FIRST
DIVISION
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JAIME O. SEVILLA,
Petitioner, - versus
- CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, Respondent. |
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G.R. No. 167684 Present: PANGANIBAN, C.J. Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO,
SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ. Promulgated: July 31, 2006 |
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CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the
Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated
In a Complaint[3]
dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before
the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter’s
father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines,
he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a
certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed
Minister of the Gospel. On the said
date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage
contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a
marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these
allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on
The trial court made the following
findings:
In support of his complaint,
plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on
Atty. Jose M. Abola,
then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was
engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of
his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan
where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the
Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was
celebrated. His request letters dated
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas
testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they
met and were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to
join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to
lose her, asked her to run away with him to
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter’s expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. “9” and “10”).
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant’s sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff’s family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn’t know that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the
defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with
defendant and in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce
each other; that when he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the
United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. “13”), it was
with the knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain
Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p.
21). During his adverse testimony,
plaintiff identified a recent certification dated
In its Decision dated
Thus, being one of
the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence
of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown
under the various certifications (Exhs. “I”, “E”, and
“C”) earlier issued by the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. “EE”) that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the
marriage contracts executed on
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and information.[7]
Carmelita filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: “The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive.”
In this case, We note that a certain
Perlita Mercader of
the local civil registry of
x x x x
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties’ marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.[8]
Jaime filed a Motion for
Reconsideration dated
This denial gave rise to the present
Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for
Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3.
Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption
of validity of a marriage arising from the admitted “fact of marriage.”[9]
At the core of this controversy is the
determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan
stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage
contract of the parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as
null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and
rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which
was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles
53,[10]
58[11]
and 80.[12]
Based on the foregoing provisions, a
marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is
of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very
well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on
the ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued
by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño[13]:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that
the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and
not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications
issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in
the earlier case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[14]
where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued
by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does
not exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the
register despite diligent search. Such
certification shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated
in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We
shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the
foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification[15]
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,[16] we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification[17]
was dated
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,[18]
issued on
TO
WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This
is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated
This
is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our
Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This
certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for
whatever legal intent it may serve.
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications
bear the statement that “hope
and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem.” It could be easily
implied from the said statement that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of
Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its “loaded work.” Likewise, both certifications failed to state
with absolute certainty whether or not such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the
testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader,
who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person
in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was
not presented in evidence. It does not
appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or
missing, or that his testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to
locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As
testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
x x x x
COURT
Why don’t you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or not?
A The
employee handling it is already retired, sir.[19]
Given the documentary and testimonial
evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the
presumption of regularity of performance of official function by the Local
Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),[20]
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed is among the disputable presumptions.
In one case,
it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.[21]
The presumption of regularity of
official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty.[22]
The presumption of regularity of
performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other
evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively
defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook
is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the
case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts
to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the
same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that
every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.[23] The courts look upon this presumption with
great favor. It is not to be lightly
repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.[24]
The Court is mindful of the policy of
the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved
in favor of the validity of the marriage.[25]
The parties have comported themselves
as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two offsprings,[26]
now adults themselves. It took Jaime
several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual
sometime in 1991.[27] We are not ready to reward petitioner by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the
process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.[28]
Our
Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. Our family law is
based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social
institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on
good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.[29]
“The
basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x
x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a
civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption
or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order
of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as
being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law. A presumption established by our
Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.’ Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio –
Always presume marriage.”[30]
This
jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.[31]
By our failure to come to the succor
of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,[32] regrettably, there are situations like
this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to
every individual problem.
Wherefore,
premises considered, the
instant Petition is DEnied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
SO
ORDERED.
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MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIOAssociate Justice |
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
Associate Justice Associate
Justice
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ROMEO J.
CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice |
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Pursuant to Article VIII,
Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in
the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V.
PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.
[2] Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.
[3] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.
[4]
[5]
[6] Rollo, pp. 47-50.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10] ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
[11] ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[12] ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.
[13] G.R. No. 132529,
[14] G.R. No. 103047,
[15] Records,
Vol. I, p. 103.
[16] Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter requesting for the issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
[17]
[18] Records, Vol. II, p. 888.
[19]
[20] Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS
x x x x
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. – The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence;
x x x x
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
[21] People
v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025,
[22] Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).
[23] Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).
[24] Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.
[25] Republic
v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498,
[26] Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN,
[27]
[28] Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).
[29] Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, 4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.
[30] Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).
[31]
[32] G.R. No. 158896,