EN BANC
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EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA, Petitioner, - versus - |
G. R. No. 159314 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CORONA, CARPIO MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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EDWARD F. RANADA and the Honorable OMBUDSMAN Aniano A. Desierto (now
succeeded by Hon. Simeon Marcelo), and his Deputy OMBUDSMAN for Respondents. |
Promulgated: |
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DECISION
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This petition for review on certiorari
assails the February 12, 2003 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62557 which affirmed the
The facts
are as follows:
On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward
F. Ranada, a member of the Davao
Pilots Association, Inc. (DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and
Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for Gross
Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner
Captain Edgardo V. Estarija,
Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa, Davao
City.[3]
The
complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master
issues the necessary berthing permit for all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200
to P2000 for the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000
as monthly contribution from the DPAI.
The complaint alleged that prior to P5,000
marked money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija.
Consequently,
the Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension[4]
and directed him to answer the complaint.
The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No.
41,464-98, against Estarija for violation of Republic
Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, before the
In his counter-affidavit[6]
and supplemental counter-affidavit,[7]
petitioner vehemently denied demanding sums of money for the approval of
berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian
Cagata, an employee of the DPAI, called to inform him
that the DPAI had payables to the PPA, and although he went to the
association’s office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the association had no pending transaction
with the PPA. Estarija
claimed that Cagata made him believe that the money
was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage
fee for July 1998 representing 10% of the monthly gross revenue of their
association. Nonetheless, he received
the money but assured Cagata that he would send an official
receipt the following day. He claimed
that the entrapment and the subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a
conspiracy to exact personal vengeance against him on account of Ranada’s business losses occasioned by the cancellation of
the latter’s sub-agency agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phil., Inc.,
which was eventually awarded to a shipping agency managed by Estarija’s son.
On
WHEREFORE,
premises considered, there being substantial evidence, respondent EDGARDO V.
ESTARIJA is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefits, pursuant to Section 23(a) and (c) of Rule XIV, Book V, in
relation to Section 9 of Rule XIV both of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). He is disqualified from re-employment in the
national and local governments, as well as in any government instrumentality or
agency, including government owned or controlled corporations. This decision is immediately executory after it attains finality. Let a copy of this decision be entered in the
personal records of respondent EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA.
PPA
Manager Manuel C. Albarracin is hereby directed to
implement this Office Decision after it attains finality.
SO DECREED.[9]
Estarija seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration.[10] Estarija claimed
that dismissal was unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and
immediate power to remove government officials, whether elective or appointive,
who are not removable by impeachment. He maintains that under the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely recommendatory, and that
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of 1989”, is
unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers
that are not provided for in the Constitution.
The Ombudsman denied the motion
for reconsideration in an Order[11]
dated
The Court of Appeals held that the
attack on the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was procedurally and
substantially flawed. First, the
constitutionality issue was belatedly raised in the motion for reconsideration
of the decision of the Ombudsman. Second, the petitioner was unable to prove the
constitutional breach and failed to overcome the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of the questioned statute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the Ombudsman, holding that receiving extortion money constituted
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner failed to refute the
convincing evidence offered by the complainant.
Petitioner presented affidavits executed by the high-ranking officials
of various shipping agencies which were found by the Court of Appeals to be
couched in general and loose terms, and according to the appellate court, could
not be given more evidentiary weight than the sworn testimonies of complainant
and other witnesses that were subjected to cross-examination.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of merit. Hence, the instant petition assigning the
following errors:
(A)
That
certain basic factual findings of the Court of Appeals as hereunder specified,
are not borne by any substantial evidence, or are contrary to the evidence on
record, or that the Court of Appeals has drawn a conclusion or inference which
is manifestly mistaken or is based on a misappreciation
of the facts as to call for a corrective review by this Honorable Supreme
Court;
(B)
That
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman’s Act of 1989”, is unconstitutional,
or that the Honorable OMBUDSMAN does not have any constitutional direct and
immediate power, authority or jurisdiction to remove, suspend, demote, fine
or censure, herein Petitioner and all other government officials, elective or
appointive, not removable by impeachment, consistent with Sec. 13, par. No.
(3), Art XI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
(C)
That
corollary to, or consistent with, the aforecited
Second Reason, said REPUBLIC ACT No. 6770, as amended, is constitutionally
impaired and invalid insofar as it is inconsistent with, or violative of, the aforecited
constitutional provisions (Sec 13, No. 3, Art XI).
