A.M. No.
P-02-1651 --- ALEJANDRO
ESTRADA, Complainant
versus
COURT INTERPRETER,
REGIONAL
BRANCH 253, Respondent.
Promulgated:
June 22, 2006
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DISSENTING OPINION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
With due respect, I am unable to
agree with the finding of the majority that “in this particular case and under these particular circumstances,
respondent Escritor’s conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and
immoral conduct” and its decision to
dismiss the administrative complaint filed by petitioner against respondent Soledad
S. Escritor.
The issue in this case is
simple. What is the meaning or standard
of “disgraceful and immoral conduct” to be applied by the Supreme Court in
disciplinary cases involving court personnel?
The
degree of morality required of every employee or official in the public service
has been consistently high. The rules
are particularly strict when the respondent is a Judge or a court employee.[1] Even where the Court has viewed certain
cases with human understanding and compassion, it has insisted that no untoward
conduct involving public officers should be left without proper and
commensurate sanction.[2] The compassion is shown through relatively
light penalties. Never, however, has
this Court justified, condoned, or blessed the continuation of an adulterous or
illicit relationship such as the one in this case, after the same has been
brought to its attention.
Is
it time to adopt a more liberal approach, a more “modern” view and a more
permissive pragmatism which allow adulterous or illicit relations to continue
provided the job performance of the court employee concerned is not affected
and the place and order in the workplace are not compromised? When does private morality involving a court
employee become a matter of public concern?
The
Civil Service Law punishes public officers and employees for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.[3] Whether an act is immoral within the meaning
of the statute is not to be determined by respondent’s concept of
morality. The law provides the standard;
the offense is complete if respondent intended to perform, and did in fact
perform, the act which it condemns.[4]
The
ascertainment of what is moral or immoral calls for the discovery of
contemporary community standards. For
those in the service of the Government, provisions of law and court precedents
also have to be considered. The task is
elusive.
The
layman’s definition of what is “moral” pertains to excellence of character or
disposition. It relates to the
distinction between right and wrong; virtue and vice; ethical praise or blame. Moral law refers to the body of requirements
in conformity to which virtuous action consists. Applied to persons, it is conformity to the
rules of morality, being virtuous with regards to moral conduct.[5]
That
which is not consistent with or not conforming to moral law, opposed to or
violating morality, and now, more often, morally evil or impure, is
immoral. Immoral is the state of not
being virtuous with regard to sexual conduct.[6]
The
term begs the definition. Hence,
anything contrary to the standards of moral conduct is immoral. A grossly immoral act must be so corrupt and
false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible
to a high degree.[7]
Anything
plainly evil or dissolute is, of course, unchangingly immoral. However, at the fringes or boundary limits of
what is morally acceptable and what is unacceptably wrong, the concept of
immorality tends to shift according to circumstances of time, person, and
place. When a case involving the concept
of immorality comes to court, the applicable provisions of law and jurisprudence
take center stage.
Those
who choose to tolerate the situation where a man and a woman separated from
their legitimate spouses decide to live together in an “ideal” and yet unlawful
union state – or more specifically, those who argue that respondent’s
cohabiting with a man married to another woman is not something which is
willful, flagrant, or shameless – show a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community in a manner prejudicial to
the public service.
Insofar
as concepts of morality are concerned, various individuals or cultures may
indeed differ. In certain countries, a
woman who does not cover herself with a burka
from head to foot may be arrested for immoral behavior. In other countries, near nudity in beaches
passes by unnoticed. In the present
case, the perceived fixation of our society over sex is criticized. The lesser degree of condemnation on the sins
of laziness, gluttony, vanity, selfishness, avarice and cowardice is decried as
discriminatory.
The
issue in this case is legal and not philosophical. It is a limited one. Is respondent Soledad S. Escritor guilty of
“disgraceful and immoral” conduct in the context of the Civil Service Law? Are there any sanctions that must be imposed?
We
cannot overlook the fact that respondent Escritor would have been convicted for
a criminal offense if the offended party had been inclined and justified to
prosecute her prior to his death in 1998.
