A.M. No. P-02-1651 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 00-1021-P) — ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, Petitioner, vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR, Respondent.

Promulgated:

June 22, 2006

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DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO, J.:

I maintain my dissent from the majority opinion as it now orders the dismissal of the administrative complaint filed by petitioner Alejandro Estrada against respondent Soledad S. Escritor.

The majority opinion relies heavily on Sherbert v. Verner[1] in upholding Escritor’s claim of exemption from administrative liability grounded on her religious belief as a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. This religious sect allows Escritor’s cohabitation with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr., who has a subsisting marriage with another woman.

The compelling state interest test espoused in Sherbert has been abandoned more than 15 years ago by the U.S. Supreme Court in the Employment Division v. Smith[2] cases. In the Smith cases, the U.S. Supreme Court set aside the balancing test for religious minorities laid down in Sherbert. Instead, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled categorically in the Smith cases that the guarantee of religious liberty as embodied in the Free Exercise Clause does not require the grant of exemptions from generally applicable laws to individuals whose religious practice conflict with those laws.

In the first Employment Division v. Smith (Smith I),[3] petitioner denied respondents’ application for unemployment compensation benefits under an Oregon statute declaring ineligible for benefits employees discharged for work-related misconduct. The misconduct for which respondents were discharged from their jobs consisted of their ingesting peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of their Native American Church. The Oregon Supreme Court ruled that although the denials of benefits were proper under Oregon law, Sherbert required the Oregon Supreme Court to hold that the denials significantly burdened respondents’ religious freedom in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. The Oregon Supreme Court did not attach significance to the fact that peyote possession is a felony in Oregon.

The U.S. Supreme Court vacated the Oregon Supreme Court’s judgment and ordered the remand of the case for a definitive ruling on whether the religious use of peyote is legal in Oregon. The U.S. Supreme Court deemed the legality or illegality of the questioned conduct critical in its analysis of respondents’ claim for protection under the Free Exercise Clause.

In Smith I, the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished respondents’ conduct with that involved in Sherbert, thus:

x x x In Sherbert, as in Thomas and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla.,[4] the conduct that gave rise to the termination of employment was perfectly legal; indeed, the Court assumed that it was immune from state regulation.[5] The results we reached in Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie might well have been different if the employees had been discharged for engaging in criminal conduct. x x x The protection that the First Amendment provides to “legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion” does not extend to conduct that a State has validly proscribed.[6] (Emphasis supplied)

In the second Employment Division v. Smith (Smith II),[7] the Oregon Supreme Court held on remand that respondents’ religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition of the Oregon statute classifying peyote as a “controlled substance” and punishing its possession as a felony. Although the Oregon Supreme Court noted that the statute makes no exception for the sacramental use of peyote, it still concluded that the prohibition was not valid under the Free Exercise Clause.

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Oregon Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a claim of exemption from a generally applicable law grounded on the right of free exercise could not be evaluated under the compelling state interest test of Sherbert, particularly where such law does not violate other constitutional protections. The U.S. Supreme Court expressly declared:

x x x We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. x x x[8]

x x x x

The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press. x x x[9]

Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated conduct, at least the claim for a religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner. x x x In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all. x x x[10]

Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. x x x[11] (Emphasis supplied)

What the Smith cases teach us is that the compelling state interest test in Sherbert is not the correct test in determining the legitimacy of a claim of exemption from generally applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the incidental effect of burdening particular religious practice. Any such claim for exemption should be analyzed by considering whether the conduct in question is one that “the State has validly proscribed,” irrespective of the sincerity or centrality of an individual’s religious beliefs.

Here, Escritor is indisputably engaged in criminal conduct. Escritor’s continued cohabitation with Quilapio is patently in violation of Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code on concubinage. Article 334 makes no exception for religiously sanctioned cohabitation such as that existing between Escritor and Quilapio. The majority opinion in fact concedes that the present case involves a claim of exemption “from a law of general applicability that inadvertently burdens religious exercise.”[12] The majority opinion even concedes further that the conduct in question is one “which Philippine law and jurisprudence consider both immoral and illegal.”[13] And yet, the majority opinion expediently brushes aside the illegality of Escritor’s questioned conduct using the obsolete compelling state interest test in Sherbert.