(D)
That
the issue of “jurisdiction” or constitutionality or validity of a law, statute,
rule or regulation can be raised at any stage of the case, even by way of a
motion for reconsideration after a decision has been rendered by the court or
judicial arbiter concerned.
(E)
That
the DECISION of the Court of Appeals is contrary to jurisprudential law,
specifically to the ruling of this Honorable SUPREME COURT in the case of “Renato A. Tapiador, Petitioner versus
Office of the Ombudsman and Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma, Respondents, G.R No. 129124” decided on March
15, 2002.
(F)
That
assuming arguendo that the Honorable OMBUDSMAN
does have such direct constitutional power to remove, suspend, etc. government
officials not removable by impeachment, the DECISION rendered in said case
OMB-MIN-ADM-98-[183], finding Petitioner “guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct”
and directing his “dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all leave
credits and retirement benefits xxx”, is still contrary to law and the
evidence on record, or, at the very least, the charge of “Dishonesty” is not
included in RANADA’s administrative complaint and
absolutely no evidence was presented to prove “Dishonesty” and the complaint
which was limited to “[Grave] Misconduct” only;
(G)
That
further assuming arguendo that Petitioner is
subject to direct administrative disciplinary authority by the Honorable
OMBUDSMAN whether under the Constitution or RA 6770, and assuming that he is
“guilty” of “Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct”, the Court of Appeals violated
Sec. 25 of R.A. 6770 for not considering and applying, several mitigating
circumstances in favor of Petitioner and that the penalty (of dismissal with
loss of benefits) imposed by OMBUDSMAN is violative
of Sec. 25, of R.A. 6770 and is too harsh, inhumane, violative of his human dignity, human rights and his
other constitutional right not to be deprived of his property and/or property
rights without due process, is manifestly unproportionate
to the offense for which Petitioner is being penalized, and, should, therefore,
be substantially modified or reduced to make it fair, reasonable, just, humane
and proportionate to the offense committed. (Emphasis supplied).[12]
Essentially, the issues for our
resolution are: First, Is there
substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for dishonesty and grave
misconduct? Second, Is the power of the Ombudsman to
directly remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials
unconstitutional?
On the first issue, petitioner
claims that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not supported by
substantial evidence, and that the Court of Appeals misappreciated
the facts of the case.
Petitioner contends that he cannot
be liable for grave misconduct as he did not commit extortion. He insists that he was merely prodded by
Adrian Cagata to receive the money. He claims that as a bonded official it was
not wrong for him to receive the money and he had authority to assist the
agency in the collection of money due to the agency, e.g. payment for
berthing permits. Moreover, he argues
that the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part and he
does not have influence on their approval, which is the function of the
berthing committee. Consequently, he
avers, it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration of the
issuance of berthing permits.
We note that indeed petitioner has
no hand in the approval of berthing permits.
But, it is undisputed that he does decide on the berthing space to be
occupied by the vessels. The berthing
committee likewise consults him on technical matters. We note, too, that he claims he was only instructed
to receive the money from Cagata, yet he admits that
there was no pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI.
In his Comment, the Ombudsman,
through the Solicitor General, counters that petitioner raised questions of
facts which are not reviewable by this Court. He argued that contrary to the petitioner’s
claim, the judgment of guilt for dishonesty and grave misconduct was based on
the evidence presented. Petitioner was
caught red-handed in an entrapment operation by the NBI. According to the Ombudsman, the entrapment of
the petitioner met the test for a valid entrapment i.e. the conduct of
the law enforcement agent was not likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing to commit the offense. The presumption in entrapment is that a law
abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is
presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Entrapment is contingent on the accused’s predisposition to commit the offense charged, his
state of mind, and his inclination before his exposure to government
agents. Thus, entrapment is not made
ineffectual by the conduct of the entrapping officers. When Estarija
went to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the
money, his doing so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime.
In an administrative proceeding,
the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only substantial
evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.[13] Further, precedents tell us that the factual
findings of the Office of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence
are conclusive,[14] and such findings
made by an administrative body which has acquired expertise are accorded not
only respect but even finality.[15]
As shown on the records, Estarija called the office of the DPAI and demanded the
payment of the monthly contribution from Captain Zamora. Captain Zamora conveyed the demand to Ranada who in turn reported the matter to the NBI. Thereafter, an entrapment operation was
staged. Adrian Cagata
called Estarija to confirm the payment, and that the
money was already available at their office.
Accordingly, Estarija went to the DPAI office
and collected the P5,000 marked money. Upon departure of Estarija
from the office, the NBI operatives frisked him and recovered the P5,000 marked money.
