FIRST DIVISION
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JOHN PANALIGAN,
Complainant, - versus - Respondent. |
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A.M. No. RTJ-06-1972 (Formerly OCA IPI No. 05-2247-RTJ) Present: PANGANIBAN,
C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: June 21, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Complainant
John Panaligan charges Judge Francisco B. Ibay,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 135,
Complainant
is a Building Management System (BMS) Operator assigned at the Task Force
Building and Facilities Maintenance Office of the City Government of
Makati. As such, it was his duty to
monitor the different offices located at the
On
On
At
the hearing on
Aggrieved
by the order of contempt and the subsequent order of imprisonment, complainant
initiated the instant complaint.
On
In
his Comment[7] dated
Complainant
submitted his written explanation dated
Respondent
Judge claims he made it his deep concern to dispose the cases assigned to him
within the prescribed period. To
accomplish this, he comes to court at
Respondent
Judge further alleged that in the course of the performance of his duty, petty
disturbances such as the subject of the instant administrative complaint prove
annoying to him. Be that as it may, he
did not lose his objectivity, probity, equanimity, integrity and
impartiality. While he was annoyed by
the incident, he reacted thereto within the limits and boundaries of the law
and justice.
On
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully
submitted to the Honorable Court our recommendations that this administrative
case be REDOCKETED as a regular administrative matter and that Judge Francisco
B. Ibay, Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, Makati City, be FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) with a STERN WARNING
that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.[8]
The
Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the above evaluation of the OCA.
The
core issue to be resolved in this case is: whether or not respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay abused his authority in citing the complainant in
contempt of court for switching off the circuit breaker to turn off the lights
left on in one of the courts after office hours?
We
are not persuaded by the ratiocinations of respondent Judge as to the
correctness of his actions. On the
contrary, we question entirely the logic behind his immediate resort to a
contempt citation.
Contempt
of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such
manner as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with
which it is clothed. It is defined as
“disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice
and dignity.”
The
Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is
committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to
do so.[9]
On
the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates
particular acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under Section 1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him.
Guided
by the above quoted provisions of the Rules of Court on contempt, complainant’s
act does not fall under any of the enumerated contumacious acts. We fail to see any contumacious attitude on
the part of the complainant to delay the proceedings of the court. Neither does
it constitute disrespect to the dignity of the court. As
Notwithstanding
the complaint of respondent Judge that he was unduly inconvenienced by the
action complained of, records show that electricity was restored within 30
minutes from the time it was brought to the attention of Edgardo
O. Gundaran, Officer-in-Charge of the Task Force
Building Facilities and Equipment Maintenance Office of the City Government of Makati. Moreover,
the restoration was made clearly before office hours. If at all, the alleged undue inconvenience
suffered by respondent Judge was very minimal. Under the circumstances, it is clear that the negligible
nature of the inconvenience cannot be made the proper subject of a contempt.
It is well-settled that the
power to declare a person in contempt is inherent in all courts so as to
preserve order in judicial proceedings and to uphold the administration of
justice. Judges, however, are enjoined
to exercise such power judiciously and sparingly, with utmost restraint, and
with the end view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the
dignity of the court, and not for retaliation or vindication.[10] The salutary rule is that the power to punish
for contempt must be exercised on the preservative, not vindictive principle,
and on the corrective and not retaliatory idea of punishment. The courts must exercise the power to punish
for contempt for purposes that are impersonal, because the power is intended as
a safeguard not for the judges as persons but for the functions that they
exercise.[11] Only occasionally should the court invoke the
inherent power in order to retain that respect without which the administration
of justice must falter or fail.[12]
Likewise,
it is settled that an act to be considered contemptuous must be clearly
contrary or prohibited by the order of the court. “A person cannot, for disobedience, be
punished for contempt unless the act which is forbidden or required to be done
is clearly and exactly defined, so that there can be no reasonable doubt or
uncertainty as to what specific act or thing is forbidden or required.[13] The acts of complainant in the case at bar is
not contrary or clearly prohibited by the order of the court.
The
integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact that it is able to
administer justice but also upon the perception and confidence of the community
that the people who run the system have done justice.[14] The assumption of office by a judge places
upon him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted position. He is the visible representation of law and justice. He must be perceived, not as a repository of
arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses justice under the sanction of the
rule of law.[15] The behavior and conduct of judges must
reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also
be seen to be done.[16] In the present case, respondent Judge may not
have been urged by ulterior motives in citing complainant in contempt and in
subsequently sending him to jail for putting off the lights in the 12th
floor including his sala;
nevertheless, his actuation can easily be perceived as being a repository of
arbitrary power. His actuation must
never serve to fuel suspicion over a misuse of the prestige of his office to
enhance his personal interest.
We
cannot simply shrug off respondent Judge’s
failure to exercise that degree of care
and temperance required of a judge in the correct and prompt administration of
justice; more so in this case where the exercise of the power of contempt
resulted in complainant’s detention and
deprivation of liberty. Respondent
Judge’s conduct amounts to grave abuse of authority.
We
have repeatedly reminded members of the judiciary to be irreproachable in
conduct and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their personal
behavior, not only in the discharge of their official duties, but also in their
daily life. For no position exacts a
greater demand for moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a
seat in the judiciary.[17]
The imperative and sacred duty of each and everyone in the judiciary is to
maintain its good name and standing as a temple of justice. The Court condemns and would never countenance
any conduct, act or omission on the part of all those involved in the
administration of justice which would violate the norm of public accountability
or tend to diminish the faith of the people in the judiciary,[18]
like in the case at bar.
Squarely
applicable is the case of Teodora A. Ruiz v.
Judge Rolando G. How.[19] In
this case, respondent Judge Rolando G. How cited complainant Ruiz who was an
employee of the court, in direct contempt of court for alleged willful display
of abusive and disrespectful language hurled by the latter. This Court disagreed with the respondent
Judge in finding that the actuations of Ruiz constitute direct contempt inasmuch
as when the derogatory words were uttered by complainant no proceedings were
being held nor was it shown that respondent Judge was performing judicial
function. Thus, respondent Judge was
declared guilty of grave abuse of authority for injudiciously ordering the
detention of complainant without sufficient legal ground, and was fined in the
amount of P5,000.00 with a stern warning that the same or similar act
shall be dealt with more severely.
WHEREFORE,
for improperly citing complainant Panaligan for
contempt and ordering his detention without sufficient legal basis, a fine of P5,000.00
is hereby IMPOSED upon the respondent
Judge, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5] Now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court.
[6] Rollo, p. 18.
[7]
[8]
[9] Rules of Court, Section 1, Rule 71.
[10] Esmeralda-Baroy v. Peralta, 350 Phil. 431, 447-448 (1998).
[11] Oclarit v. Paderanga, G.R. No. 139519,
[12] Panado v. Court of Appeals, 358 Phil. 593, 603 (1998).
[13] Abad v. Somera, G.R. No. 82216,
[14] Sy v. Fineza, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808,
[15] Tapiru v. Judge Biden, 386 Phil. 235, 243
(2000).
[16] New
Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, Canon 2, Section
2 (
[17] Sy v. Fineza, supra note 13, p. 383.
[18] Mataga v. Rosete, A.M. No. MTJ-03-1488,
[19] A.M. No. RTJ-03-1805,