SPOUSES
CONSTANTINO G. R. No. 146933
ESPIRIDION
and REMEDIOS
ESPIRIDION
and SPOUSES
RENATO
RAMOS and
ERLINDA
RAMOS,
Petitioners, Present:
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
GARCIA,
JJ.
COURT
OF APPEALS and
SECOND
BULACAN
DEVELOPMENT
BANK,
Respondents. Promulgated:
June 8, 2006
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D E C I S I O N
CORONA, J.:
This
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assails
the August 25, 2000 resolution[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66451 (1) granting the motion for
writ of execution/writ of possession pending appeal of private respondent
Second Bulacan Development Bank (SBDB) and (2) the
September 20, 2000 resolution denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.
On April 30, 1999, SBDB filed an
amended ex-parte petition for issuance of writ
of possession over a parcel of land[2]
purchased by SBDB in a public auction held on August 26, 1999. It was raffled
to Branch 148 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City and docketed as Civil Case No. 99-443.
The ex-parte
petition alleged that petitioners, spouses Constantino
Espiridion and Remedios Espiridion and spouses Renato
Ramos and Erlinda Ramos, mortgaged the subject
property to SBDB as security for a P4,200,000 loan. They failed to
comply with the terms and conditions of the mortgage, hence, SBDB extrajudicially foreclosed the property. SBDB subsequently
acquired the property as the lone bidder in the public auction held on August
26, 1997. Petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year
redemption period. As a consequence, ownership of the property was consolidated
in the name of SBDB.
Petitioners anchored their defense on
the alleged nullity of the extrajudicial foreclosure sale. They claimed that
SBDB failed to comply with several requirements of extrajudicial foreclosure:
no application for extrajudicial foreclosure was filed with the office of the
clerk of court of the RTC of Makati City; the docket
fees were not paid and no raffle of the publication of the notice of
foreclosure sale was made.
The trial court declared that it
could not rule on the propriety or validity of the foreclosure sale and, as
such, presumed that the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was done in a regular
manner. It only resolved the issue of SBDB’s
entitlement to a writ of possession. Invoking the rule that the purchaser in a
foreclosure sale of mortgaged property is entitled to a writ of possession and
that it is ministerial on the court to issue such writ upon ex-parte petition by the purchaser, the court a quo
granted SBDB’s petition.
Aggrieved,
petitioners filed a notice of appeal and elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals. SBDB filed a motion for writ of execution/writ of possession pending
appeal which the appellate court granted in its August 25, 2000 resolution.
Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this
petition.
Petitioners claim that the Court of
Appeals erred or gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of
execution/possession pending appeal on two grounds: (a) the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale was void and (b) no justifiable basis was shown and no bond
was posted.
The
petition has no merit.
No abuse of discretion may properly
be imputed to the appellate court. The issuance of a writ of possession to a
purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial act.
After the consolidation of title in the buyer’s name for failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession becomes a matter of
right.[3]
Its issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is merely a
ministerial function.[4] The trial court has
no discretion on this matter.[5] Hence, any
talk of discretion in connection with such issuance is misplaced.
A
clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a ministerial one. Thus:
The distinction between a
ministerial and discretionary act is well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner,
in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.
If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary
and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial
only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment.[6]
Clearly, the use of discretion and
the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
Where
the court acts on a matter that is within its jurisdiction, grave abuse of
discretion must be shown to nullify the act. In this case, since the issuance
of the writ of possession did not involve an exercise of discretion, no abuse
of discretion could have been committed by the trial court. Thus, the instant
petition for certiorari has no leg to stand on.
The issue of nullity of
the extrajudicial foreclosure sale was of no moment. It could not bar the
issuance of the writ of possession. As a rule, any question regarding the
validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure is not a legal ground for refusing
the issuance of a writ of execution/writ of possession.[7]
The fact that no bond was
posted by SBDB was also of no consequence. Since ownership of the property had
already been consolidated in the name of the bank, there was nothing legally
questionable in the issuance of the writ of possession even if no bond was
posted. The posting of a bond as a condition for the issuance of the writ of
possession becomes necessary only if it is applied for within one year from the
registration of the sale with the register of deeds, i.e., during the
redemption period[8]
inasmuch as ownership has not yet vested on the creditor-mortgagee. After the
one-year period, however, the mortgagor loses all interest over it.[9]
The purchaser, who has a right to possession that extends after the expiration
of the redemption period, becomes the absolute owner of the property when no
redemption is made.[10]
Thus, the posting of a bond is no longer needed.[11]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Associate Justice
W E C O N C U R :
Associate
Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice
I
attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.
Associate
Justice
Chairperson, Second
Division
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
Chief Justice
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Eloy R. Bello, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Elvi John S. Asuncion of the 13th Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, pp. 23-24.
[2] Registered under TCT No. 170136.
[3] De Vera v. Agloro, G.R. No. 155673, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 203.
[4] Id.
[5] China Banking Corporation v. Spouses Ordinario, 447 Phil. 557 (2003).
[6] Codilla,
Sr. v. de Venecia, 442 Phil. 139 (2002).
[7] Supra at note 3.
[8] Section 7, Act No. 3135.
[9] Sps. Yulienco v. Court of Appeals, 441 Phil. 397 (2002).
[10] Samson v. Rivera, G.R. No. 154355, 20 May 2004, 498 SCRA 759.
[11] Cf. De Vera v. Agloro, supra.