EN BANC
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GRACE F. MUNSAYAC
C. DE VILLA, LILY F. MUNSAYAC- SUNGA,
and ROY PETER F. MUNSAYAC, Complainants,
- versus - JUDGE ANTONIO C.
REYES, Respondent. x--------------------------------x RAMON K. ILUSORIO, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE ANTONIO C.
REYES, RTC, BRANCH 61, Respondent. x--------------------------------x JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Complainant, - versus - RTC JUDGES OF Respondents. x--------------------------------x JUDGE CLARENCE VILLANUEVA, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Respondent. x--------------------------------x JUDGE RUBEN C. AYSON, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE ABRAHAM BORRETA, Respondent. x--------------------------------x ATTY. CRISTETA R.
CALUZA-FLORES, Complainant, - versus - JUDGE AMADO S.
CAGUIOA, Respondent. x--------------------------------x HON. AMADO S. CAGUIOA Complainant, - versus - ATTY. CRISTETA R. CALUZA-FLORES, Respondent.
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A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-989-RTJ) A.
M. NO. RTJ-05-1926 (A.M. OCA IPI No.
01-1248-RTJ) A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1927
(A.M. OCA IPI No.
02-1435-RTJ) A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1928
(A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1485-RTJ) A.
M. NO. RTJ-05-1929 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1552-RTJ) A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1930 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1559-RTJ) A. M. NO. P-05-2020 (A.M.
OCA IPI No. 02-1358-P) Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, CARPIO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CARPIO-MORALES, CALLEJO, SR., AZCUNA, TINGA, CHICO-NAZARIO, GARCIA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated: June 26, 2006 |
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D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
Before the Court are these
administrative matters most of which are offshoots of the disapproval by Hon.
Antonio C. Reyes, as Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Baguio City, of the January 24, 2002 order of inhibition issued by RTC Judge
Ruben C. Ayson of the same city, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. 5140-R entitled Sps. Espirita
Malecdan, et al., Plaintiffs, versus Mabel Joan Tadoan, et al., Defendants, in which the latter inhibited himself from
hearing the case.[1]
Obviously resenting the aforementioned disapproval action, Judge Ayson issued,
on the same date, another order[2] in
which he not only delved on the issue of inhibition, but dwelt on matters alien
therefrom and proceeded to ascribe on his colleagues in Baguio City what to him
are acts constituting misconduct,
corruption and immorality. Named as erring officials were RTC Judges Amado S.
Caguioa, Antonio Esteves, Clarence J.
Villanueva, Abraham B. Borreta, Edilberto T. Claravall and Antonio C. Reyes of
Branch Nos. 4, 5, 7, 59, 60, and 61, respectively.
Judge Ayson’s exposé contained in his
Order of January 24, 2002 found its way into the pages of The Daily Inquirer, among other dailies, and eventually
reached the Court which, thru the Office
of the Court Administrator (OCA), then asked the judges mentioned in said order
to comment thereon. Thereafter, Judge Ayson, as directed by the Court,
formalized his complaint against his colleagues thru an Affidavit dated
In the ensuing formal investigation conducted, Judge Ayson would adopt
his affidavit-complaint, marked as Exhibit “A”, as part of his direct
testimony in all the cases subject of A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ.
Subsequent developments saw Atty.
Cristeta Caluza-Flores, Clerk of Court of Branch 4, joining the fray by filing
an administrative case against the presiding judge (Judge Caguioa) of that
branch. And consequent to the filing by Atty. Flores of her complaint and by
Judge Ayson of his affidavit-complaint aforestated and the bill of particulars
thereto, countercharges were also instituted.
Per an en
banc Resolution of October 15, 2002, the Court directed Court of Appeals Associate Justice Godardo A.
Jacinto to conduct a formal investigation on the aforementioned charges and
counter-charges and to include in the probe the complaints of private parties
against Judge Antonio C. Reyes and
thereafter to submit his report and recommendation. Following a marathon
joint hearings, the Investigating Justice submitted a 72-paged Consolidated Report[4]
dated
I. A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 00-989-RTJ): Grace F.
Munsayac-De Villa, et al.
Complainants, vs. Judge Antonio C.
Reyes, Respondent -
Albeit previously ordered dismissed via a Resolution dated
In their verified complaint filed on
Specifically, the complaint asks that respondent
Judge Reyes, as the presiding judge in whose sala SP No. 704-R was pending, be
adjudged administratively liable for -
(1) Issuing, without giving herein complainants, as petitioners in said proceedings an opportunity to be heard, unjust and oppressive orders which, among others, (a) directed them to release P3 Million to the oppositors, (b) declared, as part of the estate, properties that complainants claimed to be their own, and (c) directed them and certain third parties to produce documents of accounts;
(2)
Issuing, without hearing, arrest
orders against Grace F. M. de Villa and Lily M. Sunga for alleged violation of
his orders;
(3)
Refusing to act on complainants’
request for inhibition and insisting on hearing SP. No. 704-R even after a Motion for
Inhibition was filed;
(4)
Unjustifiably failing to act on a Motion filed by certain corporations
which were not parties to the case, to make a limited appearance; and
(5)
Issuing orders against complainants
without giving them time to hire another counsel.
After identifying the complaint she and
her co-complainants filed against the respondent judge and the perceived unjust
and oppressive orders he issued in S.P. No. 704-R, complainant Grace Munsayac
M. de Villa testified on the respondent judge’s refusal to act on their request
for inhibition.
In his Comment,[6] Judge
Reyes denied the various charges hurled against him by the Munsayacs,
explaining, at the outset, that it was the court’s duty to determine the extent
and worth of the estate of the deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and
Vicenta F. Munsayac. The respondent
judge also alleged that, consequent to his issuance, at the instance of the
oppositors, of subpoena to different
banks, the following material events transpired:
1.
Jewelry items apparently placed by
the decedents in a safety deposit box at the Allied Bank were uncovered. This
led to the issuance by the court of a freeze order.
2.
The Branch Manager of the United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) testified in court that complainants de Villa and
Sunga were able to transfer their
mother’s P13,506,343.33 deposits --
contained in UCPB Investment Confirmation (IC) No. 0666 of Trust Account
No. TA-2966 in the name of “Vicenta Munsayac or Grace M. de Villa or Lily M.
Sunga” -- into their own personal accounts immediately after their mother’s death and that at its maturity date
on May 22, 1995, IC No. 0666 was “rolled-over under three (3) different
Investment Confirmations,” which appeared to be in the name of only “Grace M.
de Villa or Lily Sunga;”
3.
That upon being summoned by the
court to shed light on what happened to the name of Vicenta Munsayac in the 3
ICs, the UCPB Bank Manager testified that Vicenta’s name in the 3 original
certificates were erased by a bank manager in connivance with and upon order of
de Villa and Sunga.
In the light of what
appeared to be attempts to deceive other heirs, Judge Reyes issued an order
dated May 4, 2000 granting the Motion of the Special Administrator for complainants
de Villa and Sunga to turn over the amount of P13,506,343.33, inclusive of
accrued interest, in custodia legis for
the benefit of the estate of Vicenta F. Munsayac, the heirs and the government.
It was, according to the respondent judge, complainant de Villa’s and Sunga’s refusal to
comply with said order, as reiterated in another order of May 24, 2000 with a
contempt proviso, followed by de Villa’s
open court manifestation on June 1, 2000, that she was not ready to comply with
the order, that impelled him to order de Villa’s arrest. Continuing, the respondent
judge related that de Villa was immediately released thereafter when she and
her two (2) siblings made an undertaking to comply with the court’s order; that
when they still failed to comply, he issued another order dated
Among other documents, Judge
Reyes attached to his Comment machine
copies of the Agency Safekeeping Certificate No. 006311 dated April 22, 1995 in
the amount of P15,298,835.95 and Agency Safekeeping Certificate No.
