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FAUSTO R. PREYSLER, JR., Petitioner, |
G.R. No. 158141 |
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- versus - |
Present: QUISUMBING,
J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ. |
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COURT OF APPEALS and FAR EAST ENTERPRISES, INC., Respondents. |
Promulgated: July
11, 2006 |
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QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review
assails the Decision[1] dated
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Private respondent Far East
Enterprises, Inc., owns Tali Beach Subdivision. Petitioner Fausto Preysler, Jr. and his wife
owned lots therein and also two parcels of land adjacent to the
subdivision. These two parcels were
bounded on the North and West by the P10,000 for the easement of right of way but private respondent
refused it for being grossly inadequate.
Private respondent then barricaded the front gate of petitioner’s
property to prevent petitioner and his family from using the subdivision roads
to access said parcels.
The petitioner filed, with the
Regional Trial Court of Nasugbu, Batangas, a Complaint for Right of Way with
prayer for preliminary prohibitive injunction against private respondent. After due hearing, the trial court, in an
Order dated November 5, 1996, held that barricading the property to prevent the
petitioner from entering it deprived him of his ownership rights and caused irreparable
damage and injuries. It ordered herein private
respondent:
1) To remove or cause or allow the removal of the
barricade (six concrete posts) installed by it on the front gate of the
plaintiffs’ properties fronting
2) To cease,
desist and refrain from obstructing or hindering plaintiffs’ entry into and exit
from their subject properties and/or their free passage over
Accordingly, the writ of
preliminary injunction was issued on
On
For his part, the petitioner moved to
clarify the
On
1. To remove or cause or allow the removal of the
barricade (six concrete posts) installed by it on the front gate of the
plaintiffs’ properties fronting
2. To cease, desist and refrain from obstructing
or hindering plaintiffs’ (including plaintiffs’ visitors, guests,
contractors, and other persons authorized by or acting for and/or under said
plaintiffs) entry into and exit from their subject properties and/or their
free passage over Sea Cliff Drive and other connecting subdivision roads,
from and to the public highway near the gate of the Tali Beach Subdivision,
pending the termination of this litigation on the merits and/or unless a
contrary order is issued henceforth.
3. To cease, desist and refrain from hindering
or obstructing plaintiffs’ contractors, guests, visitors and other authorized
persons to bring along with them their motor vehicles, equipments, materials,
supplies, machineries and other items necessary for the needs of the
plaintiffs’ properties.
4. To
cease, desist and refrain from hindering or obstructing the plaintiffs and/or
persons authorized by them, to install electric power lines over the Tali Beach
Subdivision for plaintiffs’ electric power requirements.[4]
Private respondent filed a
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which set aside the amended
writ dated
Petitioner now comes before us claiming
that the Court of Appeals:
I
…
[GRAVELY] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING: (1) THE JOINT RESOLUTION DATED
II
… OVERSTEPPED THE BOUNDARY OF ITS AUTHORITY AND
JURISDICTION IN RESOLVING FACTUAL MATTERS, HOWEVER, ERRONEOUS, COULD NOT BE
REVIEWED UNDER THE EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF CERTIORARI BUT BY ORDINARY APPEAL,
INSTEAD OF CONFINING ITSELF TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE JOINT RESOLUTION, … THE AMENDED WRIT
OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION (MANDATORY AND PROHIBITORY), … AND THE ORDER DATED 6
MARCH 1996 DENYING THE MOTION TO RECONSIDER THE JOINT RESOLUTION….
III
…
EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION AND AUTHORITY IN SETTING ASIDE THE JOINT RESOLUTION, …
LIFTING THE AMENDED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DATED 29 DECEMBER 1998, … AND
RESTRICTING OR LIMITING PASSAGE OVER THE TALI BEACH SUBDIVISION ROADS TO
INGRESS AND EGRESS OF PETITIONER AND MEMBERS OF THE LATTER’S HOUSEHOLD IN UTTER
VIOLATION OF THE LAW ON EASEMENT, IN GENERAL, AND LEGAL EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF
WAY IN PARTICULAR.[5]
Simply, the issue is
whether there was a legal basis for the issuance of the amended writ of
injunction. Likewise, we need to resolve
whether the right of passage allowed in the uncontested original writ applies not
only to the petitioner and his household, but also to his visitors, contractors,
construction workers, authorized persons, heavy equipment machinery, and
construction materials as well as the installation of power lines.
Petitioner contends that inherent
in the right of way under Article 649[6] of the New
Civil Code is the right to cultivate and develop the property, which is an
attribute of ownership provided under Article 428.[7] According to petitioner, the passage of heavy
equipment and construction materials through the subdivision is granted by
Article 656.[8] Petitioner adds that he was not seeking the
right of way only for occasional visits to his property but also to develop,
use and enjoy it.
