FIRST DIVISION
CARLOS C. FUENTES, G.R. No. 164664
Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,
SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO,
JJ.
HON.
SANDIGANBAYAN,
Second
Division, HON. SIMEON
V.
MARCELO, Ombudsman, Promulgated:
EUSEBIO M. AVILA, JR.,
Special Prosecution Officer,
Office
Of the Ombudsman, GERRY
MORALES and FRANCISCO
S. JIMENEZ, JR.,
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for the nullification of the Resolution[1]
of the Sandiganbayan (Second
Division) in Criminal Case No. 27518 granting the motion of the Special
Prosecutor for leave to withdraw the Information for want of probable cause to
file the same, as well as the Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Carlos Fuentes.
Petitioner was
the sales representative of the Davao Toyozu, Inc., a corporation with offices
in P1,710,000.00
for the purchase of six mini dump trucks.[3] In May 2001, Davao Toyozu, Inc., through petitioner,
delivered the six trucks which were duly accepted by the Municipality after
inspection.[4] The price
of four of the six units was then fully paid.
In the meantime,
Gerry[5] J.
Morales was elected Mayor of the Municipality and assumed office in July 2001.
Municipal Budget Officer Bill Rojas, Accountant Emeritos M. Jovilla, and
Municipal Treasurer Francisco Jimenez, Jr. approved a Request for Obligation of
Allotment[6]
for P274,377.27, the price of one of the two still unpaid mini dump trucks.
Jovilla certified that unobligated allotments were available, Rojas certified to
the existence of the appropriation for the expenditure, while Jimenez certified to the availability of funds. However, Morales refused to approve the request.[7]
Morales also refused to approve the disbursement voucher for the expenditure which
Jovilla had approved.[8]
The Municipality,
through petitioner, had also entered into a contract with East Lambajon Trading
for the rental of one bulldozer and the leveling of Sitio Dalingding, Barangay
Kinablangan, Baganga, for P57,991.77. This transaction was approved by
Engr. Fedelito Rabuya, the Baganga General Foreman, and Mayor Remegio Nazareno.[9] The undertaking was completed and duly
accepted, as evidenced by the Certificate of Completion and Acceptance[10]
signed by Rabuya, Barangay Captain
Bonifacio Ignacio and Mayor Remegio Nazareno. Rabuya, Jovilla, Rojas and
Jimenez approved the Request for Obligation of Allotment for the specified amount,[11] and
the Disbursement Voucher.[12]
Mayor Remegio Nazareno approved the Disbursement Voucher. However, Mayor
Morales refused to authorize the release of the amount.
The Municipality had also entered
into a contract with East Lambajon Trading/Carlos Fuentes for a two-day
quarrying (bulldozing works) at Sitio Mahug, Barangay Ban-ao, Baganga for P20,358.78. The project was
completed per specification and duly accepted by the Municipality, as evidenced
by the Certificate of Completion and Acceptance signed by Rabuya, Ignacio and
Nazareno. Jovilla, Rojas and Rabuya approved the Request for Obligation of
Allotment and Disbursement Voucher for the amount, but Jimenez refused to do
so.[13] Thus, Morales and Jimenez refused to allow
the disbursement of the amount and its remittance to the East Lambajon
Trading.
On
Petitioner thereafter executed an
Affidavit-Complaint[15] against Morales and Jimenez and all other responsible
officers of the Municipality charging them administratively of having violated Section
3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, and filed the same in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In a letter dated
Morales submitted his
counter-affidavit in which he alleged that he assumed office as Municipal Mayor
of the
In
his Counter-Affidavit, Jimenez alleged that the payment for the two remaining
dump trucks was expected sometime in September 2001, during which payment could
not be effected because the complainant withdrew his claim from the General Services
Section of the Municipal Treasurer. The
complainant likewise withdrew his claim for the payment of the bulldozing
services on
been withdrawn. He also alleged that the new Municipal Mayor could not be
blamed for the non-payment of the three because it was only in July 2001 when
the new municipal assumed office, and the claims had
to be reviewed by them. He also averred that there were also defects in the two
claims for the bulldozing works. The Municipal Mayor should also be the signatories
on both Requests for Obligation of Allotment, and the Disbursement Vouchers, as
he is the administrator of the fund to which the project had been charged, not
the Project Development Officer I of the Municipal Planning and Development
Office. According to Jimenez corrective acts could have been executed to both
claims if only the complainant had not withdrawn the same. He assured that as soon as the claims were resubmitted
and duly corrected, the final payment would be forwarded to petitioner.