We are unconvinced by Estarija’s explanation of his conduct. He does not deny that he went to the DPAI office
to collect the money and that he actually received the money. Since there was no pending transaction
between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latter’s office to
collect any money. Even if he was
authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, he should have
issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. All told, we are convinced that there is
substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful
behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption, clear
intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are
manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.[16] We are convinced that the decision of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct is
based on substantial evidence. When
there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman’s decision, that decision
will not be overturned.[17]
The same findings sustain the conclusion that Estarija
is guilty of dishonesty. The term
dishonesty implies disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud,
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle, lack of fairness and straightforwardness, disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray.[18] Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about
accepting money from DPAI.
Now, the issue pending before us
is: Does the Ombudsman have the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official?
At the outset, the Court of Appeals held that the
constitutional question on the Ombudsman’s power cannot be entertained because
it was not pleaded at the earliest opportunity.
The Court of Appeals said that petitioner had every opportunity to raise
the same in his pleadings and during the course of the trial. Instead, it was only after the adverse decision
of the Ombudsman that he was prompted to assail the power of the Ombudsman in
his motion for reconsideration. The Court
of Appeals held that the constitutional issue was belatedly raised in the
proceedings before the Ombudsman, thus, it cannot be considered on appeal.
When the
issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court may
exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are
present: (1) an actual and appropriate
case and controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is
pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised
is the very lis mota
of the case.[19]
For our
purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law requires that the question
of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest
opportunity. In Matibag
v. Benipayo,[20]
we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to
raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same,
such that, if it was not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it
cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial, it
cannot be considered on appeal.
In Matibag, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed, ad interim, Alfredo L. Benipayo as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Ma.
J. Angelina G. Matibag was the Director IV of the
Education and Information Department (EID) but Benipayo
reassigned her to the Law Department. Matibag sought reconsideration of her relief as Director of
the EID and her reassignment to the Law Department. Benipayo denied her
request for reconsideration.
Consequently, Matibag appealed the denial of
her request to the COMELEC en banc.
In addition, Matibag filed a complaint against
Benipayo before the Law Department for violation of
the Civil Service Rules and election laws.
During the pendency of her complaint before
the Law Department, Matibag filed a petition before
this Court assailing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointment
of Benipayo and the other COMELEC Commissioners. We held that the constitutional issue was
raised on time because it was the earliest opportunity for pleading the
constitutional issue before a competent body.
In the
case of Umali v. Guingona,
Jr.,[21]
the question of the constitutionality of the creation of the Presidential
Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was raised in the motion for
reconsideration after the Regional Trial Court of Makati
rendered a decision. When appealed, the
Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was not raised in
the pleadings in the trial court. In
that case, the Court did not exercise judicial review on the constitutional
question because it was belatedly raised and not properly pleaded, thus, it
cannot be considered by the Court on appeal.
In this
case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in
his motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to
entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality
of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals, which is the competent court,
the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the
exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be
passed upon.[22]
In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No.
6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has only the powers enumerated
under Section 13,[23]
Article XI of the Constitution; and that such powers do not include the power
to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure a government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action
to the officer concerned. Moreover,
petitioner, citing Tapiador v. Office of
the Ombudsman,[24]
insists that although the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman can
promulgate its own rules of procedure and exercise other powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law,
Sections 15,[25]
21,[26]
22[27]
and 25[28]
of Rep. Act No. 6770 are inconsistent with Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution because the power of the Ombudsman is merely to recommend
appropriate actions to the officer concerned.
For the State, the Solicitor General maintains that the framers of the
1987 Constitution did not intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which
the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the purpose of the Constitution is to
provide simply a framework within which to build the institution. In addition, the Solicitor General avers that
what petitioner invoked was merely an obiter dictum in the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.
We find petitioner’s contentions without merit. Among the
powers of the Ombudsman enumerated in Section 13, Article XI of the
Constitution are:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions, and duties:
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
2.
Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any
public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government owned or controlled
corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in
the performance of duties.
3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman.
In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the
Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in
ensuring accountability in public office.[29] Moreover, the legislature has vested the
Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.[30]
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,[31]
we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution. They gave
Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely
persuasive in character. Thus, in
addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations,
the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for
contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an
investigation when the case so warrants.
He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and
appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities
and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary.