006326 dated April 28, 1995 in the amounts of P2,894,705.31 and P116,116.71
of the Philippine Banking Corporation, Baguio City (Annexes “H” and “I” to Comment), which show that the said
amounts belonged to the late Vicenta Munsayac and, therefore, formed part
of her estate.
In the same Comment, Judge Reyes cites Section 8,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court[7]
to justify the arrest order he issued against complainant de Villa who refused
to comply with his previous orders, which was within her power to perform.
According to the respondent judge, complainant de Villa herself forced his hand
to issue the first arrest order
when she failed to keep her undertaking to bring to the court
certification of bank deposits that were previously in her late mother’s name. With respect to his
order dated
a)
Nora, the daughter of the
decedents, was a very sick woman needing immediate medical attention;
b)
Gelacio, Jr. manifested having no
other means of livelihood, all the family corporations being under the full
control of his co-heirs de Villa, Sunga and Roy;
c)
That his order provided that the amounts advanced will
be credited to Nora and Gelacio, Jr.’s shares in the estate of their deceased
parents; and
d)
That there was enough money for
all the children and the cash advances could have been very well provided for
were if not for de Villa and Sunga’s surreptitious withdrawals of decedent
Vicenta Munsayac’s money in the bank.
Anent the issue of his inhibition, the respondent judge submitted,
as required, a Comment to the OCA therein stressing that the matter of
inhibition and the legality of his orders have been raised by complainants de
Villa, et al., before the Court of
Appeals (CA) in a petition for
certiorari, docketed thereat as CA G.R. SP. No. 55193, which was resolved
against the petitioners therein in a decision promulgated on February 23, 2001
(Exhs. “22,” “22-a”-Reyes). Judge Reyes thus claims that it was due to the said
petition which involved, among others, the issue of inhibition which prompted
him to refrain from acting on the corresponding motion for inhibition.
Finally, the respondent judge denied issuing the disputed
orders without notice to herein complainants, stating that the records of the
case will attest to the fact of sending and the receipt of such notices by
every counsel of record.
From the evidence adduced, the Court is
unable to make out a
case for serious misconduct and inefficiency against respondent Judge Reyes. As
it were, the basic Munsayac complaint links the respondent judge’s culpability to
several orders he issued in SP. No. 704-R, which complainants claim to be
unjust, to call for the issuance of warrants of arrest issued against two of
them, and to the respondent’s refusal to act on a request for inhibition. As
above discussed, however, the respondent judge
has explained at length and with some measure of plausibility the circumstances
under which the various orders complained of were issued by him and the reasons
for their issuance.
To begin with, not one of the various
orders complained of can, on their face, be rightly tagged as unjust. It cannot
be over-emphasized that these orders were issued in a case over which Judge
Reyes had jurisdiction. Accordingly, complainants’ appropriate recourse
therefrom would have been to raise the issue of the validity of such orders to
the CA or this Court in a certiorari proceedings and not in an administrative
case. For, an administrative complaint is not the appropriate remedy for every judicial
act of a judge deemed aberrant or irregular where a judicial remedy exists and
is available.[8]
Militating further against the complaint
is the fact that there is no competent evidence to show that Judge Reyes issued the orders in
question with malice or in bad faith or for some fraudulent, corrupt or
dishonest motive. We can allow that some of such orders may have been
unjustified or even erroneous, albeit the circumstances leading to their issuance
tend to argue against such conclusion. At any event, the respondent judge, or
any public officer for that matter, is not amenable to disciplinary action for
his orders, even if erroneous, if that be the case, absent proof that malice or
bad faith attended the issuance thereof.[9] This is so because, in the absence of a showing that the acts complained of were done with
malice or an intention to violate the law or disregard the Rules of Court or
for some corrupt motive, they would, at best, constitute errors of judgment
which do not amount to serious misconduct.[10]
With respect to the arrest orders issued
by the respondent judge against complainant de Villa, the Court notes that some
of such orders, inclusive of the warrants of arrest against her and the matter
of the respondent judge’s inhibition, were challenged before the CA in a
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, docketed thereat as CA-G.R.
SP No. 55193 (Grace F. Munsayac – de Villa, et
al., Petitioners, vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes, et al., Respondents). And as aptly pointed out by the respondent
judge, the CA, in its Decision dated
In all, the Munsayac
complaint against Judge Antonio C. Reyes in A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1925, which the
Court had previously dismissed in its Resolution dated
II. A.M. No.
RTJ-05-1926 (A.M. OCA IPI No.
01-1248-RTJ): Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes,
Like the Munsayac
complaint, the Court, in an en banc Resolution
promulgated on July 16, 2002, ordered
the inclusion of this administrative
complaint of Ramon K. Ilusorio against Judge Antonio C. Reyes in the formal investigation of A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ (Judge
Ruben C. Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City).
In his verified Complaint
dated
1.
That he has a case against the
Baguio Country Club Corporation, Inc. (Club), docketed as Civil Case (CC) No.
4537-R of the RTC of Baguio, Branch 61,
presided over by the respondent judge;
2.
That his motion to have respondent
inhibit himself, he (respondent) being a classmate of Atty.
Federico Agcaoili, the Club’s president,
was, together with complainant’s plea
for injunction, denied;
3.
That during the pendency of CC No.
4537-R, he received information about Judge Reyes’s account with the Club being
charged to that of Atty. Agcaoili, who had requested the Club’s Accounts
Receivables Manager, Elizabeth Narciza, “to reverse against representation of
the Club” the amount of P26,175.00 which represents “the unpaid chits” racked
up with the Club by the respondent judge;
4.
That pursuant to Atty. Agcaoili’s
request, Ms. Narciza sought, via a Memo dated December 16, 1999 to the Club’s
General Manager, Anthony de Leon, and later secured approval of the desired reversal of account;
and
5. That
Judge Reyes’s acceptance of freebies constitutes bribery and violation of Section 3 (e) of RA
3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act..
During the investigation, complainant Ilusorio
presented Elizabeth Narciza who testified knowing Atty. Federico Agcaoili and
having once held the position of Accounts Receivables Manager of the Club. She
affirmed complainant’s allegations respecting the reversal of account and the
memo she addressed to Mr. de Leon. On the witness box, Ms. Narciza’s testified
and/or identified certain documents, as indicated below:
1. A copy
of the Statement of Account of “member
#14 Account #14”, and copy of GUEST CHECK NO. 107445 which bears the name
Antonio Reyes (Exh. “G-3”), indicating
that Judge Reyes, while not a Club member, was accorded special Club privileges.
2. Exhibit
“G-4,” a copy of the January 20, 1999
letter[13]
of Dr. Amado Dizon, Jr., a Club member
with authority to sponsor a guest, addressed to the Club introducing “Judge
Tony Reyes of the RTC Baguio who will be patronizing our Club sports facilities
and restaurant” and requesting to the allow the latter as his guest who “may
directly pay or charge xxx his chits to my account.”
In his Comment dated November 15, 2001,[14] Judge
Reyes alleged that, upon his denial of the writ of preliminary injunction
applied for by complainant Ilusorio, followed by a denial of the latter’s motion for
inhibition, the latter went to
the CA on a petition for certiorari challenging his denial for the issuance of
the injunctive writ, but the CA in its decision promulgated on January 12,
2001, and later this Court, upheld his order (Annexes “A” and “B” to Comment).