In reply, petitioner alleged that the
defense of Morales and Jimenez was made as an afterthought. His lawyer
already sent a demand letter as early as
Petitioner also pointed out that in
other transactions which the Municipality had with other entities/individuals, the
payments were immediately received by the “brother of the Mayor,” some of which
had even occurred after the conclusion of his (petitioner’s) transactions with
the Municipality.[18]
The respondents countered by
submitting an affidavit of Bernardo Y. Arquiza, the General Manager of Davao
Toyozu, Inc., notarized by their counsel, that he had not authorized petitioner
to file the complaint against the respondents.[19] Petitioner
responded by submitting documents, including a letter from Arquiza dated
On
Thus, the prosecuting Ombudsman filed
an Information dated
That on 4 July 2001, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto in the Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, Gerry J.
Morales, a high-ranking public officer being the Municipal Mayor of the
Municipality of Baganga, Davao Oriental, and Francisco S. Jimenez, Jr.,
Municipal Treasurer of the same municipality, both while in the performance of
their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their office,
taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring and confederating with
each other acting with evident bad faith, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally cause undue injury to complainant Carlos C. Fuentes,
by refusing to pay his claims/transactions, lawfully and legally incurred by
the municipality, despite having complied
with all the pertinent documents required to support his claims in the total
amount of P351,736.05, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[22]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,
which the Ombudsman denied. This prompted respondents to file a Motion for Reinvestigation
dated P570,000.00. However, while the
Municipality was willing and capable of paying its obligations, payment could
not be effected because petitioner withdrew all the vouchers and other
pertinent documents from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer. Respondents
pointed out that petitioner failed to refute this statement, and that the
Ombudsman had hastily resolved the case without even furnishing a copy to their
counsel of record.[23]
On
On
In the meantime, in a Letter dated
|
Date |
Particulars |
Check No. |
Amount (Net of VAT) |
|
|
Dozing
work of Sitio Mahug |
PNB-Mati
#52921 |
|
|
|
Dozing
work Rehab of Dalingding Road |
PNB-Mati
#52920 |
========= |
|
|
|
Total |
|
Petitioner was also requested to
claim the checks from the cashier along with the appropriate official receipts.
Petitioner failed to claim the checks.
Thus, in a Letter dated
The Municipal Treasurer replaced the
checks on
On
Based on his review of the Report of
the State Auditors and petitioner’s Comment thereon, Special Prosecutor Avila submitted
a Memorandum to the Ombudsman recommending that the Information against the
accused be withdrawn for lack of sufficient evidence as shown by the following findings:
(1) there was no evident bad faith in this case since the accused had valid
reasons for refusing to pay petitioner’s money claims of P351,736.05,
which was confirmed in the audit’s findings; (2) the acquisition of the six
dump trucks “was not a valid transaction
considering that the Disbursement Vouchers (DVs) covering payments thereof are
not supported by complete documentation. Evaluation of the available documents
attached to DVs revealed some inherent technical defects and irregularities in
the issuance of the Purchase Order (P.O.) and submission of bidding documents
by Davao Toyozu, Inc.”; and, (4) the bulldozing work contracts were likewise
not valid as they were not supported by the proper documents and no public
bidding was conducted. Thus, according to
The Ombudsman approved the
recommendation of the Special Prosecution Officer. Thus, a Motion for Leave to Withdraw the
Information dated
Petitioner opposed the motion.
