FIRST DIVISION
ALEJO ARANDA, SIMEONA G.R. No. 125684
JOSON-ARANDA, BONIFACIA
ARANDA, PELAGIA ARANDA,
DOMINADOR ARANDA, Present:
VIVENCIO ARANDA, LOLITA
ARANDA, JEFFREY ARANDA, PANGANIBAN,
C.J., Chairperson,
and FELICIANO ARANDA, YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
Petitioners,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
FORTUNE SAVINGS & LOAN
ASSOCIATION, INC., THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
CAVITE, SABRINO C. ARANDA,
VERONICA ARANDA, THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF THE
THE HONORABLE COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the
Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
of the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 36111 dismissing the petition for the
annulment of the Decision[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacoor,
The
Antecedents
On January 5, 1979, Alejo Aranda
purchased from the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (Ministry) a parcel of land
consisting of 20,890 square meters identified as Lot No. 1260-B, Subdivision
Plan SWO-40076 of the Yaptinchay Estate in Carmona, Cavite, for which he was
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 102248.[3]
The transfer was covered by a Deed of Sale[4]
where Aranda was prohibited from encumbering or selling the property within
five years from said date without the Ministry’s written consent.
On June 19, 1980, the Ministry issued
a Permit to Mortgage[5]
in favor of Aranda, with the condition that, in case the mortgagee is a private
banking institution or private person, the following clause should be
incorporated in the deed of mortgage: “In the event of foreclosure, only
persons who are qualified to purchase land under Commonwealth Act No. 539,
Republic Act No. 1162, as amended[,] Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, or
government banking institution or agencies, or any private banking institution
may participate in the public auction sale thereof.” It was also required that the mortgage
contract be submitted to the Ministry for verification and final approval.
Aranda’s pending loan application with
Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (FSLAI) was approved. Thus, on P95,000.00) was evidenced by
a Promissory Note,[7]
whereby the spouses Aranda, jointly and severally, obliged themselves to pay their
obligation on or before
The spouses Aranda, however, failed to
pay the loan, upon which FSLAI filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the mortgage. When Alejo Aranda
received the Notice of Sheriff’s
On
1. That plaintiff hereby waives all his
claims embodied in the complaint;
2. That
plaintiff admits that his total obligation is ONE
HUNDRED SIXTY-TWO THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED SEVENTY-FOUR PESOS & 44/100 (P162,474.44)
as of today;
3. That
plaintiff agreed and promised to pay the defendant Fortune Savings & Loan
Association, Inc., the said amount of P162,474.44 on installment basis
as follows:
a) P10,000.00 upon the execution of this
compromise agreement which amount shall be applied in the foreclosure sale
expenses and penalty charges;
b) P5,000.00 every month beginning
4. That plaintiff agreed to pay the
stipulated interest of 22.5% per annum and a penalty charge of 3% per annum on
the diminishing unpaid balance;
5. That the aforementioned obligation of
the plaintiff shall still be secured by the Real Estate Mortgage executed by
plaintiff on June 10, 1980 and entered in the Notarial Register of the Notary
Public of Rizal, Atty. Julio Francisco as Doc. No. 181; Page No. 38; Book No.
XIV; Series of 1980 wherein the plaintiff mortgaged his 20,840 square meters [of]
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-102248;
6. That, should the plaintiff fail to pay
any of the aforementioned monthly installment, then the whole unpaid
indebtedness shall become due and payable, and in case of such an event, the
plaintiff/mortgagor agreed to pay the stipulated interest and penalty charge on
the unpaid balance from date of default as agreed in paragraph 4 hereof;
7. That, as stated in the aforesaid Deed
of Real Estate Mortgage, should the plaintiff/mortgagor fail to pay any of the
foregoing installment, the defendant/mortgagee/bank shall have the right to
foreclose the said mortgage either judicially or extra-judicially; the
defendant/mortgagee/bank is hereby appointed by the plaintiff/mortgagor as
attorney-in-fact to conduct the extra-judicial foreclosure sale;
8. That should the defendant/mortgagee/bank
choose to foreclose the said mortgage either judicially or extra-judicially,
the plaintiff/mortgagor is agreeable to pay attorney’s fees of 25% of the
unpaid balance and the expenses of the foreclosure sale.
