PASTOR DE JESUS, G.R.
No. 127857
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
-
versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
HONORABLE COURT OF VELASCO, JR., JJ.
APPEALS, RONALDO, ALICIA,
FLORANTE, NELSON, BELLAFLOR,
MARIO,
ARNOLFO, JOCELYN and Promulgated:
GODFREY, all surnamed DE JESUS,
all
represented by RONALDO DE June 20, 2006
JESUS,
Respondents.
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Tinga, J.:
In this Petition[1] for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
petitioner Pastor de Jesus assails the Decision[2] dated
The
factual and legal antecedents culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals
follow.
Herein respondents de Jesus, in their
capacity as legal heirs and successors-in-interest to the property inherited by
their late father Fermin de Jesus (Fermin) filed a petition before the trial
court on 3 June 1991, seeking the partition of a parcel of land left by their
deceased grandparents.
From the pleadings and evidence
presented by the parties, the following facts were established: that respondents
de Jesus, namely Ronaldo, Alicia, Florante, Nelson, Bellaflor, Mario, Arnolfo,
Jocelyn, and Godfrey, all surnamed de Jesus, represented by Ronaldo de Jesus
(Ronaldo), are the legitimate children of Fermin; that Pastor de Jesus is their uncle, being
the brother of Fermin; that the parties
are all residents of Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao; that the spouses Juan and Eustaquia de Jesus
were the parents of Fermin, Consolacion and Pastor de Jesus from whom they
inherited through intestate succession the parcel of land in dispute consisting
of more or less five (5) hectares located in
Ipil, Bulanao, Tabuk, Kalinga-Apayao and covered by Tax Declaration No.
16100; that Juan de Jesus died on 7 December
1964 while Fermin died on 24 September 1979;
that as of the filing of the petition, the title to the property remained in the name of
Juan de Jesus.
Mainly in dispute is the claim of
respondents de Jesus that ownership of the said property had never been
transferred to anyone and/or partitioned among the legal heirs thereto, and that
as legitimate children of Fermin and by right of representation under the law
of intestate succession, they are entitled to their rightful share of the
estate left by their grandfather Juan de Jesus.
Pastor de Jesus contended that respondents
de Jesus are no longer entitled to their father’s share in the subject property
as the latter has already sold to Pastor de Jesus his property right along with
only sister Consolacion for a consideration of P10,000.00. This is
evidenced by the notarized Deed of Sale dated
The trial court ordered the Deed of Sale to be submitted to the NBI for
examination in order to determine its genuineness and due execution.
Respondents de Jesus presented as
witnesses Alicia de Jesus Oakes, Ronaldo de Jesus and the NBI Handwriting
Expert Zenaida Torres. Their rebuttal witnesses were Ronaldo and Maura Maramag
de Jesus (Maura).
On the other hand, Pastor de Jesus’s witnesses
were his sister Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C. Diasen, Jr., Zenaida Tuazon and
himself.
After trial, the trial court rendered
its decision on
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring
null and void Extra-judicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Estate of
Deceased Person dated
2. Directing
the Partition of Lot 769, Pls-93 covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-131 under the registered name of
the late Juan de Jesus;
3. Appointing
commissioners to make partition over
4. Directing
Respondents to pay Petitioners the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00)
by way of attorney’s fees; and to pay costs.