On
Petitioner received a copy of the
resolution on
Petitioner alleges that:
A. THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ACTING THROUGH SPECIAL
PROSECUTION OFFICER II EUSEBIO M. AVILA, SR. GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN
IT SOUGHT THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE INFORMATION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS RESULTING
TO (sic) THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.
B. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, SECOND DIVISION SERIOUSLY
ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT GRANTED THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE
INFORMATION AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS AS SOUGHT BY THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
RESULTING TO THE DISMISSAL OF THE CASE.[30]
Petitioner argues that
the Prosecution is not bound by the findings and recommendations of the State
Auditors; after all, the Ombudsman had found probable cause against respondents
after the requisite preliminary investigation.
He insists that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman
is distinct and separate from the special audit conducted by the State Auditors;
hence, the outcome of the State Auditors’ investigation is not determinative of
the absence or existence of probable cause against respondents.
Petitioner
reiterates that his withdrawal of the documents evidencing his claims was not
the paramount reason for non-payment of his claims – it was the alleged
non-availability of funds. However, the documents on record show that there
were available funds. If there were any defects OR irregularities and
deficiencies relative to the transactions involved as found by the State Auditors,
the persons solely liable are the municipal officials alone for failing to act thereon.
Petitioner
further points out that there was delay in the payment of his claims, and that
such payment constitutes an admission of respondents’ criminal liability.
Moreover, the fact that his complaints were eventually paid does not extinguish
their incipient criminal liability.
Petitioner
asserts that the defects and deficiencies adverted to by the State Auditors
should be ventilated during the trial and cannot be used as basis for the
withdrawal of the Information. He claims
that he sustained undue injury, that is, the unnecessary expenses he incurred
related to the subsequent transactions and the collection of his claims, such
as litigation expenses. He admits that while the consequential undue injury
cannot be ascertained yet, this has yet to be proven during the trial of the
case. In any event, proof of the extent
or quantum of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury
suffered or benefit received can be perceived substantial enough and not merely
negligible. He insists that he would not have sustained undue injury if the
private respondents/accused had only acted accordingly and paid his just and
valid claims on time.[31] He avers that the respondents and the
Sandiganbayan cannot rely on the ruling of this Court in Llorente[32] because of the divergent factual
setting therein.
The issues are the following: (1)
whether a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy of the petitioner to
question the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan; and (2) whether the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction
in granting the Special Prosecutor’s motion to withdraw the Information against
respondents Morales and Jimenez based principally on the Special Audit Report
of the State Auditors.
On the first issue, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is inappropriate. It bears stressing that the
resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan granting the motion of the Special
Prosecutor for leave to withdraw the Information and ordering the case
dismissed without prejudice is final because it disposed of the case and
terminated the proceedings therein, leaving nothing to be done with it by the
court.[33] Thus, the proper remedy is to file a petition
for review with this Court under Rule 45 on a question of law. The pertinent
provision reads:
SECTION 1. Filing
of petition with Supreme Court. – A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Court or other courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the
Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition
shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
Thus,
because he had the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, petitioner is proscribed from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The
availability of the remedy of appeal, which is likewise speedy and adequate, constitutes
a bar to the filing of a certiorari action
under Rule 65.
While
the Court may consider a petition for certiorari
as a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court in exceptional cases, Section 2 provides that such
petition must be filed within the prescribed period, thus:
SEC.
2. Time for filing; extension. – The
petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or
final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner’s
motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the
judgment. On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the
reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an
extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.
Indubitably, the petition, even if
considered as petition for review, was time-barred. This is so because petitioner received the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying his motion for reconsideration on
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the
records and find that even on its merits the instant petition is destined to
fail.