The majority opinion mentions two “opposing strains of jurisprudence on the religion clauses” in U.S. history, namely, separation or strict neutrality and benevolent neutrality or accommodation. The majority opinion asserts that the framers of our 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions intended to adopt a benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the religion clauses, i.e., the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. The majority opinion then reasons that in determining claims of exemption based on freedom of religion, this Court must adopt the compelling state interest test laid down by the U.S. Supreme Court in Sherbert, which according to the majority, best exemplifies the benevolent neutrality approach. Hence, even as the majority opinion acknowledges that the U.S. Supreme Court in the Smith cases has abandoned the compelling state interest test espoused in Sherbert, the majority opinion dismisses this abandonment in its analysis of Escritor’s free exercise exemption claim by simply labeling the Smith cases as exemplifying the strict neutrality approach.

The majority opinion blatantly ignores that whatever theory may be current in the United States — whether strict neutrality, benevolent neutrality or some other theory — the undeniable fact is what is clearly stated in Smith II:

x x x We have never held that an individual’s religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. x x x[14]

Thus, from the 1879 case of Reynolds v. U.S.[15] on the practice of polygamy by Mormons to the 1988 and 1990 Smith cases on the use of prohibited drugs by native American Indians, the U.S. Supreme Court has consistently held that religious beliefs do not excuse any person from liability for violation of a valid criminal law of general application. The majority opinion simply refuses to face and accept this reality.

The present case involves conduct that violates Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code, a provision of law that no one challenges as unconstitutional. Clearly, the theories invoked in the majority opinion have no application to the present case based on an unbroken line of U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In any event, we shall discuss for academic purposes the merits of the theories advanced in the majority opinion.

While the majority opinion only mentions separation and benevolent neutrality, a close reading of the major U.S. Supreme Court opinions specifically relating to the religion clauses presents three principal theories at play, namely, (a) the strict separation or “no aid” theory, (b) the governmental neutrality theory, and (c) the accommodation or benevolent neutrality theory.[16]

The strict separation or “no aid” theory holds that the establishment clause viewed in conjunction with the free exercise clause requires a strict separation of church and state and that government can do nothing which involves governmental support of religion or which is favorable to the cultivation of religious interests.[17] This theory found its first expression in the case of Everson v. Board of Education,[18] which espoused the “no aid” principle. Thus, the government cannot by its programs, policies, or laws do anything to aid or support religion or religious activities.[19]

Everson upheld the validity of a New Jersey statute authorizing bus fare reimbursement to parents of parochial, as well as public school children. Apparently, the strict interpretation or “no aid” theory prohibits state benefits to a particular sect or sects only, but does not prohibit benefits that accrue to all, including one or more sects. Everson did not involve religiously motivated conduct that constituted a violation of a criminal statute.

Under the governmental neutrality theory, the establishment clause requires government to be neutral on religious matters.[20] This theory was articulated by Mr. Justice Clark in the case of Abington School District v. Schempp,[21] where he stated that what the Constitution requires is “wholesome neutrality,” i.e., laws and governmental programs must be directed to secular ends and must have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.[22] This test as stated by Mr. Justice Clark embodies a theory of strict neutrality[23] — thus, the government may not use the religious factor as a basis for classification with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting religion:

The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man and religion, the state is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.[24] (Italics supplied)

However, the concept of governmental neutrality can be interpreted in various ways — to some, anything but total neutrality is anathema; to others, “neutrality can only mean that government policy must place religion at neither a special advantage nor a special disadvantage.”[25]

Schempp struck down a Pennsylvania law allowing the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and the reading of the Bible without comment in public schools, although the recitation and reading were voluntary and did not favor any sect. Schempp did not involve religiously motivated conduct that constituted a violation of a criminal statute.