WHEREFORE,
plaintiff and defendants respectfully pray that this Honorable Court approve
the foregoing compromise agreement by making a judgment based on the same.
(Sgd.)
ALEJO ARANDA FORTUNE
SAVINGS & LOAN
Plaintiff-Mortgagor ASSOCIATION,
INC.
Defendant-Mortgagee
By:
(Sgd.)
DOLORES
G. VILLENA
Accountant
Assisted by: Assisted
by:
(Sgd.) (Sgd.)
ATTY. FRANCO L. LOYOLA ATTY.
JULIO S. FRANCISCO
Counsel
for Plaintiff Counsel for Defendants
WHEREFORE,
finding the foregoing Compromise Agreement to be the term and voluntary will of
parties, and the same not being contrary to law, morals, and public policy,
judgment is hereby (sic) in
accordance with the terms and conditions therein set forth, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
SO
ORDERED.[12]
However, Alejo failed to pay his
account as provided in the decision. Thus,
on motion of the FSLAI, the RTC issued an Order[13]
dated
In due time, the FSLAI filed a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage with the Ex-Officio
Provincial Sheriff of
Alejo Aranda failed to redeem the
property. On P150,000.00.[16]
On
The
Register of Deeds thereafter issued the following titles: to Sabrino Aranda, TCT
No. T-363211[18] covering
On
Alejo prayed that, after due hearing,
judgment be rendered in his favor as follows:
WHEREFORE,
it is most respectfully prayed that this Honorable Court render judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against defendants, ordering:
ON THE PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER/PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION
1.
Issuing a Temporary Restraining Order ex-parts (sic) and after due hearing, a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining herein defendants or anyone claiming rights under them from further
performing any act which would work injustice to herein plaintiff;
ON THE MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION
1.
Ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-363211, T-363213, [and] T-363214 in the name
of defendant Sabrino C. Aranda; Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-363212 in
the name of defendant Nishin Netsuken Philippines Corporation; and Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-358872 in the name of defendant Fortune Savings Loan
Association, Inc.;
2. Declaring plaintiff to be the owner of the real
estate covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-102248 reinstating the
same to be valid and subsisting;
3. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay
plaintiff:
a) Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00
b) Exemplary damages in the sum of P100,000.00
c) The sum of P100,000.00
as and for attorney’s fees.
Plaintiff prays for other reliefs just and equitable
in the premises.[23]
The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. BCV-93-26.
NNPC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
complaint did not allege that the property was purchased in bad faith and
without value.
In his
Answer[24]
to the complaint, Sabrino alleged the following by way of special and
affirmative defenses:
6. That when herein defendant who was then
abroad and/or away from home returned, came to know of what happened, he
pleaded with defendant Fortune Savings & Loan Association, Inc., explaining
to the latter that he was a part owner of the property, as a result of which
herein defendant was allowed to buy a portion of 7,500 square meters at the
price demanded by defendant Fortune Savings & Loan Association, Inc., which
was P150,000.00 as evidenced by a deed of sale dated December 30, 1991,
a xerox copy of which is hereto attached and marked as ANNEXES “1” and “1-A”
hereof;
7. That herein defendant later on sold a
portion of 1,356 sq. meters, known as Lot 1260-B-1-B, to his co-defendant Nishin
Netsuken Philippine Corporation for a valuable consideration and in good faith,
which act, was, and still within the right of herein defendant to do, as he was
already the absolute owner thereof;
8. That plaintiff has therefore no cause
of action against the herein defendant, but even assuming without admitting
that plaintiff might have some right before to redeem said property or any
portion thereof, the said right was already deemed waived or abandoned;
9. That plaintiff is, therefore, in
estoppel to exercise whatever right, if any, he might have in the premises.[25]
On
Subsequently,
the FSLAI filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground, inter alia, of res judicata. It alleged that the action of plaintiff was
barred by the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 which was based
on the compromise agreement entered into by the parties. For his part, plaintiff filed a manifestation
and motion praying that his complaint be dismissed without prejudice. During
the
On
On
WHEREFORE,
it is most respectfully prayed that, pending final determination of the
present case, it is most respectfully prayed that:
a. A temporary restraining order
immediately be issued restraining the defendants from committing the acts
complained of;
b. After hearing on the petition for
preliminary injunction, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
all the defendants from committing the acts complained of;
and after hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants in the following tenor:
1. Making the
writ of injunction permanent;
2. Declaring
the mortgage in favor of defendant Bank, and all supporting papers thereto,
null and void ab initio;
3. Declaring
the Decision dated
4. Declaring
the Order dated
5. Declaring
the Extrajudicial Foreclosure proceedings and the Certificate of
6. Declaring
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-213097, T-363212, T-363211, T-363213,
T-363214, and T-358872 null and void ab initio,
and ordering the defendant Register of Deeds to cancel said titles;
7. Ordering
the defendants to return and reconvey the property subject of this case to the
plaintiffs free from all liens and encumbrances, and the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Cavite to issue new title in the names of plaintiffs Alejo
Aranda and Simeona Joson-Aranda over the property;
8. In any
event, ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiffs the following amounts:
a. P50,000.00 as actual damages;
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages;
c. P300,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
Plaintiffs
[pray] for such other reliefs to which they may be entitled under the law and
premises.
FSLAI
alleged, by way of defense, that (1) the complaint was barred by the decision
of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 and by the Order of the RTC in Civil
Case No. BCV-93-26 dismissing plaintiff’s second complaint on the ground of res judicata; (2) the children of the
spouses Alejo Aranda and Simeona Joson-Aranda, as plaintiffs, have no cause of
action against it; (3) they are estopped from assailing the compromise
agreement of the parties in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 and the decision of the
RTC based thereon; and (4) they were guilty of forum shopping.
On
The Alejo Aranda spouses filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the appellate court denied.[29]
The
Alejo Aranda spouses, through their new counsel, Atty. Jose Alvarez, forthwith
filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari,
alleging that the CA erred in ruling as follows: (1) that the RTC had
jurisdiction in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16; (2) that their action for the
nullification of the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 had prescribed;
and (3) that the dismissal of their complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-93-26 was
with prejudice.
Petitioners
maintain that they never authorized Atty. Franco Loyola to sign the compromise
agreement in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16; in any event, their complaint in Civil
Case No. BCV-93-26 was dismissed without any answer having been filed by
defendant therein. Considering that the dismissal
of the complaint was not on the merits of the case, it was not a bar to their
complaint in the CA. They aver that the appellate
court should have ordered an investigation on their claim that their counsels,
Atty. Franco Loyola and Atty. Dennis Angeles, took advantage of their ignorance
and illiteracy, and abandoned their cause.
In any event, petitioners point out,
the trial court dismissed their complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-93-26 on their
motion, before any answer was filed; hence, the dismissal of their complaint
was without prejudice.
The petition has no merit.
First. Petitioners Bonifacia Aranda, Pelagia Aranda, Dominador
Aranda, Vivencio Aranda, Lolita Aranda, Jeffrey Aranda, and Feliciano Aranda contend
that they are the real parties-in-interest in the CA and in this Court, and
thus had a cause of action for the nullification of the decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 and for the reversal of the CA decision. They joined their parents, spouses Alejo
Aranda and Simeona Joson-Aranda as plaintiffs in the CA, on their claim that
they are the “compulsory heirs” of said spouses. However, under the law on succession, “the
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent,”[30]
and that “compulsory heirs are called to succeed by operation of law;”[31]
as such, petitioners will only become compulsory heirs of their parents upon the
death of the latter.
Second. Petitioners claim that petitioner Alejo
Aranda did not secure the services of Atty. Loyola as his counsel in Civil Case
No. BCV-82-16 and that said counsel forged his (Alejo’s) signature in the
complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16, as well as the one above his typewritten
name on page three of the compromise agreement.