The rule is that as far as crimes
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan are concerned, the determination of probable
cause during the preliminary investigation, or reinvestigation for that matter,
is a function that belongs to the Special Prosecutor, an integral part of the
Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman is
empowered to determine, in the exercise of his discretion, whether probable
cause exists, and to charge the person believed to have committed the crime as
defined by law. Whether or not the
Ombudsman has correctly discharged his function, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct assessment of the
evidence of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court may not
be compelled to pass upon. Thus, in Crespo
v. Mogul,[35] the Court ruled:
It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the
direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action
depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended
party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not
to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for
placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal
is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. x x x
Prosecuting officers under the power vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the
duty of prosecuting persons who, according to the evidence received from the
complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime committed within the
jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to prosecute
when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie
case.[36]
As a rule, courts should not
interfere with the Ombudsman’s investigatory power, exercised through the
Special Prosecutor, and the authority to determine the presence or absence of
probable cause, except when the finding is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[37] In
such case, the aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.[38] Indeed,
if the Ombudsman does not take essential facts into consideration in the
determination of probable cause, there is abuse of discretion.[39] As
we ruled in Mendoza-Arce v. Office of the
Ombudsman (Visayas),[40] a writ
of certiorari may issue in any of the following instances:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of
justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess
of authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust or vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that
ground has been denied.[41]
On
the other hand, if the Special Prosecutor files a motion to dismiss the case or
motion for leave to file a motion to withdraw the Information after a
reinvestigation authorized by the court, the resolution of such motion rests on
the sound discretion of the trial court.
The anti-graft court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the
case before it, and may grant or deny the motion. As we held in Crespo v. Mogul:[42]
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the
fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases
even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the
trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case
before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to
the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if
this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of
Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.[43]
In a case where a motion is filed by
the Prosecution for leave to withdraw the Information on the ground that, after
a reinvestigation previously authorized by the court, no probable cause exists
as against the accused, the court may deny or grant the motion based on its own
independent assessment of the result of the reinvestigation submitted by the
Prosecution to the trial court. The
court may deny or grant such motion, not out of subservience to the Special
Prosecutor, but in the faithful exercise of judicial discretion and
prerogative.[44]
In
this case, the Sandiganbayan granted the Special Prosecutor’s motion and
dismissed the case based on its own assessment of the report of the State Auditors,
and on the Special Prosecutor’s finding that there is no probable cause for the
prosecution of respondents for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019,
particularly the absence of bad faith on the part of the respondents and undue
injury on the part of the petitioner. In its Resolution, the Sandiganbayan made
it clear that the dismissal of the case was without prejudice to the filing of
the proper charges, if warranted by the evidence. In fine, respondents Morales and Jimenez not
excluding petitioner, could still be indicted, if the evidence so warrants, for
a crime or crimes other than those defined in Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.
According to the State Auditors,
respondents Morales and Jimenez should
not entertain petitioner’s claims not only because the latter’s transactions
with the Municipality were defective and irregular, but were in fact illegal. Respondents and the other municipal officials
should have been firm in their decision to withhold the payment of petitioner’s
claims based on the following reasons. As
the State Auditors stated in their Report:
E. The validity of the claim of the Municipal
Treasurer Francisco S. Jimenez, Jr. that Carlos Fuentes withdrew from the
office of the former the claim documents for the two aforesaid (a and b)
transactions which resulted in the delay of the processing of payment.
Records show that the disbursement vouchers and
available documents related thereto were withdrawn by Mr. Carlos Fuentes
(Annexes L, M and N) from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Baganga,
Davao Oriental, to wit:
|
Payee |
Transaction |
Amount Withdrawn |
Date |
|
1. East Lambajon Trading/ Carlos Fuentes |
Dozing work/repair/ rehabilitation of |
|
|
|
2. East Lamajon Trading |
Dozing
work of Sitio Mahug Brgy. Road, Brgy. Bana-ao |
20,358.78 |
|
|
3.
Davao Toyozu, Inc. |
Partial
Payment for purchase of six (6) units dump truck (equivalent to one (1) unit |
274,377.27 |
|
The concerned local officials should have been firm in
their decision of withholding the payments based on the following issues, viz:
1. Withdrawals of vouchers with related available
documents without returning of the same despite demand thereof; and
2. Incomplete documentation and other
irregularities/deficiencies observed which should have been pointed out to the
complaining parties to effect their correction/completion or having initiated
the same by themselves before payment was to be made.