Let a copy of this
decision be furnished the Register of Deeds of Kalinga-Apayao.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Aggrieved, Pastor de Jesus interposed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals claiming that the trial court erred: (1) in not
giving weight to the evidence he offered to prove that the Deed of Sale was
duly executed by the heirs of Juan de Jesus; (2) in relying on the testimony of
the expert witness than on the testimonies of disinterested and knowledgeable
witnesses asserting the genuineness of the signatures; and (3) in declaring,
without substantial basis, null and void the Deed of Sale.[6]
The Court of Appeals found Pastor de
Jesus’s appeal to be devoid of merit. It shared the lower court’s observations:
that a mere look at the signature above the name Fermin de Jesus[7]
evinces a disparity of the signature with that appearing on page two (2) of the
Deed of Sale;[8]
that despite the assertion of petitioners Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo de
Jesus that the signature on page two (2) of the questioned document is that of
their father’s, it cannot be better than or absolute as the conclusions found
by expert witness Zenaida Torres that the signature on the second page of the Deed
of Sale and by standard signatures “were not written by one and the same
person;” and that since the genuineness of the signature becomes the crux of
the proceedings, a closer examination of the questioned signature and the
circumstances then prevailing becomes of utmost necessity. The Court of Appeals
thus declared that there is sufficient evidence to warrant the declaration of
Fermin’s signature as a forgery.[9]
However, even without the testimony of
the handwriting expert, the appellate court ruled that there are valid reasons
to doubt the due execution of the document in question.[10]
It observed that the testimony of
Consolacion on the physical condition of Fermin was fraught with contradictions
and inconsistencies seriously eroding her credibility. Consolacion testified
that Fermin had been admitted to various hospitals and was eventually released
because his illness was already beyond treatment or hopeless yet she insisted
that Fermin was still strong. Consolacion contradicted herself when she
testified that Fermin was fetched with a wheelchair when they alighted from the
helicopter on their way to the medicare room. This shows that Fermin not only
could not withstand the rigors of long travel, as pointed out by the trial
court, but could not also walk by himself. This affirms Maura’s testimony that
Fermin was already very weak and very thin when he arrived in the
The appellate court likewise ruled
that Pastor de Jesus’s credibility was not impressive. During the pre-trial
conference, Pastor de Jesus admitted being in possession of the original copy
of the Deed of Sale but when later pressed to produce the original, his reply
was that Fermin left him only a duplicate copy.[12]
In conclusion, the Court of Appeals
stated that the rule that “a notarized document is admissible in evidence
without proof of its due execution and is conclusive as to the truthfulness of
its contents” is not absolute and may be rebutted by evidence to the contrary,
which respondents de Jesus were able to present convincingly in the case at
bar. The appellate court thus declared that the notarized Deed of Sale is null
and void. Inconsistently, however, it declared the same valid and binding with
regard to Pastor de Jesus and his sibling Consolacion. The Court of Appeals
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the
decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED with the modification that the
Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Estate of Deceased Person
dated September 13, 1979 is declared NULL AND VOID only insofar as the
one-third (1/3) share of Fermin de Jesus is concerned.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[13]
With the denial of his motion for
reconsideration,[14]
Pastor de Jesus filed the instant petition wherein he argues in the main that
the testimony of the parties and their witnesses to a notarized agreement,
including that of the notary public who notarized the same, should be given
more weight than the opinion of an expert witness denying the authenticity of a
signature on the document.
In addition, Pastor de Jesus asserts in
his Supplemental Petition for Review on Certiorari[15]
that the presumption of regularity of notarized documents has not been rebutted
in the case at bar. Hence, the appellate court erred in declaring the subject
document as null and void.
In their Comment,[16]
respondents de Jesus maintain that the instant petition is but a reiteration of
Pastor de Jesus’s brief before the appellate court and that there is nothing
new in the points raised therein. They further contend that the document
entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Rights and
Interests in the Estate of a Deceased Person” suffers from grave infirmities such
that it cannot be considered as a duly executed document.[17]
The petition is without merit.
At the outset, it should be stressed
that under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, only questions of law
may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari, the reason being that the
Court is not a trier of facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must
not involve an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by
the litigants or any of them.[18]
It is not the function of this Court
to analyze or weigh evidence all over again, unless there is a showing that the
findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are glaringly
erroneous as to constitute palpable error or grave abuse of discretion.[19]
The theory advanced by respondents de
Jesus that Fermin’s signatures on the Deed of Sale is a forgery involves a
question of fact previously raised and satisfactorily ruled upon by the two
lower courts. Generally, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, affirming
those of the trial court, are final and conclusive. The Supreme Court cannot
review those findings on appeal, especially when they are borne out by the
records or are based on substantial evidence.[20]
The reliance of appellate tribunals on the factual findings of the trial court
is based on the postulate that the latter had firsthand opportunity to hear the
witnesses and to observe their conduct and demeanor during the proceedings.[21]
Although this rule admits of several
exceptions,[22]
none of the exceptions is available in the instant case which gives us reason
to deviate from the rule. The courts a quo had sufficient factual basis
in holding that the questioned signatures are spurious.
In any event, we are not convinced
that the courts a quo erred in declaring null and void the Deed of Sale.
Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon
it with respect to its due execution, and has in its favor the presumption of
regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.[23]
To prove forgery, respondents de Jesus
presented Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo de Jesus, children of Fermin who
were familiar with his handwriting; and NBI Handwriting Expert Zenaida Torres.
Alicia de Jesus Oakes and Ronaldo
asserted that the signature on page one (1) of the Deed of Sale was not Fermin’s
signature but the signature on the second page was his. Zenaida Torres, on the
other hand, came up with the finding that the purported signature of Fermin on
page two (2) of the Deed of Sale was not written by the same person whose
signatures appear on the documents that served as standard signatures of Fermin.