We also
held in Ledesma that the statement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman that made
reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum
and cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court.[32]
Lastly, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give
the Ombudsman other powers and functions. Expounding on this power of Congress
to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties to the Ombudsman, we quote
Commissioners Colayco and Monsod
during the interpellation by Commissioner Rodrigo in the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the debates relative to the power of the Ombudsman:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us go back to the division
between the powers of the Tanodbayan and the
Ombudsman which says that:
The Tanodbayan .
. . shall continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law,
except those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution.
The powers of the Ombudsman are enumerated in
Section 12.
MR. COLAYCO: They are not exclusive.
MR. RODRIGO: So,
these powers can also be exercised by the Tanodbayan?
MR. COLAYCO: No,
I was saying that the
powers enumerated here for the Ombudsman are not exclusive.
MR. RODRIGO: Precisely,
I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the Ombudsman is: “to exercise such powers or perform such
functions or duties as may be provided by law.” So, the legislature may vest
him with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may
it not?
MR. COLAYCO: Yes.
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
x x x x
MR. RODRIGO: And
precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by
the Ombudsman are “such functions or duties as may be provided by law.” x x x
MR. COLAYCO: Madam President, that is correct.
MR. MONSOD: Madam
President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of
the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates
into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance,
with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really function as a
champion of the citizen.
However,
we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, the Assembly,
as it may see fit, may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want
to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam
President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body which
has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only
persuasive powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and
then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD: I
agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO: Anyway,
since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be implemented by
the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
MR. MONSOD: Yes,
because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report
which recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the
office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in
that report, the implementing law — the last one, P.D. No. 1630 — did not
follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan
(2 record, 270-271). (emphasis supplied)
x x x x
MR. MONSOD (reacting
to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople): May we just
state that perhaps the [H]onorable Commissioner has
looked at it in too much of an absolutist position. The Ombudsman is seen as a
civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not
against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks
other things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a
competitor to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as
the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a
toothless animal, we would like to say that we are promoting the concept in its
form at the present, but
we are also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be
provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe
this, but we leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it
may need to designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more
effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability,
unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability (emphasis
supplied).[33]
Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the
Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the
Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman.
Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3,
the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and
employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary.[34]
To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770
are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given
teeth to render this constitutional body not merely functional but also
effective. Thus, we hold that under
Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the
constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring
public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed
Decision dated
No costs.
SO
ORDERED.
|
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
REYNATO S.
PUNO
Associate
Justice
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice |
ANGELINA
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice |
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
||
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice |
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
||
|
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
ROMEO
J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
||
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice |
DANTE O.
TINGA Associate Justice |
||
|
MINITA V.
CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
CANCIO C.
GARCIA Associate Justice |
||
|
PRESBITERO
J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice |
|||
Pursuant
to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions
in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
|
|
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo,
pp. 49-60. Penned by
Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with
Associate Justices
[2]
[3] Rollo, pp. 46-47.
[4] CA rollo, pp. 65-67.
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 74-93.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Avancena v. Liwanag, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1383,
[14] Republic Act No. 6770 (1989), Sec. 27(2).
[15] Advincula
v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403,
[16] Bureau of Internal
Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549,
[17] Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754, March 17, 2000, 328 SCRA 363, 373.
[18] Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001, 359 SCRA 525, 540.
[19] Arceta
v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895,
[20] G.R. No. 149036,
[21] G.R. No. 131124,
[22] Matibag v. Benipayo, supra note 20 at 65.
[23] Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by law.
[24] G.R. No. 129124,
[25] SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take
appropriate action against a public officer or employee at fault or who
neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend
his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in
Section 21 of this Act: Provided,
That the refusal by any officer without just cause to comply with an order of
the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an
officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to perform an act or
discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action
against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2), (3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public: Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high standards of ethics and efficiency.
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and records;
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein;
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after
The
Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking
government officials and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints
involving grave offenses as well as complaints involving large sums of money
and/or properties.
[26] SEC. 21. Officials Subject To
Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including
Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed
only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
[27] SEC. 22. Investigatory Power. – The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted.
In
all cases of conspiracy between an officer or employee of the government and a
private person, the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall have jurisdiction to
include such private person in the investigation and proceed against such
private person as the evidence may warrant.
The officer or employee and the private person shall be tried jointly
and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
[28] SEC. 25. Penalties. – (1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
(2) In other administrative proceedings, the
penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one year to dismissal with
forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) to twice the amount malversed,
illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman, taking
into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of
the officer or employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
[29] Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70,
[30]
[31] G.R. No. 161629,
[32]
[33] Acop v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 and 120428,
[34] Supra note 26.