In
the same Comment, Judge Reyes denied
knowledge of Atty. Agcaoili’s purported request for reversal of account, noting in this
regard that the accounts allegedly reversed were for the months of August,
September, and October 1999, while CC No. 4537-R was raffled off to him only on
P29,069.92 made by him (TSN, Nov. 26, 2002; pp. 25-26). Pressing the
point, Judge Reyes states that his use of the Club’s facilities was extended to
him at the behest of Dr. Dizon whose Sponsorship Letter of
Similarly, in his Affidavit which was also adopted as part of his direct testimony
(Exh. “12”-Reyes), the respondent judge belied Ilusorio’s insinuation that his
judgment favorable to the Club in CC No. 4537-R was a quid pro quo for his availment for free of the Club’s facilities.
As the respondent judge alleged, CC No. 4537-R was resolved on the merits by
this Court in its resolution promulgated
on October 10, 2001 in G.R. No. 148985
(Ramon K. Ilusorio vs. Hon. Antonio C. Reyes and Baguio Country Club
Corporation). The respondent judge further
alleged in the same Affidavit that he
had no dealings whatsoever with the Club’s management, except through Dr.
Dizon.
While complainant Ilusorio’s evidence
cannot, in our appreciation, support a finding of guilt for bribery or
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, it is certainly not
amiss to say that Judge Reyes’s conduct under the premises fall short of the exacting standards for
prudence expected of members of the bench. Trite as it may sound, a judge’s
conduct must, at all times, be characterized by propriety and decorum. But
beyond proper decorum, such conduct must be above and beyond suspicion.[15]
Judge Reyes’s unyielding stance about
having no knowledge of Atty. Agcaoili’s request to reverse his (respondent’s) account
with the Club strains credulity. There can be no quibbling about such request
having been made. Ms. Narciza testified about it and her Memo dated P29,069.92,
does not coincide with his account mentioned in Ms. Narciza’s Memo (Exh. “G”),
which summed up to only P21,115.00 and therefore obviously refers to a
different account.
To
be sure, Judge Reyes’s acceptance of a favor from Atty. Agcaoili during the
pendency of complainant Ilusorio’s civil case against the Club is highly censurable; it
certainly does not speak well of Judge Reyes’s sense of delicadeza. The
same may be said of the respondent judge’s act of allowing Club member Dr. Dizon
to charge to him (Dizon) any account that he (respondent) may incur with the
Club. The likelihood that any favor from a club member may somehow influence or
affect the respondent judge’s judicial functions with respect to the Club’s
pending case in his court or any case which the said sponsor may later have in
the RTC of Baguio is not far-fetched. It
may be that
mere suspicion that a
judge is partial to a party is not enough to sustain a charge of
misconduct. It behooves the Court to once again remind the respondent judge,
however, and
all members of the bench for that matter, that they are expected to so conduct themselves as to be
beyond reproach and suspicion;[16]
to endeavor to keep at all times the high respect accorded to those who wield
the gavel of justice,[17]
and, last but not least, to avoid situations likely to erode the faith of the
people in the judiciary and bring it to
disrepute.[18] Judge Reyes cannot plausibly feign ignorance
of this basic
but wise counsel which had doubtless guided men
in robes throughout the years and in the
process evade any form of sanction. To
be sure, Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct contains a caveat against
allowing the prestige of the judicial office to be used or lent to advance the private interests
of others or to convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence a judge.
Judge Reyes’s acts of impropriety and
patent lack of delicadeza verily run
counter to the injunction prescribed by the aforecited rule of the Code.
Accordingly, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, the imposition of a
fine against the respondent judge in the amount of P30,000.00, with a
stern warning is deemed very much appropriate in A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926.
III. A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1927 (A.M. OCA IPI NO. 02-1435-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. RTC Judges of
A. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Clarence J.
Villanueva for immorality.
On the charge of
immorality against Judge Clarence J. Villanueva, complainant Judge Ruben C. Ayson alleged in his underlying affidavit-complaint that Judge Villanueva –
1. Has with his mistress, Emy Tumaneng, a daughter named Shaira Marjorie Tumaneng, born on March 31, 1996, baptized on October 20, 1996 at the Don Bosco Parish Church, with Pauline Badul, his (Judge Villanueva’s) clerk of court, and Abraham de Castro, as godmother and godfather, respectively; and
2. Has
with the same woman a son named Richard Clarence Tumaneng born
To support his
charge, Judge Ayson presented documentary evidence consisting, among others, of
the Certificate of Baptism (Exh. “A-1”) of one Shaira Marjorie Tumaneng
(Shaira, hereinafter) in which the names
“Clarence Villanueva” and “Emy Tumaneng” ( Exh. “A-1-b”) appear as her
parents; a certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Baguio City
on certain entries in its Register of Births bearing on the child Shaira (Exh. “A-2”);
certified xerox copies of the Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. “A-3”) of one
Richard Clarence Parangan Tumaneng (Richard, hereinafter) in which the names “EMY PARANGAN TUMANENG”
and “CLARENCE JAPSON VILLANUEVA” appear as mother and father, respectively, and
at the back of which is an entry that reads “AFFIDAVIT OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT/
ADMISSION OF PATERNITY” (Exh. “A-3-h”), which bears a signature on top of the
typewritten name CLARENCE VILLANUEVA (Exh. “A-3-j”); and the Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. “A-4”) of
Shaira (Exh. “A-4-c”).
Judge Ayson’s
witness, Sylvia R. Laudencia, OIC of the Baguio City Registrar’s Office,
produced the original certificates of live birth of both Richard and Shaira,
confirming in effect that the certified photo-copies thus presented of the
certificates of live birth of both Richard and Shaira are faithful reproduction of the originals
thereof in the custody of her office.
The witness also testified as to the authenticity of her signature
appearing on the certified xerox copies of both documents.
In his Sworn Statement dated
Juxtaposed with
the duly identified documents presented by Judge Ayson, Judge Villanueva’s Sworn
Statement embodying his defense
has little to commend itself. As
may be noted, written on the Certificate of Live Birth of Richard vis-à-vis the
name and occupation of the child’s
father are: name - “Clarence Japson Villanueva” (Exh. “A-3-e”); occupation
- “lawyer” (Exh. “A-3-f”). Further, at the back of such certificate, the name of the father
appears to be Clarence J. Villanueva (Exh. “A-3-h”), which bears the signature
of the said father (Exh. “A-3-j”).
On the other hand, the name of the
putative father does not appear in Shaira’s
Birth Certificate. However,
written on Shaira’s Certificate of
Baptism issued by the Parish Priest of Don Bosco Parish (Exh. “A-1”) are the
following entries: “Shaira Marjorie Villanueva child of Clarence Villanueva and
Emy Tumaneng” (Exhs. “A-1-a” and “A-1-b”).
Exhibit “A-3,” supra,
being a public document, is prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated.[19] This document was, as earlier indicated,
identified by the Civil Registrar of
Baguio as a faithful reproduction of Richard’s Certificate of Live Birth in the registry’s file and which she produced
during her testimony. And while in the
nature of a private document, the baptismal certificate of Shaira (Exh. “A-1”),
may, for purposes of this administrative complaint, be accorded the same evidentiary weight as a
public document, especially when the
date of birth of the child indicated therein, i.e., March 31, 1996, coincides with the date of birth appearing in
Shaira’s Certificate of Live Birth (Exhs. “A-4” and “A-4-b”). In net effect, the onus of refuting or
disproving both documents and their contents
falls on the respondent judge.
