FIRST DIVISION
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 166556
INSURANCE SYSTEM,
Petitioner, Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.,
Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
LUZ M. BAUL, Promulgated:
Respondent.
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CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us
is a petition for review on certiorari to
set aside the May 31, 2004 Decision[1]
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 which reversed the
Decision[2]
of the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. GM-12984-202 denying
the claim for compensation benefits of Luz M. Baul under Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 626, as amended.
Luz M. Baul
was employed by the Department of Education and Culture and Sports (DECS),
Tarlac South District, as an elementary school teacher on
Medical
records show that due to extreme dizziness, headache, chest pain, slurred
speech, vomiting and general body weakness, she was admitted to the St. Martin
de Porres Hospital inside Hacienda Luisita, San Miguel, Tarlac from
On
Convinced
that her hypertension supervened by reason and in the course of her employment with
the DECS and persisted even after her retirement, she filed a claim on June 10,
1999 before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Tarlac Branch, for
disability and hospital medical benefits under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
626, as amended.[7]
On
In its
Luz filed a petition for review with
the CA for the reversal of the ECC decision.
On
The ECC
filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[11] which the CA denied.[12]
The GSIS, now petitioner, sought
relief in this Court via a petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner insists
that the ruling of the CA rests on mere presumptions, and points out that an
award of disability benefits cannot depend on surmises and conjectures. The
beneficiary must present evidence to prove that the illness was caused by
employment or that the working conditions increased the risk of contracting the
disease. Also, there is no showing that respondent’s ailment is at all
considered permanent partial or total disability by the GSIS and approved by
the ECC medical groups.
Petitioner
also claims that the Court must respect the findings of quasi-judicial agencies
entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under their special
technical knowledge and training. In this case, respondent failed to file the
claim before retirement and adduce evidence to prove compensability of her
illness; there was no such finding of permanent partial or total disability at
the time of her retirement. Moreover, her sickness, which developed after her
retirement, could not be attributed to her former occupation but to factors
independent thereof.
The petition is denied.
Cerebro-vascular accident and
essential hypertension are considered as occupational diseases under Nos. 19
and 29, respectively, of Annex “A” of the Implementing Rules of P.D. No. 626,
as amended. Thus, it is not necessary that there be proof of causal relation
between the work and the illness which resulted in the respondent’s disability.
The open-ended Table of Occupational Diseases requires no proof of causation.
In general, a covered claimant suffering from an occupational disease is
automatically paid benefits.[13]
However, although cerebro-vascular
accident and essential hypertension are listed occupational diseases, their
compensability requires compliance with all the conditions set forth in the
Rules. In short, both are qualified
occupational diseases. For cerebro-vascular accident, the claimant must prove the
following: (1) there must be a history, which should be proved, of trauma at
work (to the head specifically) due to unusual and extraordinary physical or
mental strain or event, or undue exposure to noxious gases in industry; (2)
there must be a direct connection between the trauma or exertion in the course
of the employment and the cerebro-vascular attack; and (3) the trauma or
exertion then and there caused a brain hemorrhage. On the other hand, essential
hypertension is compensable only if it causes impairment of function of body
organs like kidneys, heart, eyes and brain, resulting in permanent disability, provided
that, the following documents substantiate it: (a) chest X-ray report; (b) ECG
report; (c) blood chemistry report; (d) funduscopy report; and (e) C-T scan.
