(2) The
agricultural lessee failed to substantially comply with any of the terms and
conditions of the contract or any of the provisions of this Code unless his
failure is caused by fortuitous event or force majeure;
x x x x
[8] CA rollo, pp. 34-35.
[9]
[10] CA rollo, p. 8.
[11] Rollo, pp. 34-40.
[12]
[13]
Chua v.
[14]
[15] Pagoda Philippines, Inc. v. Universal Canning, Inc., G.R. No. 160966, October 11, 2005, 472 SCRA 355, 359; Chua v. Santos, supra note 11, at 373; Heirs of Pagobo v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 1119, 1132-1133 (1997).
[16]
Chua v.
[17] Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 456 Phil. 755, 785 (2003); Yap Sumndad v. Harrigan, 430 Phil. 612 (2002); Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Court of Appeals, 389 Phil. 644,655 (2000); Republic v. Court of Appeals, 379 Phil. 92, 97 (2000); Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 355 Phil. 503, 516 (1998); Esguerra v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 58, 75 (1997).
[18] Chua
v.
[19]
Palon v. Nino, G.R. No.
138042,
[20]
Reyes v. Reyes, 437 Phil.
274, 284 (2002); Malate v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 55318, February 9,
1993, 218 SCRA 572, 576; Heirs of E.B. Roxas, Inc. v. Tolentino, G.R.
No. L-39807,
[21]
See Mon v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 118292,
[22] See Heirs of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, G.R. No. 145568, November 17, 2005, 475 SCRA 203,212; Alarcon v. Court of Appeals, 453 Phil. 373, 381 (2003). Republic Act No. 3844, Sec. 7, as amended, provides:
SEC. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. – The agricultural leasehold relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished. The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein provided.
[23] 157 Phil. 578 (1974).
[24]
[25]
TSN,
[26] Verde
v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 108; Cuaño v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107159, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA 122,
135-136.
[27] De
Guzman v.
[28] Republic
Act No. 3844, Sections 27 and 36, as amended, provide:
Sec. 27. Prohibitions to Agricultural Lessee. -
It shall be unlawful for the agricultural lessee:
x x x x
(2) To employ a sub-lessee on his landholding: Provided, however,
That in case of illness or temporary incapacity he may employ laborers whose
services on his landholding shall be on his account.
Sec. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. - Notwithstanding any agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an agricultural lessee shall continue in the
enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and executory if after
due hearing it is shown that:
x x x x
(7) The
lessee employed a sub-lessee on his landholding in violation of the terms of
paragraph 2 of Section twenty-seven.
[29]
Jano v.
[30] Rollo, p. 38.
[31]
[32]
[33] Palon
v. Nino, supra note 17; Spouses Batingal v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 128636, February 1, 2001,351 SCRA 60, 66.
[34] Mon
v. Court of Appeals, supra note 19.
[35]
CA rollo, p. 43. Respondent Cayabyab again confirmed this
statement during cross-examination, TSN,
[36]
[37]
Supra note 18; See Planters
Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA
185; Milestone Realty and Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 431 Phil.
119,130 (2002).
[38] Planters
Development Bank v. Garcia, supra note 35; Mon v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 19; Valencia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122363, April 29,
2003, 401 SCRA 666.
[39] Heirs
of Enrique Tan, Sr. v. Pollescas, supra note 20; Mon v. Court of Appeals,
supra note 19; Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, 434 Phil. 626, 633 (2002).
[40]
[41] Republic Act No. 3844, Sections 4 and 5 read:
Sec. 4. Abolition of Agricultural Share Tenancy. - Agricultural share tenancy, as herein defined, is
hereby declared to be contrary to public policy and shall be abolished:
Provided, That existing share tenancy contracts may continue in force and
effect in any region or locality, to be governed in the meantime by the
pertinent provisions of Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred and ninety-nine,
as amended, until the end of the agricultural year when the National Land
Reform Council proclaims that all the government machineries and agencies in
that region or locality relating to leasehold envisioned in this Code are
operating, unless such contracts provide for a shorter period or the tenant
sooner exercise his option to elect the leasehold system: Provided, further, That in order not to jeopardize
international commitments, lands devoted to crops covered by marketing
allotments shall be made the subject of a separate proclamation that adequate
provisions, such as the organization of cooperatives, marketing agreements, or
other similar workable arrangements, have been made to insure efficient
management on all matters requiring synchronization of the agricultural with the
processing phases of such crops: Provided, furthermore, That where the agricultural share tenancy contract
has ceased to be operative by virtue of this Code, or where such a tenancy
contract has been entered into in violation of the provisions of this Code and
is, therefore, null and void, and the tenant continues in possession of the
land for cultivation, there shall be presumed to exist a leasehold relationship
under the provisions of this Code, without prejudice to the right of the
landowner and the former tenant to enter into any other lawful contract in
relation to the land formerly under tenancy contract, as long as in the interim
the security of tenure of the former tenant under Republic Act Numbered Eleven
hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, and as provided in this Code, is not
impaired: Provided, finally, That if a
lawful leasehold tenancy contract was entered into prior to the effectivity of
this Code, the rights and obligations arising therefrom shall continue to
subsist until modified by the parties in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
Sec. 5. Establishment of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. - The agricultural leasehold relation shall be established by operation of law in accordance with Section four of this Code and, in other cases, either orally or in writing, expressly or impliedly.
[42] Republic Act No. 6657, Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Determination of Lease Rentals. - In order to protect and improve the tenurial and economic status of the farmers in tenanted lands under the retention limit and lands not yet acquired under this Act, the DAR is mandated to determine and fix immediately the lease rentals of thereof in accordance with Section 34 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended: Provided, That the DAR shall immediately and periodically review and adjust the rental structure for different crops, including rice and corn, of different regions in order to improve progressively the conditions of the farmer, tenant or lessee.
[43] Republic
Act No. 3844, Section 34 provides:
Sec. 34. Consideration for the Lease of Riceland
and Lands Devoted to Other Crops. - The consideration for the lease of
riceland and lands devoted to other crops shall not be more than the equivalent
of twenty-five per centum of the average normal harvest during the three
agricultural years immediately preceding the date the leasehold was established
after deducting the amount used for seeds and the cost of harvesting,
threshing, loading, hauling and processing, whichever are applicable: Provided,
That if the land has been cultivated for a period of less than three years, the
initial consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during the
preceding years when the land was actually cultivated, or on the harvest of the
first year in the case of newly-cultivated lands, if that harvest is normal:
Provided, further, That after the lapse of the first three normal harvests, the
final consideration shall be based on the average normal harvest during these
three preceding agricultural years: Provided, furthermore, That in the absence
of any agreement between the parties as to the rental, the maximum allowed
herein shall apply: Provided, finally, That if capital improvements are
introduced on the farm not by the lessee to increase its productivity, the
rental shall be increased proportionately to the consequent increase in
production due to said improvements. In case of disagreement, the Court shall
determine the reasonable increase in rental.
[44] See Eduardo F. Hernandez, et
al., Landowners’ Rights Under the Agrarian Reform Program 21 (2004) citing Yujiro Hayami, et al.,
Toward an Alternative Land Reform Paradigm: A Philippine Perspective
(1990); Rodolfo V. Romero, Missed
Opportunities: The Philippine Economy 1970-1994 (1995); Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., A Living
Constitution: The Cory Aquino Presidency (2000).
[45] Land Bank of the
[46]
See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457
(1897).
[47] See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1943); Eugene Ehrlich, Montesquieu and Sociological Jurisprudence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 582 (1916).
[48] Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law 47 (Yale University Press, 1954)