However, such allegation has been proved to be a complete prevarication
by no less than petitioner Alejo Aranda himself, through his former counsel,
Atty. Loyola, when the latter testified on December 15, 1993, during the
hearing of the motion to withdraw the complaint. The lawyer categorically declared that the
signatures in the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 and the compromise
agreement in said case were genuine. Moreover,
the CA dismissed the petition for the annulment of the decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 based on the testimony of petitioner Alejo Aranda’s
own witness, Atty. Franco Loyola:
However,
the allegations in the petition are not deserving of credence. The petitioners’
claim that they never filed nor authorized Atty. Loyola to file the complaint
subject of Civil Case No. 82-16, much less the compromise agreement is not
believable considering the following circumstances: First, the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during the hearing held on December 15, 1993 in Civil
Case No. 93-26 (a case admittedly filed by petitioner Alejo Aranda) reveals
that petitioner Alejo Aranda himself, through his own counsel, Atty. Dennis Angeles,
presented as witness, Atty. Franco Loyola who testified in this wise:
ATTY. ANGELES: Your Honor, we are offering the
testimony of Atty. Franco Loyola to testify and prove that he was the counsel
on record of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 82-16 entitled Alejo Aranda versus
Fortune Savings & Loan Association, Inc. and Provincial Sheriff of Cavite
and such lawyer was responsible for the execution of the compromise agreement
signed by the parties particularly by his client Alejo Aranda. With the kind permission of this Honorable
Court.
COURT: Proceed.
Q: What was
the purpose in coming to you?
A: The purpose
in coming to me is that they can (sic) recover the property subject matter of
the sheriff sale under extrajudicial foreclosure pursuing.
Q: After your
conversation, what happened?
A: I
prepared a complaint signed by Mr. Aranda against Fortune Savings & Loan
Association, Inc., and the Provincial Sheriff of
x x x
Q: On page no.
8 of the complaint, at the last page, there is a signature of Alejo Aranda.
Will you kindly go over the same and tell the Honorable Court whose signature
is that?
A: That is
the signature of Alejo Aranda, Sir.
x x x
Q: Why do you
know that that is the signature of Alejo Aranda?
A: I was
present, Sir, when that was signed in the presence of the Clerk of Court,
Adriano Vista, before we filed our complaint before the Court of First Instance
of Bacoor, Cavite.
Q: Now, will
you kindly inform this Court whether that was already terminated?
A: That
case was terminated by compromise agreement/settlement, Sir.
x x x
Q: I am
showing to you again the compromise agreement and calling your attention
to the signature of one Alejo Aranda appearing on page 11 of the compromise
agreement, do you know whose signature is this?
A: This (sic) were all signed by Alejo Aranda,
Sir.
Q: And why do you
know that these are the signatures of Alejo Aranda?
A: It was
signed in my presence. If I remember correctly, it was signed right in the
office of Fortune Savings where the
representatives of Fortune Savings, Dolores Villena and Atty. Julio Francisco
were also present. I can distinctly remember Alejo Aranda.
x x x
Q: Now, prior
to the time Alejo Aranda affixed his signature on pages 2 and 3 of the
compromise agreement, will you kindly inform this Honorable Court whether Alejo
Aranda was duly advised of the contents of the compromise agreement?
A: Yes, Sir. I
have already explained the contents of the compromise agreement to him
because it involved monetary obligation it is incumbent for me to explain to
him the meaning of the compromise agreement that has to be approved by the
court.
x x x
Q: On the
basis of this compromise agreement, what happened?