The accommodation theory provides that any limitation derived from the establishment clause on cannot be rigidly applied so as to preclude all aid to religion and that in some situations government must, and in other situations may, accommodate its policies and laws in the furtherance of religious freedom.[26] The accommodation theory found its first expression in Zorach v. Clauson.[27] The U.S. Supreme Court held in Zorach that a state could authorize an arrangement whereby public school children could be released one hour a week for religious instruction off the school premises. Zorach did not involve religiously motivated conduct that constituted a violation of a criminal statute.

In his book Religion and the Constitution published in 1964, Professor Paul G. Kauper used the term “benevolent neutrality” in the following context:

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that the theory of accommodation x x x is unrelated to other ideas and theories that have been developed, notably the no-aid and neutrality concepts. Rather, accommodation, instead of being viewed as a wholly independent theory of interpretation, should be seen as a modification of the no-aid or neutrality concepts. x x x

These ideas cannot be pressed to their absolute limit. Not only must the no-aid or neutrality concept be subordinated to the necessities of free exercise, but an area of legislative discretion must be allowed where a state may choose to advance the cause of religious freedom even at the expense of not being completely neutral. Indeed, this may be described as the larger or benevolent neutrality.[28] (Emphasis and italics supplied)

Six years later, the U.S. Supreme Court used the term “benevolent neutrality” for the first time in Walz v. Tax Commission.[29] In Walz, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of tax exemption of property used exclusively for religious purposes on the basis of “benevolent neutrality,” as follows:

The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other. x x x

x x x x

The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.[30] (Emphasis and italics supplied)

At issue in Walz was a provision in New York’s Constitution authorizing property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship. Walz did not involve religiously motivated conduct that constituted a violation of a criminal statute.

The majority opinion cited the case of Walz in support of its assertion that the framers of the 1935 Constitution intended to adopt the benevolent neutrality approach in the interpretation of the religion clauses, viz.:

x x x With the inclusion of the church property tax exemption in the body of the 1935 Constitution and not merely as an ordinance appended to the Constitution, the benevolent neutrality referred to in the Walz case was given constitutional imprimatur under the regime of the 1935 Constitution. x x x

The U.S. Supreme Court decided Walz only in 1970, more than three decades after the adoption of our 1935 Constitution. It is certainly doubtful whether the framers of our 1935 Constitution intended to give “constitutional imprimatur” to a theory of interpretation espoused in a case that was yet to be formulated. Moreover, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of church property tax exemption on the basis of “benevolent neutrality,” it did so on grounds that no particular religion is singled out for favorable treatment, and partly on historical grounds that church tax exemptions have been accepted without challenge in all states for most of the nation’s history.[31]

The majority opinion vigorously argues the merits of adopting the theory of accommodation in the interpretation of our Constitution's religion clauses. However, the majority opinion fails to mention that a distinction is often drawn by courts and commentators between mandatory accommodation and permissive accommodation. Mandatory accommodation is exemplified by the key idea in Sherbert that exemptions from generally applicable laws are required by force of the Free Exercise Clause,[32] which the majority opinion adheres to in granting Escritor’s claim of free exercise exemption.

Permissive accommodation refers to exercises of political discretion that benefit religion, and that the Constitution neither requires nor forbids.[33] The U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Smith II that although the Free Exercise Clause did not require permissive accommodation, the political branches could shield religious exercise through legislative accommodation,[34] for example, by making an exception to proscriptive drug laws for sacramental peyote use.

Professor Michael W. McConnell, whose views on the accommodation theory were frequently quoted by the majority opinion, defends mandatory accommodation.[35] However, Prof. Kauper, likewise an accommodationist, favors permissive accommodation, stating that “as a general proposition, no person should be allowed to claim that because of his religion he is entitled as a matter of constitutional right to claim an exemption from general regulatory and tax laws.”[36] Prof. Kauper further explains his position that religious liberty furnishes no ground for claiming immunity to laws which place reasonable restrictions on overt conduct in the furtherance of public interests protected by the state’s police power,[37] as follows:

Where the issue is not the use of governmental power to sanction religious belief and practices by some positive program but the granting of exemption on religious grounds from laws of general operation, what determines whether the government is required, or permitted, to make the accommodation? While a state may appropriately grant exemptions from its general police and tax laws, it should not be constitutionally required to do so unless this immunity can properly be claimed as part of the constitutional guarantee of religious liberty. Thus, exemptions from property tax and military service, health and labor laws should be at the discretion of government. Whether Sherbert carried the principle of required accommodation too far is debatable. It may well be that the court here undertook a determination of questions better left to the legislature and that in this area, x x x the policy of granting exemptions on religious grounds should be left to legislative discretion.[38] (Emphasis supplied)

It is true that a test needs to be applied by the Court in determining the validity of a free exercise claim of exemption as made here by Escritor. The compelling state interest test in Sherbert pushes the limits of religious liberty too far, and so too does the majority opinion insofar as it grants Escritor immunity to a law of general operation on the ground of religious liberty. Making a distinction between permissive accommodation and mandatory accommodation is more critically important in analyzing free exercise exemption claims. Such limitations forces the Court to confront how far it can validly set the limits of religious liberty under the Free Exercise Clause, rather than presenting the separation theory and accommodation theory as opposite concepts, and then rejecting relevant and instructive American jurisprudence (such as the Smith cases) just because it does not espouse the theory selected.

Theories are only guideposts and “there is no magic formula to settle all disputes between religion and the law, no legal pill to ease the pain of perceived injustice and religious oppression, and certainly no perfect theory to bind judges or legislators.”[39] The Smith cases, particularly Smith II, cannot be so easily dismissed by the majority opinion and labeled as “best exemplifying the strict neutrality approach.” The Smith Court affirmed the power and the discretion of legislatures to enact statutory protection beyond what the Free Exercise Clause required. The U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Smith II that legislatures could enact accommodations to protect religion beyond the Free Exercise Clause minimum without “establishing” religion and thereby running afoul of the Establishment Clause.[40] What the Smith cases espouse, therefore, is not really the strict neutrality approach, but more of permissive accommodation.[41]

Even assuming that the theory of benevolent neutrality and the compelling state interest test are applicable, the State has a compelling interest in exacting from everyone connected with the dispensation of justice, from the highest magistrate to the lowest of its personnel, the highest standard of conduct. This Court has repeatedly held that “the image of a court of justice is necessarily mirrored in the conduct, official or otherwise, of the men and women who work thereat.”[42] While arguably not constituting “disgraceful and immoral conduct,”[43] Escritor’s cohabitation with Quilapio is a patent violation of our penal law on concubinage that vitiates “the integrity of court personnel and the court itself.”[44] The public’s faith and confidence in the administration of justice would certainly be eroded and undermined if tolerated within the judiciary’s ranks are court employees blatantly violating our criminal laws.

I therefore maintain that Escritor’s admitted cohabitation with Quilapio is sufficient basis to hold her guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and to impose upon her the appropriate penalty.

Equally compelling is the State’s interest in the preservation of marriage and the family as basic social institutions,[45] which is ultimately the public policy underlying Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code. This Court has recognized in countless cases that marriage and the family are basic social institutions in which the State is vitally interested[46] and in the protection of which the State has the strongest interest.[47] In Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[48] the Court stressed that:

Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;” as such, it “shall be protected by the State.” x x x So crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their “nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation.

The same sentiment has been expressed in Article 149 of the Family Code:

The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given effect. (Emphasis supplied)

And yet, notwithstanding the foregoing compelling state interests at stake, the majority all too willingly and easily places them in jeopardy by upholding Escritor’s claim of exemption. On this point, Professor William P. Marshall aptly observes that one of the problems involved in free exercise exemption analysis is that it requires the Court to weigh the state interest against the interest of the narrower class comprised only of those seeking exemption. On the other hand, in other doctrinal areas, the Court balances the state interest in the regulation at issue against the interests of the regulated class taken as a whole. Prof. Marshall persuasively argues that this leads to both unpredictability in the exemption balancing process and potential inconsistency in result “as each regulation may be subject to limitless challenges based upon the peculiar identity of the challenger.”[49] Moreover, Prof. Marshall notes that the exemption balancing process necessarily leads to underestimating the strength of the countervailing state interest.[50] Indeed, the state interest in a challenged regulation will seldom be seriously threatened if only a few persons seek exemption from it.[51]