F. The validity of the payment made by the P570,000.00.
As discussed in Items A and C.1, the validity of
payment made by the P570,000.00
less withholding tax of P21,245.45 could not be considered valid as this
was based on insufficient and defective documents.[45]
These findings confirmed the
correctness of the respondent’s intial refusal to pay petitioner’s claims,
initially because the latter had withdrawn the pertinent vouchers and documents.
Without the documents, respondents could not ascertain whether petitioner’s
claims were in accord with law, rules and regulations. It bears stressing that respondents had been
insisting all along that petitioner’s claims would be paid, provided that said
claims are determined lawful.
For the respondents to be criminally
liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the injury sustained by
petitioner must have been caused by positive or passive acts of manifest
partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[46]
Since the State Auditors even recommended that respondents should not pay
petitioner’s claims due to irregularities in the transactions and the patent nullity
of the same, it cannot be said that the “injury” claimed to have been sustained
by petitioner was caused by any of respondents’ overt acts.
On hindsight, had petitioner not
withdrawn the vouchers and other documents relative to his claims from the
Office of the Municipal Treasurer on August 8 and
1. For transactions covering purchase of six (6) units
Mini Dump Truck
A. Purchase Order (Annex C) issued to Davao Toyozu,
Inc. in the amount of P1,710,000.00 did not stipulate the following
basic information, viz:
1. Office to which the delivery shall be made
2. Provision for penalty in case of late or non-delivery
3. Period of delivery
4. Other terms and conditions
The following shall clearly appear in every
purchase/letter order or contract aside from other requirements prescribed
under existing laws and regulations:
xxx;
c. office to which the delivery should be made.
xxx;
e. provisions for penalty in case of late or
non-delivery;
xxx;
g. period of delivery;
xxx
The date when the purchase/letter order was received
by the supplier or contractor shall be indicated clearly.
B. Strict compliance of the requirements in the
conduct of competitive public bidding had not been observed, to wit:
1. Bidder’s bond of P8,160.00 (Annex D) was
insufficient which is not equivalent to 5% of the bid price of P20,000.00
as required under Sec. 3 of COA Cir. No. 92-386;
2. No performance bond, equivalent to 10% of the value
of the contract or purchase order was submitted;
3. Minutes of the bidding document (Advertisement for
Bids, Annex E) which quoted the lowest/awarded price of P285,000.00 per
unit signed by one Mr. Leo Reyes, a representative of Carlos Fuentes in the
bidding (Annex F) did not bear the name of Davao Toyozu, Inc. to indicate its
official participation in the bidding process.
Neither Mr. Reyes nor Mr. Fuentes were identified as a responsible
official of Davao Toyozu, Inc. to
represent in the conduct of public bidding contrary to the provisions of Sec.
43 of COA Cir. No. 92-386 which partly states that:
Duties of Bidders. xxx
Bids
shall be signed by a responsible officer of the company or firm authorized for
the purpose whose name and designation must be clearly indicated in the bid.
[4]
Section 44 of COA Cir. No. 92-386 requires that all bids must be accompanied by
statement declaring under oath all the business establishments or interest in
the locality of the bidders. The statement shall include, among others, the
business name, business address and the nature of the business. This requirement was not complied.
[5]
The Abstract of Quotation of Bids (Annex G) did not indicate the date the
bidding was conducted and [no] action on the Award of Contract by the Committee
on Award was made.
[6]
The date of receipt of Purchase Order (PO) by the dealer/supplier.
Insufficiency
of such information in the preparation/issuance of the Purchase Order did not
comply with the provisions of Sec. 74 of COA Circular No. 92-386 dated
7.
The other participating bidders did not qualify as bona fide bidders required
under Sec. 42 of COA Cir. No. 92-382 as the existence of their business
establishments could not be ascertained.
They had not submitted any business permit/license to engage in [the] business
of selling dump trucks.
C.