Sad to state, however, Judge Villanueva has failed to discharge the
burden. As it were, he relied on his
uncorroborated denial respecting the
filiation of both children and his relationship
to Emy Tumaneng who is mentioned in Exhibits “A-1”, “A-3” and “A-4” as
the mother. Needless to state, Judge Vllanueva’s evidence leaves much to be desired. To begin with, the Certificate of Baptism
(Exh. “A-1”) mentions the name of the officiating priest and the persons who
stood as godfather and godmother of Shaira. Judge Villanueva could and should
have requested the priest or either of the baptismal sponsors to testify and
perhaps clarify that the “Clarence Villanueva” mentioned in the baptismal
certificate as father of Shaira refers
to a different person. Also, the
Certificate of Live Birth of Richard
(Exh. “A-3”) appears to have been prepared by staff nurse, Maria Theresa
B. Fulgencio. Again, Judge Villanueva should
have had asked Ms. Fulgencio to testify as to the real identity of the “Clarence Japson Villanueva” entered therein
as the child’s father. And more importantly, he should have called on the
mother, Emy Tumaneng, to at least confirm his protestation over his imputed
paternity of both children. Judge Villanueva
has offered no explanation why he failed in that regard and, for this reason,
thus failed to destroy the probative value of the said documents.
Certainly not on lost on the Court is Judge
Villanueva’s failure, after having been apprised of Judge Ayson’s allegation
that he had affixed his signature at the dorsal side of the child’s Certificate
of Live Birth (Exh. “A-3”), to engage the services of a handwriting expert to
shed light on the said signature and perchance confirm his theory of his purported
signature being forged.
In all, Judge Villanueva
failed to substantiate his defense of not being the father of Shaira and Richard. And lest it be overlooked, Judge
Villanueva, a married man, sired Shaira, who was born
in March 1996, and Richard, who was born in March 1999, while he was occupying the position of RTC
Judge of Baguio. This reality necessarily means that his intimate although illicit
relationship with their mother, Emmy Tumaneng,
started or at least continued during his incumbency as such judge. As it were, Judge
Villanueva’s service record on file with the Court yields the information that
he was appointed RTC judge of
The Code of Judicial
Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of
impropriety not only with respect to his discharge of judicial duties, but also to his
behavior outside his sala and as a private individual. As we articulated in Castillo vs. Calanog,[20]
there is no dichotomy of morality: a public official, particularly a member of
the judiciary, is also judged by his private morals. A judge’s official life
cannot simply be detached from his personal existence. His public as well as
his private life must be above suspicion.
The charge of immorality
proven against Judge Villanueva demonstrates his unfitness to remain in office
and continue to discharge the functions of a judge.[21]
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court
classifies immorality as a serious offense. It is punishable by dismissal from
the service with accessory penalties. With the view we take of the case, there
is no reason for not meting out the severest form of disciplinary sanction, specially since the offense was committed in the very city
where the respondent judge holds office. What is more, there seems to be little
attempt on the part of Judge Villanueva to be discreet
about his liaison with a women not his wife. The fact that Judge Ayson knew about Emy Tumaneng and the birth and baptism of Shaira
and Richard would suggest as much.
B. Judge
Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judges Abraham B. Borreta, Amado S. Caguioa, Antonio M.
Esteves & Clarence J. Villanueva for Gambling and Drinking in the Court
Premises During Office Hours.
On the charge of
gambling and drinking against Judges Borreta, Caguioa, Esteves and Villanueva,
complainant Judge Ayson alleged seeing respondents Judge Borreta et al.,
playing “pusoy” (a card game) with money bets and drinking liquor “three times in the Court premises
during office hours”, the first, in Judge
Villanueva’s sala lasting the whole afternoon of September 26, 2001 or just
before the program of the Baguio IBP started;
the second, in the morning until
12 noon of September 27, 2001 in Judge Caguioa’s sala, and the third, at about
1:30 p.m. of the same date, September 27,
in the chambers of Judge Borreta.
In his Comment[22]
to this particular charge, respondent Judge Borreta admitted playing, during a despedida party tendered for him on
For his part, respondent Judge Esteves,
in his Comment,[23]
practically repeated what Judge Borreta said respecting what transpired during
the despedida party adverted to,
adding, however, that
he recalled the judges agreeing “to use the winnings in the purchase of
additional foodstuff for the party.” Judge Esteves, therefore, denied Judge
Ayson’s insinuation that RTC judges in
For his part, respondent Judge Caguioa
admitted in his separate Comment[24] that
card games were indeed played
during the send-off parties for Judge Borreta separately tendered by the
IBP and Judge Borreta’s staff. He
stressed, however, that the games were played for fun, without bets and after
office hours. And he dismissed, as without basis, the charge of drinking
liquor, claiming that he has been taking medicines daily to control his blood
pressure and has been under strict medical orders to avoid alcohol.
Respondent Judge Villanueva, in his Comment[25]
dated
As it were, the parties have chosen not
to introduce any further evidence on this particular charge and agreed to
submit the same for resolution on the bases of Judge Ayson’s affidavit and the respondents’
respective comments.
It is noteworthy that Judge Borreta’s aforesaid
Comment, supra, dated
xxx The
only time that I can remember that I had the occasion to drink and play cards
with my fellow Judges was during my despedida on P20.00
to P100.00. Some of the guests
brought bottles of liquor and offered to open one for me and the other
Judges. But I demurred and told them
that I would only take wine knowing very well that hard liquor was bad for my
health …. It was while we were drinking
wine and playing a friendly game of pusoy that Judge Ayson came into my
office. xxx” (Exh. 1-Ayson [Perjury])
Similarly, respondent Judges Caguioa,
Esteves and Borreta stated in their Joint
Affidavit (Exh. “4”-Villanueva) as follows:
That we played pusoy for fun on the
occasion of the despedida of Judge Abraham Borreta on September 27, 2001 at
10:00 A.M. up to 12:00 noon at the courtroom of Judge Amado Caguioa;
That since the game was for fun only to while away the time before the
despedida lunch for Judge Abraham Borreta, our betting was minimal and a purely
friendly game; (p. 41, Rollo, Vol. V).
The statements made in the Comments and Joint
Affidavit immediately referred to above
veritably partake of the nature of
binding admissions
on the part of the declarants or affiants, as the case may be, that they played
“pusoy” on the date/s and places mentioned in both documents. Thus, the charge
of gambling stands substantiated, except with respect to respondent
Judge Villanueva, who has
denied
participating in the “pusoy”
game as well
as in the
drinking sessions. In effect,
respondent Judge Villanueva’s
alleged participation in said sessions
is at least doubtful, more so since respondents Caguioa, Esteves, and Borreta, in their Joint Affidavit, categorically declared that Judge Villanueva declined their invitation
to join them
in their friendly
card game.
We can allow
that what the
three (3) respondent judges played was no more
than just a friendly game of
“pusoy” to while
away their time.
They, however, used the
court premises for this
past time, thus adding an
inappropriate dimension to what
would have otherwise been an insignificant isolated
event. To borrow from Alumbres vs. Caoibes,[26]
misbehavior within the
court premises diminishes its sanctity
and dignity. Respondents Caguioa, Esteves and Borreta should, therefore, be fined
and warned against a repetition of such improper conduct. This particular
complaint should, however, be dismissed as against respondent Judge Villanueva
for insufficiency of evidence.
The
Court need not delve further on the charge of drinking hard liquor in the court
premises during office hours. Suffice it to state in regard to this charge that Judge Ayson has not discharged his
burden, like any complainant in administrative disciplinary proceedings, of
proving by substantial evidence the allegations of his complaint.[27]
C. Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs.
Judge Amado S. Caguioa for gross misconduct, incompetence and for allowing
collection of commissioner’s fees in ex-parte hearings and allowing ex-parte
reception of evidence by non-lawyers/employees of his court.