The degree of proof required to
validate the concurrence of the above-mentioned conditions under P.D. No. 626
is merely substantial evidence, that is, such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. What the law requires is
a reasonable work-connection and not direct causal relation. It is enough that
the hypothesis on which the workmen’s claim is based is probable.[14] As
correctly pointed out by the CA, probability, not the ultimate degree of
certainty, is the test of proof in compensation proceedings.[15] For, in interpreting
and carrying out the provisions of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations, the primordial and paramount consideration is the employee’s
welfare. To safeguard the worker’s rights, any doubt as to the proper
interpretation and application must be resolved in their favor.[16]
In the instant case, medical reports
and drug prescriptions of respondent’s attending physicians sufficiently
support her claim for disability benefits. Neither the GSIS nor the ECC
convincingly deny their genuineness and due execution. The reports are made
part of the record and there is no showing that they are false or erroneous, or
resorted to as a means of deceiving the Court, hence, are entitled to due
probative weight. The failure of respondent to submit to a full medical examination,
as required by the rules, to substantiate her essential hypertension, is of no
moment. The law is that laboratory
reports such as X-ray and ECG are not indispensable prerequisites to
compensability,[17] the reason
being that the strict rules of evidence need not be observed in claims for
compensation.[18] Medical
findings of the attending physician may be received in evidence and used as
proof of the fact in dispute.[19] The doctor’s
certification as to the nature of claimant’s disability may be given credence
as he or she normally would not make untruthful certification. Indeed, no
physician in his right mind and who is aware of the far reaching and serious
effect that his or her statements would cause on a money claim against a
government agency would vouch indiscriminately without regarding his own
interests and protection.[20]
Significantly, even medical
authorities have established that the exact etiology of essential hypertension
cannot be accurately traced:
The term essential
hypertension has been employed to indicate those cases of hypertension for
which a specific endocrine or renal basis cannot be found, and in which the
neural element may be only a mediator of other influences. Since even this
latter relationship is not entirely clear, it is more properly listed for the
moment in the category of unknown
etiology. The term essential hypertension defines simply by failing to define;
hence, it is of limited use except as an expression of our inability to
understand adequately the forces at work.[21]
It bears
stressing, however, that medical experiments tracing the etiology of essential
hypertension show that there is a relationship between the sickness and the
nature and conditions of work.[22] In this jurisdiction, we have already ruled in
a number of cases[23] the strenuous office of a public
school teacher. The case of Makabali v.
Employees’ Compensation Commission,[24] which we
have re-affirmed in the subsequent cases of De
Vera v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,[25] Antiporda v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,[26] and De la Torre
v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,[27] amply
summarized, thus:
We are well aware of the
fact that only a handful of public elementary school teachers are fortunate
enough to be assigned in urban areas where the working conditions are
comparatively much better than those in the rural areas. A large majority of
public elementary school teachers, as in the case of the petitioner, work in
remote places such as sitios and barrios under poor working conditions. Thus,
the daily task of conducting classes (normally composed of 40 to 50 pupils in
urban areas and up to 70 pupils in rural areas) in an atmosphere that is, by
any standard, not conducive to learning becomes even more physically taxing to
the teachers. Tremendous amount of paper work during and after office hours
(from correcting examination papers, assignments, school projects and reports
to writing lesson plans and the computation and recording of grades) can be
very physically draining especially to the senior members of the teaching
profession such as the petitioner. Such and other related school activities of
a teacher, aggravated by substandard, if not adverse, working conditions, give
rise to increased tension, if not emotional and psychological disturbance on
the part of the teachers. This is especially true in the case of public
elementary school teachers whose pupils, being of tender age and immature, need
to be disciplined and to be taught good manners and right conduct, as well as
to be assisted in their formal school lessons
[We] must not also neglect
to mention the fact that public elementary school teachers are the lowest paid
government workers, considering the nature and importance of the services they
render. They are the most reliable and dedicated public servants being
constantly called upon by officials of the local and national government to
assist in various extra-curricular and civic activities which contribute to the
welfare of the community and the country. Their responsibility in molding the
values and character of the young generations of the country, cannot be
overestimated.
Significantly, even Republic
Act No. 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers,
mandates in one of its provisions that 'teachers shall be protected against the
consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects
of the physical and nervous strain on the teacher's health shall be recognized
as compensable occupational diseases in accordance with existing laws.’