Even now, she is a co-principal in the crime of concubinage. A married woman who has sexual intercourse
with a man not her husband, and the man who has carnal knowledge of her knowing
her to be married, commit the crime of adultery.[8] Abandonment by the legal husband without
justification does not exculpate the offender; it merely mitigates the penalty.
The
concubine with whom a married man cohabits suffers the penalty of destierro.[9] It is true that criminal proceedings cannot
be instituted against persons charged with adultery or concubinage except upon
complaint of the offended party.[10] This does not mean that no actionable offense
has been committed if the offended party does not press charges. It simply cannot be prosecuted. The conduct is not thereby approved, endorsed
or commended. It is merely tolerated.
The
inescapable fact in this case is that acts defined as criminal under penal law
have been committed.
There
are experts in Criminal Law who believe that the codal provisions on adultery
and concubinage are terribly outmoded and should be drastically revised. However, the task of amendment or revision belongs
to Congress, and not to the Supreme Court.
Our
existing rule is that an act so corrupt or false as to constitute a criminal
act is “grossly immoral.”[11] It is not merely “immoral.” Respondent now asks the Court to go all the
way to the opposite extreme and condone her illicit relations with not even an
admonition or a slight tap on the wrist.
I
do not think the Court is ready to render a precedent-setting decision to the
effect that, under exceptional circumstances, employees of the judiciary may
live in a relationship of adultery or concubinage with no fear of any penalty
or sanction and that after being discovered and charged, they may continue the
adulterous relationship until death ends it.
Indeed, the decision in this case is not limited to court interpreter
Soledad Escritor. It is not a pro hac
vice ruling. It applies to court
employees all over the country and to everybody in the civil service. It is not a private ruling but one which is
public and far-reaching in its consequences.
In
the 1975 case of De Dios v. Alejo,[12]
the Court applied compassion and empathy but nonetheless recognized as most
important a mending of ways through a total breaking of relationships. The facts in that case are strikingly similar to those in this case. Yet, the Court required a high degree of
morality even in the presence of apparently exculpating circumstances. It was stated:
While
it is permissible to view with human understanding and compassion a situation
like that in which respondents find themselves, the good of the service and the
degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the government in
the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part,
affecting morality, integrity and efficiency, while holding office should be
left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances
taken into account. In the instant case,
We cannot close our eyes to the important considerations that respondents have
rendered government service for more than thirty-three and twenty-five years,
respectively, and that there is no showing that they have ever been found
guilty of any administrative misconduct during all those periods. In the case of respondent Alejo, it seems
rather sadistic to make her suffer the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service after she had taken care of her co-respondent’s four children, giving
them the needed love and attention of a foster mother after they were
completely abandoned by their errant and unfaithful natural mother. Even respondent Marfil, if to a lesser
degree, is deserving of compassion. Most
importantly, respondents have amply demonstrated that they recognize their
mistake and have, therefore, actually mended their ways by totally breaking
their relationship complained of, in order to conform with the imperatives of
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
The
standards for those in the judicial service are quite exacting.
The
Court has ruled that in the case of public servants who are in the judiciary,
their conduct and behavior, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk,
must not only be characterized by propriety and decorum, but above all else,
must be above suspicion.[13]
In
Burgos v. Aquino,[14] it
was ruled:
The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of court personnel must be free from any whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his duties in the judicial branch but
also to his behavior outside the court as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality; a court
employee is also judged by his private morals.
These exacting standards of morality and decency have been strictly
adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the judiciary.
Respondent, as a court stenographer, did
not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life. Her act of maintaining relations with Atty.
Burgos speaks for itself.
Respondent
Aquino was a court stenographer who was suspended for six months for
maintaining illicit relations with the husband of complainant Virginia E.
Burgos. The Court therein stated that a
second offense shall result in dismissal.
We
should not lose sight of the fact that the judicial system over which it presides
is essentially composed of human beings who, as such, are naturally prey to
weakness and prone to errors. Nonetheless,
in Ecube-Badel v. Badel,[15] we
imposed on respondent a suspension for six months and one day to one year with
warning of dismissal should the illicit relations be repeated or continued.