According to
complainant Judge Ayson, respondent “Judge Caguioa allowed ex-parte hearings of his cases to be presided by a clerk or
stenographer who is not a lawyer and not his clerk of court contrary to Section
9 of Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, [and that] commissioner’s fees were also
collected in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 50-2001 dated August 17, 2001.”
Judge Ayson presented as witnesses the
following individuals whose affidavits
served as their respective direct testimonies:
1.
Vida Ramos inter alia stated in her Affidavit (Exh. “D”) that she had a
petition for correction of birth certificate entry, docketed as
Special Proc. No. 1030-R of the RTC of Baguio City, Br. 4, presided over
by respondent; that Court Stenographer Carmen Diaz, instead of respondent, presided over an ex-parte hearing of the petition, as shown in the TSNs of the
proceedings (Exh. “E”); that before the hearing commenced, Mrs. Diaz reminded
her and her lawyer about the “commissioners’ fee”; that when asked how much is
such fee and for what it is for, Mrs. Diaz
responded “Tig-fifive hundred kami” and that it is intended as a measure
of compensation “listening to your
case.”
2.
Atty. Joy Angelica P.
Santos-Doctor, in her affidavit/direct testimony (Exh. “H”), declared appearing
as counsel in Special Proc. No. 990-R for change of name and correction of
entries. Like Ms. Ramos, Atty. Doctor
testified about Ms. Carmen Diaz presiding over the ex-parte hearing and about her client being also asked to pay commissioner’s
fees.
3. Atty.
Tomas B. Gorospe, in
his affidavit/direct testimony (Exh. “K”), declared that, in at least two (2)
cases assigned to Judge Caguioa, the ex-parte
hearings were presided over by a court personnel other
than the branch clerk of court. In the ex-parte hearing
in Spec. Proc. No. 1051-R (Exh. “L”) for
guardianship, Atty. Gorospe adds, Court Interpreter Teodora Paquito presided
and in connection with which
his client was charged
P1,500 as commissioner’s fee.
4.
Atty. Cristeta C. Flores, the clerk of Court
of Judge Caguioa, in her Affidavits of
In refutation of
the aforementioned evidence, Judge Caguioa presented the affidavits of Melita
Salinas, and several others, all of which were adopted as their direct
testimonies. A summary of the relevant portions of their respective testimonies follows:
1. Melita Salinas,
Docket Clerk 3, Br.4, RTC,
2. Carmen Diaz, now retired,
in her affidavit (Exh. "23”) and joint affidavit
with Mercedes Onato (“Exh. “24”), declared donating part of what she and
co-employees received for copies of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs)
to defray certain office expenses (Exh. “N-24”).
She denies ever presiding over any ex-parte
hearing, albeit
she admits assisting Judge Caguioa in those hearings. Ms. Diaz also denied having asked for commissioner’s fees from Ms. Flor-Ramos,
noting that it was the latter’s lawyer who
voluntarily handed her two P500 bills, one of which she gave to Mercedes Onato
to cover payment for the TSNs.
Particularly referring to the Fuentes case handled by one Atty.
Gorospe, Ms. Diaz asserts that it was Judge Caguioa who presided over the
hearings.
3.
Teodora Paquito, court interpreter, declared that she
never acted as commissioner to receive evidence in ex-parte hearings, her role in such hearings being limited to
attending to simple court matters like preparing the minutes of the proceedings
and summarizing testimonies of
witnesses. He denied having received any
fee in such ex-parte hearings.
4.
Prosecutor Romeo Carbonell, in his
Affidavit (Exh. “26”), stated that as trial prosecutor once assigned to
the sala of Judge Caguioa, he always attended, when the government’s interest
is involved, all such ex-parte hearings which respondent Judge Caguioa or his Clerk of
Court, when so authorized, conducts. Setting his sight on the ex-parte hearings in the Vida Ramos case
and the cases cited by Attys. Gorospe and Doctor, Prosecutor Carbonell belies allegations
that Judge Caguioa was
not present in those hearings, noting that the respondent judge always
controlled the proceedings even when he leaves the courtroom from time to time
to go to his chambers.
5.
Attys. Lisa P. Calvi, Jaime
Pablito and Alan Mazo separately declared in essence that they appeared several
times before the sala of Judge Caguioa, who presided over all ex-parte
hearings of cases raffled to his court.
Judge Caguioa, in
his Comment dated
Pursuant to Supreme Court (SC) Circular
No. 12 dated
Unlike, however, with respect to the
non-compliance with SC Circular 12, Judge Ayson’s evidence, vis-à-vis his
charge on alleged collection of commissioner’s fees in ex-parte
proceedings in violation of another Supreme Court issuance, i.e., SC Circular No. 50-2001,[28]
is far from persuasive. As explained by
Ms. Diaz, in her Affidavit (Exh. “23”-Caguioa) and in another Affidavit
she executed jointly with Mercedes Onato (Exh. “24”-Caguioa), no fees were
collected from the parties, although most lawyers voluntarily gave money for
the TSNs and for their snacks. Ms. Diaz’ declaration find substantial
corroboration from Judge Caguioa’s other
witnesses. But the more important
consideration with respect to this particular charge is that there is
absolutely no showing whatsoever that any portion of the amounts lawyers
voluntarily gave ended up in the respondent judge’s own pocket. Similarly, there is no evidence tending to
prove that Judge Caguioa acted with malice or with similar base motivation in
allowing some court personnel to participate or assist him in the ex-parte
hearings. If at all, Judge Ayson’s evidence
only exposed Judge Caguioa’s lack of circumspection in the performance of some
of his judicial mandate.
While admonition
with warning may be in order for Judge Caguioa’s act of allowing his court stenographer
and/or interpreter to participate in ex-parte
hearings, absent any showing to vitiate the bona fides of such
act,
a heavier penalty should be meted him for his failure to strictly adhere
to the prescription of Circular No. 12, series of 1986, of this Court. As
recommended by the Investigating Justice, a fine of P10,000.00 should be imposed on the respondent judge.
D. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus Judge Antonio C.
Reyes for assigning to himself a case without benefit of raffle.
The particular
suit upon which the charge against respondent Judge Antonio C. Reyes for
allegedly assigning to himself a case without the benefit of raffle refers to
Civil Case No. 4892-R (Edgar Avila, et al., vs. Jadewell Corporation).
Presented to substantiate the charge were the petitioners in that civil case
themselves, namely, Attys. Edgar M. Avila, Ma. Nenita Opiana and Ruth P.
Bernabe who affirmed the truth of the
allegations they made in their
On the other hand, Atty. Avila affirmed the
truth and veracity of another letter he sent
to then Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. in reply to the letter of
Atty. Emiliano Gayo, Jadewell Corporation’s counsel, who earlier wrote the then
Chief Justice, through Deputy Court
Administrator Christopher O. Lock, on the matter of raffle of the Jadewell case. On cross-examination, however, Atty. Avila
testified not having seen the Certification issued by Clerk of Court Delilah Muñoz, to the effect
that the Jadewell case was the
subject of a special raffle conducted on
Judge Reyes, in his Comment (Exh. “13”-Reyes), which he adopted as part of his direct
testimony, denied allegations that he acted on the Jadewell case without the benefit of a raffle, stating that the
case was raffled off to him on February 26, 2001 at 2:30 pm in open court. In
the same comment, the respondent judge made reference to the
Respondent Judge Reyes further declared
that, in his capacity as Executive Judge, he conducts raffles himself in the
presence of the parties’ lawyers, with some media people in attendance.