As stated in the decisions of the courts a quo, some of the striking
differences noted by the expert witness are as follows:
First- On the sample signature, the
“T” bar on the “F” is either little bit straight coming from below while that of
the signature on page 2 comes from the top.
Second- Looking at letter “E”, there
is a very small but significant difference. The beginning of the letter “E” is
hooking from the top while that cannot be seen on the sample signatures because
all the “E’s” are either straight or hooking comes from below.
Third-That, another unusual thing is
that when you cover the first and second “s” in Jesus on the sample signature,
you can decipher a letter “W.” But on the questioned signature, even if the
letter “s” is not covered does not form a letter “W” but letter “U” instead
because the stroke tends to go straight down.
Fourth- The crown in F on the
signature on page 2 shows a pronounced tremor and shaky appearance which is not
visible in the sample signature.
Fifth- Letter R is of the signature on
page 2 is fundamentally different from those of the specimen signatures.[24]
With regard to Fermin’s abbreviated
signature on page one (1) of the Deed of Sale, expert witness Torres initially
testified that she could not make a definite opinion about it because the sample
signatures, which are long hand signatures, cannot be used as bases for
comparative examination. However, on cross-examination, she clarified that
there are indications that the signature on page one (1) and the
standard/sample signatures compared were also not written by one and the same
person.[25]
It is true that the opinion of
handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court,[26]
the expert’s function being to place before the court data upon which the court
can form its own opinion.[27]
Handwriting experts are usually
helpful in the examination of forged documents because of the technical
procedure involved in analyzing them. But resort to these experts is not
mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the comparison of handwriting.
A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the
questioned signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its
authenticity.[28]
As held in Estacio v. Jaranilla,[29]
to wit:
It bears stressing that the trial court may
validly determine forgery from its own independent examination of the
documentary evidence at hand. This the trial court judge can do without
resorting to experts, especially when the question involved is mere handwriting
similarity or dissimilarity, which can be determined by a visual comparison of
specimen of the questioned signatures with those of currently existing ones.
Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court explicitly authorizes the court,
by itself, to make a comparison of the disputed handwriting with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is
offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge.[30]
The courts
below did exactly this. They conducted their independent examination of the
signatures and concluded that the disparity of the signatures on page one (1)
and page two (2) of the Deed of Sale is readily noticeable upon inspection.
Moreover, the appellate court observed that a scrutiny of the documents where
Fermin’s specimen signatures appear show that most of them do not bear his
printed name but Fermin consistently signed his name in full and never in the
abbreviated style as the one on page one (1) of the Deed of Sale.
In support of Pastor de Jesus’s
contention, on the other hand, Pastor de Jesus, Consolacion, Atty. Marcos C.
Diasen, Jr., and Zenaida Tuazon all testified that Fermin signed the Deed of
Sale in their presence.
However, the trial court held that their inconsistent
and incredible testimonies together with the circumstances at the time of its
alleged execution rendered doubtful the genuineness of the Deed of Sale.[31]
Moreover, the trial court found it irregular that two (2) typewriters were used
in preparing the Deed of Sale when only one secretary typed the document. The
reason for this was not explained to the full satisfaction of the trial court.[32]
Thus, considering the testimonies of
the witnesses and a plain comparison of the questioned signatures with
admittedly genuine ones, the Court finds no reason to reverse the findings of
the two lower courts. Although the Deed of Sale was a public document having in
its favor the presumption of regularity, such presumption of regularity was
adequately refuted by competent witnesses and the visual analysis of the
signatures made by the courts below.
Since the signatures of Fermin were
forged, the Deed of Sale is effectively nullified. The document should not be annulled
only with respect to Fermin’s share. The document bearing the forged signatures
is in fact an extrajudicial settlement which requires the assent of all the
heirs to the extrajudicial partition.[33]
It is not binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had
notice thereof.[34]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
the Petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated 11 September 1996 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 47008 is AFFIRMED except insofar as it
declared the Extrajudicial Settlement with Simultaneous Sale of Estate of Deceased
Person dated 13 September 1979 null and void only with respect to the 1/3 share
of Fermin de Jesus. The Decision dated
SO
ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR.
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson,
Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII
of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[2]
[21]Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical
[22]Larena v. Mapili, 455 Phil. 945, 950-951
(2003); Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 382 Phil. 15, 24-25 (2000).
[23]Potenciano v. Reynoso, supra note 20;
See also Pan Pacific Industrial Sales
Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Nicolas Capistrano, G.R. No. 125283,
[26]Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission,
United Presbyterian Church, USA, supra note 21, at 907.
[28]Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission,
United Presbyterian Church, USA, supra note 21, AT 907.
[33]Francisco V. J., The Revised Rules of Court in the