In
Nalupta v. Tapec,[16] a
deputy sheriff was suspended, also for six months, for having illicit relations
with a certain Cristian Dalida who begot a son by him. His wife complained and neighbors confirmed
that Tapec was frequently seen leaving the house of Consolacion Inocencio in
the morning and returning to it in the afternoon. Tapec and Inocencio begot two children. Consistently with the other cases, we imposed
the penalty of suspension for the first offense with the graver penalty of
dismissal for a second offense.
The
earlier case of Aquino v. Navarro[17]
involved an officer in the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports who was
abandoned by her husband a year after their marriage and who lived alone for
eighteen years with their child.
Pretending that she sincerely believed her husband to have died, she
entered into a marital relationship with Gonzalo Aquino and had children by him
in 1968 and 1969. Eighteen days before their
third child was born on
Times
are changing. Illicit sex is now looked
upon more kindly. However, we should not
completely disregard or overlook a relationship of adultery or concubinage involving
a court employee and not order it to be terminated. It should not ignore what people will say
about our moral standards and how a permissive approach will be used by other
court employees to freely engage in similarly illicit relationship with no fear
of disciplinary punishment.
As
earlier mentioned, respondent Escritor and Luciano Quilapio, Jr. had existing
marriages with their respective legitimate spouses when they decided to live
together. To give an aura of regularity
and respectability to what was undeniably an adulterous and, therefore, immoral
relationship, the two decided to acquire through a religious ceremony what they
could not accomplish legally. They
executed on
In
this case, respondent is charged not as a Jehovah’s Witness but in her capacity
as a court employee. It is contended that
respected elders of the Jehovah’s Witnesses sanction “an informal conjugal
relationship” between respondent and her marital partner for more than two
decades, provided it is characterized by faithfulness and devotion to one
another. However, the “informal conjugal
relationship” is not between two single and otherwise eligible persons where
all that is missing is a valid wedding ceremony. The two persons who started to live together
in an ostensible marital relationship are married to other persons.
We
must be concerned not with the dogmas or rules of any church or religious sect
but with the legal effects under the Civil Service Law of an illicit or
adulterous relationship characterized by the facts of this case.
There
is no conflict in this case between the dogmas or doctrines of the Roman
Catholic Church and those of the Jehovah’s Witnesses or any other church or
denomination. The perceived conflict is
non-existing and irrelevant.
The
issue is legal and not religious. The
terms “disgraceful” and “immoral” may be religious concepts, but we are concerned
with conduct which under the law and jurisprudence is proscribed and, if
perpetrated, how it should be punished.
Respondent
cannot legally justify her conduct by showing that it was morally right by the
standards of the congregation to which she belongs. Her defense of freedom of religion is
unavailing. Her relationship with Mr.
Quilapio is illicit and immoral, both under the Revised Administrative Code[18]
and the Revised Penal Code,[19]
notwithstanding the supposed imprimatur given to them by their religion.
The
peculiar religious standards alleged to be those of the sect to which
respondent belongs can not shield her from the effects of the law. Neither can her illicit relationship be
condoned on the basis of a written agreement approved by their religious
community. To condone what is inherently
wrong in the face of the standards set by law is to render nugatory the
safeguards set to protect the civil service and, in this case, the judiciary.
The
Court cannot be the instrument by which one group of people is exempted from
the effects of these laws just because they belong to a particular
religion. Moreover, it is the sworn
mandate of the Court to supervise the conduct of an employee of the judiciary,
and it must do so with an even hand regardless of her religious affiliation.
I
find that respondent’s “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” does nothing for
her insofar as this administrative matter is concerned, for written therein are
admissions regarding the legal impediments to her marrying Quilapio. In the said document, she even pledged to seek
all avenues to obtain legal recognition by civil authorities of her union with
Quilapio.[20] However, the record is silent as to any effort on respondent’s part to
effect this covenant.
The
evidence shows that respondent repeatedly admitted the existence of the legal
infirmities that plague her relationship with Quilapio.[21] As a court interpreter, she is an integral
member of the judiciary and her service as such is crucial to the
administration of justice. Her acts and
omissions constitute a possible violation of the law – the very same law that
she is sworn to uphold as an employee of the judiciary. How can she work under the pretense of being
a contributing force to the judicial system if she herself is committing acts
that may constitute breaking the law?