Continuing, he said that he conducted a hearing on the Jadewell case in the
afternoon of February 26, 2001 to determine the propriety of extending the TRO which
then Acting Executive Judge Borreta previously issued and where Attys. Avila and Alim appeared for
the petitioners, while Attys. Gayo and Fangayen appeared for respondents
Jadewell Corporation and the City of Baguio, respectively. Respondent Judge Reyes
identified the TSNs taken during the said hearing of
In
the same Comment, Judge Reyes further
stated that in a letter dated
Testifying for the respondent judge,
Atty. Emiliano Gayo confirmed writing
the letter (Exh. “1”-Reyes) dated April
27, 2002 to then Chief Justice Davide, in which he stated the fact that Atty.
Johnico Alim was one of the lawyers of the petitioners in the Jadewell case and that during the
hearing of February 26, 2001, Civil Case No. 4892-R, was set for raffle and
preliminary conference at 2:30 p.m. of that day. He further stated that after the raffle, which was done in the
presence of the parties and counsels, Judge Reyes returned to his chambers
after advising the parties that he would study the records and call the case at
The Court
notes that on the charge under consideration, complainant Judge Ayson lined up three (3)
witnesses, uniformly stating that no raffle was conducted in the Jadewell case in the afternoon of
The
case was raffled on
Additionally, the respondent judge submitted in evidence a certified xerox
copy of the Minutes of the Special Raffle held on
At bottom then, what is before the Court
are conflicting evidence presented by complainant Judge Ayson and
respondent Judge Reyes on the raffle (or
absence thereof) of the Jadewell case,
Civil Case No. 4892-R. Given this
perspective, and considering the submission of the Minutes of Special Raffle, supra, it is not amiss to say, as did
the Investigating Justice, that this particular charge against Judge Antonio C.
Reyes has not been satisfactorily established. Accordingly, its dismissal for insufficiency of evidence
is clearly indicated.
E. Judge Ruben C. Ayson versus
Judge Edilberto Claravall for conduct unbecoming a judge.
On Judge Ayson’s complaint against Judge
Edilberto T. Claravall for misconduct, it is noted that the parties agreed to
submit the same for resolution on the basis of Judge Ayson’s
Affidavit-Complaint and Judge Claravall’s February 18, 2002 letter-comment[31]
to the OCA and his December 2, 2002 Counter-Affidavit,[32]
without need of formally presenting evidence thereon.
This charge against Judge Edilberto T.
Claravall stemmed from an incident which occurred during the judges convention
held on June 10, 1999 at the Century Park Hotel, Manila, where Judge
Claravall’s van hit another vehicle.
In his affidavit of complaint, Judge
Ayson alleged in esse the following:
1.
Judge Claravall and those inside his van named him
(Judge Ayson) as the driver of the offending van, albeit he was not on board
the vehicle;
2. The
next day, Domingo Rodenas, the hotel’s chief of security, had him paged at the
convention floor and was asked to pay the damage caused to the car allegedly
hit by his van the night before;
3.
His (Judge Ayson’s)
protestation of innocence notwithstanding, Mr. Rodenas gave him his
calling card therein indicating the plate number of the offending van, so that
if he (Judge Ayson) changed his mind, he could call him to settle the damage;
4.
It turned out that
the offending van belonged to Judge
Claravall, who, when confronted,
promised to settle the matter with the hotel guest involved; and
5.
Judge
Claravall’s act of falsely imputing to him (Judge Ayson) something constitutes
conduct unbecoming of a judge.
In his aforesaid letter-comment,
respondent Judge Claravall alleged that:
1.
In the evening of June 10, 1999, while driving his van
out of the Harrison Plaza parking area, he “accidentally cracked [but hardly
noticed] the tail light lens of a car that was parked very close to the van;”
2.
When the parking attendant called his attention to what
happened, two of the judges seated
behind called out one after the other for the parking attendant not to worry
because ‘Justice Ayson’ would take care of any damage to the car; that the remarks were made in levity;
3.
He identified himself and gave his name to the parking
attendant and asked him to just take note of his van’s plate number and to tell
the owner of the car that he would be back;
and
4.
He was not aware that the Security Officer of Century
Park paged Judge Ayson or that the incident was reported to the former until Judge Ayson so informed him in Baguio,
where Judge Ayson asked him to call up the hotel’s security officer and settle
the car damage; and, that, as promised, he immediately attended to and settled
the matter.
Respondent Judge Claravall further stated
in his Counter-Affidavit dated
As may be noted, Judge Ayson has charged
Judge Claravall with conduct unbecoming of a judge on the postulate that the
latter implicated him to the minor car accident in question by calling out to
the parking attendant that “Justice Ayson” would take care of the resulting
damage.
However,
Judge Claravall, in his aforementioned
Comment and Counter-Affidavit, distinctly recalled stating that it was “one
of the judges ‘seated behind’” (who) called out to the parking attendant not to
worry because “Justice Ayson” would take care of any damage to the car and that
another judge gave a similar remark. Notably, Judge Ayson’s inculpatory
allegations stand without corroborative support. On the other hand, Judge
Claravall’s denial that he implicated Judge
Ayson to the incident in question finds full corroboration from Antonio Aquino
who, in his Affidavit of
On balance then, Judge Ayson’s evidence,
failing as it does to conclusively establish that respondent Judge Claravall
implicated him to the incident in question, cannot support a case for conduct
unbecoming of a judge. For this reason, the complaint for that offense against
Judge Claravall must fail.
IV. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1928 (A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1485-RTJ): Judge Clarence
J. Villanueva vs. Judge Ruben C. Ayson -
Judge Clarence J. Villanueva’s complaint
(Exh. “A” – Villanueva) for perjury under Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code
and serious misconduct against Judge Ruben C. Ayson arose from the Bill of
Particulars submitted by the latter in A.M. OCA IPI No. 02-1435-RTJ (Exh. “C” –
Villanueva). In it, Judge Ayson pertinently
stated:
The second time I saw the gambling
was in the morning of
Complainant Judge Villanueva tags the
reference to their having played “pusoy” from “’10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon’ on
September 27, 2001 [as] an absolute lie and amounts to a fabrication of facts”
the truth, according to him, being that he (Judge Villanueva) had regular civil
cases hearings from 8:30 a.m. up to 12:00 noon of September 27, 2001, as
evidenced by the orders issued and
minutes of proceedings in the said cases (Exhs. “H” to “T,” Perjury). Complainant Villanueva, therefore, maintains
that respondent Judge Ayson’s untruthful statements in his Bill of Particulars
(Exh. “C,” Perjury) amounted to perjury.
Testifying for complainant Judge Villanueva,
Judge Antonio Esteves declared that Judge Villanueva did not play “pusoy” in Judge Caguioa’s chambers at 10:00
a.m. of September 27, 2001; that at 10:00 a.m. of the said date, he went to
fetch Judge Caguioa at his office to
attend a despedida party for Judge
Borreta; that Judge Caguioa was then working and he waited for him (Caguioa) so
that they could go together; that Judge Borreta then came also to fetch him
about past 10:00 a.m.; that when they were informed that the food was still
being prepared, they decided to have a friendly game of “pusoy”; and that Judge
Villanueva was not with them because he was then conducting trial.
Judges Antonio Esteves, Amado Caguioa
and Abraham Borreta all testified to belie respondent Judge Ayson’s allegation
that they played “pusoy” with
complainant Judge Villanueva on
Attys. Galo Reyes and Juris Carl Dacaoi
likewise testified to corroborate complainant Judge Villanueva’s testimony
respecting his being in his courtroom hearing cases in the morning of September
27, 2001.