In dismissing the administrative complaint against Escritor, the majority opinion effectively condones and accords a semblance of legitimacy to her patently unlawful cohabitation with Quilapio, while in the eyes of the law, Quilapio remains married to his legal wife. This condonation in fact facilitates the circumvention by Escritor and Quilapio of Articles 334 and 349 of the Revised Penal Code on concubinage and bigamy.[52] Without having his first marriage legally dissolved, Quilapio can now continue to cohabit with Escritor with impunity. How do we reconcile this scenario with the Constitution’s emphatic declaration that marriage is “an inviolable social institution”?[53]

By choosing to turn a blind eye to Escritor’s criminal conduct, the majority is in fact recognizing and according judicial imprimatur to a practice, custom or agreement that subverts marriage, albeit one that is sanctioned by a particular religious sect. The majority’s opinion here bestows “a credibility and legitimacy upon the religious belief in question simply by its being judicially recognized as constitutionally sacrosanct.”[54] This is another problem that arises in free exercise exemption analysis — the benevolent neutrality approach fails to take into account the role that equality plays in free exercise theory.[55] While the text of the Free Exercise Clause is consistent with protecting religion from discrimination, it does not compel discrimination in favor of religion.[56] However, the benevolent neutrality approach promotes its own form of inequality when under it, exemptions are granted only to religious claimants like Escritor, whose religiously-sanctioned but otherwise illegal conjugal arrangement with Quilapio acquires a veneer of “special judicial reinforcement.”[57]

Catholics may secure a church annulment of their marriage. A church annulment does not exempt Catholics from criminal or administrative liability if they cohabit with someone other than their legal spouse before their marriage is finally annulled by a civil court. Catholics cannot legally justify before civil courts such act of concubinage on the ground that the act conforms to their religious beliefs because they have a secured a church annulment which freed them from their marital vows. If this Court condones Escritor’s act of concubinage on religious grounds, then it will have to condone acts of concubinage by Catholics who have secured church annulment of their marriage even without a final annulment from a civil court. The majority pushes their opinion on a slippery slope.

It may well be asked how, under a well-meaning but overly solicitous grant of exemption based on the Freedom of Exercise Clause of our Constitution, an individual can be given the private right to ignore a generally applicable, religion-neutral law. For this is what the majority opinion has effectually granted Escritor in dismissing the administrative complaint against her. The accommodation of Escritor’s religious beliefs under the benevolent neutrality approach is too high a price to pay when weighed against its prejudicial effect on the sound administration of justice and the protection of marriage and the family as basic social institutions.

Finally, there is even no claim here that concubinage is central to the religious belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses, or even a part of the religious belief of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Escritor merely claims that her live-in arrangement with a married man is, in the words of the majority opinion, “in conformity with her and her partner’s religious belief.” This case is not an issue of a statute colliding with centrally or vitally held beliefs of a religious denomination, as in the case of Sherbert. This case is about a religious cover for an obviously criminal act.

In Sherbert, the conduct in question was the refusal of a member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church to work on the Sabbath Day or on Saturdays, which prevented prospective employers from giving petitioner in Sherbert employment. Petitioner in Sherbert then claimed unemployment benefits, which the State denied because the law withheld benefits to those who failed without good cause to accept available suitable work. In Sherbert, the questioned conduct — the refusal to work on Saturdays — was part of the religious tenets of the Seventh Day Adventists. The questioned conduct in Sherbert was not a criminal conduct, unlike the questioned conduct of Escritor in this case. Clearly, even assuming for the sake of argument that Sherbert remains good law in the United States and thus has some persuasive force here, still Sherbert is patently inapplicable to the present case.