A: It was
approved, Sir, by the court and the decision was made by Judge Ildefonso
Nobleza dated
[Underscoring ours; Tsn,
The
foregoing quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing held on
Third. Petitioners’ contention that the CA should
have ordered the investigation of Atty. Loyola and Atty. Angeles is anchored on
an erroneous factual premise, namely, that the CA found said counsels to have
committed acts of misconduct to the prejudice of the rights of their client, petitioner
Alejo Aranda. However, a careful study
of the CA decision shows that no such findings were made. The appellate court merely declared that even
assuming the truth of the allegations in the petition, they merely constitute
extrinsic fraud, a ground for the annulment of the RTC Decision in Civil Case
No. BCV-82-16:
“A
judgment can be annulled on the following grounds: that the judgment is void
for want of jurisdiction; that the judgment is void for lack of due process; or
that it has been obtained by fraud.” (Regidor v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA
530; Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, 201
SCRA 577). The allegations in the
petition that petitioner Alejo Aranda never filed nor authorized Atty. Franco
Loyola to file the complaint for annulment of real estate mortgage which was
docketed as Civil Case No. 82-16; that the signature in said complaint was
forged, that petitioner Alejo Aranda never appeared nor participated in the
proceedings of said Civil Case No. 82-16; that Alejo Aranda never authorized
the compromise agreement, and that the signature appearing in said compromise
agreement dated December 22, 1983 which was wrongfully made the basis of the
herein assailed judgment upon compromise dated January 5, 1984, was a forgery,
could legally constitute extrinsic fraud that would be a ground for annulment
of judgment. Among the instances of
extrinsic or collateral fraud are: keeping the unsuccessful party away from
court by a false promise of compromise, or purposely keeping him in ignorance
of the suit; or where an attorney fraudulently pretends to represent a party,
and connives at his defeat, or being regularly employed, corruptly sells out
his client’s interest (Magno v. Court of
Appeals, 107 SCRA 285, at page 292).[33]
Indeed,
there is no declaration that Atty. Franco Loyola ever committed any act of
misconduct as counsel of petitioner Alejo Aranda in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16. In fact, the CA declared that as gleaned from
the evidence of petitioner Alejo Aranda in the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-93-26, the signature of Atty. Loyola and
petitioner Alejo Aranda in the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 and in the
compromise agreement were genuine. Moreover,
petitioner spouses never bothered to file any administrative complaint against
Atty. Loyola or Atty. Angeles to assert their claim.
Fourth. We are convinced that the complaint of
petitioners in the CA assailing the decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16
based on the compromise agreement of the parties is merely an
afterthought. The records show that the
RTC rendered judgment in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16 as early as
Fifth. Petitioners’ claim that the complaint in
Civil Case No. BCV-93-26 was dismissed
without prejudice is belied by the records of the case. The Order of the RTC in Civil Case No. BCV-93-26
shows that the complaint was dismissed based on res judicata:
Considering
that the plaintiff himself seeks the dismissal of this case and considering
further defendant Fortune Savings and Loan Association, Inc.’s grounds for
seeking the dismissal of this case, particularly that of res judicata,
to be well-founded, this Court has no alternative but to dismiss this case.
WHEREFORE,
let this case be dismissed.
SO
ORDERED.[34]
An
order of the court dismissing the complaint on the ground of res judicata is an adjudication of the
case on the merits although no trial has been held. Such an order is thus an absolute bar to the
filing of a subsequent action for the same cause between the same parties.[35]
The
decision referred to in the Order of the RTC which barred the complaint of
petitioner Alejo Aranda in Civil Case No. BCV-93-26 was the Decision of the RTC
in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16. The
aforementioned Order of the trial court thus affirmed the validity of the RTC decision
in Civil Case No. BCV-82-16. Therein
plaintiff Alejo Aranda (now petitioner) did not appeal the Order.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate
Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
On leave
CONSUELO YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
* On leave.
[1] Penned by then CA Associate Justice Minerva
P. Gonzaga-Reyes (who would later become a member of the Court, now retired),
with Associate Justices
[2] Penned by Judge Ildefonso M. Bleza (retired); records, pp. 240-242.
[3] Records, p. 118.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21]
[22]
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
Article 777, New Civil Code.
[31] Rabadilla v. Court of Appeals, 390 Phil.
11, 24 (2000).
[32] Rollo, pp. 11-14.
[33]
[34] Records, p. 297.
[35] Mirpuri v. Court of Appeals, 376 Phil.
628, 650 (1999).