Testifying for respondent Judge Ayson, Atty. Cristeta Flores identified her Affidavit
executed on
In resisting what basically is a
countercharge against him for perjury, respondent Judge Ayson submitted in
evidence his underlying affidavit-complaint (Exhs. “A” and “8” – Ayson). He further offered in evidence the Joint Affidavit of Judges Borreta,
Caguioa and Esteves (Exh. “11” – Ayson, also Exh. “G,” Perjury) to prove that
affiants themselves had in fact admitted
playing “pusoy” on September 27, 2001 from 10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon in the
courtroom of Judge Caguioa.
The Court finds no merit in the complaint
of Judge Villanueva which, at bottom, turns on the question of whether or not
what Judge Ayson wrote under oath about the former playing the game of “pusoy”
on the date in question is false. As may very well be noted, Judge
Borreta, in his Comment dated
Accordingly, Judge Villanueva’s complaint
against Judge Ayson is, as recommended by the Investigating Justice, should be dismissed for
insufficiency of evidence.
V. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1929 (A.M.
OCA IPI No. 02-1552-RTJ): Judge Ruben C. Ayson vs. Judge Abraham B. Borreta -
In his letter of
1.
In July 2000, respondent Borreta, while
still a RTC judge of
2.
A week after, respondent (i.e.,
Judge Borreta) acquired an authorization from the PNB to work out and secure from
the Department of Agrarian Reform and
other government agencies the exemption of the property from agrarian reform coverage;
3.
Respondent subsequently entered
into a contract of Intent to Sell with several entities/groups, among them the
Green Meadows Homeowners Association (HOA) I and employees of the city
government of
4.
A case for damages has been filed
by Benguet Green Meadows, Inc. against one Rose Ann Tabora.
According to Judge Ayson, Judge
Borreta’s act of entering into transactions/deals involving the above-described
may constitute engaging in the private practice of law and violate certain provisions of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
During the investigation, complainant Judge
Ayson presented one Rose Ann Tabora, who adopted, as her direct testimony, her Affidavit dated
In his verified Comment dated
Anent the cases involving landowner
Llorente, Judge Borreta belabored to explain that none of the cases was
assigned to the branch (Branch 59) of which
he was previously the presiding judge. The respondent judge hastens
to add that the contract of agency he entered into relates only to a single,
regular transaction, the CMP Housing
Project in Longlong, La Trinidad, Benguet, which did not interfere in or conflict with the discharge
of his judicial functions.
Judge Borreta’s witness, Victoria
Reyes-Ferrer, submitted her Affidavit which
was adopted as part of her direct testimony (Exh. “2” – Borreta). For the most
part, the affidavit contained a denial of the statements or acts attributed to her
by Ms. Rose Ann Tabora.
Another witness, Lovely Ladignon, in her
Affidavit (Exh. “3” – Borreta) which
was adopted as her direct testimony, denied Ms. Tabora’s testimony that Judge
Borreta had anything to do with the civil and criminal cases filed against her (Tabora).
Going over the evidence presented, the
Court can concede, as Judge Borreta urges, that there is nothing illegal or
immoral per se about his having
entered into an agreement with Purita Llorente for the sale of her property and
the side transactions concluded to bring the same under the CMP scheme. We
cannot, however, turn a blind eye on, first, SC Administrative Circular No. 5
issued on
And lest it be overlooked,
Rule 5.02
of the Code of Judicial Conduct also prohibits judges from engaging in
activities or entering into dealings, particularly financial, likely to
interfere with the performance of their functions or present a
conflict-of-interest situation. The provision thus provides:
Rule 5.02.- A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere, with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interest as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualifications.
The Court has to be sure taken stock of
the fact that some of the CMP Project beneficiaries are employees of the
Like the judge in another disciplinary case
charged with, and eventually adjudged guilty of, a similar offense,[35] Judge
Borreta ought to be penalized with a fine in the amount of P2,000.00 and warned to be more discreet in his
private and business activities.
VI. A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1930 (A.M.
OCA IPI No. 02-1559-RTJ): Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores vs. Judge Amado S.
Caguioa -
In an Affidavit-Complaint executed on
In his Comment to Atty. Flores’ Affidavit-Complaint,
Judge Caguioa virtually answered point-by-point the inculpatory allegations
against him, particularly about his not being present during ex-parte hearings of cases assigned to
him. He notes in this regard that the
TSNs of the corresponding proceedings would show his presence thereat. And just
like what he said with respect to Judge Ayson’s basic complaint, respondent Judge
Caguioa inter alia alleged that there
were instances that he had to leave the courtroom and stay in his chamber to
answer telephone calls or the call of nature, but in all the proceedings, he
was in control.
Judge Caguioa attached to his Comment the affidavit of Branch 4 Clerk
III, Melita Salinas executed on February 14, 2002,[36] which
the respondent judge earlier submitted in his defense against the complaint of
Judge Ayson in A.M. OCA IPI No.
02-1435-RTJ.
At the outset, it is to be stated that no
separate reception of evidence in this particular case was held, the parties’
evidence thereon having been offered in the formal hearing of the other cases
previously discussed.
In this case, Judge Caguioa is charged with incompetence
and improper judicial conduct by his Branch Clerk of Court, Atty. Flores.
According to complainant Flores, Judge Caguioa is a slave driver who only sees her and her
co-workers’ mistakes but not their good points; is a judge who, in dealing with
his personnel, uses intemperate words; and one who does not dictate orders in open court but
merely requires the stenographer on duty to prepare the orders based on what
had been manifested by the parties. Atty. Flores also invites attention to the
operation in
With the view we take of this particular
case, what the evidence on record has adequately established is that Judge
Caguioa had allowed his stenographer/s and interpreter to make, when called to assist during ex-parte proceeding, remarks that should
have been properly made by the judge. This is quite clear from the TSNs of some
ex-parte proceedings that were
presented by complainant Ayson (Exh. “N-17,” “N-19,” “N-20,” “N-21,” and “N-22”).
While this aberration is not actionable, Judge Caguioa is advised to revise his
system to ensure that he alone presides over all proceedings in his court. His
practice, as shown by the TSNs presented in evidence, can very well lead to the
impression that the stenographer or interpreter also presided over the said
proceedings. This certainly does not enhance the dignity of the court or
improve its image. While the respondent judge may, during ex-parte hearings, momentarily leave the courtroom, it behooves him
to make it a point that he promptly return to ensure that he alone directs the
proceedings. At any rate, the same acts of impropriety have been treated in
A.M. No. RTJ-05- 1927 (Judge Ayson v. RTC Judges of Baguio City), for which the
corresponding sanction has been meted, as recommended by the Investigating
Justice.
As to the other acts complained of by
Atty. Flores, like Judge Caguioa being a slave driver, who only sees her and
her co-workers’ bad points, and about what the respondent judge painted on his
taxicabs, the Court, like the
Investigating Justice, finds them so trivial to require belaboring. Suffice it
to state that judges, like any human being, have their own idiosyncrasis and
subject to human limitations.[37]
Certainly, perceived personality flaws and human frailties, of which everyone
is an heir to, cannot, without more, plausibly be the subject of an
administrative complaint.
VII. A.M. NO. P-05-2020 (A.M.
OCA IPI No. 02-1358-P): Hon. Amado S. Caguioa vs. Atty.