The positive law and the institutions of government are concerned not with correct belief but with overt conduct related to good order, peace, justice, freedom, and community welfare.[58] Hence, while there are times when government must adapt to, or acquiesce to meet the needs of religious exercise, there are also times when the exercises a religion wishes to pursue must be adapted or even prohibited in order to meet the needs of public policy.[59] For indeed, even religious liberty has its limits. And certainly, “there is a price to be paid, even by religion, for living in a constitutional democracy.”[60]

Certainly, observance of provisions of the Revised Penal Code, whose validity or constitutionality are not even challenged, is a price that all religions in the Philippines must willingly pay for the sake of good order and peace in the community. To hold otherwise would, as aptly stated in Reynolds v. U.S.,[61] “make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land,” and in effect “permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.” The majority opinion will make every religion a separate republic, making religion a haven for criminal conduct that otherwise would be punishable under the laws of the land. Today concubinage, tomorrow bigamy, will enjoy protection from criminal sanction under the new doctrine foisted by the majority opinion.

Accordingly, I vote to suspend respondent Soledad S. Escritor for six months and one day without pay for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. However, the suspension shall be lifted immediately upon Escritor’s manifestation to this Court that she has ceased cohabiting with Luciano D. Quilapio, Jr. Moreover, respondent Escritor is warned that her continued cohabitation with Quilapio, during or after her suspension and while Quilapio’s marriage with his legal wife still subsists, shall merit the penalty of dismissal from the service.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice

[1] 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

[2] 485 U.S. 660 (1988) and 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

[3] 485 U.S. 660 (1988).

[4] Citations omitted.

[5] In Sherbert, the appellant was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.

[6] Employment Division v. Smith, supra note 3 at 670-671.

[7] 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

[8] Id. at 878-879.

[12] Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 574 (2003).

[14] Employment Division v. Smith, supra note 7 at 878-879.

[15] 98 U.S. 145 (1878).

[16] Kauper, P., Religion and the Constitution 59 (1964). See also Abraham, H. and Perry, B., Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States 270 (7^th ed., 1998).

[19] Kauper, op. cit., at 61.

[20] Abraham, H. and Perry, B., Freedom and the Court: Civil Rights and Liberties in the United States 272-73 (7^th ed., 1998).

[21] 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

[22] Kauper, op. cit., at 64.

[24] Abington School District v. Schempp, supra note 15 at 226.

[25] Abraham, H. and Perry, B., op. cit., at 280.

[26] Kauper, op. cit., at 59.

[27] 343 U.S. 306 (1952).

[31] Abraham, H. and Perry, B., op. cit., at Table 6.3.

[32] Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60(3) Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 751 (1992).

[34] Anne Y. Chiu, When Prisoners Are Weary and Their Religious Exercise Burdened, RLUIPA Provides Some Rest for their Souls, 79 Wash. L. Rev. 999 (2004). In this article, Chiu defines “legislative accommodation” as a statute enacted by the legislature to lift a neutral, generally applicable burden on religion imposed by the government.

[35] Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60(3) Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 687-688 (1992).

[36] Kauper, op. cit., at 17.

[39] Weber, P., Equal Separation: Understanding the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment 154 (1990).

[40] Anne Y. Chiu, op. cit.

[41] Ira C. Lupu, op. cit., at 751, note 33.

[42] Villaraza v. Atienza, 195 Phil. 383, 390 (1981).

[43] See Dissenting Opinion, J. Carpio in Escritor v. Estrada, op. cit., see note 12.

[44] Ganaden v. Bolasco, 64 SCRA 50, 53 (1975).

[45] Section 2, Article XV and Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution.

[46] Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 35 Phil. 252 (1919); Brown v. Yambao, 102 Phil. 168, 172 (1957).

[47] Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, 203 SCRA 750,761 (1991).

[48] G.R. No. 104818, 226 SCRA 572, 584 (1993).

[49] William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 308, 311-312 (1991).

[52] Bigamy is an illegal marriage by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been legally dissolved. It is interesting to note that, while Escritor and Quilapio both executed a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness,” such execution was unaccompanied by any religious ceremony officiated by a presiding minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses. Precisely, such ceremony would have constituted a violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code prohibiting the performance of an illegal marriage ceremony by priests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect.

[53] Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.

[54] William P. Marshall, op. cit., at 322-23.

[58] Kauper, op. cit., at 83.

[59] Weber, P., op. cit., at 150.

[61] 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878).