Respondent
invokes her constitutional right to religious freedom. The separation of church and state has been
inviolable in this jurisdiction for a century. However, the doctrine is not involved in this
case.[22] Furthermore, the legislature made cohabitation
with a woman who is not one’s wife a crime through the enactment of the Revised
Penal Code.[23] The legislative power has also seen fit to
enact the Civil Service Law and has given said law general application.
The
argument that a marital relationship is the concern of religious authorities
and not the State has no basis.
In
Reynolds v. United States,[24] the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
It is impossible to believe that the constitutional guaranty of religious freedom was intended to prohibit legislation in respect to this most important feature of social life. Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is, nevertheless, in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is necessarily required to deal.
The
strengthening of marriage ties and the concomitant hostility to adulterous or
illicit marital relations is a primary governmental concern. It has nothing to do with the particular
religious affiliations of those affected by legislation in this field.
The
relations, duties, obligations and consequences of marriage are important to
the morals and civilization of a people and to the peace and welfare of
society.[25] Any attempt to inject freedom of religion in an
effort to exempt oneself from the Civil Service rules relating to the sanctity
of the marriage tie must fail.
The U.S. Supreme Court in the
above-cited case of Reynolds v. United
States[26]
upheld federal legislation prohibiting bigamy and polygamy in territories of
the
We
must not exempt illegal conduct or adulterous relations from governmental
regulation simply because their practitioners claim it is part of their free
exercise of religious profession and worship.
Indeed,
the Court distinguishes between religious practices, including the seemingly
bizarre, which may not be regulated, and unacceptable religious conduct which
should be prevented despite claims that it forms part of religious freedom.
In
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of
Schools,[27] we validated
the exemption of Jehovah’s Witnesses from coerced participation in flag
ceremonies of public schools. Following
the ruling in West Virginia v. Barnette,[28] we
declared that unity and loyalty, the avowed objectives of flag ceremonies,
cannot be attained through coercion. Enforced
unity and loyalty is not a good that is constitutionally obtainable at the
expense of religious liberty. A
desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means.
The
exemption from participation in flag ceremonies cannot be applied to the
tolerance of adulterous relationships by court personnel in the name of
religious freedom.
A
clear and present danger of a substantive evil, destructive to public morals,
is a ground for the reasonable regulation of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession.[29] In addition to the destruction of public
morals, the substantive evil in this case is the tearing down of morality, good
order, and discipline in the judiciary.
Jurisprudence
on immoral conduct of employees in the civil service has been consistent. There is nothing in this case that warrants a
departure from precedents. We must not
sanction or encourage illicit or adulterous relations among government
employees.
Soledad
S. Escritor and Luciano D. Quilapio are devoted members of Jehovah’s
Witness. Exemptions granted under our
Muslim Laws to legitimate followers of Islam do not apply to them.[30] The Court has no legislative power to place
Jehovah’s Witness in the same legal category as Muslims.
In
Bucatcat v. Bucatcat,[31]
it was held that conduct such as that demonstrated by the respondent is immoral
and deserving of punishment. For such
conduct, the respondent, another court interpreter, was dismissed from the
service. It was held:
Every
employee of the judiciary should be an example of integrity, uprightness and
honesty. Like any public servant, he
must exhibit the highest sense of honesty and integrity not only in the performance
of his official duties but in his personal and private dealings with other
people, to preserve the court’s good name and standing. It cannot be overstressed that the image of a
court of justice is mirrored in the conduct, official and otherwise, of the
personnel who work thereat, from the judge to the lowest of its personnel. Court employees have been enjoined to adhere
to the exacting standards of morality and decency in their professional and
private conduct in order to preserve the good name and integrity of courts of
justice.
All
those who work in the judiciary are bound by the most exacting standards of
ethics and morality to maintain the people’s faith in the courts as dispensers
of justice. In Liguid v. Camano,[32]
it was ruled:
Surely,
respondent’s behavior of living openly and scandalously for over two (2)
decades with a woman not his wife and siring a child by her is representative
of the gross and serious misconduct penalized by the ultimate penalty of
dismissal under Section 22 (c), Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book
IV of Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as the Revised Administrative
Code of 1987. As defined, misconduct is
a transgression of some established or definite rule of action, more
particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by the public officer. Respondent’s conduct is an example of the
kind of gross and flaunting misconduct that so quickly and surely corrodes the
respect for the courts without which government cannot continue and that tears
apart the bonds of our polity.