The delivery of six (6) units Dump Truck was not inspected by the designated
inspector or inspection committee as no inspection report thereof is attached
to the voucher. Likewise, there was no Report of Acceptance by the designated
General Services Officer or Municipal Treasurer.
D.
There was no Inspection Report of the COA Technical Audit Specialist as to
condition and specifications of the heavy equipment delivered.
E.
Official Receipt (OR) No. 36714 of Davao Toyozu, Inc. dated P548,754.55
is not the original copy (only xerox copy is attached).[47]
Relative to the bulldozing works of
the barangay road, the State Auditors
further declared that the transactions were not supported by the following
vital documents:
1.
Contract between the
2. Pertinent documents on public bidding
conducted as basis of awarding contract to Mr. Fuentes;
3. DTI
registration of East Lambajon Trading in the name of Mr. Carlos Fuentes as a
duly-registered contractor qualified to undertake government infrastructure
projects and business license/permit to engage in the same business;
4.
Proof of existence of business establishment of East Lambajon Trading;
5.
The infrastructure projects contracted were not covered by appropriate and
duly-accomplished Project Program of Work which should include detailed
specifications. Likewise, the same
document should have been prepared by the Municipal Engineer’s Office.
6.
Transactions were not covered by any requisition document/Purchase Request;
7. Transactions under Check Nos. 12741928 for P18,841.15
and 12741929 for P53,320.91 were supported by photocopies of Request of
Obligation and Allotment (ROA) and Certificate of Completion and Acceptance
instead of original copies as these were taken by Mr. Fuentes as informed by
the Municipal Accountant (Annex H).[48]
Petitioner’s contention, that the
reinvestigation made by the Special Prosecutor was independent of the audit
made by the State Auditors during the period of February to July 2001 relative
to Criminal Case No. 27518 before the Sandiganbayan, is not correct. The fact is that the special audit conducted
by the State Auditors was to aid the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor,
in reinvestigating the case as ordered by the Sandiganbayan. The results of the
special audit would confirm whether the initial finding of probable cause for
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 against respondents was made with
basis. The ultimate objectives of the
Special Prosecutor and the State Auditors were thus congruent and complementary.
It turned out that, based on the
Report of the State Auditors, there was no probable cause for violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, hence, the need to withdraw the Information
without prejudice to an investigation of the matter by the Special Prosecutor
in order to determine whether respondents Morales and Jimenez, and other
municipal officials, including petitioner, may be criminally liable for
violation of another or other provisions of R.A. 3019.
What is worrisome is that the Assistant
Municipal Treasurer gave due course and paid the balance of petitioner’s claims
even while the State Auditors were conducting their special audit.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice
WE
CONCUR:
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of
the Court’s Division.
ARTEMIO
V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Efren N. de la Cruz, with Associate Justices Edilberto G. Sandoval and Francisco H. Villaruz, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 46-51.
[2] Rollo, p. 82.
[3]
[4]
[5] Also spelled “Jerry.”
[6] Rollo, p. 85.
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19]
[20]
[21] Per the recommendation of Special Prosecutor Officer I Eusebio M. Avila, Jr.
[22] Rollo, p. 155.
[23]
[24]
[25]
[26]
[27]
[28]
[29]
[30]
[31]
[32] Llorente, Jr .v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
122166, March 11, 1998, 287 SCRA 382.
[33] Metropolitan
[34] Kuizon v. Desierto,
G.R. Nos. 140619-24, March 9, 2001, 354 SCRA 158, 171.
[35] G.R. No. L-53373,
[36]
[37] Cabahug v. People, 426 Phil. 490, 500
(2002).
[38] Garcia-Rueda v. Pascasio, G.R. No.
118141,
[39] Sistoza v. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117, 129
(2002).
[40] 430 Phil. 101 (2002).
[41]
[42] Supra
note 34.
[43]
[44] People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
126005,
[45] Rollo, pp. 180-181.
[46] Cabrera v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 162314-17,
October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 377, 382.
[47] Rollo, pp. 176-179.
[48]