Private respondent claims that what
was granted in the original writ was not the easement of right of way but only the
maintenance of the status quo. It
maintains that from the very beginning, petitioner and his household
were allowed into the subdivision only because petitioner owned several
lots in the subdivision. Hence,
according to private respondent, the Court of Appeals properly dissolved the
amended writ as the status quo protected by the original writ did not
include the passage of construction workers in petitioner’s property outside
the subdivision. Private respondent stresses
that at the time the original writ was applied for there was no construction
work yet.
Private respondent argues that its recognition
of the original writ should not be construed as admitting that petitioner had a
right of way; and with no easement of right of way, petitioner cannot claim
other rights under the law on easement. It
further contends that acts prohibited and allowed under the amended writ
amounted to a premature adjudication on the merits of the main case on whether
or not petitioner has a right of way, which is still pending before the trial
court.
Prefatorily, we note that
what was granted by the trial court was the preliminary injunction, and that the
main case for right of way has not yet been settled. We have in previous cases[9] said that the
objective of a writ of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the case can be fully heard.
Status quo is the last actual, peaceable and uncontested situation which
precedes a controversy.[10] The Court of Appeals was correct in its
findings that the last actual, peaceful and uncontested situation that preceded
the controversy was solely the access of petitioner and his household to his property
outside the subdivision for visits and inspections. At the time the writ was applied for in 1995,
there was still no construction going on in the property. It was merely raw land. The use of the subdivision roads for ingress
and egress of construction workers, heavy equipment, delivery of construction
materials, and installation of power lines, are clearly not part of the status
quo in the original writ. Along this
line, the Court of Appeals properly set aside the amended writ and reinstated
the original writ.
However, under Article 656 of the New Civil Code, if the
right of way is indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement,
alteration or beautification of a building, a temporary easement is granted after
payment of indemnity for the damage caused to the servient estate. In our view, however, “indispensable” in this
instance is not to be construed literally.
Great inconvenience is sufficient.[11] In the present case, the trial court found that
irrespective of which route petitioner used in gaining access to his property,
he has to pass private respondent’s subdivision. Thus we agree that petitioner may be granted
a temporary easement. This temporary easement
in the original writ differs from the permanent easement of right of way now
being tried in the main case.
The law provides that temporary
easement is allowed only after the payment of the proper indemnity. As there are neither sufficient allegations
nor established facts in the record to help this Court determine the proper
amount of indemnity, it is best to remand the case to the trial court for such
determination.
Additionally, we find that the installation of electric
power lines is a permanent easement not covered by Article 656. Article 656 deals only with the temporary
easement of passage. Neither can installation
of electric power lines be subject to a preliminary injunction for it is not part
of the status quo. Besides, more
damage would be done to both parties if the power lines are installed only to
be removed later upon a contrary judgment of the court in the main case.
WHEREFORE, the
petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
We hereby order (a) private respondent
to allow the right of passage thru the subdivision by the petitioner’s visitors
and guests, contractors, construction workers, heavy equipment vehicles, and delivery
construction materials; and (b) petitioner to pay private respondent the indemnity
therefor to be determined by the trial court. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the
trial court for the determination of the proper amount of indemnity for the
temporary easement under Article 649.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice |
WE CONCUR:
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ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice |
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CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice |
DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice |
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PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
JR. Associate Justice |
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A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson |
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in
the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
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ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice |
[1] Rollo, pp. 42-69. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong, with Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr. concurring.
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6] Art. 649. The owner, or any person who by virtue of a real right may cultivate or use any immovable, which is surrounded by other immovables pertaining to other persons and without adequate outlet to a public highway, is entitled to demand a right of way through the neighboring estates, after payment of the proper indemnity.
x x x x
[7] Art. 428. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.
x x x x
[8] Art. 656. If it be indispensable for the construction, repair, improvement, alteration or beautification of a building, to carry materials through the estate of another, or to raise thereon scaffolding or other objects necessary for the work, the owner of such estate shall be obliged to permit the act, after receiving payment of the proper indemnity for the damage caused him.
[9] Cortez-Estrada v. Heirs of Domingo Samut/Antonia Samut, G.R. No. 154407, February 14, 2005, 451 SCRA 275, 288; Medina v. Greenfield Development Corporation, G.R. No. 140228, November 19, 2004, 443 SCRA 150, 159; First Global Realty and Development Corporation v. San Agustin, G.R. No. 144499, February 19, 2002, 377 SCRA 341, 349.
[10] Los Baños Rural Bank, Inc. v. Africa,
G.R. No. 143994, July 11, 2002, 384 SCRA 535, 547.
[11] E. Paras, Civil
Code of the