Earlier, in Navarro
v. Navarro,[33] the
penalty of suspension was imposed on a court employee for maintaining illicit
relations with a woman not his wife, thus:
Time
and again we have stressed adherence to the principle that public office is a
public trust. All government officials
and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism
and justice, and lead modest lives. This
constitutional mandate should always be in the minds of all public servants to
guide them in their actions during their entire tenure in the government
service. The good of the service and the
degree of morality which every official and employee in the public service must
observe, if respect and confidence are to be maintained by the Government in
the enforcement of the law, demand that no untoward conduct on his part,
affecting morality, integrity and efficiency while holding office should be
left without proper and commensurate sanction, all attendant circumstances
taken into account.
The exacting standards
of ethics and morality imposed upon court judges and court employees are
required to maintain the people’s faith in the courts as dispensers of justice,
and whose image is mirrored by their actuations. As the Court eloquently stated through Madame
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma:
[T]he
image of the court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official
or otherwise, of the men and woman who work thereat, from the judge to the
least and lowest of its personnel – hence, it becomes the imperative sacred
duty of each and everyone in the court to maintain its good name and standing
as a true temple of justice.[34]
The high degree of moral
uprightness that is demanded of employees of the government entails many
sacrifices that are peculiar to the civil service. By aspiring to these positions, government
employees are deemed to have submitted themselves to greater scrutiny of their
conduct, all in the pursuit of a professional civil service. The Court has repeatedly applied these
principles in analogous cases.[35]
Immorality is punishable
by suspension of six (6) months and one day to one (1) year for the first
offense and dismissal for the second offense.[36] Considering that respondent’s misconduct is in
the nature of a continuing offense, it must be treated as a first offense, and
her continued cohabitation with Luciano E. Quilapio, Jr. must be deemed a
second offense, which will warrant the penalty of dismissal.
ACCORDINGLY,
I vote that respondent Soledad S. Escritor is GUILTY of immorality and
disgraceful conduct and should be SUSPENDED for a period of Six (6)
months and One day without pay, with a warning that the continuance of her
illicit cohabitation with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. shall be deemed a second
offense which shall warrant the penalty of dismissal.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
[1] Lacuata v. Bautista, A.M. No.
P-94-1005,
[2] De Dios v. Alejo, A.M. No. P-137,
[3] Revised
Administrative Code, Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Section 46 (b) (5).
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7] Sibal,
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia, p. 406; Soberano
v. Villanueva, 116 Phil. 1208 (1962); Reyes v. Wong, A.M. No. 547,
[8] Revised
Penal Code, Art. 333.
[9] Revised
Penal Code, Art. 334.
[10] Quilatan v. Caruncho, 21 Phil. 399,
403 (1912), Rules of Court, Rule 110, Section 5.
[11] Reyes v. Wong, supra.
[12] Supra.
[13] Lacuata v. Bautista, supra.
[14] Supra.
[15] 339
Phil. 510 (1997).
[16] A.M.
No. P-88-263,
[17] 220
Phil. 49 (1985).
[18] E.O.
292, Sec. 46 (5).
[19] Art. 334.
[20] Rollo,
Exhibits "1" and "2", pp. 14-15.
[21] TSN,
[22]
Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6; 1973 Constitution, Art. XV, Sec. 15.
[23] Art.
334.
[24] 98
[25] Maynard
v. Hill, 125
[26] Supra.
[27] G.R.
No. 95770,
[28] 319
[29]
American Bible Society v. City of
[30] Sulu Islamic Association of Masjid Lambayong
v. Malik, A.M. No. MTJ-92-691,
[31] 380 Phil.
555 (2000).
[32] A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1509,
[33] A.M.
No. OCA-00-61,
[34]
[35] Benavidez v. Vega, A.M. No.
P-01-1530,
[36] Civil
Service Rules, Rule XIV, Section 23 (o).