(Calvero v. ECC, et al., 117 SCRA 462 [1982].[28]
The fact
that the essential hypertension of respondent worsened and resulted in a CVA at
the time she was already out of service is inconsequential. The main
consideration for its compensability is that her illness was contracted during
and by reason of her employment, and any non-work related factor that
contributed to its aggravation is immaterial.[29]
Indeed, an
employee’s disability may not manifest fully at one precise moment in time but
rather over a period of time. It is possible that an injury which at first was
considered to be temporary may later on become permanent or one who suffers a
partial disability becomes totally and permanently disabled from the same
cause.[30] The right
to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and proximately
and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury
is shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an
independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or
misconduct. Simply stated, all medical consequences that flow from the primary
injury are compensable.[31]
P.D. No.
626, as amended, is said to have abandoned the presumption of compensability
and the theory of aggravation prevalent under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Nonetheless,
we ruled in Employees’ Compensation Commission
v. Court of Appeals,[32] that:
Despite the abandonment of
the presumption of compensability established by the old law, the present law
has not ceased to be an employees' compensation law or a social legislation;
hence, the liberality of the law in favor of the working man and woman still
prevails, and the official agency charged by law to implement the
constitutional guarantee of social justice should adopt a liberal attitude in
favor of the employee in deciding claims for compensability, especially in
light of the compassionate policy towards labor which the 1987 Constitution
vivifies and enhances. Elsewise stated, a humanitarian impulse, dictated by no
less than the Constitution itself under the social justice policy, calls for a
liberal and sympathetic approach to legitimate appeals of disabled public
servants; or that all doubts to the right to compensation must be resolved in
favor of the employee or laborer. Verily, the policy is to extend the
applicability of the law on employees’ compensation to as many employees who
can avail of the benefits thereunder.[33]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76461 is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO
YNARES-
Associate Justice Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the
Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso, with Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and
Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo,
pp. 40-49.
[2] Approved on
[3] CA rollo, pp. 28-31.
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13] Orate v. Court of Appeals, 447 Phil 654,
662 (2003); Quizon v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 87590, November 12, 1991, 203 SCRA 426,
433; Rodriguez v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. 46454, September 28, 1989, 178 SCRA 30, 33; Raro vs. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
G.R. No. 58445, April 27, 1989, 172 SCRA 845, 851; Sarmiento v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-65680,
[14] Castor-Garupa v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. 158268,
[15] Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, G.R. No. 158846, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 639, 646, citing Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 123891, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 47, 53.
[16] Quizon v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, supra note 13, at 434.
[17]
See Guillen v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, No.
[18] Castor-Garupa v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. 158268, April 12, 2006; Rodriguez v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, supra note 13, at
33; and De Jesus v. Employees’
Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-56191,
[19] Romero v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,
No. L-42617,
[20] Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, supra note 15, at 646; Ijares v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil 9, 20 (1999); Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132648, March 4, 1999, 304 SCRA 243, 250-251; Loot v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 86994, June 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 54, 59-60; Bejerano v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 84777, January 30, 1992, 205 SCRA 598, 603-604; Vicente v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 85024, January 23, 1991, 193 SCRA 190, 196; and Abaya v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. 64255, August 16, 1989, 176 SCRA 507, 511.
[21] Naval v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
G.R. No. 83568,
[22] De la Torre v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, No. L-69491,
[23]
See Government Service Insurance System v. Cuanang, supra note 15, at 647;
Librea v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. 58879, November 14, 1991, 203 SCRA 545, 552; Naval v. Employees’ Compensation Commission,
G.R. No. 83568, July 18, 1991, 199 SCRA 388, 394; Panotes v. Employees’ Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-64802,
[24]
G.R. No. L-51533,
[25] G.R.
No. L-48669,
[26] G.R.
No. L-43031,
[27] Supra note 22, at 110-113.
[28] Makabali v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. L-51533,
[29] De la Torre v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, No. L-69491,
[30] Social Security Commission v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 152058, September 27, 2004, 439 SCRA 239, 258; Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil 357, 363 (1998); and Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116015, July 31, 1996, 260 SCRA 133, 139.
[31] Belarmino v. Employees’ Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. 90204, May 11, 1990, 185 SCRA 304, 308-309, citing Enriquez v. Workmen's Compensation
Commission, G.R. No. L-42640,
[32] G.R.
No. 121545,
[33]