Cristeta R. Caluza- Flores -
In his Complaint dated
1)
the act of her husband, Manolo, buying
a portion of a lot that was subject of an LRC case once pending before
the RTC of Baguio (BR. 4) in which his wife is the Branch Clerk of Court, is in
violation of Article 1491 of the Civil Code;[38]
2)
bringing home an armalite rifle
which, before complainant’s assumption to office, was submitted in evidence in
Criminal Case No. 7872-R for illegal possession of firearms against accused
Sixto Raymundo;
3)
bringing home the records of two (2)
cases, one of which she brought back, with her draft order, almost 9 months after
the case was submitted for resolution, and, the other, 18 months after the case
was submitted for resolution, together with her draft summary of the evidence;
4)
that in answer to complainant’s
memorandum on the LRC case, respondent Flores admitted that she forwarded the
records to the office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) on March 29, 1995; that she
retrieved the records on April 20, 1999 when an unnamed person went to her to
check on the status of the case; that respondent Flores was negligent in
forwarding to the OCC the records of the case which was still pending; and
5)
failing to set, for an unreasonable length of time, the
hearing of five cases.
In her Comment dated
With respect to the records of two (2)
pending cases, respondent
Complainant Judge Caguioa presented as
witness retired Judge Benito Dacanay who, while
admitting having signed the certification adverted to above, nonetheless
denied so authorizing Atty. Flores to bring the armalite rifle to her house.
In
his report, the Investigating Justice recommended the dismissal of the case
against respondent Atty. Flores on the strength of the following premised
observations:
1.
Atty.
Flores’ explanation bearing on the latter’s act of bringing home, for
safekeeping, an armalite rifle submitted
in evidence in a pending criminal case is satisfactory.
2.
She cannot be held accountable for the purchase of
a piece of land once the subject of a pending case in her court (Br.4). As
explained by respondent
3.
The charge that respondent Flores had
brought home records of two ( 2) cases and keeping the records of one case for
almost 9 months after the case was submitted for resolution and that of another
case which she returned, together with her draft summary of the evidence, 18
months later, forwarding to the OCC the records of a case that was still
pending and failure to set 5 cases for hearing for an unreasonable length of
time, would reflect more on Judge Caguioa’s court management. A more systematic
management and control of the court by complainant judge could have avoided the
very acts he has complained of.
The recommendation and the premises
holding it together commend themselves for concurrence. Indeed, respondent
IN
VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RULES, as
follows:
1. In A. M. NO. RTJ-05-1925 - Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa, et al. vs. Judge Antonio C. Reyes:
The complaint of Grace F.
Munsayac C. De Villa, et al.
against Judge Antonio C. Reyes is, for
insufficiency of evidence, DISMISSED.
2. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1926 - Ramon K. Ilusorio vs.
Judge Antonio C. Reyes,
Judge Antonio C. Reyes is FINED in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) and WARNED
that a repetition of similar acts complained of shall be dealt with more
severely.
3. In A.M.
No. RTJ 05-1927 - Judge Ruben C.
Ayson v. RTC Judges of
a.
Judge Clarence J. Villanueva is found GUILTY of immorality and is DISMISSED
from the service, with prejudice to his reinstatement or appointment to any
public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and forfeiture
of retirement benefits, if any, except accrued leave credits.
b.
Judge Abraham B. Borreta, Judge
Amado S. Caguioa
and Judge Antonio M. Esteves are,
for engaging in a friendly game of “pusoy” in court premises, each FINED in the amount of Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) and WARNED against a repetition of such
improper conduct. The complaint for gambling insofar as Judge Clarence Villanueva is concerned is DISMISSED.
The
complaint against all the respondent judges for drinking is DISMISSED.
c. Judge Amado S. Caguioa is FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) for not strictly adhering to the prescription of
Supreme Court Circular No. 12 dated
d. The complaint against Judge Antonio C. Reyes insofar
as it charges him for assigning to himself a case without benefit of raffle is DISMISSED.
e. The complaint insofar as it charges Judge Edilberto Claravall for conduct unbecoming a
judge is DISMISSED.
4. In A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1928 - Judge Clarence J. Villanueva vs. Judge Ruben C. Ayson:
The complaint of Judge Clarence
Villanueva against Judge Ruben C. Ayson is DISMISSED
for insufficiency of evidence.
5. In
A.M.
No. RTJ-05-1929 - Judge Ruben C.
Ayson vs. Judge Abraham B. Borreta:
Judge Abraham B. Borreta is, for violation
of the injunction prescribed under Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct,
in relation to SC Administrative Circular No. 5, FINED
in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) and WARNED to be more discreet in his private and business activities.
6. In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1930 - Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza-Flores
vs. Judge Amado S. Caguioa:
The complaint of Atty. Cristeta R.
Caluza-Flores against Judge Amado S. Caguioa is DISMISSED.
7. In A.M. No. P-05-2020 - Hon. Amado S. Caguioa vs. Atty. Cristeta
R. Caluza-Florez:
The complaint of Judge Caguioa against his
clerk of court, Atty. Cristeta R. Caluza–Flores, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
|
REYNATO S. PUNO Associate
Justice
|
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate
Justice
|
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Justice
|
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate
Justice
|
|
ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate
Justice
|
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate
Justice
|
|
RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice |
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice |
|
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate
Justice
|
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate
Justice
|
|
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice |
|
CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice |
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice |
[1] CA Rollo, Vol. l, pp. 131-135.
[2]
[3] CA Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 43-56.
[4] CA Rollo, Vol. 1, pp. 213 et seq.
[5] CA Rollo, Vol. III, p. 451.
[6] CA Record, Vol. I, p. 65.
[7] SEC. 8. Imprisonment until order obeyed.- When the contempt consists in the refusal or omission to do an act which is yet in the power of the respondent to perform, he may be imprisoned by order of the court until he performs it.
[8] Alcaraz v. Lindo, MTJ-04-1539,
[9] Cortes v. Chico-Nazario, A.M. No.
SB-04-11-J,
[10] Cruz v. Alino-Hormachuelos, A.M. No.
CA-04-38,
[11] Exh. “22-A”-Reyes.
[12] CA Rollo, Vol. IV, 125 et seq.
[13] CA Rollo, Vol. IV, p. 143.
[14] CA Rollo, Vol. VII, pp. 19 et seq.
[15] Judge Lacurom v. Magbanua, A.M. No.
P-02-1646,
[16] Balderama
v. Alagar, RTJ-99-1449,
[17] Malaggan
v. Mabazza, A.M. No. P-01-1493,
[18] Bangco
v. Gatdula, MTJ-00-1297,
[19] Sec. 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
[20] Adm. Matter No. RTJ-90-447;
[21] A.M.
No. 97-2-53 RTC,
[22] CA
Rollo, Vol.
VI, p. 68.
[23] Rollo,
Vol. I, p. 16.
[24] CA Rollo,
Vol. I, p. 167.
[25] CA Rollo, Vol. I, p 48.
[26] A.M.
No. RTJ-99-1431,
[27] A.M.
No. RTJ-02-1677,
[28] Prohibits Clerks of Court from collecting compensation for services rendered as commissioners in ex-parte proceedings; CA Rollo, Vol. I, p. 190.
[29] CA Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 353-355.
[30] SEC. 2 Proceedings to be recorded.- The entire proceedings of a trial or hearings … shall be recorded by means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found suitable by the court. A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (Rule 132, Rules of Court).
[31] CA Record, Vol. I, pp. 503 et seq.
[32] CA Record, Vol. III, p. 506 et seq.
[33]
[34] CA Rollo, Vol. IV, pp. 65-67.
[35] Berin,
et al. v. Judge Felix P. Barte, A.M.
No. MTJ-02-1443,
[36] CA Rollo, Vo. VII, pp. 222-223.
[37] Misajon
v. Feranil, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1872,
[38] which
prohibits “Justices, judges, xxx clerks of superior and inferior courts, xxx,”
from acquiring by purchase, xxx xxx xxx, either in person or through the
mediation of another;